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Foreword 
T HE subject of perpetuities is peculiarly appropriate for monographic treatment. Replete with intri-cate knots, which only history and precise logic can 
untangle, it presents to the general practitioner a quag-
mire of uncertainty, and causes him to seek the aid of 
the specialist. Yet from the standpoint of a writer, this 
subject requires the examination of a sufficiently limited 
body of source material to make the preparation of a 
treatise definitely less than a lifetime undertaking. Thus 
legal writers early chose this theme. Lewis on Perpetui-
ties, the first English treatise, appeared in 1843, when the 
rule itself had hardly crystallized in all its aspects. Mars-
den's book on the same subject came out forty years later. 
The classic treatises on this side of the Atlantic, both 
on restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetui-
ties, are those of John Chipman Gray. His Restraints on 
Alienation, the first edition of which appeared in 1884, 
was primarily an argument against the decision of the 
Supreme Court of the United States in the case of 
Nichols v. Eaton1 which approved the spendthrift trust. 
But the high quality of its scholarship fixed its character 
in the legal profession as a treatise rather than a brief. 
Gray's treatise on the rule against perpetuities, the first 
edition of which appeared in 1886, is known to every 
lawyer worthy of the name. Written in part to eliminate 
the confusion between rules as to restraints on alienation 
and the rule against perpetuities, the book so thoroughly 
taught its lesson that it has ceased to be regarded as a 
demonstration of the remoteness-of-vesting theory, and 
has become almost the embodiment of the rule itself. 
vii 
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The fourth and last edition of Gray's treatise was 
edited by his son, Mr. Roland Gray, and appeared in 
1942. But monographic treatment of the American rule 
did not stop here. Thus, 588 pages of volume VI of the 
American Law of Property, published in 1952, are de-
voted to three excellent monographs: one by Professor 
W. Barton Leach and Mr. Owen Tudor on the common-
law rule against perpetuities, one by Professor Horace 
Whiteside on statutory rules against perpetuities, and 
one by Professor Merrill Schnebly on restraints on alien-
ation. 
The question may then be asked: Why another mono-
graph on Perpetuities and Other Restraints? The answer 
is not far to seek. Even a superficial examination of the 
treatises on the American law of these subjects is sufficient 
to demonstrate that no one treatise can deal exhaustively 
with the law of each state. Thus the treatises of Leach 
and Tudor and of' Schnebly make no attempt to deal 
separately with the law of Michigan. And Whiteside's 
treatise disposes of the Michigan statutory law of perpe-
tuities in about twenty-three pages. Yet Professor 
Fratcher finds it necessary to devote four chapters and 
135 pages of his monograph to the Michigan statutory 
rules. 
Indeed, in view of our constantly growing body of cases 
and statute law, it is believed that an increasingly fruitful 
type of legal research is that which concentrates on the 
law of a single jurisdiction. Not only does it provide a 
more precise statement of legal doctrines of one state than 
can be derived from more general treatises, but it also 
furnishes a unique basis for generalizations as to rules 
which are applicable in all jurisdictions. After all, gen-
eral statements about the American common law, when 
in one sense there are in fact some forty-eight or more 
FOREWORD IX 
American common-law systems, are not uniformly 
helpful. 
Professor Fratcher has brought to bear on the prepara-
tion of his monograph the qualities needed to make it 
something more than a treatise on one facet of Michigan 
law. That he has made a thorough and exhaustive ex-
amination of all pertinent cases and statutes is evident. 
But he is also the legal historian. Major aspects of his 
subject are introduced with a delineation of the back-
ground of English and American legal history. If the 
English law of restraints on alienation prior to Magna 
Carta is necessary to an understanding of modern Michi-
gan law, it is discussed. If the New York legislation of 
1828 on perpetuities furnishes a background for the 
Michigan statutes of 1846, then a brief treatment of the 
New York legislation is included. Moreover, before en-
tering upon a specialized discussion of a major area of 
Michigan common law, Professor Fratcher follows the 
general plan of summarizing the pertinent English com-
mon law. 
That the Michigan lawyer, vexed with a problem in 
the law of perpetuities and restraints, will find the last 
word on it in this treatise, goes without saying. But the 
book also has significance outside Michigan. Just as a 
careful scholarly study by a psychologist of the conduct 
of twenty-five white mice in a maze may be significant 
as to the reactions of all white mice and even as to human 
beings, so a study of perpetuities and other restraints 
based upon Michigan source material will have signifi-
cance wherever Anglo-American law is known and prac-
ticed. 
LEWIS M. SIMES 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
Preface 
al fetter thee with brazen bonds that none can loose." 
-Aeschylus) Prometheus Bound 
T HE central theme of this study comprises the judi-cial and legislative rules developed to restrict attempts by men of property to endow their fami-
lies in perpetuity, usually with land, in such manner 
that each successive living generation can neither part 
with the property nor prevent unborn generations from 
succeeding to it. Part One deals with attempts to accom-
plish this object by bestowing the whole title on each 
living generation but denying each such generation the 
power to dispose of the property or to prevent its· descent 
to the next generation. In this part the principal re-
strictive rules are judicial, the common-law rules against 
restraints on alienation. Part Two deals with attempts 
to accomplish the same object by splitting the title into 
present and future estates; bestowing only an estate for 
life on the currently living generation and conveying 
future estates directly to unborn generations, so that the 
currently living generation cannot cut them off. In this 
part the principal restrictive rules are likewise judicial, 
the common law Rule Against Perpetuities and the 
common-law Rule Against Accumulations. Part Two 
also deals with a partial statutory substitute for the com-
mon-law Rule Against Accumulations which was in 
force in Michigan from 1847 to 1952. Part Three deals 
with a group of Michigan statutes, applicable to disposi-
tions of land made between 184 7 and 1949, which par-
tially superseded the common-law Rule Against Per-
xi 
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petuities and supplemented, but did not supersede, the 
common-law rules against restraints on alienation. 
In earlier centuries the motivation for attempts to 
create perpetual family endowments of land arose pri-
marily from the concept, made vivid by the philosophic 
realism of mediaeval schoolmen, of the agnatic family as 
a perpetual series of generations, an entity vastly more 
important than any single generation and deserving of 
the loyalty and devotion of each succeeding generation. 
When such ideas were generally accepted, the perpetual 
endowment of one's family with land, the chief source 
of prestige and social position, must have seemed as 
morally worthy and compellingly attractive as patriotic 
loyalty and the perpetual endowment of public, relig-
ious, and charitable organizations now seem to us. This 
concept has not been prominent in America, but other 
motives for the creation of indestructible family endow-
ments exist. The desire to protect the immediate suc-
ceeding generation and its progeny against want and 
suffering caused by mismanagement or business reverses 
is one. Perpetuities created by means of future interests 
are commonly designed to avoid or minimize inheritance 
taxes by having unborn generations take by purchase 
instead of by descent. 
Although the study centers upon the rules developed 
to restrict attempts to create perpetual family endow-
ments of land, its scope is by no means limited to such 
attempts. The rules developed for this purpose are not 
limited in their operation to family settlements of land. 
Some of them apply to dispositions of personalty and to 
transactions which are primarily commercial in nature. 
Indeed, the application of rules designed to govern 
family settlements to very different sorts of transactions 
occasions much of the difficulty found in the cases, and 
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the fact that some of these rules invalidate seemingly 
inoffensive commercial transactions may make this study 
as valuable to practitioners who do not handle family 
settlement problems as to those who do. 
The law of Michigan in the fields covered by this study 
was enormously complicated by the adoption in 1846 of 
some, but not all, of a New York statutory code which 
was designed to replace the entire common law of per-
petuities, accumulations, trusts, and powers. The fact 
that some of this code was not adopted left questionable 
gaps in the law. The situation has been further com-
plicated by the gradual piecemeal repeal, beginning in 
1907, of sections of the partial code adopted in 1846. 
Because portions of that code are still in force, the law 
of Michigan is unique, different from both that of New 
York and that of states which follow the common law. 
Hence the general treatises which cover these fields are 
not fully satisfactory guides to the law of Michigan. If 
this book helps Michigan judges and lawyers to thread 
the complex maze of statutes and decisions in the fields 
covered, it will have served its purpose. 
In an effort to prevent, so far as human fallibility per-
mits, overlooking pertinent local precedents, I have, in 
addition to consulting the usual digests and secondary 
authorities, read the head notes of all published decisions 
of the Supreme Court and Court of Chancery of the 
Territory and State of Michigan to July 6, 1954, and read 
the opinions in all those cases which, from the head 
notes, appeared to have any possible bearing on the 
problems under study. 
This study was begun (1940-41) when I was practicing 
with the Detroit firm of Lewis and Watkins. Messrs. 
Lewis and Watkins, especially Mr. James K. Watkins, 
were helpful in making available the time necessary for 
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the initial stages of the work. It was completed (1950-
54) while I was a member of the University of Missouri 
Faculty of Law. Dean Glenn A. McCleary of that Fac-
ulty has given much friendly encouragement to the 
progress of the undertaking. Mr. Percy A. Hogan, Law 
Librarian of the University of Missouri, procured needed 
books. The initial and part of the final stages of the 
work were financed by the University of Michigan Law 
School. The original outline was prepared with the 
guidance of Professors Lewis M. Simes and Ralph W. 
Aigler of the University of Michigan Law Faculty and 
Professor (later Dean) Oliver S. Rundell of the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Law School. The manuscript of 
Part One, which was accepted by the University of Mich-
igan as a thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of the Science of Law, was read 
by Professors Simes and Aigler and by their colleague, 
Professor Allan F. Smith. Portions of Part One were 
published originally in the University of Detroit Law 
.Journal and the Michigan Law Review and are re-
printed by permission. My wife typed the original out-
line and a large part of the manuscript and supplied 
much of the inspiration for the project. 
To Professor Lewis M. Simes, Floyd Russell Mechem 
University Professor of Law and Director of Legal Re-
search in the University of Michigan, I am deeply in-
debted for helpful guidance and advice throughout the 
progress of the study. He read every chapter as it was 
completed, often while still in longhand, and made sug-
gestions of great value at all stages of the work. 
New York University 
October 4, 1954 
WILLIAM F. FRATCHER 
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PART ONE 
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
A. ALIENABILITY IN THE ABSENCE OF RESTRAINTS 
D URING the century and a half which followed the Norman Conquest, the owner of land who 
attempted to transfer it might meet with opposi-
tion from three interested parties: his feudal overlord, 
his heir apparent, and his tenant. His feudal overlord 
might object to a transfer by way of substitution, that is, 
one under the tenris of which the transferor did not 
retain a reversion, because the proposed transferee was 
not a suitable person to perform the feudal services due 
for the land. As these services were frequently of a per-
sonal or military nature, such an objection was not nec-
essarily captious. His overlord might object with equal 
reason to a transfer by way of subinfeudation, that is, 
one under the terms of which the transferor did retain 
a reversion. Although in this case the transferor would 
remain personally responsible for the feudal services due 
to the overlord, the value of some of the feudal incidents 
of lordship might be seriously reduced. For example, 
if the owner died such, the overlord, by virtue of the 
feudal incident of wardship, would be entitled to pos-
session of the land during the minority of the heir; 
whereas if the owner had transferred the land by way 
of subinfeudation, reserving only nominal services, such 
as a rose a year at midsummer, the overlord would be 
entitled only to those nominal services from the trans-
1 
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feree during the minority of the transferor's heir. The 
reason why an heir apparent might object to the alien-
ation of his anticipated inheritance requires no elucida-
tion. The tenant might have cogent reasons for oppos-
ing a transfer which would require him to render 
homage, fealty, and personal or military service to a 
stranger. 
The extent to which the objections of the overlord, 
the heir, and the tenant constituted legal impediments 
to inter vivos alienation prior to the year 1200 is not 
now known and probably was far from clear at the 
time.1 Early in the thirteenth century it was settled by 
judicial decision that neither the heir apparent nor the 
tenant could effectively prevent a transfer by the owner. 
If an owner in fee simple absolute transferred the land 
in his lifetime without the consent of his heir apparent, 
the heir could not get it back after his ancestor's death.2 
Although the acquiescence (attornment) of the tenant 
was necessary to the complete effectiveness of a transfer 
of land, that acquiescence could be compelled. 3 The 
objection of the overlord was not so quickly overruled. 
The 1217 edition of Magna Carta expressly recognized 
the right of an overlord to object to alienation in some 
1 1 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME 
OF EDWARD l, 310-330 (1895); 2 id. 93, 127-128, 250-253, 306-311; 3 
Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 73-87 (1923). This 
doubtful state of the law is not surprising in view of the then relatively 
recent imposition of a system of feudal tenures upon the earlier Anglo-
Saxon land law, which had included a variety of tenures and of local 
customs not fully understood by the Normans. Scrutton, LAND IN 
FETTERS 1-36 (1886). 
2 FitzRoger v. Arundel, Bract. N.B. pl. 1054 (1225). 
3 Pesehale v. Fitz Aucher, Bract. N.B. pl. 533 (1231 ); Cambridge v. 
Risle, R.S.Y.B. 34-35 Edw. I, 314 (1306). The requirement of attorn-
ment was abolished by Stat. 4 Ann. c. 16, §9 (1705). It never existed 
in Michigan. Perrin v. Lepper, 34 Mich. 292 (1876). 
INTRODUCTION 3 
cases.4 Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that by 
1284 the courts recognized the power of an owner of 
land to transfer it without the consent of his overlord.5 
However that may be, the question was settled by the 
enactment in 1290 of the Statute of Westminster III, 
commonly known as Quia Emptores Terrarum.6 This 
statute forbade further transfers by way of subinfeuda-
tion and provided, 
"That from henceforth it shall be lawful to every 
freeman to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tene-
ments, or part of them, . . . This statute extendeth but 
only to lands holden in fee simple."7 
Although it may have been possible to transmit land 
4 "No freeman from henceforth shall give or sell any more of his 
land, but so that of the residue of his lands the lord of the fee may 
have the service due to him, which belongeth to the fee." C. 39, Bar-
rington, MAGNA CHARTA AND OTHER GREAT CHARTERS OF ENGLAND, 2d 
ed., 279 (1900). This provision was repeated in 9 Hen. III, stat. 1, c. 
32 (1225), 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 65. The "Grand Chartre des Franchises" 
of Henry III was confirmed by 25 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1297), 28 Edw. 
I, stat. 3, c. 1 (1300), and 42 Edw. III, c. 1 (1368) but without specific 
mention of chapter 32. It would seem that these confirmations of 
Magna Carta did not revive chapters which had been repealed or mod-
ified by later statutes. Jenk. 2, 145 Eng. Rep. 2 (1771). 
5 Plucknett, LEGISLATION oF EDWARD I, 104 (1949). The Statute of 
Wales, 12 Edw. I, c. 10 (1284), 1 Stat. of the Realm 55, 66 (1810) pro-
hibited specific enforcement of covenants against alienation. This stat-
ute was a codification of the existing English common law made for 
the purpose of extending it to \Vales and, although not applicable to 
England, is evidence of the current state of the common law. 
s 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). 
7 Id., caps. 1, 3; 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 500, 504. Sir Edward Coke states 
that the word "sell" (vendere) includes "give." Id., 501. The statute 
was not construed to permit alienation by tenants in chief of the 
Crown without royal license [3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 
3d ed., 81, 83-84 (1923)] but this exception was narrowed by statutes 
providing that lands once held under a subordinate overlord should 
not be treated as being held in chief of the Crown by reason of the 
king's acquiring the overlord's estate by escheat, attainder, dissolution, 
or surrender. 9 Hen. III, stat. 1, c. 31 (1225); 1 Edw. III, stat. 2, c. 13 
(1327); 1 Edw. VI, c. 4 (1547). Moreover, a transfer by a tenant in 
chief without royal license was not void but merely entitled the king 
to a reasonable fine. 17 Edw. II, stat. 1, c. 7 (1324); 1 Edw. III, stat. 
2, c. 12 (1327). Such fines for alienation of land held of the Crown in 
chief were abolished by stat. 12 Car. II, c. 24, §1 (1660). 
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by will in the Anglo-Saxon and early Norman periods, 
it became settled in the twelfth century that a devise of 
a legal freehold estate in land was ineffective as against 
the heir of the testator.8 Early in the thirteenth century 
the device of conveying legal title to others to hold to 
the use of the transferor or those whom he might name 
was developed.9 The rights of the beneficiary of a con-
veyance to uses, who was known as a cestui que use, 
were not initially enforcible in any tribunal, and the 
common-law courts never did enforce them, but from 
the end of the fourteenth century they were enforcible 
in equity.10 Such rights were conceived of as being more 
in the nature of a chose in action than a property inter-
est, and choses in action were not assignable.u Neverthe-
less, the interest of the cestui que use was always alien-
able inter vivos, and a statute of 1483 empowered him 
to convey the legal title without the consent of the legal 
owner.12 The interest of the cestui que use was trans-
missible by will, and one of the chief purposes of the 
use device was to avoid the rule that legal freehold 
estates in land could not be devised.13 This possibility 
8 2 Pollock and Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895). There were exceptions to this 
rule as to land in towns. I d., 330. 
9 Quency v. Prior of Barnwell, Bract. N.B. pl. 999 (1224). 
10 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399); 
Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 HARV. L. REv. 261 at 262, 274 
(1908); Brown, "Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use," 10 NoTRE DAME 
LAWYER 353 at 361-366 (1935). 
nAmes, "The Inalienability of Choses in Action," LECTURES ON 
LEGAL HISTORY 210-218 (1913). 
12 Stat. I Ric. III, c. 1 (1483); Bacon, READING UPoN THE STATUTE 
of UsES 16 (1642); Cruise, EssAY ON UsEs §36 (1795); Gilbert, LAW 
oF UsEs AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 26 (1741); Holmes, CoMMON LAw 408 
(1881); Sanders, EssAY ON UsEs AND TRUSTS, 4th ed., 65 (1823). 
13 Rothanhale v. Wychingham, 2 Cal. Proc. Ch. iii (1413-1422); 
Williamson v. Cook, Sel. Cas. in Chan. (S.S) pl. 118 (1417-1424), note 
539, infra; Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1487); 7 Hen. VII, c. 3 (1490); 3 
Hen. VIII, c. 4 (1511); Sullivan, HisTORICAL TREATISE oN THE FEUDAL 
LAW 166-167 (1772); Jenks, SHoRT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, new ed., 
104 (1934); Maitland, EQUITY, 2d ed., 25-26 (1936). 
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was cut off in 1535 by the Statute of Uses, which con-
verted the interest of the beneficiary into a legal estate.14 
Five years later the power to transmit legal freehold 
estates by will was conferred by statute.15 
The Statute of Uses had no application to property 
interests other than freehold estates in land, and within 
a century after its enactment the High Court of Chancery 
created two important exceptions to its applicability to 
freehold interests in land. The uses excepted from the 
operation of the statute were the use created by a con-
veyance which imposed active duties upon the conveyeet6 
and the use on a use.17 In these cases and in the case of 
a conveyance to uses of something other than a freehold 
interest in land, the transaction was enforced in equity 
as a trust. The early decisions treated the interest of 
the beneficiary of a trust as a chose in action which could 
be transmitted by will but was not transferable inter 
14 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535). This statute is entitled, "An Act 
concerning Uses and Wills," and its preamble recites as its primary 
purpose the abolition of wills of land. It may be that this effect of the 
Statute of Uses could be avoided by making a feoffment to such uses 
as the feoffor might by will appoint. See Sir Edward Clere's Case, 
6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599). 
15 Statute of Wills, 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540). The explanatory stat-
ute of 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542) limited the operation of the 
Statute of Wills to estates in fee simple, thus excluding estates in fee 
tail and estates pur autre vie. The latter were made devisable by Stat. 
29 Car. II, c. 3, §12 (1676). The Statute of Wills restricted the de-
visability of land held by knight-service. This form of tenure was 
abolished and land formerly so held made freely devisable by Stat. 12 
Car. II, c .. 24, §1 (1660). See 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 111b (Hargrave's note 
No. 138 to 13th ed., 1787). The restriction on devisability of land held 
by knight-service could be avoided by making a feoffment to such uses 
as the feoffor might by will appoint. Sir Edward Clere's Case, note 
14 supra. 
1s Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1544); 
Nevil v. Saunders, 1 Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686). 
11 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (common-law 
decision that use on a use is not executed); Sambach v. Dalston, Tot· 
hill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (1634) (Chancery decision that use on a 
use is enforceable in equity); Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 
HARv. L. REv. 261 at 270-274 (1908). 
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vivos.18 Before long, however, the property analogy pre-
vailed and a cestui que trust could transfer his interest 
inter vivos as freely as he could an equivalent legal 
estate.19 
The transferability of estates for life seems to have 
been conceded without serious opposition in the medi-
aeval period.20 Such a transfer did not affect the over-
lord's feudal incident of wardship or injure the trans-
feror's heir. Estates for years were treated as chattel 
interests and regarded as freely alienable, both by assign-
ment inter vivos21 and by wil1.22 The law of England has 
always recognized the alienability of chattels personal, 
both inter vivos23 and by wil1.24 
B. SCOPE OF PART ONE 
It thus appears that by the time English law was car-
ried to this country in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries it recognized that, in the absence of special 
restrictions on alienability imposed by the creator of the 
interest or by its owner, property interests, real and per-
sonal, were transferable by their owner, either inter vivos 
or by will. As to estates in fee simple, the incident of 
alienability was expressly conferred by the statute Quia 
ts Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827, Jenk. 245, 145 Eng. 
Rep. 172 (1580); Earl of Worcester v. Finch, 4 Coke, INSTITUTES 85, 2 
Anderson 162, 123 Eng. Rep. 600 (1600); Holmes, CoMMON LAw 409 
(1881 ). 
19 Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. R. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498 (1628). 
w Littleton, TENURES §301 (1481); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAW, 3d ed., 123 (1923). 
21 FitzHenry v. Utdeners, Bract. N.B. 804 (1233); Littleton, TENURES 
§319 (1481). 
22 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME 
OF EDWARD I, 115-117 (1895); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 
3d ed., 215 (1923). 
2a Cochrane v. Moore, 25 Q.B.D. 57 (Ct. App. 1890). 
24 Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 1 & 2 Edw. II, 39, 42 (1308); 2 Pollock & 
Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I. 
353 (1895); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 552-553 
(1923). 
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Emptores Terrarum. 25 From an early period, English 
law had permitted access by judgment creditors to prop-
erty which the debtor had power to transfer voluntarily.26 
There then were and still are a number of restrictions 
imposed by law upon the free alienability of property. 
Nevertheless, by the law of England, property interests 
are, in general, alienable. In Part One the question for 
inquiry is, to what extent will the law recognize and 
enforce special restrictions on alienability, imposed by 
the creator of the interest or its owner, on property 
interests which, in the absence of such special restric-
tions, would be alienable? Such a restriction may assume 
the form of a prohibition on alienation, the effect of 
which would be, if enforced, to leave the owner still 
owner despite an attempt on his part to transfer his inter-
est. It may assume the form of a provision that the 
interest shall revert to its creator or pass to a third party 
if the owner attempts to transfer it. Or it may provide 
for some other penalty to be suffered by the owner or 
his transferee in the event of a transfer. 
Part One does not cover the validity of indirect re-
straints on alienation, that is, provisions which do not 
directly nullify or penalize a transfer of property but 
which have the indirect effect of making alienation im-
possible, difficult, or improbable. The creation of prop-
erty interests in unborn or unascertained persons has 
the effect of making them inalienable, because there is 
no owner to alienate.27 The creation of a type of interest 
as to which the law imposes restrictions on alienation 
25 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290); note 7 supra. 
2a 13 Edw. I, stat. l, c. 18 (1285); Amby v. Gower, 1 Ch. Rep. 168, 
21 Eng. Rep. 540 (1655); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 19la (Butler's note No. 
77, VI 9, to 13th ed. 1787). 
21 As to the possibility of creating such interests, see Fratcher, "Trus-
tor as Sole Trustee and Only Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 MICH. L. 
REV. 907-934 (1949). 
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has the effect of restraining its alienation although the 
creator of the interest may not wish this result. For 
example, a conveyance of land to a husband and wife 
creates a tenancy by the entirety which neither tenant, 
acting alone, can alienate, wholly or in part.28 Even 
though a property interest is legally transferable, its sale 
may be commercially impracticable if it does not entitle 
the owner to exclusive enjoyment of the land or goods 
concerned, if enjoyment is burdened with onerous servi-
tudes, or if enjoyment is uncertain as to coming into 
existence or duration. Property subject to cotenancy, 
easements, profits, or use restrictions may be very hard 
to sell because of such burdens. A present interest which 
is subject to being defeated by the happening of an event 
which is not certain to occur or uncertain as to time of 
occurrence is likely to be unsalable. A future interest 
which may never become possessory unless an uncertain 
event occurs is almost certain to be unmarketable. There 
is little commercial demand for future interests, even 
those which are certain to become possessory, particu-
larly if the date when enjoyment is to commence is un-
certain. The law recognizes the social undesirability of 
too great extension of these indirect restraints upon 
alienation and upon free commerce in property and sets 
limits to them in various ways, some of which are treated 
in Parts Two and Three of this book. The common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities, which is the subject of Part 
Two, restricts the creation of contingent future interests. 
The former statute prohibiting suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation for unduly long periods, which 
is treated in Part Three, restricted the creation of inter-
ests in unborn and unascertained persons and of interests 
28 Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N.W. 664 (1893). 
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which the law makes inalienable.29 Part One does not 
extend to such indirect restraints upon alienation except 
where an interest is made conditional upon or subject 
to defeasance by alienation, or the creator or owner of 
an interest which is by its nature affected by an indirect 
restraint attempts to impose an additional restriction 
designed to nullify or penalize such alienation as would 
otherwise be legally possible. 
C. MICHIGAN's RECEPTION OF ENGLISH LAW 
The direction and scope of the present inquiry have 
been defined, but discussion of the Michigan decisions 
relative to direct restraints on alienation must be defer-· 
red to a preliminary inquiry into the extent to which 
the law of England has been adopted as the rule of 
decision in Michigan. Until its cession to Great Britain 
by the Treaty of Paris of 1763, the area which now 
composes the State of Michigan was subject to the laws 
of France and of the French colonial government. By 
the law of England, the settlement of uninhabited terri-
tory by English colonists extends to that territory the 
common law and statutes of England then in force, but 
English law does not extend to conquered territory un-
less and until so extended by the king.80 As Michigan 
2 9 The common-law rules restricting restraints on alienation, which 
are the subject of Part One, are sometimes confused with the statutes 
restricting suspension of the absolute power of alienation, which are 
the principal subject of Part Three. These statutes supplemented but 
did not supersede the common-law rules against restramts on aliena-
tion. For the distinction between a restraint on alienation and suspen-
sion of the absolute power of alienation, see Chapter 18, Section B, 
infra. 
8° Calvin's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 377, 398, and 
Fraser's note k (1608); Blankard v. Galdy, 4 Mod. 215, 87 Eng. Rep. 
356, 2 Salk. 411, 91 Eng. Rep. 356 (1693); Sioussat, "The Theory of the 
Extension of English Statutes to the Plantations," 1 SELECT EssAYS IN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HisTORY 416-430 (1907). The present writer has 
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became British by conquest rather than by settlement, 
the problem of whether English law is in force here is, 
therefore, different from that in the seaboard states. 
The British government was very slow in extending 
its administration to the area, no definite provision being 
made until it was incorporated into the Province of Que-
bec by the Quebec Act of 1774, which provided that the 
law of Canada, that is, the French law, should be the rule 
of decision in matters of property and civil rights. 31 In 
1791 the old Province of Quebec was divided into Upper 
Canada and Lower Canada, the former embracing the 
territory which now composes Michigan and Ontario.32 
In the following year the legislature of Upper Canada 
repealed the Quebec Act insofar as it made the law of 
Canada the rule of decision and provided: 
"That from and after the passing of this Act, in all 
matters of controversy relative to property and civil 
rights, resort shall be had to the Laws of England, as the 
rule for the decision of the same."33 
On July 14, 1795, the Governor and Judges of the 
Territory of the United States Northwest of the River 
Ohio adopted a law reading as follows: 
"The common law of England, all statutes or Acts of 
the British parliament in aid of the common law, prior 
to the fourth year of the reign of King James the first 
discussed the vexed question of the application to colonial possessions of 
British statutes enacted after the settlement or conquest of the colony 
in an unpublished magisterial thesis entitled, A CoMMENTARY FOR 
CANADA ON THE STATUTE OF WESTMINSTER, 1931, PP· 118-123 (1938), 
copies of which are deposited in the library of Wayne University. 
at Stat. 14 Geo. III, c. 83, §§I, 18. Great Britain was in actual con-
trol of Michigan from November 29, 1760 to July 11, 1796, despite the 
provisions of the treaties of 1783 and 1794. 1 Burton, CITY OF DETROIT 
114, 154 (1922); Riddell, MicHIGAN UNDER BRITISH RuLE: LAw AND 
LAw CouRTS 1760-1796, 21-26 (1926); Russell, THE BRITISH REGIME IN 
MICHIGAN AND THE OLD NoRTHWEST 1760-1796, 16, 270n (1939). 
32 Canada Act, 31 Geo. III, c. 31 (1791). 
33 Stat. 32 Geo. III (Upper Canada), c. 1, §3 (1792). 
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(and which are of a general nature, not local to that 
kingdom) and also the several laws in force in this Terri-
tory, shall be the rule of decision, and shall be considered 
as of full force, until repealed by legislative authority, 
or disapproved of by Congress."34 
It has been suggested that this law of the Northwest 
Territory is the basis upon which the law of England, 
as altered by local statutes, is applied in Michigan,35 but 
this is probably inaccurate, for Michigan was not an-
nexed to the Northwest Territory until July 15, 1796, 
and a mere cession of territory from one sovereign to 
another does not of itself alter the law of the land.311 The 
statute of Upper Canada would seem to be in force in 
Michigan, however, except insofar as repealed or modi-
fied by local statutes. 31 
On September 16, 1810, the Governor and Judges of 
Michigan Territory adopted an act providing that no 
act of the parliament of England, no act of the parlia-
ment of Great Britain, no law of France or the French 
provinces of Canada or Louisiana, no law of Canada 
generally or of the province of Upper Canada under 
the British Crown, and no law of the Northwest Terri-
tory or Indiana Territory should have any force in 
34 Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West of the Ohio, 
175, 176 (I796). As to the validity of this law see 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. 
Terr. Mich., 1805-1814, xiv, xv. The similar law of Indiana Territory 
(Act Sept. 17, I807, Laws of Indiana Territory, p. 323) was never 
effective in Michigan because Michigan was part of Indiana Territory 
only from July 4, H~OO, to June 30, 1805. 
as May v. Rumney, 1 Mich. I, 4 (1847). See: Abbott v. Godfroy's 
Heirs, I Mich. I78 (1849). 
36 Laws of the Territory of Michigan, x (1871). 
31 In Denison v. Tucker, I Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. I805-I8I4, 
385 (I807), Chief Judge Woodward of the Territorial Supreme Court 
held that a statute of Upper Canada authorizing slavery ceased to op-
erate in July, 1796, but on the ground it was superseded by the anti-
slavery provisions of the Ordinance of 1787. 
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Michigan.38 The legislative authority of the Governor 
and Judges was limited to the adoption of "laws of the 
original states." 39 In token of conformity to this limita-
tion, the act of September 16, 1810, recites that the part 
of it relative to British statutes and laws of the North-
west and Indiana territories is taken from the law of 
Virginia, and that relative to French and Canadian law 
from the law of Vermont. The writer has been unable 
to find any Virginia statute repealing the laws of the 
Northwest Territory or Indiana Territory, or any Ver-
mont statute repealing the laws of Upper Canada. In 
consequence, the validity of the act of September 16, 
1810, would seem to be dubious. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court of Michigan has held that it was effec-
tive to repeal English statutes of Henry VIII, Eliza-
beth I, and Charles 11.40 
38 1 Laws Terr. Mich. 210, 900 (1871). This act was expressly ex-
cepted from the act of the Legislative Council of AJ.>ri1 13, 1827 which 
repealed most of the early territorial legislation. 3 td., 602, 603. Since 
Michigan has become a state there have been only two attempts to 
revise and reenact completely all the statutory law, Rev. Stat. 1838 and 
1846. Neither revision appears to repeal the 1810 act. 
39 Ordinance of 1787, §5, 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 53; act Jan. 11, 
1805, 2 Stat. 309, 1 Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) 58. 
40 Grant v. Earl of Selkirk, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1814-1824, 
431 (1818) (Lord's Day Act, 29 Car. II, c. 7, 1676. The court held, how-
ever, that the statute was merely declaratory of the common law, which 
is in force in Michigan); Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. 19 
(Mich. 1843) (Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, 1540); Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 
358 (1861) (Statute of Uses, 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10, 1535); Ready v. 
Kearsley, 14 Mich. 215 (1866) (id.); Methodist Episcopal Church of 
Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879) (Statute of Charit-
able Uses, 43 Eliz., c. 4, 1601.) In this case the court did not recognize 
that the Statute of Charitable Uses was declaratory of the common law 
despite the convincing evidence to that effect presented by Horace 
Binney in Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 2 How. (43 U.S.) 127 (1844). 
In his dissenting opinion in Laraviere v. Campau, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. 
Terr. Mich. 1825-1836, 305 at 312, Judge Sibley suggested that all Eng-
lish statutes passed before the colonization of America were part of 
the common law in force in Michigan. There are dicta by Justice 
Christiancy in Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 at 365 (1861) and Chief 
Justice Campbell in In the Matter of Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105 at 108, 
27 N.W. 882 (1886), suggesting that the English statutes were never 
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In a case decided in 1845, counsel contended that 
the common law was repealed by the Schedule to the 
Constitution of 1835 or by the Revised Statutes of 1838. 
This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court, 
which held that the common law is in force in Mich-
igan.41 Assuming the soundness of this decision and of 
those holding that the act of September 16, 1810, re-
pealed the Tudor and Stuart statutes, are the statutes of 
the Plantagenet kings in force in Michigan? In his 
astonishing opinion in Grant v. Earl of Selkirk/2 Judge 
Woodward stated that the common law "became com-
plete, and insusceptible of any additions" upon the 
coronation of Richard the Lion-Hearted, September 3, 
1189.43 Such a view would restore trial by ordeal and 
wager of battle; it would deny that even Magna Carta 
and the English case law of the thirteenth through six-
teenth centuries are part of the common law and would 
effective in Michigan, but they are clearly erroneous. In his dissenting 
opinion in Dalby v. State Highway Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 
N.W. 694 (1938), at pp. 625-627, Justice Potter expressed the view that 
the Act of 1810 was void and that the English statutes have been since 
1796 and still are a part of the law of Michigan. 41 Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845). Accord: Lorman v. 
Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich. 568, 22 
N.W. 41 (1885). A better argument would have been that, as it was 
the Upper Canada Act of 1792 (note 33 supra) which extended the 
common law to this area, the repeal of that act in 1810 repealed the 
common law. The schedules to the Constitutions of 1850 and 1908 
provide that the common law shall remain in force until altered or 
repealed. l Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) pp. 105 and 151. In Stanton v. 
Loranger, 1 Trans. Sup. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1825-1836, 282 (1825) it was 
held that· a common-law rule does not apJ?lY here unless the facts and 
principles upon which it was founded exiSt here. 
42 1 Trans. SUp. Ct. Terr. Mich. 1814-1824, 431 (1818). 
43 !d. at 436. In fairness to Judge Woodward, it should be noted 
that he did use English cases decided after 1189 as precedents, probably 
upon the theory that, although the common law remains complete, 
static, and unchangeable, judges find or declare it from time to time 
as occasion requires. No doubt the modern concept, necessitated by 
the research of legal historians, of the common law as a constantly 
growing and developing system, moulded by the judges to fit new 
conditions, would have been anathema to Judge Woodward. 
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confine that term to a primitive system which is virtu-
ally unknown and certainly unsuited to a modern com-
munity. Sir Matthew Hale thought that the statutes 
enacted prior to 1327 or 1336 should be treated as part 
of the common law/4 and even a most conservative view 
would include later non-statutory judicial developments, 
at least through the period of the Year Books. Although 
there is reason to believe that parts of the two Plantage-
net statutes which are most significant in the law of 
restraints on alienation. De Donis Conditionalibus45 and 
Quia Emptores Terrarum/6 declared pre-existing com-
mon law,47 the view that thirteenth and fourteenth cen-
tury statutes were mere custumals, solely declaratory of 
the common law and effecting no change in it what-
ever, has been effectively refuted. 48 
The English polity of the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries knew no clear differentiation among executive, 
legislative, and judicial functions. The king in his coun-
cil, of which the royal judges were important members, 
was chief executive, supreme legislator, and chief judge. 
His formal enactments, orders in council, written and 
oral instructions to judges about to go on circuit, and 
decisions of litigated cases were alike sources of law. The 
judges had administrative as well as judicial functions 
and their pronouncements were sometimes legislative, 
sometimes administrative, sometimes judicial, and some-
44 Hale, HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw oF ENGLAND, 3d ed., 7-9 
(1739). Sir Edward Coke thought that the statutes enacted prior to 
1351 were part of the common law. 8 REPORTS, Preface, xxiii. (1611). 
Cf. dissenting opinion of Sibley, J. in Laraviere v. Campau, note 40 
supra. 
45 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285). 
46 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). 
47 Plucknett, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, 104 (1949); Plucknett, 
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FoUR· 
TEENTH CENTURY 10, 130-131 (1922). 
48 !d., 26-31; Venour v. Blund, S.S.Y.B. 3 & 4 Edw. II, 159, 162 (1310). 
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times all three. In later centuries, when Parliament, the 
Council, and the courts had become sharply distinct, 
compilers chose to print some of the early royal charters, 
proclamations, and orders with the acts of Parliament. 
Many, perhaps most, of the rules which were not so 
printed had origins which were equally as legislative 
as those which were printed.49 The law of the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries cannot be divided into statute 
law and common law as can that of later eras. Any 
attempt to adopt the common law of those centuries and 
reject the statutes produces disconnected fragments of 
what was a unified legal system, selected according to 
arbitrary modern standards which would be unintelli-
gible to contemporary lawyers. We must adopt Planta-
genet law as a whole or reject it entirely. 
To Americans generally, the English common law 
is the general system of jurisprudence, including statutes 
and their judicial interpretation, expounded in the In-
stitutes of Sir Edward Coke. The usual view, exempli-
fied by the law of the Northwest Territory of 1795,S0 
that the law of England, statutory and otherwise, as it 
was at the time of the settlement of Virginia in 1607, 
i.s in force in this country 51 is consistent with this con-
cept. It provides a complete and integrated system of 
law upon which American courts and legislatures may 
engraft such changes and additions as our social condi-
tions and development require. The unfortunate ter-
ritorial law of September 16, 1810, and the decisions 
49 Plucknett, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF 
OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY 1-2, 7-11, 20-25 (1922); 1 Pollock 8c Mait-
land, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 159-
160 (1895). 
5o Note 34 supra. 
61 1 Kent, CoMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw, 11th ed., 515-516, notes 
(a), (b) (1867); 1 Blackstone, COMMENTARIES, (Cooley's 2d ed.) 67, 
Cooley's note (3) (1872). 
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that the statutes of the Tudors and Stuarts were repealed 
by it 52 prevent . Michigan from being fully in accord 
with the general American view. They do not prevent 
a decision that the Plantagenet statutes are part of that 
common law which is declared to be in force by the 
Schedule to the Constitution of Michigan. 53 
52 Note 40 supra. 
53 Note 41 supra. In his great opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 
29 Mich. 78 at 95 (1874), Justice Christiancy suggested that, whether 
or not the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum is in force as such here, its 
principles have always been basic in the law of the western states. 
CHAPTER 2 
Entails 
A. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND 
I NCIDENT to his daughter's marriage, the mediaeval man of property commonly gave land to his new son-in-law to facilitate support of the daughter and the 
children of the marriage. The donor in such cases, un-
derstandably, desired to restrict the gift so that the land 
would be certain to go to the children of the marriage 
rather than to the son-in-law's children by some other 
wife, that it would not be lost by the improvidence of 
the son-in-law, and that it would return to the donor 
if there were no children of the marriage or if the issue 
of the marriage failed. The device used for this pur-
pose from very early times, probably before the Norman 
Conquest, was the maritagium, a gift under the terms 
of which the land could descend only to issue of the 
marriage; the immediate donee, the children of the 
marriage, and the grandchildren of the marriage were 
forbidden to alienate in fee; and the land returned to 
the donor if there was no issue of the marriage or if 
the issue of the marriage failed before a great~grandchild 
inherited. If a great-grandchild of the marriage did 
succeed to the title, he and his heirs owned the land in 
fee simple absolute.54 
54 Plucknett, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, 125-127 (1949). Strictly 
speaking, the entailment lasted until there had been three descents. If 
a son died before his father, the descent to the grandson would be only 
one. In such cases the restraint on alienation might extend beyond 
grandchildren. There were other forms of maritagium. The gift might 
be to the daughter or to the daughter and son-in-law jointly. When 
the terms exempted the estate conveyed from feudal services during 
17 
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There were other situations, notably gifts to younger 
sons, in which restrictions upon inheritance and aliena-
tion and provisions for reversion to the donor seemed 
desirable, particularly after the courts decided, early in 
the thirteenth century, that an owner in fee simple 
could transfer his estate without the consent of his heir 
apparent. 55 These restrictions were commonly imposed 
by making the gift to the donee and the heirs of his 
body, to him and the heirs male of his body, or to him 
and the heirs of his body by a particular wife. Initially 
such gifts seem to have been construed and enforced 
similarly to the maritagium, but about the middle of 
the thirteenth century the courts, probably due to the 
influence of Roman law, held that all such gifts, in-
cluding the maritagium, were in fee simple conditional. 
That is, they construed a gift to "B and the heirs of his 
body" to mean "to B in fee simple on condition that 
he have heirs of his body." Under this tortured con-
struction, the donee of a conditional fee could transfer 
a fee simple absolute, cutting off both the reversion of 
the donor and the expectancy of his heirs, as soon as 
issue of the specified class was born.56 This judicial legis-
lation enabled a donee to thwart the reasonable desire 
of a parent who made a gift incident to the marriage 
of a son or daughter that the land should revert to him 
if there were no children of the marriage and that it 
should pass to the children of the marriage if any there 
were. In modern law this desire can be effectuated by 
the period of inalienability, the transaction was known as a gift in frank 
marriage. 
55 I d. at 127-128; 3 Holdsworth, HrsToRY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 
111-113 (1923); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. IV, 
Pt. I (1944). 
56 Brian v. London, R.S.Y.B. 32-3 Edw. I, 279 (1304). An alienation 
by the donee before birth of issue barred the issue but not the donor's 
reversion. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 19a. 
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a conveyance to the donee for life, with remainder in 
fee to his children, which makes the children take by 
purchase instead of by descent. Although future in-
terests by way of remainder were not unknown in the 
thirteenth century, 57 the law governing them was in a 
very imperfect state of development. It is probable that 
conveyancers of that century anticipated the rules which 
became established in the next century that remainders 
limited to unborn persons were contingent and that 
contingent remainders were invalid. 58 Accordingly, the 
enactment of a statute seemed to be the only effective 
way of making it possible for a donor to make sure that 
he would get the land back if there were no children of 
the marriage to which the gift was incident, and that 
they would get it if there were. 
Chapter I of the Statute of Westminster Il,59 known 
as De Donis Conditionalibus1 recited the recent judicial 
construction which defeated the intent of the donor of 
a maritagium or other fee simple conditional, and pro-
vided: 
57 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 104 (1923). 
58 !d. at 134-136. Even after the validity of contingent remainders 
was established in the fifteenth century, they would not have served 
the purpose at hand because, under the Rule in Shelley's Case, I Co. 
Rep. 93b, 104a, 76 Eng. Rep. 206, 234 (1581), and the doctrine of 
worthier title [Fenwick v. Mitforth, Moore K. B. 284, 72 Eng. Rep. 
583 (1589); Read v. Erington, Cro. Eliz. 321, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594); 
Bingham's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 82b, 91a, 76 Eng. Rep. 599, 611 (1600); 
Wills v. Palmer, 5 Burr. 2615, 98 Eng. Rep. 376 (1770); Doe ex dem. 
Earl and Countess of Cholmondeley v. Maxey, 12 East 589, 104 Eng. 
Rep. 230 (1810)], attempts to limit remainders to the heirs of the 
life tenant or the heirs of the donor gave interests by descent, not by 
purchase, and even a valid contingent remainder was destroyed by 
the life tenant's conveyance in fee. Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 
Eng. Rep. 691 (1628). It is scarcely necessary to point out that the 
trust to preserve contingent remainders was not invented until the 
seventeenth century. See Fratcher, "Trustor as Sole Trustee and Only 
Ascertainable Beneficiary," 47 MicH. L. REv. 907-918 (1949); Part Two, 
notes 14-21, infra. 
59 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1285). 
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"Wherefore our lord the king, perceiving how neces-
sary and expedient it should be to provide remedy in 
the aforsaid cases, hath ordained, that the will of the 
giver, according to the form in the deed of gift mani-
festly expressed, shall be from henceforth observed; so 
that they to whom the land was given under such con-
dition, shall have no power to aliene the land so given, 
but that it shall remain unto the issue of them to whom 
it was given after their death, or shall revert unto the 
giver, or his heirs, if issue fail (whereas there is no issue 
at all) or if any issue be, and fail by death, or heir of the 
body of ruch issue failing." 
The statute provided remedies to enforce the donor's 
reversion when issue of the donee failed and to protect 
the issue's right to the land when the donee had alien-
ated and died. The courts soon devised a similar remedy 
to enforce a remainder limited after the gift to the donee 
and the heirs of his body.60 The effect of the statute, as 
applied by the courts, was to give the donee a new type 
of estate of inheritance, the fee tail, which, unlike the 
pre-statutory conditional fee, was not a fee simple but 
a lesser estate carved out of the fee simple. After the 
creation of an estate tail, what was left of the fee simple 
remained in the donor by way of reversion or passed 
to another by way of remainder. 61 In consequence, the 
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum,62 enacted five years 
after De Donis Conditionalibus, being limited to estates 
in fee simple, had no application to estates tail as such, 
although it did apply to the reversion or remainder: in 
fee simple following an estate tail. In inter vivos con-
veyances the words "heirs" and "body" were both re-
quired for the creation of an estate tail; such words as 
60 Fitzwilliam v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33-35 Edw. I, 20 (1305); 
Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 1 & 2 Edw. II, 166 (1308-09). 
61 1 Coke, INsTITUTES 18b-19b, 327a. 
62 Or Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, notes 6 and 7 supra. 
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seed, issue, and the like being insufficient as substitutes 
for "heirs," although some substitutes for "body" were 
allowed. In the construction of devises, however, much 
latitude was allowed, the only requirement being a 
sufficient expression of an intention to entail.63 
De Donis Conditionalibus clearly restrained aliena-
tion by the immediate donee in tail, but it was not clear 
as to whether it restrained alienation by his issue. The 
word "issue" in the statute may have referred only to 
the children or immediate heirs of the donee in tail or 
it may have meant lineal descendants forever. There is 
respectable authority for the view that the statute was 
not designed to revive the restrictions of the ancient 
maritagium or to permit perpetual entails, but was only 
intended to make it possible to give a life estate to the 
immediate donee with an unbarrable remainder in fee 
simple to his heir.64 However that may be, it was de-
cided in 1312 that the son of the donee in tail could not 
alienate, with a suggestion that the restraint extended, 
as in the ancient maritagium} to the grandson of the 
donee, 65 and in 1330 it was settled that the restraint on 
alienation was perpetual, binding the heirs of the donee 
sa 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 9b, 20a-20b, 27a-27b. For the varieties and in-
cidents of estates tail see id., 18b-28b, and 2 Blackstone, CoMMENTARIES 
*113-*119. 
6 4 Bolland, Introduction to S.S.Y.B. 5 Edw. II, xxv-xxix (1915); 3 
Holdsworth, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 114 (1923); Plucknett, 
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOUR· 
TEENTH CENTURY, 51-52 (1922); Plucknett, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, 
131-135 (1949). But see Updegraff, "The Interpretation of 'Issue' in 
the Statute De Donis," 39 HARv. L. REv. 200-220 (1925). 
ss Belyng v. Anonymous, S.S.Y.B. 5 Edw. II, 176, 177 (XI Y.B. Ser.), 
5 Edw. II, 225, 226 (XII Y.B. Ser.) (1312). This was the utmost limit 
to which such a restraint could extend under Justinian's Novel 159 
[17 Scott, THE CIVIL LAW 187 (1932)], Buckland, TEXTBOOK ON RoMAN 
LAw, 360 (1921); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 191a, Butler's Note 77 V. (7) to 
-13th ed. (1787); Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551. Cf. Note 
54, supra. 
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in tail forever. 66 So by 1330 the courts, by construction 
or extension of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus) 
had made possible the creation of perpetual, unbarrable 
entails. If they had been permitted to continue, all of 
the land in England might have become inalienable, 
and the withdrawal of land from commerce would prob-
ably have hampered seriously English commercial and 
industrial pre-eminence in later centuries. 
Unbarrable entails lasted for a little less than two cen-
turies after the enactment of the statute De Donis Con-
ditionalibus. By 1472 the courts had decided that a 
tenant in tail in possession could bar both his heirs and 
the reversioner or remainderman by suffering a com-
mon recovery, a default judgment in a collusive suit 
brought by one who was feigned to have a title superior 
to that of the tenant in tail.67 Within a few years, sta-
tutes of Henry VII and his son empowered the tenant 
in tail to levy a fine which would bar the heirs in tail 
but not the reversioner or remainderman.68 A statute 
6 6 Bastard v. Somer, Y.B. 4 Edw. III, Trin., pl. 4 (1330); 3 Holds-
worth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 115-116 (1923). 
6 7 Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich. pl., 25 (1472). This case 
was decided the year after the short-lived restoration of Henry VI. 
At that time English law, unlike the Scots, did not permit forfeiture 
of entailed estates for treason. There is a tradition that the decision 
in Taltarum's Case was really a piece of royal legislation, dictated by 
Edward IV with a view to minimizing the amount of land which was 
exempt from forfeiture. Pigott, CoMMON REcoVERIEs 8-9 (1739). See 
note 72 infra. It was not wholly certain that a common recovery 
barred the reversion or remainder until the decision in Capel's Cas~, 1 
Co. Rep. 61b, 76 Eng. Rep. 134 (1593). Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 
20, §2 (1542) nullified common recoveries where the king was rever-
sioner or remainderman. Stat. 14 Eliz., c. 8, §2 (1572) made recoveries 
by a tenant in tail after possibility of issue extinct ineffective against 
the reversioner or remainderman. 
68 Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 24 (1487), as explained by Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, 
c. 36 (1540). The statute excepts estates tail created by the king while 
the reversion remains in the king. Statutory permission was necessary 
because De Donis Conditionalibus had provided that a fine levied to 
bar an estate tail should be void both as to the heirs and as to the 
reversioner. Stat. 13 Edw. I, c. 1, §4 (1285), restated, Stat. 1 Ric. Ill, 
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of 1540 empowered the tenant in tail in possession to 
bind the heirs in tail and the reversioner or remainder-
man by leases for terms not in excess of three lives or 
twenty-one years reserving substantial rent.69 
When the law of trusts was developed in the sixteenth 
and seventeenth centuries, it was assumed that a trust 
or equitable estate could be entailed as well as a legal 
estate. In such case it was settled that a cestui que trust 
in tail who was in possession could bar the equitable 
entail and the equitable reversion or remainder by suf-
fering a common recovery 70 and that a cestui que trust 
in tail could bar his issue by levying a fine as fully as 
if he had the legal estate.71 Thus by the end of the six-
teenth century a tenant in tail, although restricted to 
special forms of conveyance, was able to transfer inter 
vivos a fee simple or any lesser estate. The inheritance 
could not, however, be reached by his creditors, 72 and 
c. 7, §5 (1483). The fine, which was a compromise of record of a 
collusive action brought against the tenant in tail, was used when the 
tenant in tail was himself the reversioner or remainderman or was 
conveying to the reversioner or remainderman, and when the tenant 
in tail was such in reversion or remainder as, prior to Stat. 14 Geo. II, 
c. 20, §1 (1741), only a tenant in tail in possession could suffer a 
common recovery. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 121a (Hargrave's Note No. 172 to 
13th ed., 1787). It should be noted that the issue in tail could also be 
barred in some situations, without common recovery or statutory fine, 
by the operation of the highly technical rules of warranty. As this 
operation was frequently dependent upon the occurrence of events 
which could not be foreseen at the time of the conveyance, these rules 
cannot have contributed a great deal to the alienability of entailed 
land. Id., 37la-377a, 391b-393b. Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpe-
tuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 1 at 44-50 (1938). 
69 32 Hen. VIII, c. 28, §§1, 2 (1540), continued in force by Stat. 34 
8c 35 Hen. VIII, c. 20, §4 (1542). 
10 North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13, 23 Eng. Rep. 270, sub nom. North v. 
Williams, 2 Ch. Ca. 63, 78, 22 Eng. Rep. 848, 855 (1681). 
n Basket v. Pierce, 1 Vern. 226, 23 Eng. Rep. 431 (1683). 
12 Except the king, claiming under judgment or specialty. Stat. 33 
Hen. VIII, c. 39, §75 (1541). Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 19, §12 (1623) enabled 
creditors to reach estates tail through bankruptcy proceedings. Estates 
tail, but not the reversion or remainder following them, were subjected 
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its descent according to the limitations of the entail 
could not be affected by will. 73 
As has been seen, restraints on alienation assume two 
general forms, the prohibition, which, if effective, would 
compel the owner of a property interest to keep it de-
spite his attempts to transfer, and the imposition of a 
penalty, usually forfeiture of the interest, upon aliena-
tion. Insofar as it is a restraint upon alienation, en-
tailment is essentially of the prohibitory type. The 
case law of the fifteenth century and the statutes of 
the fifteenth and sixteenth made the prohibition on 
alienation implicit in entailment completely ineffective 
as to transfers by way of common recovery, fine levied 
under the statutes of Henry VII and his successor, and 
leases for periods not exceeding three lives or twenty-one 
years. The peculiar mediaeval rules of seisin also made 
the prohibition partially ineffective as against the more 
ordinary modes of conveyance. If a tenant in tail con-
veyed an estate of inheritance or pur autre vie by feoff-
ment, release, confirmation, or common-law fine, not 
levied under the statutes, his act, although tortious and 
not a complete bar to the issue in tail or the reversioner 
or remainderman, was fully effective for the term of his 
life and worked a discontinuance of the estates of the 
issue and the reversioner or remainderman. That is, the 
right of entry which the issue or the reversioner or re-
mainderman would otherwise have had upon the death 
of the tenant in tail was destroyed and he left with only 
a mere chose in action, the right to bring an action of 
formedon. 74 
to forfeiture for treason of the tenant in tail by Stat. 26 Hen. VIII, 
c. 13, §5 (1534) and 33 Hen. VIII, c. 20 §3 (1541). See Dalrymple, 
GENERAL HISTORY OF FEUDAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., CC. 3, 4 (1758). 
73 Stat. 34 & 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5, §3 (1542). 
74 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 325b-327b; 1 Cruise, DIGEST 89; Maitland, "The 
Beatitude of Seisin,'' 4 L.Q. R.Ev. 24, 286, 297-298 (1888). 
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It having been settled that entailment was largely in-
effective as a prohibition on alienation, questions soon 
arose as to the extent to which a donor in tail could im-
pose penalties on alienation. 
As might be expected, the decisions rendered before 
1472 had held valid conditions providing for forfeiture 
of an estate tail upon alienation by the tenant in tail. 
This continued to be the rule, even as to alienations 
by way of common recovery or statutory fine, until the 
end of the sixteenth century, although there is evidence 
of growing recognition of the fact that to hold such 
conditions valid as against common recoveries and statu-
tory fines would operate to defeat these methods of bar-
ring the entail and recreate perpetual unbarrable en-
tails.75 The old decisions were overruled early in the 
seventeenth century, and it was settled that no restraint 
by way of penalty, by forfeiture or otherwise, could be 
imposed upon the right of a tenant in tail to bar the 
75 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil. pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, Y.B. 
8 Hen. VII, Hil. pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich. pl. 
28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch. pl. 9 (1498); Newis 
v. Lark, 2 Plow. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 (1571) (condition good against 
common recovery); Earl of Arundel's Case, 3 Dyer 342b, 73 Eng. Rep. 
771, Jenk. 242, 145 Eng. Rep. 170 (1575) (dictum in the report m 
Jenkins, p. 243, that condition bad against common recovery); Croker 
v. Trevithin, Cro. Eliz. 35, 78 Eng. Rep. 301 (1584); Rudhall v. Mil-
ward, Moore K.B. 212, 72 Eng. Rep. 537, sub nom. Ruddall v. Miller, 
1 Leon. 298, 74 Eng. Rep. 271 (1586) (condition good against fine); 
Spittle v. Davie, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 339 (1588) (condition good 
against lease); Arton v. Hare, Poph. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 (1595) 
(condition against "going about to alien, sell, grant or give or to suffer 
any recovery or levy any fine" assumed to be good); Sharington v. 
Minors, Moore K.B. 543, 72 Eng. Rep. 746 (1599) (condition against 
mortgage, sale or pledge good. Popham, C. J ., dissented on the ground 
the condition was "encounter ley" and void). A proviso that the estate 
should cease only as to the offending tenant in tail and pass to his 
heir was ineffective, not because of the restraint on alienation but be-
cause of technical common-law rules preventing an estate from being 
forfeited in part. Germin v. Ascot, Moore K.B. 364, 72 Eng. Rep. 631 
(1594); Cholmeley v. Humble, Moore K.B. 592, 72 Eng. Rep. 778 
(1595); Corbet's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 83b, 76 Eng. Rep. 187 (1599); Mild-
may's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 77 Eng. Rep. 31l (1605). 
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entail by statutory fine or to bar both the entail and the 
reversion or remainder by common recovery. 76 Whether 
exercise by a tenant in tail of his statutory power to 
make leases for three lives or twenty-one years could be 
penalized was not definitely settled.77 A covenant by the 
donee in tail not to bar the entail was not specifically 
enforcible 78 but might give rise to an action for dam-
ages. 79 The seventeenth century decisions did not over-
rule those of the preceding centuries insofar as the latter 
held valid restraints by way of penalty upon tortious 
feoffments and other conveyances which worked a dis-
continuance but did not bar the entail.80 
As a common recovery could not be suffered by a ten-
ant for years, attempts were soon made to create an un-
barrable entail in estates for long terms of years. These 
attempts were frustrated by decisions that estates for 
years could not be entailed and that the first donee in 
tail owned the entire term with full power of aliena-
76 Sonday's Case, 9 Co. Rep. 127b, 77 Eng. Rep. 915 (1611) (com-
mon recovery); Partington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 77 Eng. Rep. 976 
(1613) (common recovery); Foy v. Hynde, Cro. Jac. 697, 79 Eng. Rep. 
605 (1624) (fine); King v. Burchall, Amb. 379, 27 Eng. Rep. 252 
(1759) (common recovery). The first three cases involved penalties of 
forfeiture, the last a penalty by way of an equitable charge on the 
entailed land. Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. 
REv. 59-66 (1938). Accord: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §408 (1944). Jus-
tice Christiancy's classic opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 
Mich. 78 at 93-94 (1874), quotes the reasoning in Partington's Case and 
cites that in Mildmay's Case with approval. 
77 Cf. Spittle v. Davie, 2 Leon. 38, 74 Eng. Rep. 339 (1588); 1 Coke, 
INsTITUTEs 223b, with contrary dicta in Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 
40a, 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311, 317 (1605); Partington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 
35b, 39a, 77 Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613). 
78 Collins v. Plummer, 2 Vern. 635, 23 Eng. Rep. 1015, 1 P. Wms. 
104, 24 Eng. Rep. 313 (1708). 
79 Ibid.; Freeman v. Freeman, 2 Vern. 233, 23 Eng. Rep. 751 (1691). 
But see Poole's Case, cited in Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore K.B. 809, 
810, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610). 
8o 1 Coke, IN1!TITUTES 223b-224a, and Butler's note No. 132 to 13th 
ed. (1787). See Anonymous, 1 Brown!. & Golds. 45, 123 Eng. Rep. 655 
(1616); Pierce v. Win, 1 Ventr. 321, 86 Eng. Rep. 208 (1677). 
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tion.81 As the statute De Donis Conditionalibus applied 
only to land, chattels personal could not be entailed. 
B. THE MICHIGAN STATUTES 
On March 2, 1821, the Governor and Judges of the 
Territory of Michigan adopted a law providing that 
all estates tail were abolished and that all persons hold-
ing or to hold land under any devise, gift, grant, or 
conveyance which did, or which, but for the law would, 
create a fee tail, should "be seized thereof as an allo-
dium." 82 This law was in force until superseded by a 
provision of the Revised Statutes of 1838 that: 
81 Tatton v. Mollineux, Moore K.B. 809, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610); 
Lovies's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1613); Sanders v. 
Cornish, Cro Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631); Grig v. Hopkins, 1 
Sid. 37, 82 Eng. Rep. 955 (1661). 
82 Code of 1820, p. 393; Laws of 1827, p. 261; Laws of 1833, p. 278; 
1 Terr. Laws, P· 815. Sections 1 and 2 of the law provide: 
"Sec. 1. Be tt enacted by the Governor and judges of the Territory 
of Michigan, That all estates tail shall be, and are hereby abolished; 
and that in all cases, where any person or persons now is, or are seized 
in fee tail of any lands, tenements or hereditaments, such person or 
persons shall be deemed to be seized of an allodial estate; And further, 
in all cases where any person or persons would, if this act had not 
been passed, at any time hereafter become seized in fee tail of any 
lands, tenements or hereditaments, by virtue of any devise, gift, grant 
or other conveyance, heretofore made or hereafter to be made or by 
any other means whatsoever, such person or persons, instead of becom-
ing seized thereof in fee tail, shall be deemed and ad jus ted to be seized 
thereof as an allodium. 
"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted, That where lands, tenements or 
hereditaments, heretofore have been devised, granted or otherwise con-
veyed by a tenant in tail, and the person or persons, to whom such 
devise, grant or other conveyance, hath been made, his, her, or their 
heirs or assigns, hath or have, from the time such devise took effect, or 
from the time such grant or other conveyance was made, to the day 
of the passing of this act, been in the uninterrupted possession of such 
lands, tenements or hereditaments, and claiming and holding the same 
under or by virtue of such devise, grant or other conveyance, then such 
devise, grant or other conveyance shall be deemed as good, legal and 
effectual, to all intents and purposes, as if such tenant in tail had at 
the time of the making of such devise, grant or other conveyance, been 
seized of such lands, tenements or hereditaments allodially, any law 
to the contrary hereof notwithstanding.'' 
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"All estates tail are abolished, and every estate which 
would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of the 
territory of Michigan, as it existed before the second day 
of March, one thousand eight hundred and twenty-one, 
shall, for all purposes, on and after the said second day 
of March, be adjudged a fee simple." 83 
There are two difficulties with the Act of 1838: (1) 
If the statute De Donis Conditionalibus was not in force 
immediately before March 2, 1821, it is possible that 
no estate would, at that time, have been adjudged 
a fee tail; 84 and (2) It is not clear whether a convey-
ance (if any could be) affected by the Act of 1838 
created a fee simple conditional or a fee simple absolute. 
The second difficulty has been eliminated by the present 
statute, but the first remains. It may be argued that 
both the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1838 and 
those of the statute now in force should be considered 
practical nullities, since no conveyance could fall within 
their terms and that, therefore, a conveyance which 
would have created an estate tail under the statute De 
Donis Conditionalibus, would now create an estate in 
fee simple conditional. Since March 1, 1847, the follow-
ing provisions have been on the Michigan statute books: 
"Sec. 3. All estates tail are abolished, and every 
estate which would be adjudged a fee tail, according to 
the law of the territory of Michigan, as it existed before 
the second (2nd) day of March, one thousand eight hun-
dred and twenty-one (1821), shall for all purposes be 
83 P. 258. 
84 It would seem that the term "fee tail" was sometimes used before 
the statute De Donis Conditionalibus in reference to conditional fees 
other than the maritagium. 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, 19, n. 6 (1895); Plucknett, 
CoNCISE HISTORY OF THE CoMMON LAw 353-357 (1929). An application 
of the Michigan statutes to such fees tail only, leaving the maritagium 
in existence as a fee simple conditional, would be awkward to say 
the least. 
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adjudged a fee simple; and if no valid remainder be 
limited thereon, shall be a fee simple absolute. 
"Sec. 4. When a remainder in fee shall be limited 
upon any estate which would be adjudged a fee tail 
according to the law of the territory of Michigan as it 
existed previous to the time mentioned in the preceding 
section, such remainder shall be valid as a contingent 
limitation upon a fee, and shall vest in possession, on the 
death of the first taker, without issue living at the time 
of such death." 85 
As has been shown, estates in fee tail as that term is 
understood in the developed common-law system are a 
creation of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus. These 
statutory provisions only purport to affect estates "which 
would be adjudged a fee tail, according to the law of the 
territory of Michigan, as it existed before the second 
(2nd) day of March ... 1821". Yet despite dicta sug-
gesting that no English statutes ever were in force in 
Michigan and positive decisions that if any were in force 
they were repealed by the Act of September 16, 1810,86 
the Supreme Court of Michigan has consistently applied 
these statutory provisions to conveyances which would 
85 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§3, 4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2587, 2588; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4070, 4071; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8785, 8786; 
How. Stat., §§5519, 5520; Comp. Laws (1915) §§II521, II522; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §§ 12923, 12924; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.3, 26.4; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§554.3, 554.4. 
Six other states have similar statutes: Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 
1949) §§763, 764; Mont. Rev. Code (1935) §§6725, 6726; N. Y. Real 
Property Law (1909) §32; N.D. Rev. Code (1943) §§47-0405, 47-0406; 
Okla. Stat. (1941) tit. 60 §§24, 25; S.D. Code (1939) §§51.0405, 51.0406. 
The New York statute was construed in the following cases: Wilkes v. 
Lion, 2 Cow. 333 (1823); Grout v. Townsend, 2 Denio 336 (1845); 
Van Rensselaer v. Poucher, 5 Denio 35 (1847); Wendell v. Crandall, I 
N.Y. 491 (1848); Emmons v. Cairns, 3 Barb. 243 (1848); Lott v. 
Wykoff, 2 N.Y. 355 (1849); Barlow v. Barlow, 2 N.Y. 386 (1849); 
Brown v. Lyon, 6 N.Y. 419 (1852); Barnes v. Hathaway, 66 Barb. 452 
(1873); Buel v. Southwick, 70 N.Y. 581 (1877); Jenkins v. Fahey, 73 
N.Y. 355 (1878); Coe v. De Witt, 22 Hun. 428 (1880); Alger v. Alger, 
31 Hun. 471 (1884). 
s6 Note 40 supra. 
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have created fees tail under the statute De Donis Con-
ditionalibus.87 
The effect of the Act of 1821 abolishing estates tail 
came before the Supreme Court only once, in Fraser v. 
Chene .88 This was a suit in chancery to quiet title to 
land involving the construction of a will, which was ex-
ecuted and became effective in 1829, reading: 
"I give and bequeath unto my beloved son, Gabriel 
Chene, my eldest, the farm I now reside on, for and 
during his life-time, with all the appurtenances there-
on; and after he, my said son, the said Gabriel Chene, is 
deceased, then the right, title and appurtenances of the 
aforesaid farm, is to become the property of the said 
Gabriel Chene's male heirs, .... " 
The plaintiff claimed under a deed from Gabriel 
Chene which purported to convey a fee simple. The 
defendants, who were the sons and heirs of Gabriel 
Chene, contended that this devise created a life estate 
in Gabriel, with remainder in fee simple absolute to his 
male heirs. On this point the court decided that the 
Rule in Shelley's Case was in force in Michigan in 
1829; 89 in consequence of which the devisee, Gabriel 
87 Fraser v. Chene, 2 Mich. 81 (1851); Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich. 
47 (1875); Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897); Down-
ing v. Birney, 112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897); Rhodes v. Bouldry, 
138 Mich. 144, 101 N.W. 206 (1904); Millard v. Millard, 212 Mich. 
662, 180 N.W. 429 (1927); Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. l, 46 
N. W. (2d) 437 (1951). 
88 2 Mich. 81 (1851). 
89 The Rule in Shelley's Case was abolished by Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258, 
which was replaced by a clearer provision, still in force, Rev. Stat. 
1846, c. 62, §28, Comp. Laws (1857) §2612; Comp. Laws (1871) §4095; 
Comp. Laws (1897) §8810; How. Stat. §5544; Comp. Laws (1915) 
§11546; Comp. Laws (1929) §12948; Mich. Stat. Ann §26.28; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §554.28. Accordingly, it was held in Wilson v. Terry, 
130 Mich. 73, 89 N.W. 566 (1902), and Thompson v. Thompson, 330 
Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951), that a conveyance to A for life, 
remainder to the heirs of his body, created only a life estate in A, 
with remainder in fee simple in the heirs of his body. 
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Chene, took a fee. The court held further that the word-
ing was such as would have created an estate in fee tail 
male prior to March 2, 1821. The Act of that date was 
construed to convert this into an "allodial" estate, which 
the court ·assumed to mean an estate in fee simple abso-
lute. 
The section of the Revised Statutes of 1838 abolish-
ing entails was never considered in a reported decision, 
but the provisions of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which 
are now in force, have been construed in several cases. 
Downing v. Birney 90 involved a deed between James G. 
Birney 
"And Lorainie Spicer, wife of Ezekiel Spicer, of the 
same place, of the second part, witnesseth, that, in con-
sideration of one hundred dollars paid by the said 
Ezekiel Spicer to the parties of the first part, they have 
bargained and sold and do hereby convey to the said 
Lorainie Spicer ... lots .... To have and to hold the 
said lots to the said Lorainie, to the children of her body 
begotten by the said Ezekiel, to her heirs, executors, and 
to the assigns of the said Lorainie and Ezekiel, forever; 
and the said James G. Birney, for himself, his heirs, ex-
ecutors and administrators, hereby covenant and agree 
that he will at all times defend the lawful title hereby 
conveyed, to the said lots, of the said Lorainie, to the 
children of her body begotten by the said Ezekiel, to her 
heirs, executors, and to the assigns of the said Lorainie 
and Ezekiel, against the claim or claims of all persons 
whomsoever.'' 
The court held that this instrument was not designed 
to create a fee tail and that, therefore, the statutory pro-
visions in question had no bearing. The deed was con-
strued to vest: (1) A life estate in Lorainie; (2) A life 
estate in the children of Lorainie by Ezekiel in being 
9o 112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897), 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 
(1898), Part Three, note 49, infra. 
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at the date of the deed, to take effect on the death of 
Lorainie; and (3) A remainder in fee simple absolute in 
Lorainie, to take effect on the death of the last of her 
children by Ezekiel. 
Section 3 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 
1846, which converts a fee tail upon which no remainder 
is limited into a fee simple absolute, has been applied 
for this purpose only twice. In Rhodes v. Bouldry 91 a 
devise reading: 
"I bequeath the above described lands, not only to 
the said Silas W. Bouldry, but to the heirs of his body." 
was construed to be one which would have created a fee 
tail under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus and 
which, therefore created a fee simple absolute. The 
other case, Millard v. Millard, 92 involved the construc-
tion of a warranty deed containing the following lan-
guage: 
"This indenture made the 27th day of July in the year 
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred forty-six, be-
tween Moses Dean, of the county of Ionia and State of 
Michigan, of the first part, and Charity Millard and her 
children, heirs of her body, of the second part .... To 
have and to hold, the above-mentioned and described 
premises, with the appurtenances, and every part and 
parcel thereof, to the said parties of the second part, 
their heirs and assigns forever." 
The court failed to consider the fact that the language 
of the habendum indicated an intent that there should 
really be several grantees. Regarding the words "and 
her children" as mere surplusage, it determined that, 
since the magical words "heirs of her body" were pre-
sent, the conveyance was one which would have created 
n 138. Mich. 144, 101 N.W. 206 (1904). See Thompson v. Thomp-
son, note 89 supra. 
92 212 Mich. 662, 180 N.W. 429 (1920). 
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a fee tail under the statute De Donis Conditionalibus 
and which was transformed into a fee simple absolute by 
"3 Comp. Laws 1915, S. 11521". It is to be noted that 
the statutory provision applied by the court to a deed 
executed in 1846 was that of the Revised Statutes of 
1846, which did not become effective until March 1, 
184 7. The provision of the Revised Statutes of 1838 
should have been applied but the effect, no doubt, would 
have been the same. 93 
At the ancient common law, no remainder could be 
limited on an estate in fee simple conditional.D4 The 
right retained by the donor was a mere possibility and 
inalienable. It was not clear at first that the statute De 
Donis Conditionalibus permitted the limitation of a re-
mainder upon the newly created estate in fee tail, but 
it was soon settled that it did.95 It will be remembered 
that since 1847 the Michigan statute has provided that 
a remainder in fee limited on what would have been 
a fee tail takes effect as a contingent limitation on a fee 
and vests in possession on the death of the first taker, 
without issue living at the time of such death.96 It is to 
be noted that the mere birth of issue has no effect under 
this provision. If the donee in tail dies with issue, his 
heirs, devisees, or assigns take in fee simple absolute; if he 
dies without issue, the remainderman takes in fee simple 
absolute. One peculiar effect of this provision would 
seem to be that the issue of the donee in tail may never 
»s There is some possibility, however, that the 1846 Act might be 
construed to be retroactive and valid as such, at least in some situations. 
See "Estates Tail in the United States," 24 HARv. L. REV. 144 (1910). 
The 1821 Act clearly purported to be retroactive. 
94 2 BLACKSTONE's CoMMENTARIES •164, 165. But see 3 Holdsworth, 
HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 18 (1923). The modern American 
cases are collected in 114 A.L.R. 616. See Part Two, note 7, infra. 
95 Note 60 supra; 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 
18 (1823). 
96 Note 84 supra. 
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inherit, even though they survive the donee: their 
rights are liable to be cut off by inter vivos conveyance 
of the donee in tail, by his will, or, in part, by provisions 
of the statutes of descent and distribution. 
The provision first received the attention of the 
Supreme Court in Goodell v. Hibbard/1 which. was an 
action of ejectment founded on a will containing this 
devise: 
"Second, I give and devise all the rest, residue and 
remainder of my real and personal estate, of every name 
and nature whatsoever, to my sister, Betsey Goodell, ... ; 
to have and to hold the said premises, which is described 
in several deeds, to the said Betsey Goodell and her 
heirs, forever; and in failure of heirs, all to fall and be 
bequeathed to the minor children of Alexander Goodell, 
now deceased, . . . . " 
Alexander Goodell was a brother of the testator who 
had pre-deceased him, leaving four minor children. The 
plaintiffs claimed under a bargain and sale deed, the 
only covenant of which was one of seizin, executed by 
one of these children before the death of Betsey Goodell. 
The court, taking into consideration the fact that Betsey 
Goodell was an aging spinster with a large number of 
collateral heirs presumptive at the time the will was 
executed, determined that the word "heirs", as used in 
the will, meant "heirs of her body". In consequence, 
the estate created was held to be what would have been 
a fee tail in Betsey with remainder in fee simple absolute 
in the children of Alexander. Applying the statute, the 
land passed to the children of Alexander in fee simple 
absolute upon the death of Betsey without issue. 
97 32 Mich. 47 (1875). It should be noted that, in this case, the con-
tingent estate created by §4 of the statute was held to be alienable be-
fore taking effect in possession. See also Mullreed v. Clark, liO Mich. 
229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896). 
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Eldred v. Shaw 98 was a suit to construe a will devis-
ing land to a trustee for "my grandson, Rata Eldred", 
with directions to manage and control until the grand-
son should reach the age of twenty-one, 
"and, in the case of the death of my said grandson 
without heirs by his body begotten, the lands and pro-
perty above described, with all its increases or accre-
tions, I give, devise and bequeath to my said sons, Ly-
sander, Henry, and William, and my said daughters, 
Matilda and Sally, share and share alike, and to their 
heirs and assigns forever." 
The grandson contended that the gift over to his 
uncles and aunts would be effective only if he died dur-
ing minority and that, upon reaching majority, he be-
came vested with title in fee simple absolute. The cir-
cuit judge agreed with this contention but, on appeal, 
it was held that the devise created an estate tail general 
with remainder over which, by force of the statute, be-
came a fee simple subject to a contingent limitation over 
if the tenant should die at any time, before or after 
reaching majority, without issue him surviving. 
It would seem then that the statutory provision af-
fecting remainders limited upon estates tail will be en-
forced in accordance with its terms. Its application to 
estates in fee tail general not restricted to issue of a par-
ticular sex is not difficult. As to the more complicated 
forms of estates tail the effect of the statute is far from 
clear. Suppose a conveyance to A and the heirs male of 
his body, remainder to Band his heirs, forever. If A dies 
9 8 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897). In Coe v. De Witt, 22 Hun. 
428 (1880), testator devised land to "Edward B. Coe, and the heirs of 
his body forever, and in case of his death without issue then living" 
to certain charities. Edward B. Coe conveyed the land in his lifetime 
and then died, leaving a surviving daughter. It was held that the 
grantee of Edward took a fee simple absolute upon the death of Ed-
ward, leaving issue. 
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leaving a daughter as his only descendant, does B take? 
A similar problem would be created by a gift to A and 
the heirs of his body begotten of a particular wife, re-
mainder to Band his heirs, forever, if A should die leav-
ing only issue by another wife. Presumably, in these 
cases, the remainder would take effect in possession if, 
at the time of the first taker's death, he had not issue of 
the particular class named in the conveyance. 
Under Michigan law, then, the entail is completely 
ineffective as a prohibition on alienation, except that, 
when a remainder is limited after an estate tail, the 
donee in tail cannot, as he could in England after 1472, 
bar the remainder. The remainderman can, however, 
transfer his interest.99 As the statutes convert the estate 
of the donee in tail into a fee simple, the rules which 
govern the validity of restraints on alienation of fees 
simple apply to that estate. If the remainder is in tail, 
the same conversion occurs. The validity of restraints 
on alienation of the remainder is governed, therefore, 
by the rules applicable to expectant estates of types other 
than the fee taiP00 
99 Note 97 supra. 
wo For periodical material on the treatment of fee tail in other juris-
dictions, see: Morris, "Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America," 
27 CoL. L. REv. 24-51 (1927); Lundberg, "Barring of Entails, Its Marks 
on Our Land Laws," 3 DAKOTA L. REv. 160-164 (1930); Redfearn, 
"Estates Tail in Florida," 6 FLA. L.J. 69-78 (1932); Costigan, "Equit-
able Fee Tail Estates-Illinois Fee Tail Statute-Shall Equity Follow 
the Law?" 5 ILL. L. REv. 514 (1911); Beals, "Estates Tail in Kansas," 
1 J. BAR A. KAN. 203-209 (1933); Turner, "Estates Tail in Kansas," 
2 J. BAR A. KAN. 241-256 (1934); Hudson, "Estates Tail in Missouri," 
7 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1913); Steiner, "Estates Tail in Missouri," 7 KANsAs 
CITY L. REv. 93-108 (1939); Ho1mested, "Estates Tail," 22 CAN. L.T. 
426 (1902); Sanger, "Estates Tail Under the New Law," 2 CAMB. L.J. 
212 (1925); "Estates Tail in the United States," 15 CoL. L. REv. 618 
(1915). 
CHAPTER 3 
Present Legal Estates in Fee Simple 
A. THE ENGLISH LAW 
AT THE beginning of the thirteenth century, when the royal courts of justice were acquiring effective control of the development of private law, the 
possible forms of action and their limits were uncertain. 
It seemed then that a new form of action could be de-
vised to fit any need which might arise. In the course 
of that century the courts set themselves to limiting the 
possible forms of action to a definite list, defining with 
certainty the scope of permitted actions, and so refusing 
relief upon states of fact which did not fall within the 
fixed limits of permitted forms of action. This process, 
of course, operated to fix and limit the classes of private 
rights protected by law.101 
A parallel process went on with respect to interests 
in land. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, 
when alienation of land was becoming possible, it 
seemed that any sort of interest which ingenuity could 
devise might be created by apt terms in the transfer 
creating the interest. Perhaps the form of the gift could 
create interests of any specified duration, with peculiar 
rules for descent, with special rights not ordinarily in-
cident to ownership, or deprived of some of the ordinary 
incidents of ownership. As in the case of the forms of 
action, the courts set themselves to limiting the possible 
interests in land to a definite list, defining with certainty 
1o1 Maitland, FoRMS OF ACTION AT CoMMON LAW 51-52 (reprint 
1941). 
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the incidents of permitted interests, and refusing to en-
force provisions of a gift which would add to or subtract 
from the fixed incidents of the type of interest conveyed. 
The law would recognize only a certain definite list of 
estates in land, each with fixed incidents, and every gift 
must be forced to fit the Procrustean bed of one or an-
other of these estates.102 The effect of this process in re-
ducing widely varying types of maritagium and entail to 
one estate in fee simple conditional with a fixed inci-
dent of alienability after birth of issue has been shown 
in the preceding chapter. The statute De Donis Condi-
tionalibus checked the process of systematization insofar 
as that process tended to impose one canon of descent and 
a uniform rule of alienability upon all estates of inheri-
tance. Beyond this it did not stop the rigid fixation of 
estates and their incidents. With respect to duration, 
the recognized types of estates came to be limited to 
those in fee simple, in fee tail, for life, for years, at will, 
and at sufferance. As to these, the courts would permit 
slight variations in non-essential incidents, but none 
whatever in those considered essential. And an incident 
formally conferred by statute was almost necessarily 
deemed essential. A provision purporting to deprive the 
estate granted of an essential incident was repugnant to 
the grant and void. For example, it was settled.by the 
102 2 Holdsworth, HisTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 4th ed., 349-352 (1936); 
3 id., 3d ed., 101-105 (1923); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 
22 IowA L. REv. 437 at 444-445 (1937). "For the sake of certainty and 
stability, the law has classified and defined all the various interests 
and estates in lands which it recognizes the right of any individual 
to hold or create, and the definition of each is made from, and the 
estate known and recognized by the combination of certain legal inci-
dents, many of which are so essential to the particular species of estate 
that they cannot, by the parties creating it, be severed from it, as this 
would be to create a new and mongrel estate unknown to the law, 
and productive of confusion and uncertainty." Christiancy, J., in 
Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 92 (1874). 
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first decade of the seventeenth century that every estate 
in fee tail was endowed by law with certain inseparable 
incidents, that among these incidents were dower, 
curtesy, and the right to bar the entail by common re-
covery, and that any provision purporting to deprive an 
estate tail of any of these incidents or penalize its enjoy-
ment was void.108 
As has been seen, the Statute of Westminster III, Quia 
Emptores T errarum, made two important provisions as 
to estates in fee simple; first, that the donor of such an 
estate could not retain a reversion, and second, that the 
owner might "sell at his own pleasure his lands and tene-
ments, or part of them." 104 A remainder being analog-
ous to a reversion, 105 the first provision operated to pre-
vent the limitation of a remainder after a fee simple.106 
That the statute made free alienability an inseparable 
incident of every estate in fee simple seems always to 
have been assumed by the judges and lawyers of England. 
Knowing this, and realizing that such an attempt would 
be nugatory, English conveyancers have not attempted 
to restrain alienation of legal estates in fee simple by 
1oa Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 40a, 4la, 77 Eng. Rep. 
311, 314 (1605); Mary Portington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 38b-39a, 77 
Eng. Rep. 976, 982 (1613). 
104 Stat. 18 Edw. I, stat 1, c. 1 (1290); 2 Coke, INsTITUTES 66, 67. 
The language of the statute, as printed in the Statutes at Large, is, 
"quod de cetero liceat unicuique libero homini terram suam sen tene-
mentum pen partem inde pro voluntate sua vendere." In Mayn v. 
Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412), Justice Hankford said, at 
£. 3b, "le statute voit, 'Quod quilibet liber homo possit dare et vendere 
terram suam.' " Sir Edward Coke (whose version of the statute varies 
slightly from that of the Statutes at Large) says, "'Vendere' is here 
not onely taken for a sale, but for any alienation by gift, feoffment, 
fine, or otherwise: But sale was the most common assurance." 2 IN-
STITUTES 501. 
1os 1 Coke, INsTITUTEs 373b (Butler's Note No. 328 to 13th ed. 1787); 
Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 635 at 
655-656 (1939). 
1o6 1 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 5th ed., 7 (1794); Part Two, 
note 7, infra. 
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prohibition, and there is a consequent dearth of English 
decisions as to such restraints. American lawyers have 
not always understood so well the system of estates, and 
conveyancing by laymen has been more common here. 
By the overwhelming weight of authority in this coun-
try, a prohibition on alienation of a legal fee simple, 
that is, a provision that a transfer by the owner shall 
be wholly inoperative and leave him still owner, is a 
nullity, whether extending to all alienation or limited 
to alienation in a particular manner, alienation during 
a limited period, or alienation to specified persons or 
classes of persons.107 
As to restraints by way of penalty, it has been settled 
in England since the fourteenth century that a proviso in 
a conveyance in fee simple that the estate shall be for-
feited upon any alienation is void.108 The same rule 
101 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d 
ed., 91-133 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of 
Property,'' 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§26.15, 26.16 (1952); Man-
ning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation since Gray," 48 
HARv. L. REv. 373-406 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Aliena-
tion of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-995, ll86-1215 (1935). Accord: 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §405 (1944). The Restatement and Professor 
Schnebly refer to prohibitions on alienation as "disabling restraints." 
Id. §404. The statement in the text does not apply to provisions of a 
trust instrument restraining alienation by the trustee. As to these see 
Schnebly, 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, §26.13 and Chapter 8, infra. 
1os Anonymous, Liber Assissarum 33 Edw. III, pl. 11 (1359); Mayn 
v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous Y.B. 21 Hen. 
VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 
(1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anony-
mous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9 (1498); Vernon's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 
1a, 3b, 76 Eng. Rep. 845, 854 (1572); Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744, 
78 Eng. Rep. 977 (1600); Statham, ABRIDGEMENT, "Conditions," pl. 12 
(1495); Brooke, GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, "Conditions," pl. 57, 135, 239 
(1573); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 222b-223a. Shailard v. ·Baker involved a 
condition in a will, the other cases conditions in inter vivos conveyances. 
As in the case of estates tail, restraint by way of penalty on types of 
conveyance which had purely tortious operation, working a discon-
tinuance, were upheld. Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 
(1494); Brooke, td., pl. 239. 
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obtains in this country.109 Sir Thomas Littleton, writ-
ing in the fifteenth century, expressed the rule in this 
wise, 
"Sect. 360. Also, if a feoffment be made upon this 
condition, that the feofee shall not alien the land to 
any, this condition is void, because when a man is in-
feoffed of lands or tenements, he hath power to alien 
them to any person by the law. For if such a condition 
should be good, then the condition should oust him of 
all the power which the law gives him, which should be 
against reason, and therefore such a condition is void." 110 
So much is clear. Unfortunately for the clarity of the 
law, Sir Thomas added, 
"Sect. 361. But if the condition be such, that the 
feofee shall not alien to such a one, naming his name, or 
to any of his heirs, or of the issues of such a one, etc., 
or the like, which conditions do not take away all power 
of alienation from the feoffee, etc. then such condition 
is good." 111 
Littleton's exception to the general rule was repeated 
by way of dictum in a case decided twelve years after 
the publication of his treatise, 112 but it seems inconsis-
tent with the reasoning of the opinions which declare 
the general rule.113 Those cases hold that conditions in 
restraint of alienation of an estate in fee simple are void 
109 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d 
ed., 8-25 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Prop-
erty," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.15 (1952) and the articles 
cited in note 107 supra. Accord: PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT §406, com-
ment d, §407 (1944). 
110 TENURES §360 (1481). 
111 I d., §361; 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 223a-223b. See Sheppard, ToucH-
STONE ON COMMON AssURANCES 129-130 (1648); Sweet, "Restraints on 
Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236 at 242-243 (1917). 
112 Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3, f. lOb (1493), per 
Hussey, C.J. 
113 Pearson, J., in In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801 at 813-814. 
Chancellor Kent says of this section, "But this case falls within the 
general principle, and it may be very questionable whether such a 
condition would be good at this day.'' 4 CoMMENTARIES •131. 
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because, (1) they are repugnant to the grant, that is, 
their operation would tend to deprive the estate of the 
inseparable incident of alienability conferred upon it by 
the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum/14 and (2) re-
straints on alienation may be imposed only in favor of 
a reversion or remainder following the estate restrained, 
and, by force of the same statute, no reversion or re-
mainder may follow a fee simple.115 In a case decided 
in 1443 Mr. Justice Paston argued that the existence of 
a reversion or remainder had no bearing, that restraints 
on alienation were void only because of "inconven-
ience." l:Hl This view was decisively rejected, not only in 
that case but in the sixteenth and seventeenth century 
decisions which developed the law of restraints on aliena-
tion on estates in fee tail, for life and for years. Never-
theless, some modern writers, notably Professor John 
Chipman Gray, have tried to explain and support the 
law of restraints on alienation solely on the ground of 
public policy, rather than the technical common-law 
rules as to estates.111 No doubt there are objections of 
114 Anonymous, Liber Assissarum, 33 Edw. III, pl. 11 (1359); Mayn 
v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 
Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., 
pl. 9 (1498); Shailard v. Baker, Cro. Eliz. 744, 78 Eng. Rep. 977 (1600). 
m Yelverton, J., in Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); 
Hussey, C. J., in Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Bord-
well, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 23 IowA L. REv. 1 at 11-13 
(1938). 
116 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443). He was con-
tending that restraints on alienation in a lease for years are void, a 
contention long since overruled. 
117 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., ll (1895); Sweet, "Re-
straints on Alienation," !13 L.Q. REv. 2!16, 243 (1917); Schnebly, "Re-
atraints upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-966 
(19!15); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. IV, Part 
II, "Rationale." Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alien-
ation since Gray," 48 HARV. L. REv. 373-374 (1935), appears to recog-
nize the inadequacy of public policy as an explanation of the law as 
it is, and Professor Schnebly's most recent study of the subject does 
likewise. "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.25 (1952). 
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public policy to a complete restraint on alienation of 
property for an extended period, but public policy alone 
does not explain the technical rules which govern re-
straints on alienation of estates in fee simple. For ex-
ample, where, as in Michigan,118 the Rule in Shelley's 
Case has been abolished, it is possible to convey a life 
estate to John Stiles, remainder in fee simple to his 
heirs, with a proviso that if John transfers his life estate 
it shall be forfeited. Professor Gray would concede the 
validity of this penalty restraint upon the alienation of 
the life estate.119 On the other hand, if land is conveyed 
to John Stiles in fee simple with a proviso that if John 
transfers an estate for his own life his estate in fee simple 
shall be forfeited and the land pass to Andrew Baker 
for the life of John and then to John's heirs, the restraint 
upon alienation is in Professor Gray's opinion, void.uo 
So far as removing land from commerce is concerned, 
one restraint has an effect which is virtually identical 
with that of the other. Public policy is no explanation 
of why one is good and the other bad. The true explana-
tion was given us five hundred years ago by Mr. Justice 
Hankford, who pointed out that the statute Quia Emp-
tores T errarum conferred an inseparable incident of 
alienability upon every estate in fee simple,121 and by 
Mr. Justice Yelverton, who pointed out that the statute 
prohibited the retention of a reversion after a fee simple 
to which the restraint on alienation could be annexed.122 
Professor Maitland remarked, "The forms of action 
we have buried, but they still rule us from their 
118 Note 89 supra. 
119 RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 72 (1895). 
1 20 I d. at 33-42. 
121 Mayn v. Cros, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Mich., pl. 6 (1412). 
12z Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443). 
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graves." 123 So it is with the doctrine of estates. The 
nineteenth century saw numerous efforts to abolish com-
mon-law rules of property, such as the Rule in Shelley's 
Case, which operate to defeat intention. The theory be-
hind such efforts seems to have been that the real, sub-
jective intention of every testator and grantor should be 
carried out fully unless the effect of its execution is con-
trary to public policy. The success of these efforts, like 
the contemporary efforts to abolish the forms of action, 
has been much qualified. We may be thankful that it 
is so. The judges of the thirteenth century remembered 
a period when great stress had been laid upon carrying 
out the intention of the donor, no matter how whimsi-
cal or capricious, unless it contravened some ill-defined 
standard of public policy. They knew the effect of such 
a stress, namely, that there can be innumerable types of 
interests in land with widely varying and doubtful inci-
dents; that the effect of a conveyance is uncertain until 
there has been litigation to determine the true intent of 
the donor and its compatibility with public policy. They 
sought to achieve simplicity and certainty as to titles by 
limiting the possible interests in land to a very few, with 
fixed and inseparable incidents. They must have known 
that, in doing so, they were defeating the intention of 
donors. But the land belongs to the living, not to the 
dead. The generation now alive should have certain 
titles and known rights of enjoyment, even at the ex-
pense of thwarting the expressed wish of some long-dead 
and half-forgotten testator or donor. The rules which 
Justices Hankford and Yelverton laid down were not un-
reasonable. The law of their day permitted perpetually 
inalienable estates in fee tail; why should it permit any 
other inalienable estate of inheritance? The owner of 
12s FoRMS OF AcrioN AT CoMMON LAW 2 (reprint 1941). 
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a reversion or vested remainder which is certain to be-
come possessory within a relatively few years has a real 
interest in the personal characteristics of the tenant in 
possession; no one else has sufficient interest to warrant 
allowing him to interfere with alienation by the tenant 
in possession. 
If the true basis of the rules governing restraints on 
alienation of estates in fee simple lies in the two pro-
visions of the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum, no such 
restraint should be valid, and Mr. Justice Littleton's ex-
.ception in Section 361 as to restraints limited to aliena-
tion to a named man, his heirs or issue, is wrong in prin-
ciple. Even if it is sound, it should not be extended to 
restraints which are more comprehensive than the ex-
amples he gives. Littleton's statement in Section 360 of 
the general invalidity of restraints on alienation of fees 
simple describes a restraint which is limited in time to 
the lifetime of the feoffee/24 Hence his statement that 
conditions which "do not take away all power of aliena-
tion" 125 are good cannot extend to restraints which are 
general in scope and limited only in duration.126 Cer-
tainly it should not be extended to the converse of the 
example given, i.e., to a restraint upon all alienation 
except to a certain person.127 
Probably because it is inconsistent with the common-
law doctrine of estates and so an unsure foundation for 
further development, Section 361 of Littleton's Tenures, 
asserting the validity of limited penalty restraints on 
alienation of estates in fee simple, has caused confusion 
124 Note llO supra. 
125 Note ll1 supra. 
126 In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801. 
127 Mr. Serjeant Bridgman in Muschamp v. Bluet, J. Bridg. 132 at 
137, 123 Eng. Rep. 1253 at 1256 (1617). 
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in the law, both in England and in this country.128 The 
Restatement of Property takes the position that a pen-
alty restraint upon alienation of a legal possessory estate 
in fee simple is valid if (1) qualified so as to permit alien-
ation to some though not all possible alienees, and (2) 
reasonable under the circumstances.129 This rule denies 
the validity of restraints which are general in scope so 
far as alienees are concerned but qualified as to dura-
tion 130 or as to manner of alienation, 131 but in other 
respects it does not provide a certain and definite stand-
ard against which to test the validity of limited restraints. 
B. RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION BY DEED 
The Michigan statutes adopt the common-law classi-
fication of estates in land into estates of inheritance, 
estates for life, estates for years, and estates at will and 
by sufferance, and establish the estate in fee simple as the 
only permissible type of estate of inheritance.132 As these 
1zs The English cases are collected in Sweet, "Restraints on Alien-
ation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236-253, 342-362 (1917); the American cases in 
Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 25-69 (1895); Schnebly, "Re-
straints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROP· 
ERTY, §§26.19 to 26.34 (1952) and the articles cited in note 107 supra. 
Much of the English confusion was eliminated by Justice Pearson's 
wise reliance in In re Rosher, [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801 on the reasoning 
in Justice Christiancy's brilliant opinion in Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 
29 Mich. 78 (1874). 
129 Sections 406, 407 (1944). This, in effect, means that a penalty 
restraint which permits alienation only to members of a very small 
group is void but one which permits alienation to anyone except mem-
bers of a relatively small group is valid. This view is supported by 
considerable American authority. Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Al-
ienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§26.31 to 26.34 
(1952). 
1so I d., §406, comment e. This view is supported by the great weight 
of American authority. Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of 
Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.19 (1952). 
131 I d., §406, comment f. See: Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Al-
ienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.34 (1952). 
132 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§l to 5; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2585 to 
2589; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4068 to 4072; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8783 
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statutory provisions were adopted verbatim from the 
New York Revised Statutes of 1830, Chancellor Kent's 
remark, "The technical language of the common law 
was too deeply rooted in our usages and institutions, to 
be materially affected by legislative enactments," 133 is 
apt. In adopting the common-law classification of 
estates, our legislature must have intended to give the 
terms the meaning they had at common law, that is, to 
adopt the common-law definitions and incidents of 
estates, except as they are modified by our statutes. So 
far as legal estates are concerned, our statutory modifica-
tions tend to increase alienability. They certainly do 
not favor restrictions upon it. The incidents of an 
estate in fee simple were fixed in part by the statute Quia 
Emptores Terrarum. The term "fee simple" has no 
meaning in the developed common law without assum-
ing that fixation. Our courts have assumed, as indeed 
they must, that by adopting the term, the statutes adopt 
the incidents of the estate as known to the developed 
common law.134 
Walton v. Torrey 135 was a suit brought by the widow 
and children of Jesse Hicks, who died in 1825 leaving 
a will directing that his land remain undivided in the 
use and occupation of his children until the youngest 
should reach twenty-one, then to be divided among them 
and the heirs of any who might die, subject to a life 
estate of the widow in the homestead and a third of the 
to 8787; How. Stat. §§5517 to 5521; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11519 to 
11523; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12921 to 12925; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1 
to 26.5; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.1 to 554.5. 
133 4 CoMMENTARIES, * 3. 
134 See Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 92 (1874). The 
will involved in this case became operative before the effective date of 
the Revised Statutes of 1846, but the Revised Statutes of 1838 had 
adopted, at least by implication, the common-law classification of es-
tates, including fees simple. Pp. 257-269. 
135 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836). 
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profits of the farm. The widow and a son who was of 
age conveyed their interests to the defendant, and the 
interest of the minor children was conveyed to the de-
fendant under license of the probate court. Chancellor 
Farnsworth denied an injunction against the defendant's 
asserting title under these conveyances, saying that the 
direction against division should not be construed as an 
attempt to inhibit any of the devisees from conveying 
whatever interest he possessed, and that provisions in 
restraint of alienation are not to be favored. The will, 
as so construed, did not purport to restrain the type of 
transfer involved, so there was no occasion for a de-
cision as to the validity of such a restraint. 
Campau v. Chene 13~ was a suit to quiet title brought 
by the heirs of Jean Baptiste Campau against the de-
visees of Gabriel Chene. In 1800 Campau conveyed the 
land in que.stion to Chene in fee simple, the deed provid-
ing that the grantee promised and obligated himself to 
pay £1000 and to support the grantor for life, 
"And for the security of the said payment of one 
thousand pounds, in the manner above mentioned, and 
for the fulfilling of the clauses and conditions here above 
expressed, the said Gabriel cannot give, alienate, ex-
change or sell the said farm or land, ... without the per-
mission or assent of the said Jean Baptiste Campau, ... 
till the payment in full of said one thousand pounds." 
The plaintiffs contended that these provisions consti-
tuted a condition subsequent and that they were en-
titled to enter for breach. The court held that the pro-
visions were not a condition but a covenant secured by a 
lien on the land, supporting its construction by the re-
mark, 
"If the covenant against alienation could be con-
1s6 1 Mich. 400 (1850). 
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sidered a condition, it would be void. For a condition 
annexed to a conveyance, in fee or devise, that the pur-
chaser should not alien, is unlawful and void. 4 Kents' 
Com. 126." 137 
Mandlebaum v. McDonell 138 was a suit to quiet title 
to land which now forms part of the site of the Federal 
Building in Detroit. John McDonell died in 1846 leav-
ing a will, executed the year before, which, as construed 
by the court, devised a legal life estate to his widow with 
legal remainder in fee simple to his four sons, an adopted 
daughter, and a grandson, 
" ... upon the express condition ... that it shall not 
be competent for any of my devisees hereinbefore named 
to either dispose of, alienate, mortgage, barter, pledge or 
transfer any portion of the real estate," 
until the grandson reached twenty-five years of age, or 
until twenty-one years from the date of the will in case 
of his death, and not then while the widow was living and 
had not remarried. During the lifetime of the widow, 
who had not remarried, and while the grandson was less 
than twenty-five years of age, the four sons, the adopted 
daughter, and the grandson executed conveyances of 
their remainder interests, under which the plaintiff 
claimed. The suit was brought after the death of the 
widow against the devisees in remainder and the ad-
ministrator cum testamento annexo of the testator, who 
denied the effectiveness of the conveyances previously 
made. 
137 ld. at 414. Relief by way of foreclosure of the lien was denied 
on the ground of laches. The citation should be to 4 Kent, CoMMEN-
TARIES, *131. This is the passage in which Chancellor Kent questions 
the soundness of Justice Littleton's approval of limited restraints on 
alienation of a fee simple. Note 113 supra. 
138 29 Mich. 78, 18 Am. Rep. 61 (1874). This case involves the effect 
of a restraint on alienation on a vested remainder in fee rather than 
on a possessory estate in fee. It is mentioned here because the ground 
of decision necessarily includes possessory estates as well as vested re-
mainders. 
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The court, in an excellently reasoned opinion by Mr. 
Justice Christiancy which has become a classic exposi-
tion of the law of restraints on alienation, determined 
that the language of the will purported to restrain 
alienation by prohibition, that is, to make conveyances 
by the devisees completely ineffective, not merely to pen-
alize them. In words broad enough to extend to all 
legal interests, the court denied the validity of such a 
prohibition, pointing out that it could have no bene-
ficiary except the devisees themselves, and that an ob-
ligation owed only to themselves could be released by 
them. "But lest this may be thought too narrow a 
ground" the opinion proceeds to a review of the develop-
ment of the English law of restraints on alienation of 
fees simple by way of penalty.139 In language reminis-
cent of Justices Hankford and Yelverton, Mr. Justice 
Christiancy rested the invalidity of such provisions upon 
the twin grounds of repugnancy to the grant, i.e., that 
they tend to deprive the estate of an inseparable inci-
dent conferred upon it by the statute Quia Emptores 
Terrarum, and lack of a reversion or remainder to which 
the benefit of the restraint can be annexed. He ques-
tioned the soundness, in principle, of Littleton's Section 
361, pointed out that it related to a restraint limited at 
all times as to alienees, and concluded, 
"But however competent it may be, under the authori-
ties, to impose upon an estate in fee, a condition against 
alienation to certain specified persons, it does not follow, 
and the authorities upon the point have no tendency to 
show, that a condition against selling such an estate at 
tall Id. at 91-107. A condition subsequent, even if valid, could not 
have penalized alienation under the peculiar facts of the case. The 
devisees were the sole heirs of the testator and so owners o£ any right 
of entry on breach of condition subsequent which he might reserve by 
his will. 
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all to any party or parties, for a long, or for any period 
of time, would be valid .... 
"We are entirely satisfied there has never been a time 
since the statute quia emptores when a restriction in a 
conveyance of a vested estate in fee simple, in possession 
or remainder, against selling for a particular period of 
time, was valid by the common law. And we think it 
would be unwise and injurious to admit into the law 
the principle contended for by the defendant's counsel, 
that such restrictions should be held valid, if imposed 
only for a reasonable time. It is safe to say that every 
estate depending upon such a question would, by the 
very fact of such a question existing, lose a large share 
of its market value. Who can say whether the time is 
reasonable, until the question has been settled in the 
court of last resort; and upon what standard of certainty 
can the court decide it? . . . The only safe rule of de-
cision is to hold, as I understand the common law for 
ages to have been, that a condition or restriction which 
would suspend all power of alienation for a single day, 
is inconsistent with the estate granted, unreasonable and 
void. 
"Certainty in the law of real estate, as to the incidents 
and nature of the several species of estates and the effect 
of the recognized instruments and modes of transfer, is of 
too much importance to be sacrificed to the unskillful-
ness, the whims or caprices of a few peculiar individuals 
in isolated cases." 140 
An earlier passage in the opinion had pointed out 
that a restraint on alienation, of the same scope and 
duration, could, perhaps, have been imposed validly by 
means of the trust device.141 The quoted language makes 
14o I d. at 97, 107. Fuller v. McKim, 187 Mich. 667, 154 N.W. 55 
(1915). involved a restraint on alienation of a fee simple general in 
scope but limited in duration. A testatrix domiciled in Michigan de-
vised in fee New York land which was subject to a twenty-year lease 
with a direction that the land should not be sold during the term of 
the existing lease. The court refused to determine the validity of this 
restraint, saying it was a question for the New York courts. See also 
Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). 
141 29 Mich. 78 at 88. See notes 548. 549. infra. 
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it clear, therefore, that the decision in Mandelbaum v. 
McDonell is not based upon any public policy favoring 
free alienability of land; it is grounded squarely upon 
the technical common-law rules of estates, rules which 
were made and which still operate to make interests in 
land certain and definite. 
Barrie v. Smith 142 did not involve a direct restraint on 
alienation, but it did raise a problem which has an im-
portant bearing upon the validity of penalty restraints 
on alienation under our statutes. The plaintiffs had con-
veyed land in fee simple by a deed providing that if the 
grantees, their heirs or assigns, should sell or keep for 
sale intoxicating liquor thereon or permit anyone under 
them to do so, title should revert to the grantors, their 
heirs and assigns, and they might re-enter. Defendant, 
a mesne purchaser from the original grantees, com-
menced operating a saloon on the land and plaintiffs 
brought ejectment to enforce their right of entry. The 
Michigan statutes provide, 
"When any conditions annexed to a grant or convey-
ance of lands are merely nominal, and evince no in-
tention of actual and substantial benefit to the party to 
whom or in whose favor they are to be performed, they 
may be wholly disregarded, and a failure to perform the 
same shall in no case operate as a forfeiture of the lands 
conveyed subject thereto." 143 
The court held that the plaintiffs could not recover 
without proof that performance of the condition would 
be of substantial benefit to them; that the benefit of 
being able to assert a right of entry upon breach was 
142 47 Mich. 130, 10 N.W. 168 (1881). 
143 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §46; Comp. Laws (1857) §2630; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4113; Comp. Laws (1897) §8828; How. Stat. §5562; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11564; Comp. Laws (1929) §12966; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §26.46; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46. 
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not in itself sufficient to validate the condition. This 
statutory provision, so interpreted, evinces a policy ana-
logous to the common-law rule that conditions in re-
straint of alienation are valid only if imposed for the 
benefit of a reversion or remainder in the lands involved. 
That the statutory rule is narrower than that of the 
common law, however, is shown by the decision of the 
court, after the plaintiffs had proved on a new trial that 
they owned a mill near the land in question and were 
interested in keeping their employees sober, that such 
a benefit, arising from ownership of land other than 
that burdened with it, was sufficient to support the con-
dition.144 The operation of the statute was narrowed 
further by a later decision that it is applicable only to 
conditions in inter vivos conveyances and does not in-
validate conditions in wills.145 Even as so limited, how-
ever, the statute may operate to invalidate some condi-
tions which, because imposed upon estates less than a 
fee simple for the benefit of a reversion or remainder in 
the same land, would be valid at common law. 
Aultman, Miller & Co. v. Pettys 146 was a suit to fore-
close a mortgage given by Daniel Pettys, who died before 
the suit was started. Before executing the mortgage, 
Pettys had entered into an ante-nuptial contract with 
144 Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). The opinion, 
by Cooley, C. J., contains dictum that a condition in general restraint 
of alienation is always void. 56 Mich. 317, 22 N.W. 818. The decision is 
criticized in Fratcher, "Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan," 
52 MICH. L. REv. 505 at 519-520 (1954). 
145 Johnson v. Warren, 74 Mich. 491, 42 N.W. 74 (1889). Another 
later decision broadens the operation of the statute beyond its express 
words by holding that the substantial benefit must continue to the 
time of breach. Abraham v. Stewart, 83 Mich. 7, 46 N.W. 1030 (1890). 
146 59 Mich. 482, 26 N.W. 680 (1886). In Mertens v. Mertens, 314 
Mich. 651, 23 N.W. (2d) 114 (1946), the court approved a provision in 
a divorce decree, inserted by consent, which forbade either party to 
dispose of the property assigned to him without the consent of the 
court. Such approval seems unsound and a dangerous precedent when 
it is recalled that for centuries most English conveyancing was done 
by means of collusive or consent judgments. 
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the defendant in which he covenanted that, if the defend-
ant survived him, his executors, administrators or as-
signs would convey the land to the defendant in fee, 
and both parties covenanted, 
"that neither party hereto, during the lifetime of the 
other party, shall bargain, sell, alien, or convey, or shall 
incumber by mortgage, lease or otherwise, the said 
premises, without being joined by the other party in 
such bargain, sale, alienation, conveyance or incum-
brance.'' 
The court affirmed a decree dismissing the bill in 
language which implies the validity of the quoted re-
straint on alienation. On its face this decision would 
appear to constitute specific enforcement of a covenant 
in general restraint of alienation of an estate in fee 
simple. Specific enforcement of such a covenant seems 
to have been denied even before the enactment of the 
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 147 If granted, it con-
verts the restraint on alienation into a prohibition which 
forces the owner to retain the land in spite of his efforts 
to transfer it, thus imposif).g much more than a penalty 
for alienation. In actuality however, the ante-nuptial 
contract was a covenant to stand seised which operated 
as a conveyance of a contingent springing use to the de-
fendant. The only thing decided was that Petty's mort-
gage could not bind his wife's contingent future in-
terest. That result would follow even if there had been 
no attempt to impose a restraint on alienation by coven-
ant. The validity of the covenant against alienation was 
not involved in the decision, and the case is not prop-
erly a precedent as to the validity or specific enforcibility 
of such a covenant. Nevertheless, it stands in the books. 
a trap for the unwary. 
147 Note 5 supra. 
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Smith v. Smith 148 was an action of ejectment brought 
by the executor of Joseph Smith, deceased. Joseph had 
executed a quit-claim deed conveying land to his son 
Thomas "and to his heirs for the use, benefit, and sup-
port of himself and his family, and the proper educa-
tion of his children," habendum, "to have and to hold 
for the period of his natural life, and after his death to 
his children in fee-simple," Thomas covenanting, 
"That he will, during the period of his natural life, 
keep and preserve the same free and clear from levies, 
liens, and incumbrances .... 
"That he will make no conveyance of any interest 
therein during the life-time of any of his children, or 
of any of his brothers and sisters." 
Thomas conveyed the land to the defendant, his wife, 
and died, leaving a will by which he devised all his land 
to the defendant. Thomas had no children. It is infer-
able from the opinion that he had brothers and sisters 
living at the time of his death. The plaintiff proceeded 
on the theory that the deed to Thomas conveyed only 
a life estate, with contingent remainder to his children. 
The court rejected this contention, holding that the 
habendum was repugnant to the grant and so void; 
that the deed conveyed to Thomas a fee simple, which 
was owned by the defendant at the time of trial. The 
opinion does not decide whether the defendant's title 
rested on her husband's deed or on his will. Neither 
court nor counsel raised the question of the validity of 
the covenants against alienation, but it may be in-
ferred that, if the habendum was void as repugnant to 
the grant, the covenants were also. The action being in 
ejectment, however, the decision is not a precedent as 
to the enforcibility of such covenants. 
148 71 Mich. 633, 40 N.W. 21 (1888). 
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Bassett v. Budlong 149 was an action of ejectment 
brought by the heirs of Annette Budlong. In 1873 
William H. Budlong had executed a quit-claim deed 
of the land to Annette, his wife, in the form usual to 
conveyance of a fee simple. Following the habendum 
the following language was inserted: 
"Provided, always, and this indenture is made (in all 
respects) upon these express conditions and reserva-
tions, that is to say: First, it is reserved that said party 
of the second part shall not, at any time during the life-
time of the said party of the first part, convey to any 
person or persons, by deed, mortgage, or otherwise, the 
whole or any part of the said premises, as above des-
cribed, without the written assent of the said party of 
the first part, or his joining in such conveyance. Second, 
it is further reserved that, in case of the decease or death 
of the said Annette Budlong, party of the second part, 
at any time before the decease or death of the said 
William H. Budlong, party of the first part, then, in 
such case, and upon such decease, the said premises, ... 
shall forthwith, upon said decease, revert back unto the 
said William H. Budlong, of the first part, and to his 
assigns forever." 
Annette predeceased her husband and he died, devis-
ing the land to the defendant. The court reversed a 
judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that, so far 
as the fee was concerned, the conveyance was intended 
to be contingent upon the wife's surviving, saying, 
''The condition in the deed that his wife should not 
convey or mortgage the land without his written assent, 
or joining in the deed, is a clear indication that the title 
should not pass, because if it was the intention that it 
should pass, and the estate vest in his wife, the condition 
would be nugatory; and no force or effect be given to 
this part of the instrument." 150 
149 77 Mich. 338, 43 N.W. 984 (1889). 
15o I d. at 347. 
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The restraint on alienation here involved was merely 
a restatement of the common-law disability of a married 
woman to convey her land without her husband's con-
sent or joinder.m That disability was removed by the 
Married Women's Act of 1855,152 and the language of the 
court just quoted is clearly a statement that a condition 
purporting to restrain the exercise of the power of 
alienation conferred by that act is void. The opinion in 
Bassett v. Budlong has sometimes been misunderstood 
to assert the validity of conditions in restraint of aliena-
tion and so qualify the opinion in Mandlebaum v. Mc-
Donell.158 It does not do so; indeed, it reasserts and ex-
tends the doctrine of that opinion. 
In re Estate of Schilling 154 was an appeal from a pro-
bate order of distribution under a will which devised 
land to four children of the testatrix and the children of 
a fifth and provided, 
"None of my said real estate shall be sold or divided 
between my said heirs before my youngest child is at 
the age of 21 years." 
151 Restated in Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 85, §25. 
15'2 "The real and personal estate of every female . . . may be con-
tracted, sold, transferred, mortgaged, conveyed, devised or bequeathed 
by her in the same manner and with like effect as if she were unmar-
ried." Act 168, P. A. 1855; Comp. Laws (1857) §3292; Comp. Laws 
(1871) §4803; Comp. Laws (1897) §8690; How. Stat. §6295; Comp. 
Laws (1915) §11485; Comp. Laws (1929) §13057; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§26.161; Comp. Laws (1948) §557.1. The power to devise and be-
queath was conferred by the Constitutions of 1850 and 1908. CoNsT. 
1850, art. 16, §5; CoNST. 1908, art. 16, §8. 
15S Note 138 supra. It was held in Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 380, 
183 N.W. 186 (1921), that Bassett v. Budlong does not overrule or 
modify Mandlebaum v. McDonell. 
154102 Mich. 612 sub nom. Moore v. Schindehette, 61 N.W. 62 
(1894). The opinion contains language (102 Mich. 617, 61 N.W. 63) 
which may mean that a restraint on alienation of a defeasibly vested 
interest is valid, even though the interest is possessory, at least so long 
as the defeasibility exists. The soundness of such a view is very ques-
tionable. See PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §§407, 411 (1944); note 370 
infra. 
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The court held that this prohibition on alienation was 
void as attempting to deprive an estate in fee of one of 
its essential features, the right to convey, and so repug-
nant to the nature of the estate. 
Howard v. McCarthy 155 was an action of ejectment 
brought by the heirs of Shepard L. Howard. In 1872 
Francis A. Howard and Abbie L. Patrick conveyed lands 
to Shepard L. Howard by separate quit-claim deeds, 
each, as to grant and habendum, in the form usual to 
conveyance of a fee simple. The following provision 
was inserted between the grant and habendum of one 
deed, 
"And it is provided that the said party of the second 
part shall not sell the above described lands and pre-
mises, but that after his decease the above described 
lands and premises shall descend to the heirs of the 
aforesaid Shepard L. Howard." 
The other deed contained a provision, inserted in the 
same position, as follows: 
"And it is hereby provided and the intention of this 
conveyance is declared to be that the said party of the 
second part shall have the use and possession only of the 
premises above conveyed, but not the power or right to 
sell the same, and after his decease the said bargained 
land and premises shall descend to the heirs of the afore-
said Shepard L. Howard." 
In 1889 Shepard L. Howard, Francis A. Howard, and 
Abbie L. Patrick joined in a conveyance of the land 
under which the defendants claimed. A judgment for 
the defen_dants was affirmed by an equally divided court. 
The justices who favored reversal thought that the deeds 
conveyed a life estate to Shepard L. Howard with con-
tingent remainder in fee to his heirs, and that the pro-
155 232 Mich. 175, 205 N.W. 169 (1925). 
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hibitions on alienation were intended only to prevent 
his destroying the contingent remainder, which he could 
not do in any event under the Michigan statutes.156 The 
justices who favored affirmance seem to have agreed with 
the defendants' contentions that the 1872 deeds con-
veyed a fee simple to Shepard L. Howard and that the 
prohibitions on alienation of that estate were void. 
Their opinion suggests that if the 1872 deeds conveyed 
only a life estate, the reversion in fee was left in Francis 
A. Howard and Abbie L. Patrick and passed by their 
joinder in the 1889 deed. The latter construction seems 
definitely unsound. The proper construction would ap-
pear to be that contended for by the defendants, that 
the 1872 deeds conveyed a fee simple and that the pro-
hibitions on alienation, although limited in duration 
to the life of the grantee, were void under the rule laid 
down in Mandlebaum v. McDonell.157 Although the 
result reached is in harmony with this view, it would 
seem unfortunate that the court did not take this op-
portunity to reaffirm the doctrine of the Mandlebaum 
case in clear and unmistakable terms. 
Porter v. Barrett 1.s8 ranks with Mandlebaum v. Mc-
Donell as a leading case on the law of restraints on alien-
ation. The plaintiffs sold land by executory contract 
to Louis Parent, who assigned his interest to Wilbratt 
Barrett with the consent of the vendors.. The contract 
provided, "This land is sold upon express condition 
that the . . . same shall never be sold or rented to a 
colored person." Barrett, by separate executory con-
1.ss Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §34, c. 65, §4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2618, 
2723; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4101, 4206; How. Stat. §§5550, 5654; 
Comp. Laws (1897) §§8816, 8958; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11552, 11690; 
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12954, 13280; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.34, 26.523; 
Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.34, 565.4. 
1.57 Note 138 supra. 
158 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267 (1925). 
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tract, sold the land to Wilson Robinson, a colored per-
son. The plaintiffs sought to assert a right of entry for 
breach of condition by summary proceedings for posses-
sion against Barrett and Robinson. A judgment for the 
defendants on procedural grounds was affirmed on the 
ground the condition was void as an illegal restraint on 
alienation of an estate in fee simple. 
The opinion of the court, written by Mr. Justice Fel-
lows, points out that the statute Quia Emptores Ter-
rarum made free alienability an inseparable incident of 
estates in fee simple and reaffirms the view of Chancellor 
Kent and Mr. Justice Christiancy that Littleton's Sec-
tion 361 and the English and American cases based upon 
it, holding valid limited restraints on alienation of a 
fee simple, are inconsistent in principle with the statute 
of Edward I. It having been ruled in Mandlebaum v. 
McDonell that a restraint general in scope but limited 
as to duration is void for this reason, it follows, by parity 
of reasoning, that a restraint limited as to alienees but 
unlimited in duration is equally inconsistent with the 
principle laid down by the statute and likewise void. 
After quoting Mr. Justice Christiancy's statement, "that 
a condition or restriction which would suspend all power 
of alienation for a single day, is inconsistent with the 
estate granted, unreasonable and void," 159 the opinion 
presses this argument to its sound and ultimate conclu-
sion in the following language: 
"Now if a restraint on alienation for a single day is 
bad, how can it be said that a restraint on alienation to 
a large class of citizens or a small one, or to even one is 
good? If it is not for the courts to determine what would 
be a reasonable time to restrain alienation, how can it 
be left to the courts to say whether a restraint on aliena-
159 Note 140 supra. 
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tion to a class is reasonable or not? We must bear in 
mind that we are not dealing with a restraint on the 
use of the premises. Such restraints unless unreasonable 
have quite uniformly been upheld. Before the sale of 
intoxicating liquor was prohibited, this court and prac-
tically every court of last resort in the Union upheld 
restraints of the use of premises for its manufacture or 
sale. Such a restraint upon the use was uniformly up-
held; but would a restraint on sale of premises to one 
who was engaged in the sale of intoxicating liquors else-
where be valid? I think not. Restraints upon the erec-
tion of manufacturing plants in residential districts have 
uniformly been upheld, but would a restraint of sale to 
one engaged in the manufacturing business be valid? I 
think not. Restraint on the occupancy of premises in 
residential districts by colored people has been upheld 
by this court. Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625.uQ Does 
it follow that a restraint upon the right to sell property 
to a colored man is valid? I think not. I think the hold-
ing and the reasons for the holding in Mandlebaum v. 
McDonell, supra, precludes us from sustaining as valid 
the restrictions before us.161 
1oo 188 N.W. 330 (1922). Michigan adhered to the rule that a re-
striction against occupancy by members of a particular race is valid 
and specifically enforceable until overruled on constitutional grounds 
by the United States Supreme Court. In Schulte v. Starks, 238 Mich. 
102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927) a provision, "that the granted premises 
shall not be sold, rented or leased to any person or class of persons 
whose ownership or occupancy would be mjurious to the locality," 
was enforced by an injunction against occupancy by colored persons. 
The opinion reiterates the rule in Porter v. Barrett that restraint on 
alienation to members of a racial group is void as such. Northwest 
Civic Association v. Sheldon, 317 Mich. 416, 27 N.W. (2d) 36 (1947); 
Mrsa v. Reynolds, 317 Mich. 632, 27 N.W. (2d) 40 (1947); Sipes v. 
McGhee, 316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947), reversed, McGhee 
v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948); Malicke v. Milan, 320 Mich. 
65, 30 N.W. (2d) 440 (1948), reversed in conformity to the decision 
in McGhee v. Sipes, 320 Mich. 77, 32 N.W. (2d) 353 (1948). Cf. 
Kathan v. Stevenson, 307 Mich. 485, 12 N.W. (2d) 332 (1943); Kathan 
v. Williams, 309 Mich. 219, 15 N.W. (2d) 137 (1944); Gableman v. 
Dept. of Conservation, 309 Mich. 416, 15 N.W. (2d) 689 (1944); Saari 
v. Silvers, 319 Mich. 591, 30 N.W. (2d) 286 (1948). 
161 233 Mich. 373 at 382-383, 206 N.W. 532. The opinion in Porter 
v. Barrett treats the condition against alienation as if it were annexed 
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In Braun v. Klug 162 the defendants conveyed land to 
the plaintiffs in fee simple by a deed which provided, 
"grantees herein specifically covenant and agree that 
the above property will not be sold to anyone except 
grantors herein or their heirs, representatives or as-
signs. It is agreed that this covenant shall run with the 
land." The Court held "the condition in the deed - - -
is repugnant to the grant and a restraint on the inherent 
right of alienation and therefore void." This decision 
completed the development of the Michigan law of 
restraints on alienation by holding that a covenant in 
restraint of alienation is void where a condition sub-
sequent would be invalid. 
At common law a conveyance in fee simple to two or 
to a conveyance of a legal possessory estate in fee simple, whereas it 
actually was a provision of an executory land contract. It was later 
decided in Sloman v. Cutler, 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932), notes 
716, 719, infra, that a provision in an executory land contract against 
assignment without the consent of the vendor is valid, at least for some 
purposes. Such a provision against assignment is, however, inserted 
for the protection of the vendor's quasi-reversionary interest. The re-
straint in Porter v. Barrett was intended to be inserted in the deed 
given pursuant to the contract, for the benefit not of the vendor's 
interest but of other lands in the vicinity. Moreover, there was no 
assignment in Porter v. Barrett. 
Act 230, P.A. 1897, Comp. Laws (1897) §§7618 to 7638; Comp. Laws 
(1915) §§10034 to 10056; Comp. Laws (1929) §§10304 to 10326; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §§21.661 to 21.683; Comp. Laws (1948) §§455.1 to 455.24, 
authorizes the organization of corporations to hold property for sum-
mer resort or park purposes, permits their by-laws to prohibit transfer 
of stock without the consent of the board of directors, and provides 
that lands "assigned, allotted, or confirmed" to stockholders shall be 
deemed appurtenant to the stock and not transferable separately. In 
In re Berry, (D.C. Mich. 1917) 247 F. 700, Judge Tuttle expressed the 
view that this statute permitted such a corporation to convey land to 
stockholders in fee simple subject to a condition subsequent providing 
for forfeiture upon alienation separately from the stock or contrary to 
the rules of the corporation governing transfer of stock. It seems im-
probable that the legislature intended to authorize such a fettered fee 
simple. The language of the statute seems to contemplate that the 
corporation shall retain the fee and give stockholders only leases or 
licenses. 
162 335 Mich. 692, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953). 
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more persons created a joint tenancy unless it specified 
that they were to hold as tenants in common.m If one 
joint tenant died, the survivor or survivors took the 
whole, and this right of survivorship could not be cut 
off by the will of the tenant so dying.164 If, however, one 
joint tenant made an inter vivos conveyance, the joint 
tenancy was severed, and the transferee took an un-
divided interest as tenant in common which was not 
subject to the right of survivorship and could, there-
fore, be transmitted by will.165 The Michigan statutes 
change the common-law presumption, so that a convey-
ance to two or more persons creates a tenancy in com-
mon "unless expressly declared to be in joint tenancy," 
but provide that the nature and properties of estates in 
joint tenancy and in common, "shall continue to be 
such as are now established by law, except so far as the 
same may be modified by the provisions" of the sta-
tutes.166 
Smith v. Smith 167 involved a transaction in which J. 
N. Smith conveyed land to a straw party who at once 
conveyed in fee simple to J. N. Smith and D. R. Smith 
as joint tenants by a deed which provided, 
1ss Littleton, TENURES §277 (1481). 
164 I d., §287. See Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a, 76 Eng. 
Rep. 684 (1591). 
165 Littleton, TENURES §§292, 294. 
166 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§43, 44; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2627, 2628; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4110, 4111; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8825, 8826; 
How. Stat. §§5559, 5560; Comp. Laws (1915) §§II561, ll562; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §§12963, 12964; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.43, 26.44; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§554.43, 554.44. 
167 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411, 124 A.L.R. 215 (1939). The joint 
tenancy in fee simple involved in this case must be distinguished from 
a joint tenancy for life with contingent remainder in fee to the 
survivor. In the latter case one tenant cannot cut off the remainder. 
Schultz v. Brohl, 116 Mich. 603, 74 N.W. 1012 (1898); Finch v. Haynes, 
144 Mich. 352, 107 N.W. 910 (1906); Ames v. Cheyne, 290 Mich. 215, 
287 N.W. 439 (1939); Rowerdink v. Carothers, 334 Mich. 454, 54 N.W. 
(2d) 715 (1952); Danahey, "The Confusing Right of Survivorship," 32 
MICH. ST. BAR J. L. 14-17 (Feb. 1953). 
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"It is a part of the consideration for which this deed 
is given that neither of the parties of the second part 
hereto shall or can sell, deed, mortgage, or in any way 
incumber or dispose of his interest in said premises or 
any part thereof without the consent of the other party 
in writing." 
J. N. Smith, without the consent of his cotenant, con-
veyed his interest to the defendant, and later died. D. R. 
Smith claimed title to the whole by survivorship, argu-
ing that the prohibition on alienation was valid be-
cause annexed to and for the benefit of another interest 
in the same land. This argument assumed, of course, 
that the only basis for the common-law rule against re-
straints on alienation on estates in fee simple was the 
provision of the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum pro-
hibiting reversions or remainders on such an estate. As 
has been seen, the rule has two bases, the other being 
that the statute makes alienability an inseparable in-
cident of every estate in fee simple. The court, recogniz-
ing the latter basis of the rule, held that the prohibition 
on alienation "was repugnant to the grant and a re-
straint on the inherent right of alienation and therefore 
void." 168 Accordingly, J. N. Smith's conveyance to the 
defendant gave her an undivided half of the land as 
tenant in common in fee simple, and her estate was not 
cut off by the failure of J. N. Smith to survive his for-
1 68 290 Mich. 157, 287 N.W. 416. Accord as to result: PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT §406, comment c (1944). In Portage Grange No. 16 v. 
Portage Lodge No. 340, 141 Mich. 402, 104 N.W. 667 (1905), the grange 
leased a lodge room to the lodge for use in common by them, the 
lease providing that the room should not be rented to any other lodge 
without the consent of both lessor and lessee. The grange rented the 
room to another society without the lodge's consent and sued the 
lodge in equity for an injunction against interference with the new 
tenant's use of the room. A decree for the defendant was affirmed, the 
court assuming without discussion that the restraint on alienation was 
valid. The opinion does not state whether the grange owned a fee 
simple or some lesser estate. See note 388 infra. 
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mer cotenant. The court was careful to point out that, 
inasmuch as one tenant by the entirety is disabled by 
law from alienating his interest without the concur-
rence of his cotenant,169 the decision does not extend 
to estates held by the entirety. 
As to restraints on alienation of possessory estates in 
fee simple by way of prohibition or penalty of forfeiture, 
Michigan has achieved that clarity and certainty which 
was the dream of the judges of the thirteenth century. 
All such restraints, whether general in scope and un-
limited in duration or limited as to duration or alienees, 
are void. The law as to the validity and specific enforci-
bility of covenants or contracts imposing like restraints 
has not been so fully worked out, but the decisions made 
point to the same result: all restraints on alienation of 
estates in fee simple are void. The fettered inheritances 
permitted by the statute De Donis Conditionalibus have 
been eliminated and the confusion in the law introduced 
by Section 361 of Littleton's treatise has been dispelled. 
To paraphrase Sir Edward Coke's nostalgic reference to 
the good old days before De Donis Conditionalibus, we 
have attained a state of the law in which purchasers are 
sure of their purchases, tenants of their leases, and credit-
ors of their debts.m 
C. RESTRAINTS ON TESTATION AND DESCENT 
In the process by which the mediaeval judges limited 
the number and fixed the incidents of the possible 
estates in land, they developed rules of descent for estates 
of inheritance.171 In the place of widely varying modes 
169 Naylor v. Minock, 96 Mich. 182, 55 N.W. 664 (1893); Dickey v. 
Converse, 117 Mich. 449, 76 N.W. 80 (1898). Accord: PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT §406, comment C (1944). 
170 1 INSTITUTES 19b. 
171 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 171-185 (1923). 
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of inheritance prescribed by custom or the form of 
gifts, they strove to establish a uniform canon of descent, 
applicable to all estates of inheritance. The statute De 
Donis Conditionalibus partially thwarted this process of 
unification and simplification so far as entails were con-
cerned, but it did not prevent the creation of a single 
rule of inheritance applicable to every estate in fee 
simple.172 This rule of inheritance became, like alien-
ability inter vivos, an inseparable incident of the estate. 
Any attempt to deprive an estate in fee simple of herit-
ability or to endow it with a peculiar mode of descent 
not following the course fixed by the general law, is re-
pugnant to the grant and void.173 The Michigan statutes 
governing descent are so worded as to suggest that they 
make heritability according to the statute an inseparable 
incident of every estate in fee simple.174 Consequently, it 
may be predicted that the Michigan courts will hold void 
any provision of a conveyance or devise in fee simple 
17 2 This statement must be qualified by an admission that a few pe-
culiar local customs of descent, such as gavelkind and borough Eng-
lish, did survive. Id. at 256-275. Scrutton, LAND IN FETIERS 53-64 
(1886). 
1 73 "The law of England has from the earliest times prohibited the 
introduction of new modes of devolution of property by operation of 
law. Of course a man can direct his property to go according to any 
series of limitations that he pleases, but he cannot create a new mode 
of devolution by operation of law. If there be a gift in fee, for in-
stance, the donor cannot say that in the event of the donee dying 
intestate, the estate shall descend not to his eldest, but to his youngest 
son . . . That is, a man cannot give property absolutely, and at the 
same time say it shall not devolve according to law." Jessel, M. R., 
in In re Wilcocks' Settlement [1875] 1 Ch. Div. 229 at 231. Accord: 
In re Irwin's Estate, Irwin v. Jacobs, 335 Mich. 143, 55 N. W. (2d) 769 
(1952). And see Johnson v. Whiton, 159 Mass. 424, 34 N.E. 542 (1893). 
1 74 "When any person shall die seized of any lands, tenements or 
hereditaments, or of any right thereto, or entitled to any interest 
therein in fee simple ... , not having lawfully devised the same, they 
shall descend," etc. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 67, §1; Comp. Laws (1857) §2812; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §4309; How. Stat. §5772a; Comp. Laws (1897) 
§9064; Comp. Laws (1915) §11795; Comp. Laws (1929) §13440; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (150); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.80. 
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which would operate to deprive the estate of its incident 
of heritability or change the course of inheritance fixed 
by law. 
The statute Quia Emptores Terrarum did not make 
transmissibility by will an incident of the estate in fee 
simple and, as has been seen, legal freehold estates in 
land were not devisable under the Plantagenets. It is 
probable that one of the reasons why the courts did 
not enforce wills of land is that they would interfere 
with the uniform scheme of inheritance which the courts 
had annexed as an inseparable incident to every estate 
in fee simple. 
The Statute of Wills provided that any person hav-
ing solely, as co-parcener or in common, an estate in 
fee simple, 
"from the twentieth day of July in the year of our 
Lord God M.D.XL. shall have full and free liberty, 
power and authority to give, dispose, will and devise, as 
well by his last will and testament in writing, or other-
wise by act or acts lawfully executed in his life, all his 
said manors, lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any 
of them, at his free will and pleasure; any law, statute 
or other thing heretofore had, made or used to the con-
trary notwithstanding." 175 
The wording of the Statute of Wills indicates that it 
was intended to make devisability an inseparable in-
175 Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1, §1 (1540), as explained by Stat. 34 & 35 
Hen. VIII, c. 5 §§3, 4 (1542); see note 15 supra. Section 14 of the 
explanatory act provided that wills of land made by married women 
should not be good or effectual. The Michigan statute of wills is 
similar. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 68, §1; Comp Laws (1857) §2825; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4322; amended Act 15, P.A. 1873; How. Stat. §5785; Comp. 
Laws (1897) §9262; Comp. Laws (1915) §11817; Comp. Laws (1929) 
§13478; Mich. Stat. Ann., §27.3178 (71); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.1. As 
originally enacted in 1846 the statute permitted married women to 
make wills only with the consent of their husbands. This disability 
was removed by the Constitution of 1850, and the Married Women's 
Act of 1855, note 152 supra. The earlier Michigan statutes of wills 
were Act Jan. 31, 1809, 2 L. TERR. MicH. 13; Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 270. 
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cident of every estate in fee simple, just as the statute 
Quia Emptores Terrarum made alienability inter vivos 
an inseparable incident of every such estate, and it has 
been so interpreted. A restraint on transmission of an 
estate in fee simple by will is void if a like restraint on 
inter vivos alienation would be. 
If land is conveyed or devised in fee simple, a gift 
over upon the death of the first taker if he fails to dis-
pose of the land by will is clearly void.m It restrains 
alienation by deed during the life of the first taker and 
deprives the estate of the essential incident of herit-
ability. If Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles, his 
heirs and assigns, "but any part undisposed of by the 
will of John shall pass, at John's death to Lucy Baker, 
her heirs and assigns," the executory limitation to Lucy 
is void. If valid, it would prevent John from conveying 
in fee by deed and would prevent his heirs from taking 
if he died intestate. Conversely, if land is conveyed or 
devised in fee simple, a gift over upon the death of the 
first taker if he fails to dispose of the land by deed is 
void at common law.177 It deprives the estate of the es-
sential incidents of heritability and of devisability. If 
John Stiles devises land to his wife Lucy, her heirs and 
assigns, "but what remains undisposed of at her death 
shall pass to our children," the executory limitation to 
the children is void. Moreover, if land is conveyed or 
devised in fee simple, a gift over upon the death of the 
first taker if he fails to dispose of the land by deed or 
176 Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.37 (1952). 
177 Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 43-48 (1895); Schnebly, 
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §§26.41 to 26.44 (1952); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the 
Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1198-1199 
(1935). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §406, comment f. 
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will is also void at common law.178 It attempts to de-
prive the estate of the essential incident of heritability. 
Although, as has been seen, the true reason why an 
executory interest cutting off a fee simple on failure of 
its holder to alienate is invalid is that it is a restraint on 
alienation by descent, devise or both, the courts have 
commonly relied upon the very different reason that, 
as such an executory interest would be destructible by 
the first taker, it would violate the rule that executory 
interests are indestructible. New York and Michigan 
have statutes authorizing the creation of destructible 
executory interests.179 There is some authority in New 
York for the proposition that these statutory provisions 
validate a gift over on failure of the first taker of an 
estate in fee simple to alienate by deed.180 There is no 
Michigan authority for this proposition and the Mich-
igan cases about to be discussed make it clear that these 
statutes have not changed the common law on this point 
here. 
] ones v. Jones 181 was a suit to construe a will which 
devised the testator's estate to his widow, 
"to have, hold, use, and enjoy the same, as she may 
178 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d 
ed., 48-69 (1895), Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Prop-
erty," 6 AMERicAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.42 (1952) and Schnebly, 
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 
1186 at 1198-1207 (1935). Professors Gray and Schnebly question the 
soundness of the rule because it is not explicable by their theory that 
the law of restraints on alienation is based wholly upon a public 
policy favoring free alienability of land. Accord with the rule: PROP-
ERTY RESTATEMENT §27, Comment f (1936), §406, comment g (1944). 
Annotation 17 A.L.R. (2d) 7-227 (1951). 
1.79 N.Y. Real Property Law, §57; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §33; Comp. 
Laws (1857) §2617; Comp. Laws (1871) §4100; Comp. Laws (1897) 
§8815; How. Stat., §5549; Comp. Laws (1915) §11551; Comp. Laws 
(1929) §12953; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.33; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.33. 
180 Vincent v. Rix, 248 N.Y. 76, 161 N.E. 425 (1928). Contra: Till-
man v. Ogren, 227 N.Y. 495, 125 N.E. 821 (1920). 
18125 Mich. 401 (1872). 
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see fit, and in all respects the same as though it was hers 
absolutely and without any limitation or reversion, for 
and during her natural life. 
"And after the death of my said wife, it is my will, 
that my estate . . . that shall remain, should be distrib-
uted in manner following, to wit: (three quarters to 
named persons and a society); and the remaining one-
fourth of said estate I desire that my said wife shall dis-
pose of as she sees fit; the division, however, not to take 
place until after her death. 
"If my said wife shall desire to make sale of any of 
my said real estate, in her use and enjoyment of it dur-
ing her life, it is my will and desire that she have, and 
I hereby give her, full power and authority to make such 
sale, and to give all necessary deeds of conveyance there-
of, and to receive the consideration therefor, to be used 
as aforesaid by her during her life." 
The court held that the intention expressed in the 
will was to give the widow the entire estate in fee simple 
absolute and that the second paragraph quoted above 
was merely a precatory expression of what the testator 
hoped she would do with three quarters of the property 
when she was through with it. The court said, however, 
that if the second quoted paragraph "should be con-
sidered as covering a gift of what should remain, it 
would be void, as inconsistent with the absolute estate, 
or jus disponendi, previously given." If, as the court 
thought, the testator intended to give his widow a fee 
simple, this dictum is correct, for the second quoted para-
graph of the will would operate to deprive the estate 
of its inseparable incidents of heritability and devis-
ability and so be a void restraint on alienation. That is, 
a gift over on failure of the first taker to alienate inter 
vivos is repugnant to a grant or devise in fee simple. 
The dictum in ]ones v. jones has been misunderstood 
and has served as the foundation for a line of cases hold-
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ing or assuming that there cannot be a remainder fol-
lowing a life estate if the life tenant is given unlimited 
power of inter vivos disposition of the fee.182 The theory 
of these cases, based on authority in other jurisdictions, 
is that a gift of a life estate plus an unlimited power of 
disposition inter vivos, as a matter of law, and without 
regard to the intention expressed, operates to convey a 
common-law estate in fee simple. If this premise were 
sound in Michigan, the conclusion drawn by the cases 
would be correct, i.e., that a gift over on failure of a 
tenant in fee simple to alienate inter vivos is a void re-
straint on heritability and devisability. In Michigan, 
1s2 Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890) (personalty; 
power held limited and so assumed rule of Jones v. Jones inapplicable); 
Jones v. Deming, 91 Mich. 481, 51 N.W. 1119 (1892) (realty; same as 
preceding); Gadd v. Stoner, 113 Mich. 689, 71 N.W. 1111 (1897) 
(realty; same as preceding); In re Mallory's Estate, 127 Mich. 119, 86 
N.W. 541, 89 N.W. 348 (1901) (same as preceding); Dills v. La Tour, 
136 Mich. 243, 98 N.W. 1004 (1904) (realty; gift over held void on 
the basis of the assumed rule of Jones v. Jones); Moran v. Moran, 143 
Mich. 322, 106 N.W. 206 (1906) (same as preceding); Killefer v. Bassett, 
146 Mich. 1, 109 N.W. 21 (1906) (same as preceding); Turnbull v. 
Leavitt, 158 Mich. 545, 123 N.W. 43 (1909); Farlin v. Sanborn, 161 Mich. 
615, 126 N.W. 634 (1910) (same as Jones v. Deming); Bateman v. 
Case, 170 Mich. 617, 136 N.W. 590 (1912) (same as preceding); White 
v. Grand Rapids &: Indiana Ry. Co., 190 Mich. 1, 155 N.W. 719 (1915) 
(same as Dills v. La Tour); Laberteaux v. Gale, 196 Mich. 150, 162 
N.W. 968 (1917) (same as Jones v. Deming); Gibson v. Gibson, 213 
Mich. 31, 181 N.W. 41 (1921) (same as Dills v. La Tour). In Quarton 
v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 229 N.W. 465 (1930) the court refused to 
apply the assumed rule in Jones v. Jones to facts similar to those in 
Dills v. La Tour and Gibson v. Gibson. Although it was suggested in 
274 Mich. xxxv (1936) that Quartan v. Barton overruled the doctrine, 
the opinion in that case does not do so in terms. Cf. In re Moor's 
Estate, 163 Mich. 353, 12~ N.W. 198 (1910); Chamberlain v. Husel, 
178 Mich 1, 144 N.W. 549 (1913); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352, 
38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949); Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. 1, 46 
N.W. (2d) 437 (1951); Hollway v. Atherton, 205 Mich. 129, 171 N.W. 
413 (1919); Grover v. Wood, 337 Mich. 467, 60 N.W. (2d) 316 (1953). 
In New York [Leggett v. Firth, 132 N.Y. 7, 29 N.E. 950 (1892)] 
and, by the great weight of authority, at common law, a remainder 
of an estate for life is valid even if the life tenant has unlimited power 
to dispose of the fee. Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of 
Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.47b (1952). 
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however, the premise is not sound because our statutes 
provide that when an unlimited power of disposition 
of the fee inter vivos is given to a life tenant, 
"such estate shall be changed into a fee, absolute in 
respect to the rights of creditors and purchasers, but 
subject to any future estates limited thereon, in case 
the power should not be executed, .... " 183 
This statutory fee is not a common-law fee simple, and 
the gift over on failure of the life tenant to alienate 
inter vivos is not repugnant to the statutory fee because 
the statute says that it is not. This line of cases is, then, 
a correct exposition of the law of restraints on aliena-
tion of common-law estates in fee simple, but it reaches 
a result contrary to the language of our statutes. 
Robinson v. Finch 184 was a suit to construe a will. One 
clause devised the residue to Thomas Weldon; the next 
provided that if Thomas should die leaving no wife and 
children, the property not used by him or for his edu-
cation or benefit should pass to named persons. Thomas 
died without wife or children. The court held that the 
gift over was valid. The decision is probably sound and in 
accordance with the general rule in like cases, inasmuch 
as the defeasibility of Thomas's estate was not condi-
tioned on his failure to alienate but on his death without 
wife or children, a common contingency upon which 
to base an executory limitation. The mere fact that he 
had a limited power of disposition free of the defeas-
1&a Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§9, 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666, 2670; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4149, 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864, 8868; 
How. Stat. §§5598, 5602; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11600, 11604; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §§13003, 13007; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.99, 26.103; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§556.9, 556.13 . 
. 184 116 Mich. 180, 74 N.W. 472 (1898). 
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ibility of his estate in general should not invalidate the 
executory limitation.185 
There is dictum in Mandlebaum v. McDonell 186 that 
"a man cannot by contract render his will irrevocable 
during his life, for it is of the very essence of a will to 
be revocable until death." Strictly speaking, this state-
ment is correct. Notwithstanding a contract against re-
vocation, a testator can revoke his will and the revoked 
will is no longer eligible for probate.187 Nevertheless, 
the English courts have long recognized the validity of 
a contract to transfer property by will. Such a contract 
could be enforced by an action at law for breach against 
the executor of the deceased promisor,188 or by a suit 
in equity to compel the heir or devisee of the promisor 
to hold the property upon constructive trust for the 
promisee or beneficiary of the promise.189 The Michigan 
decisions are to the same effect. If the owner of land, 
for an adequate consideration, contracts to devise it to 
the other party to the contract and does not do so, the 
promisee can compel the transferee, devisee, or heir of 
the promisor to convey the land to him.190 And a con-
.185 See Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 
44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Aliena· 
tion of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §26.47a (1952). But 
see §26.44. 
1ss 29 Mich. 78 at 91 (1874). See Mertens v. Mertens, 314 Mich. 651 
at 658, 23 N.W. (2d) 114 (1946). 
187 Hobson v. Blackburn, 1 Add. 274, 162 Eng. Rep. 96 (1822); 
Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932). See Eicholtz v. 
Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666 at 675-676, 21 N.W. (2d) 914 (1946). 
188 Silvester's Case, Poph. 148, 79 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1619). 
1 89 Goilmere v. Battison, 1 Vern. 48, 23 Eng. Rep. 301 (1682); 
Fortescue v. Hennah, 19 Ves. Jr. 67, 34 Eng. Rep. 443 (1812); Cf. Lord 
Walpole v. Earl of Orford, 3 Ves. Jr. 402, 30 Eng. Rep. 1076 (1797); 
Cochran v. Graham, 19 Ves. Jr. 63, 34 Eng. Rep. 442 (1811). 
l9o Bird v. Pope, 73 Mich. 483, 41 N.W. 514 (1889); Jolls v. Burgess, 
252 Mich. 437, 233 N.W. 372 (1930). See Faxton v. Faxton, 28 Mich. 
159 (1873); Sword v. Keith, 31 Mich. 247 (1875); De Moss v. Robin-
son, 46 Mich. 62, 8 N.W. 712 (1881). There are numerous later cases 
which assume the validity of contracts to make a will. E.g., Kelley v. 
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tract to transmit property by will is enforcible by a bene-
ficiary who is not a party to the contract.191 Contracts 
of the latter type usually are in the form of agreements 
not to revoke a joint or mutual will. As has been seen, 
such a contract does not prevent the revocation of the 
will, but it does subject the devisee under a subsequent 
will to a constructive trust for the benefit of the devisee 
under the joint or mutual will.192 Moreover, a contract 
by an owner of land not to convey or devise it and to 
allow it to descend to his heirs is specifically enforcible 
by the heirs.193 
In form, a contract to make a will, not to revoke a will, 
or not to make a will is a serious restraint on alienation 
of an estate in fee simple, particularly when it is con-
strued to restrain inter vivos alienation by the pro-
misor.194 Upon analysis, however, it is seen that such 
Dodge, 334 Mich. 499, 54 N.W. (2d) 730 (1952); Coull v. Piatt, 337 
Mich. 334, 60 N.W. (2d) 157 (1953). In Mertens v. Mertens, 314 Mich. 
651, 23 N.W. (2d) II4 (1946), a provision in a divorce decree requir-
ing the husband to make a will and leave it unchanged was held 
improper in the absence of a voluntary contract to do so. Such a 
provision is proper, however, if it confirms a voluntary property settle-
ment. Kull v. Losch, 328 Mich. 519, 44 N.W. (2d) 169 (1950). 
191 Carmichael v. Carmichael, 72 Mich. 76, 40 N.W. 173 (1888); 
Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156 (1930); Getchell v. 
Tinker, 291 Mich. 267, 289 N.W. 156 (1939). See Elmer v. Elmer, 271 
Mich. 517, 260 N.W. 759 (1935). In such cases however, the parties to 
the contract may rescind or modify it without the consent of the bene-
ficiary. Sage v. Sage, 230 Mich. 477, 203 N.W. 90 (1925); Phelps v. 
Pipher, 320 Mich. 663, 31 N.W. (2d) 836 (1948); Rose v. Southern 
Michigan National Bank, 328 Mich. 639, 44 N.W. (2d) 192 {1950). 
t92 Keasey v. Engles, 259 Mich. 178, 242 N.W. 878 (1932). See 
Eicholtz v. Grunewald, 313 Mich. 666 at 675-676, 21 N.W. (2d) 914 
(1946). 
19a Ruch v. Ruch, 159 Mich. 231, 124 N.W. 52 (1909). 
194 In Fortescue v. Hennah, note 189 supra, the contract was con-
strued as not inhibiting inter vivos alienation. In Carmichael v. Car-
michael, note 191 supra, Bird v. Pope, note 190 supra, Ruch v. Ruch, 
note 193 supra, Jolls v. Burgess, note 190 supra, and Getchell v. Tinker, 
note 191 supra, the contracts were construed to restrain inter vivos 
transfer and enforced against the transferees. See Klever v. Klever, 333 
Mich. 179, 52 N.W. {2d) 653 (1952); Trisch v. Fairman, 334 Mich. 
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a contract is not intended to and does not operate to re-
strain alienation by an owner in fee simple. It is merely 
an executory land contract binding the promisor to con-
vey in the future by a particular mode of conveyance. 
An executory land contract operates to create an equit-
able estate, usually contingent or defeasible, in the pur-
chaser. This type of contract creates an equitable future 
interest in the beneficiary. The promisor is not re-
strained from alienating his retained legal interest, but 
any transfer which he makes is subject to the equitable 
future interest of the contract beneficiary. The decisions 
relative to these contracts, therefore, do not qualify the 
general rule that restraints on the heritability or devisi-
bility of estates in fee simple are void. 
D. RESTRAINTS ON PARTITION AND DIVISION 
At common law, joint tenants and tenants in common, 
because each had full power of inter vivos alienation of 
his interest, could partition their land by voluntary ac-
tion. One joint tenant or tenant in common could not, 
however, compel partition.195 A statute of 1539 em-
powered such a tenant to do so, by action at law or suit 
in equity, in language which would seem to be designed 
to annex the power to such estates as an inseparable in· 
cident.196 Nevertheless, the English courts appear to be 
willing to enforce at least some restraints on compulsory 
partition, 197 and the American courts are in conflict as 
432, 54 N.W. (2d) 621 (1952). If the contract is construed as not 
inhibiting inter vivos alienation the promisor is left with a life estate 
and an unlimited power of disposition inter vivos, which raises the 
problem involved in the cases cited in note 182 supra . 
. 1os Littleton, TENURES §§290, 318 (1481). A parcener could compel 
partition. Id., §241. 
l.96 31 Hen. VIII, c. 1, §2 (1539). 
l.97 Peck v. Cardwell, 2 Beav. 137, 48 Eng. Rep. 1131 (1839). Cf. Abel 
v. Heathcote, 2 Ves. Jr. 98, 30 Eng. Rep. 542 (1793). 
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to the validity of such restraints.198 The Restatement of 
Property takes the position that a restraint on voluntary 
partition is no more valid than any other restraint on 
alienation of a fee simple, but that a restraint upon the 
power to compel partition is valid if limited in duration 
to a reasonable time.199 "Reasonable time" is defined 
as lives in being or twenty-one years.200 As Professor 
Gray has pointed out, 201 a restraint upon compulsory 
partition is not, strictly speaking, a restraint on aliena-
tion because it does not deprive the owner of an interest 
of the power to transfer what he has or penalize him for 
doing so. Yet it is a severe indirect restraint on aliena-
tion and, if the statutes of partition are intended to make 
the power to compel partition an inseparable incident 
of every joint tenancy and tenancy in common, enforce-
ment of restraints on that power is inconsistent in prin-
ciple with the treatment of restraints on alienation. 
The Michigan statutes provide, "All persons holding 
lands as joint tenants or tenants in common, may have 
partition thereof, .... " 202 The decision in Smith v. 
Smith 203 that a restraint on the power of a joint tenant 
198 The cases are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 
24-25 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 
6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §26.74 (1952); Manning, "The Develop-
ment of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. L. REv. 373 at 
393-394 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal 
Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186, 1380 at 1397-1403 (1935). Restraints 
on compulsory partition have usually been held valid if limited in 
duration to the period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 
199 Sections 173 (1936), 412 (1944). 
zoo Section 173, comment c (1936). 
201 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 25 (1895). 
2°2 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 109, §I; Comp. Laws (1857) §4616; Comp. Laws 
(1871) §6266; How. Stat. §7850; Comp. Laws (1897) §11013; Comp. 
Laws (1915) §13258; Comp. Laws (1929) §14995; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§27.2012; Comp. Laws (1948) §631.1. The earlier statutes were Act 
April 24, 1820, 1 L. TERR. MICH. 633, Act April 12, 1827, 2 id., 388; 
Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 481. 
zo3 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411 (1939), note 167 supra. · 
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in fee simple to sever the tenancy by conveying his in-
terest is void would seem to indicate that no restraint 
could be imposed in this state upon voluntary parti-
tion, by joint tenants or tenants in common. If all of 
the cotenants convey their interests in the entire tract 
to a third person who conveys separate parts of the tract 
in severalty to each of them, partition would be accom-
plished even if there could be a valid restraint on their 
releasing directly to each other. The Michigan law as 
to restraints on the statutory power of one joint tenant 
or tenant in common to compel his cotenants to submit 
to partition against their wishes is not so clear. 
In Walton v. Torrey 204 a provision in a will devising 
land to children that it should "remain undivided in the 
use, occupation and possession of all my children now 
living, until the youngest attains the age of 21 years" was 
held not to prevent all of the devisees from conveying 
to a third party. There was no occasion for determining 
the validity of the provision as a restraint on partition, 
voluntary or compulsory, but the decision demonstrates 
the ineffectiveness, if not the invalidity, of a restraint 
on voluntary partition. 
Avery v. Payne 205 was a suit for partition under the 
statute. The defendant had conveyed an undivided half 
of a large tract of land to the plaintiff, the sole considera-
tion being a mortgage on the interest conveyed securing 
a bond for payment to the defendant of $25,000 from the 
proceeds of sales of the land and a collateral contract by 
which the plaintiff agreed to manage the subdivision 
and sale of the land. The suit for partition was com-
menced some eight years after the execution of this con-
veyance and while much of the tract remained unsold. 
204 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1836), note 135 supra. 
2os 12 Mich. 540 (1864). 
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The court denied partition on the ground that it would 
be inconsistent with the contract, saying, 
"We think the statute can only be considered impera-
tive in its application to ordinary joint tenancies or ten-
ancies in common, where the right of partition is left to 
result as an ordinary legal incident of such tenancy; and 
that it was never intended to intefere with contracts be-
tween such tenants modifying or limiting this otherwise 
incidental right; nor to render it incompetent for parties 
to make such contracts, either at the time of the creation 
of the tenancy or afterwards." 206 
Eberts v. Fisher 207 was a suit to terminate a lease and 
compel partition brought by four of eleven devisees of 
the reversion against the lessees, who had acquired the 
interests of the other seven devisees of the reversion. The 
lease, made in 1860 by the devisor, who died in 1876, 
provided that it should run until 1880 and should be 
extended automatically to 1890 unless the reversioners 
elected in 1880 to pay the lessees for improvements made 
by them. The reversioners did not so elect in 1880 but 
instead brought this suit, contending that the lease was 
forfeited by breach of several conditions. The court 
held that there had been no breach of the conditions of 
the lease and denied partition, saying, 
"As a general rule it is a matter of right for a tenant 
in common of lands to have partition. But this rule is 
not of universal application. A party may enter into such 
agreements with his co-tenant as to estop him from en-
forcing the right of partition. This principle was recog-
nized and applied in Avery v. Paine) 12 Mich. 540; and 
when in this case, instead of terminating the lease at the 
:~oG I d. at 548-549. The opinion was written by Justice Christiancy 
ten years before he wrote his great opinion in Mandlebaum v. Mc-
Donell, note 138 supra. See Swan v. !spas, 325 Mich. 39 at 44-45, 37 
N.W. (2d) 704 (1949). 
201 54 Mich. 294, 20 N.W. 80 (1884). 
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end of twenty years, the complainants and defendants, by 
mutual consent, obtained an appraisal of the premises, 
it was in effect an agreement that the premises should be 
held by the lessees ten years longer under the terms of 
the lease; and in view of the relation of the parties to the 
fee and reversion, it was as plainly implied that such 
relations should not be interfered with by partition, 
without mutual consent, so long as the terms of the lease 
were kept and performed by the lessees. Counsel for 
complainant (sic) admit that unless the lease has been 
terminated by breach of the conditions thereof, a parti-
tion is neither desirable nor asked for." 208 
Eberts v. Fisher is commonly cited in support of the 
proposition that a restraint on compulsory partition of 
an estate in fee simple is valid if limited in duration to 
a reasonable period. In view of the facts that the plain-
tiffs did not ask for partition so long as the lease re-
mained in force and the lease was held to be in force, the 
language of the opinion relative to the validity of re-
straints on partition is only dictum. 
In re Estate of Schilling 209 was an appeal from a pro-
bate order of distribution under a will which devised 
land to four children of the testatrix and the children 
of Caroline Moore, a fifth child, 
"Provided always, that none of my said real estate shall 
be sold or divided between my said heirs before my 
youngest child is at the age of twenty-one (21) years." 
2o8 !d. at 299. 
209 102 Mich. 612, 61 N.W. 62 (1894), note 154 supra. The partition 
in this case was ordered by the probate court under Rev. Stat. 1846, 
c. 74, §5 [Comp. Laws (1857) §2995; Comp. Laws (1871) §4499; How. 
Stat. §5967], relating to partition incident to administration among 
heirs and devisees, rather than under the general statute authorizing 
suits for partition in the circuit court, note 202 supra. There is no 
difference between the statutes which would affect the problem under 
consideration. The current statute governing partition by probate 
courts is the Probate Code (Act 288, P.A. 1939), c. 2, §98; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §27.3178 (168); Comp. Laws (1948) §702.98. 
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The order appealed from, entered when the youngest 
child of the testatrix was some seventeen years of age, 
directed an immediate partition of the land between the 
devisees in severalty. The appellants contended that the 
division should not be made until this child reached 
twenty-one. The court affirmed the order of distribution, 
holding that the quoted provision of the will was "void 
as repugnant to the nature of the estate" so far as vested 
interests were concerned. As all interests under the will 
vested upon the death of Caroline Moore, which oc-
curred before the order complained of was entered, the 
restraint was wholly ineffective when that order was 
made. 
It would be unwise to assert that the four cases dis-
cussed make the Michigan law as to restraints on parti-
tion definite and certain. The decisions in Walton v. 
Torrey and In re Estate of Schilling indicate that a pro-
hibition on partition in the instrument creating the co-
tenancy is void as repugnant to the estate created. As 
In re Estate of Schilling relies upon Mandlebaum v. Mc-
Donell,210 it is probable that a provision in the instru-
ment creating a joint tenancy or tenancy in common im-
posing a forfeiture or other penalty on partition would 
likewise be void as repugnant to the grant. Avery v. 
Payne and Eberts v. Fisher indicate, on the other hand, 
that a contract against partition made by joint tenants 
or tenants in common with each other will be enforced 
specifically by denial of compulsory partition, thus mak-
ing such a contract effective as a prohibition on parti-
tion. There is nothing in the last two cases to indicate 
whether Michigan will follow the qualification sug-
gested by the Restatement that such restraints on par-
tition must be limited in duration to a reasonable period. 
210 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra. 
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When knighthood was in flower, a feudal overlord 
was more likely to object to his tenant's alienating part 
of his land than to a transfer of all of it, since division 
of the holding compelled the overlord to look to sev-
eral tenants instead of one for performance of the serv-
ices due from the land. The statute Quia Emptores Ter-
rarum empowered every tenant in fee simple "to sell at 
his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of 
them" and devoted one of its three chapters exclusively 
to regulating the division of services necessarily incident 
to alienation of part of an estate. 211 It seems perfectly 
clear that a provision in a conveyance of an estate in fee 
simple that the tract must be kept intact and alienated, 
if at all, only as a whole, should be considered void as 
attempting to deprive the estate of the inseparable in-
cident of alienability in part conferred on it by the sta-
tute. 
Utujian v. Boldt 212 was a suit to restrain resubdivision. 
The defendants had sold the plaintiff 2.8 acres accord-
ing to an unrecorded plat of a larger tract showing no 
lot smaller than an acre. Later the defendants recorded 
a plat showing much smaller lots. The plaintiff sought 
an injunction prohibiting the defendants from selling 
21118 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). The Plat Act of 1929 [P.A. 172, as 
amended; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13198 to 13276; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§26.431 to 26.509; Comp. Laws (1948) §§560.1 to 560.79] prohibits, 
by penalty of $50 per lot sold, the partitioning or dividing of a lot, 
tract, or parcel of land into ten or more lots for the purpose of sale 
or occupancy for residential purposes, other than by recorded plat, and 
authorizes a purchaser of a lot described by reference to an unrecorded 
plat to rescind his purchase. The act requires approval of plats prior 
to recording by various public authorities and permits townships to 
regulate the width of lots, provided that residence lots may not be 
required to be more than forty feet wide. The act has no application 
to subdivision of agricultural land into lots of ten or more acres for 
agricultural use. Nothing in the act appears to authorize private 
restrictions on resubdivision which are more onerous than those im-
posed by it. 
212 242 Mich. 331, 218 N.W. 692 (1928). 
82 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
lots of less than an acre in size. A decree for the plain-
tiff was reversed on the ground that the plaintiff had not 
established the existence of a general scheme or plan re-
stricting the tract to large lots. The opinion suggests 
that such a restriction would be valid. 
Bang v. Forman, 213 was a similar suit. The plaintiffs 
and defendants had purchased lots according to a rec-
orded plat which showed twenty-seven lots, each fifty 
feet wide and extending some five hundred feet from 
a beach to a road. The conveyance of each lot restricted 
its use to dwelling purposes and conferred on the owner 
a right to use the beach in common with other lot own-
ers. The defendants resubdivided three of these large 
lots into twenty-six small lots and sold some of the small 
lots on executory contract to purchasers who erected 
cottages. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed in an 
opinion which stresses the fact that the occupation of 
the three original lots by twenty-six families would over-
burden the easement of use of the beach. 
Wilcox v. Mueller 214 was also a suit to restrain resub-
division. A subdivision containing lots of 3.7 acres each 
was restricted throughout to a single dwelling on each 
lot, except that certain lots might be subdivided so as 
to build not more than one house on each 17 5 feet of 
frontage. The original subdivider and all the then lot 
owners signed an agreement permitting the owners of 
four lots to subdivide these four into 75 foot lots, with 
restrictions to one house on a lot. The owners of these 
four lots did not take advantage of this agreement but 
instead conveyed two of the lots to the original sub-
divider and two to the defendants, who sought to resub-
213 244 Mich. 571, 222 N.W. 96 (1928). Cf. Henkle v. Go1denson, 
263 Mich. 140, 248 N.W. 574 (1933). 
214 250 Mich. 167, 229 N.W. 600 (1930). 
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divide these two into 90 and 150 foot lots. A decree for 
the defendants was reversed, the court holding that the 
agreement permitted resubdivision only of the whole 
four lots to which it related, not of the two alone. 
In the decision of these three cases, the court failed 
to take account of the distinction between use restric-
tions and restraints on alienation set out in Porter v. 
Barrett.215 A restriction against occupancy of a given 
tract by more than one family or against erection of more 
than one house on a parcel of land is valid under our 
law, though such restraints may tend to promote snob-
bishness, foster the growth of a landed aristocracy, and 
deter municipal development. A restraint on alienation 
of part of a tract conveyed in fee simple is void under 
the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum. 216 That the use 
restrictions may have the same practical result as the 
restraint on alienation is no answer to the mandate of 
the statute, as the opinion in Porter v. Barrett clearly 
points out. Insofar as Utujian v. Boldt~ Bang v. Forman~ 
and Wilcox v. Mueller hold that an owner in fee simple 
can be restrained from alienating part of his land, they 
are wrong in principle and ought to be overruled. 
E. ILLUSORY RESTRAINTS 
As has been seen, even after it was settled that every 
restraint on barring an entail by common recovery or 
statutory fine was void, it was possible to impose a valid 
penalty restraint on forms of alienation by a tenant in 
tail which had a purely tortious operation, putting the 
heirs in tail or the remainderman to the trouble of more 
difficult legal procedures to assert their rights.217 Like-
215 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925), note 158 supra. 
z1s Re Lunham's Estate, I.R. 5 Eq. 170 (1871). 
217 Coke, INSTITUTES 223b-224a and Butler's note No. 132 to 13th ed. 
(1787); note 80 supra. 
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wise, a penalty restraint on wrongful alienation of a fee 
simple, such as a tortious feoffment by a husband seised 
in right of his wife, was valid at common law.218 In 
both cases what was restrained was not really alienation 
but wrongful attempts to alienate that which the alienor 
had no power to alienate, attempts which could operate 
only to confuse and encumber the title. The same prin-
ciple is observable in the decisions relative to contracts 
to devise by will, to leave a will unaltered, or to refrain 
from making a will. In form such contracts are re-
straints on alienation; in substance they are merely 
awkward methods of conveying future interests and so 
not objectionable as restraints on alienation. 
At common law, when property was conveyed to a 
public or charitable corporation with a restriction, ex-
press or implied, to use for the corporate purposes or 
some of them, the corporation was incapable of alien-
ating the property.219 Michigan unquestionably recog-
nizes the validity of such restricted gifts.220 Such a con-
veyance does not, strictly speaking, create a trust, but 
218 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494); note 108 
supra. 
21 9 In the cases of ecclesiastical corporations, colleges, and hospitals, 
this inalienability was declared by statute, except that leases for three 
lives or twenty-one years reserving the customary rent could be made. 
I Eliz., c. 19 (1558); 13 Eliz., cc. 10, 20 (1571); 14 Eliz., c. 11 (1572); 
18 Eliz., c. 11 (1575); 1 Jac. I, c. 3 (1603). As to other public and charit-
able corporations, it was declared by judicial decision. Attorney-Gen-
eral v. Corporation of Plymouth, 9 Beav. 67, 50 Eng. Rep. 268 (1845). 
See Mayor and Commonalty of Colchester v. Lowten, 1 V. & B. 226, 
35 Eng. Rep. 89 (1813); Attorney-General v. Warren, 2 Swans. 291, 
36 Eng. Rep. 627 (1818); Attorney-General v. Pembroke Hall, 2 Sim. 
& St. 441, 57 Eng. Rep. 415 (1825); Bordwell, "Alienability and Per-
petuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 1 at 12, 15 (1938). 
220 Maynard v. Woodward, 36 Mich. 423 (1877); Hathaway v. Vil-
lage of New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (188,2); Penny v. 
Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); FitzGerald v. City of Big 
Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); German Corp. v. Negaunee 
German Aid Soc., 172 Mich. 650, 138 N.W. 343 (1912); Hosmer v. 
City of Detroit, 175 Mich. 267, 141 N.W. 657 (1913); Greenman v. 
Phillips, 241 Mich. 464, 217 N.W. 1 (1928); Michigan Congregational 
Conference v. United Church of Stanton, 330 Mich. 561, 48 N.W. (2d) 
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the result is much like a perpetual charitable trust.221 As 
any alienation of such property is wrongful, it would 
seem that a provision in the conveyance to the corpora-
tion for forfeiture of the property on an attempt to 
alienate should be valid.222 In County of Oakland v. 
Mack228 the Michigan Supreme Court treated as valid 
a provision in a conveyance of land to a county for the 
purpose of erecting a court house, that, 
"if the above granted and described lots of land or 
any or either of them be at any time used, appropriated 
or sold otherwise than is herein expressed, limited and 
declared, then the same shall revert back to the said 
(grantor) ." 
So far as conditions subsequent, that is, provisions 
for forfeiture to the creator of the estate or his heirs, are 
concerned, the law has been modified by a statute pro-
viding that, 
"Whenever any lands shall heretofore or hereafter 
be conveyed by any grant or devise to be held or used 
108 (1951). See Act 280, P.A. 1915; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11099 to 
11101; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13512 to 13514; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1191 
to 26.1193; Comp. Laws (1948,) §§554.351 to 554.353; Act 373, P.A. 
1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13516 to 13517; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1201 
to 26.1202; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.381 to 554.382; But see Kemp v. 
Sutton, 233 Mich. 249 at 260, 206 N.W. 366 (1925), note 277, infra. 
There are numerous statutes regulating the powers of particular types 
of eleemosynary and ecclesiastical corporations to convey land, some of 
which restate and others of which relax the general common-law rule 
of inalienability, e.g., Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§152, 161, 174, 183, Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§450.152, 450.161, 450.174, 450.183; Act. 80, P.A. 1855, 
§6, Comp. Laws (1948); §453.236; Act 235, P.A. 1849, §4, Comp. Laws 
(1948) §457.234; Act. 63, P.A. 1917, §5, Comp. Laws (1948) §457.265; 
Act 29, P.A. 1901, §7, Comp. Laws (1948) §458.8,7; Act 42, P.A. 1842, 
§6, Comp. Laws (1948) §458.156. 
221 3 Scott, TRUSTS §348.1 (1939); Blackwell, "The Charitable Corpo-
ration and the Charitable Trust," 24 WASH. UNIV. L.Q. REv. 1-45 
(1938). But see Detroit Osteopathic Hospital v. Johnson, 290 Mich. 283 
at 296-297, 287 N.W. 466 (1939). 
222 St. Germain, DocTOR AND STUDENT, Dial. 2, c. 35 (ed. 1607). As 
to the authority of which see 5 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
266-269 (1924). 
22a 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928). 
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for any religious, educational, charitable, benevolent or 
public purpose, with a condition annexed in the instru-
ment of conveyance that in event said lands shall at any 
time cease to be held or used for the purpose set forth 
in such conveyance, title thereto shall revert to the 
grantor or devisor and his heirs, and . . . because of 
changed conditions or circumstances since the execu-
tion of such conveyance it is impossible or impracticable 
to longer hold or use said lands for the purposes limited 
in such conveyance and that the religious, educational, 
charitable, benevolent or public object of the grantor, 
as set forth in such conveyance, may be defeated thereby, 
a decree may be entered authorizing the grantor (sic) to 
sell such lands .... 
"No sale of lands under the decree of the court as 
herein provided shall defeat the estate of the grantee 
named in the original conveyance because of the failure 
to longer hold or use the same for the purpose named 
in such conveyance and shall be sufficient to convey to 
the purchaser of such lands a good and sufficient title 
in fee simple, free from all conditions or limitations 
whatsoever, under which the same shall theretofore have 
been held or used." 224 
This statute makes a penalty restraint on alienation 
by way of condition subsequent ineffective as against 
alienation pursuant to decree under the statute. By 
parity of reasoning with the cases holding valid penalty 
restraints on tortious alienation by a tenant in tail even 
where a restraint on the same tenant's levying a fine or 
suffering a recovery would be void, it would seem that 
the statute does not make such conditions subsequent 
inoperative if the charitable or public corporation re-
strained attempts to convey without first securing a 
decree under the statute. Moreover, the statute has no 
application to provisions for forfeiture to someone other 
224 Act. 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to 
554.404. 
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than the original creator of the estate or his heirs. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that unless the gift 
over to another on alienation is to a charity, the pro-
vision for it must be so worded as to take effect, if at 
all, within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities.225 
Another type of provision which restrains alienation 
in form but not in fact is one for pre-emption. This may 
be a provision in a conveyance of a fee simple that the 
taker shall not sell the land without offering the donor 
or someone else an opportunity to buy, or it may take 
the form of a pre-emptive option contract by which the 
owner of land agrees not to sell without first giving the 
optionee an opportunity to buy. The Restatement of 
Property takes the position that a pre-emptive provision 
is a restraint on alienation. 226 It asserts, nevertheless, 
that such a provision is valid if the optionee is required 
to meet any offer received by the optionor as a condition 
of exercising his option. If, however, the optionee need 
pay only a fixed price or a percentage of any offered 
price, the Restatement treats the provision as one gov-
erned by the general rules as to restraints on alienation 
of estates in fee simple.227 The latter rule, if applied 
strictly, would avoid all such pre-emptive provisions in 
Michigan, inasmuch as our law does not admit the valid-
ity of limited restraints on alienation of a fee simple. 
Probably the leading case adopting the Restatement's 
view that a pre-emptive provision is a direct restraint 
on alienation is In re Rosher/28 a nineteenth century 
English decision. That case involved a devise of land in 
fee simple with a proviso that if the devisee should wish 
225 Scott, TRUSTS §401.6 (1939); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §397, com-
ment a (1944); Chapters 9, 15, infra. 
226 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §418 (1944). 
227Jbid. 
22s [1884] 26 Ch. Div. 801. 
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to sell during the life of the testator's wife, she should 
have an option to purchase for a fixed price which, at 
the time of the decision, was approximately a fifth of the 
value of the land. This proviso was held void as a re-
straint on alienation inconsistent with the nature of an 
estate in fee simple. The decisions in this country are 
far from uniform, but there appears to be some tendency 
to follow the rules laid down by the Restatement of 
Property.229 As an option is essentially a future interest 
in land which remains contingent until exercised, it 
must not, in jurisdictions which follow that rule, exceed 
in duration the period of the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, except when it is an option reserved by 
the creator of the estate subject to it for his own bene-
fit.230 Consequently pre-emptive provisions are frequent-
ly invalid because they violate the Rule Against Per-
petuities, even though they may not offend the rule 
against restraints on alienation of estates in fee simple. 
Windiate v. Lorman 231 was a suit to remove a cloud 
from title. In 1910 the plaintiff executed an instru-
ment providing, 
229 The cases are collected in Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Aliena-
tion of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.67 (1952): 
Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE 
L.J. 961, 1186 at 1390-1395 (1935). 
zso PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT §§393, 394 (1944); Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., 308-310 (1915); Part Two, notes 362, 364, infra. 
There is dictum in Chief Justice Cooley's opinion in Smith v. Barrie, 
56 Mich. 314 at 317, 22 N.W. 816 (1885), in favor of the validity of a 
condition in a conveyance of an estate in fee simple that no sale of the 
property should be made without first giving to the grantor, or his 
heirs, the opportunity to purchase. Such a condition does not violate 
the Rule Against Perpetuities, but it does impose a potentially per-
petual indirect restraint on alienation. 
231 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). The facts are more fully 
stated in the companion case, Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 
N.W. 620 (1929). In Livonia Township School District v. Wilson, 339 
Mich. 454, sub nom. Wayne County v. Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 
(1954), a provision in a 1944 deed giving the grantor an option to 
repurchase for $80 if, within 25 years, the land should not be used for 
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"If I ever desire to sell, or if my heirs or devisees shall 
ever desire to sell (certain land), I will give to Janette 
Lorman, her heirs, devisees and assigns the first oppor-
tunity to buy the said land at the best price, not to ex-
ceed $1,000, which I can get for it from anyone else ... 
and upon payment or tender of such price by her, her 
heirs or assigns, to me, my heirs and devisees, that the 
land shall be conveyed to her, her heirs or assigns, in 
f . I " ee simp e .... 
The plaintiff, at a time when the land was worth some 
$8,000, contended that this pre-emptive option was void 
and sought its removal as a cloud upon his title. An 
assignee of the optionee intervened as party defendant 
and filed a cross-bill for specific performance of the op-
tion. The court affirmed a decree for the defendant 
granting specific performance of the option, saying that 
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was not in 
force in Michigan so far as real property was concerned 
and that the option did not offend a statute then in 
force which forbade suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation for a period in excess of two lives in being. 
In a later opinion involving the same option, the court 
intimated that the common-law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities has no application to option contracts, citing as 
school purposes, was treated as valid. The validity of pre-emptive option 
contracts which required the optionee to meet any offer received by the 
optionor was assumed in Hake v. Groff, 232 Mich. 233, 205 N.W. 145 
(1925); Nu-Way Service Stations, Inc. v. Vandenberg Oil Co., 283 Mich. 
551, 278 N.W. 683 (1938); Digby v. Thorson, 319 Mich. 524, 30 N.W. 
(2d) 266 (1948); and Laevin v. St. Vincent de Paul Society, 323 Mich. 
607, 36 N.W. (2d) 163 (1949). Specific performance of such a contract 
was granted in Brenner v. Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W. (2d) 320 
(1947). Cf. Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Co. 36 Mich. 105 (1877); 
Braun v. Klug, 335 Mich. 691, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), note 162, supra. 
In Epstean v. Mintz, 226 Mich. 660, 198 N.W. 225 (1924), the defen-
dant, owning land in fee simple, contracted with the plaintiff, a real 
estate broker, to sell it when the plaintiff so advised and pay the 
plaintiff a commission on the sale. It was held that the plaintiff was 
entitled to a commission upon the defendant's refusal to sell when so 
advised, the court saying that the contract did not restrain alienation 
but encouraged it. 
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authority for that statement Section 339 of Gray's Rule 
Against Perpetuities and failing to note that, when the 
following section of that work is read, it appears that 
Professor Gray was of the opinion that specifically en-
forcible options are governed by the Rule. The com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities now applies to real 
property in Michigan.232 Whether the court will follow 
this doubtful dictum as to its inapplicability to options 
remains to be seen. 
Apart from the Rule Against Perpetuities problem, 
Windiate v. Lorman seems to establish in Michigan a 
rule, contrary to that of England and the Restatement of 
Property, that a pre-emptive option is never a direct 
restraint on alienation and is not void under the law 
of restraints on alienation even when the optionee is 
entitled to buy at a price which is a small fraction of 
that offered by others. If the dictum as to the inap-
plicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities is followed, 
such an option may have the practical effect of restrain-
ing all alienation in perpetuity. Michigan is probably 
logically correct in holding that a pre-emptive option 
is not a direct restraint on alienation, but it is certainly 
a very serious indirect restraint, and it may be ques-
tioned whether such restraints should be specifically 
enforcible in perpetuity.233 
232 Act 38, P.A. 1949; §1; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49 (1); Comp. Laws 
(1949) §554.51. 
233 See: Schnebly, "Restraint Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.66 (1952). The use of a pre-emptive 
option for the sole purpose of restraining alienation is illustrated by 
Stoney Pointe Peninsula Assn. v. Broderick, 321 Mich. 124, 32 N.W. 
(2d) 363 (1948). There restrictions in a subdivision provided that if 
the subdivider did not approve of a vendee to whom a lot owner 
proposed to sell, the subdivider might repurchase the lot for the origi-
nal sale price, without compensation for improvements. The circuit 
court held the option void as a restraint on alienation. The Supreme 
Court denied specific performance on another ground, without deciding 
whether the option was a restraint on alienation. 
CHAPTER 4 
Present Legal Estates for Life 
((ESTATE for life" is a generic term embracing 
interests in land of several types. The dura-
tion of such an estate may be measured by the 
life of the tenant himself, by the life of some other per-
son, by the joint lives of a group of persons (i.e., the 
life of the member of the group who first dies), or by 
the life of the survivor of a group of persons. In the 
last two cases the tenant himself may or may not be a 
member of the group. When the duration of the estate 
is measured by the life of someone other than the tenant, 
that person is known as the cestui que vie and the estate 
as one pur autre vie. An estate for life may arise by 
operation of law, as in the case of dower, curtesy, and 
tenancy in tail after possibility of issue extinct, or it may 
be created by express limitation or implication in a 
conveyance or devise. A conveyance creating a life 
estate may form part of a family settlement, it may be 
an outright sale, or it may be a commercial lease, re-
serving rent and differing from an estate for years only 
in that duration is measured in lives. The incidents of 
these several types of estate for life are not precisely 
uniform, but, for most present purposes, they may be 
considered together. 234 
As has been seen, opposition to the alienability of 
estates in fee simple arose from three sources, the own-
er's feudal overlord, his tenant, and his heir. As an 
234 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 41b-42b; Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3d 
ed., 339-348, 356-363 (1911); Plucknett, CoNCISE HISTORY oF THE CoM-
MON LAW 363-364 (1929). 
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estate for life is not an estate of inheritance, the heir 
could have no serious opposition to its alienation. 235 
Tenants of life tenants have only a slight interest. 
Alienation of a life estate would rarely interfere with 
the most valuable of the feudal overlord's incidents of 
tenure, wardship, marriage, and escheat. There was 
probably little opposition to the alienability of life 
estates, and it was unnecessary to provide for it by sta-
tute. The common law seems always to have recognized 
the power of a tenant for life to make an inter vivos 
transfer of his estate. 236 It will be recalled that freehold 
estates were not transmissible by will at common law 237 
and the Statute of Wills of 1540 did not empower the 
tenant pur autre vie to devise his estate. 288 He could, 
however, accomplish nearly the same result by making 
a lease to commence at his death, 239 and power to trans-
mit estates pur autre vie by will was conferred by sta-
tute in 1676.240 Strictly speaking, a life estate was not 
heritable but, if limited to the tenant and his heirs, or 
235 If an estate pur autre vie was limited to a tenant and his heirs, 
the heir was entitled to it as special occupant after the death of the 
tenant. Challis, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 358 (1911). Such a right is, 
however, trivial comr.ared with a right to inherit in fee simple or tail. 
2ae Anonymous, Ltber Assissarum, 27 Edw. III, pl. 31 (1353); Utty 
Dale's Case, Cro. Eliz. 182, 78 Eng. Rep. 439 (1590); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 
4lb; 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 123 (1923). 
237 Pollock 8e Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME 
OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895); note 8 supra. 
23s Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540) as explained by Stat. 34 8e 35 Hen. 
VIII, c. 5, §3 (1542); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES lllb (Hargrave's Note No. 
141 to 13th ed. 1787). 
2 39 Barwick's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b, 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 199 at 201 
(1598). 
240 Statute of Frauds, 29 Car. II, c. §12 (1676), explained by Stat. 
14 Geo. II, c. 20, §9 (1741). The latter statute provided that, when an 
estate pur autre vie was not disposed of by will and there was no special 
occupant (i.e., the estate was limited to the deceased tenant without 
mention of his heirs), it should be distributed as personal property of 
the deceased tenant. 
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to him and the heirs of his body, the heir took upon 
intestacy as special occupant. 241 
As in the case of the fee simple, the English common 
law did not permit the creation of an inalienable life 
estate. A restraint on alienation by way of prohibition, 
which would force the life tenant to remain such against 
his will, was both impossible and void. It was impos-
sible because the life tenant could always destroy his 
estate by making a tortious conveyance in fee or com-
mitting waste.242 It has been seen that entailment is es-
sentially the designation of a peculiar course of descent 
coupled with a prohibition on alienation. Entailment of 
an estate pur autre vie was effective as a designation of 
the special occupant but wholly ineffective as a pro-
hibition on alienation; The life tenant could bar the 
entail by the ordinary forms of inter vivos conveyance 
and possibly by will. 243 That a prohibition on alienation 
2n Note 235 supra. 
242 Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628) (feoff-
ment in fee); Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, cc. 5, 7 (1278) (waste; 
tortious conveyance by dowress); 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 309. There were 
several other ways in which a tenant for life could divest himself of his 
estate by forfeiture. 1 Cruise, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RE-
SPECTING REAL PROPERTY *112-*114. The Michigan statutes provide 
that a conveyance of the fee by a life tenant shall not work a forfeiture 
of his estate [Rev. Stat. 1816. c. 65, §4; Comp Laws (1857 §2723; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §4206; How. Stat. §5654; Comp. Laws (1897) §8958; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11690; Comp. Laws (1929) §13280; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §26.523; Comp. Laws (1948) §565.4] and probably eliminate 
forfeiture for waste [Rev. Stat. 1846. c. 110, §6; Comp. Laws (1857) 
§4703; Comp. Laws (1871) §6358; How. Stat., §7945; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §11121; Comp. Laws (1915) §14945; Comp. Laws (1929) §15120; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2146; Comp. Laws (1948) §690.406]. They recog-
nize, however, that life estates may be destroyed by disseisin, forfeiture, 
surrender or merger. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §32; Comp. Laws (1857) 
§2616; Comp. Laws (1871) §4099; Comp. Laws (1897) §8814; How. 
Stat., §5548; Comp. Laws (1915) §11550; Comp. Laws (1929) §12952; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.32; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.32. See note 263 
infra. 
243 Doe ex dem. Blake v. Luxton, 6 T.R. 289, 101 Eng. Rep. 558 
(1795); 1 Cruise, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL 
PRoPERTY *106-*108; Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 362-363 
(1911). 
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in a conveyance of an estate for life is void is well settled 
in England 244 and is the prevailing view in this coun-
try.24s 
The position of the English common law as to the 
validity of a penalty restraint on alienation of a legal 
estate for life is not so certain. At common law a con-
veyance by a life tenant of a greater estate than he had 
forfeited his estate and destroyed reversions and re-
mainders expectant upon it. There is dictum in a fif-
teenth century opinion that a condition against alien-
ating in fee may be imposed upon a life estate.246 This 
is no doubt sound because, as has been seen, tortious 
alienation may always be restrained by penalty. The 
two grounds upon which the fourteenth and fifteenth 
century judges ruled that penalty restraints on aliena-
tion of estates in fee simple were void, that the statute 
Quia Emptores Terrarum conferred an inseparable in-
cident of alienability upon every estate in fee simple 
and prohibited a reversion or remainder following such 
an estate,247 have no application to estates for life. The 
statute did not apply to life estates and they may, indeed, 
must, be followed by a reversion or remainder. The 
stress laid upon the existence of a reversion or remain-
244 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (18ll); 
Graves v. Dolphin, 1 Sim. 66, 57 Eng. Rep. 503 (1826); see Rochford 
v. Hackman, 9 Hare 475 at 482, 68 Eng. Rep. 597 (1852). These cases 
involved equitable life estates but the rule applies with greater force 
to legal life estates. Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 
236 at 244 (1917). 
245 The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d 
ed., 134-277 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of 
Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §26.49 (1952); Manning, 
"The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. 
L. REv. 373 at 394-398 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Aliena-
tion of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1208 (1935). Accord: 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944). 
246 Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, Mich., pl. 28 (1494). See notes 
242 supra and 263 infra. 
247 Notes 114, 115 supra. 
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der in the cases holding valid penalty restraints on 
alienation of estates in fee tail and for years 248 suggests 
the validity of such restraints on life estates. The re-
versioner or remainderman whose estate follows a life 
estate has a greater interest in the personal characteristics 
of the life tenant than have reversioners and remainder-
men whose interests succeed estates tail or long terms 
of years. Professor John Chipman Gray thought that 
penalty restraints on alienation of legal estates for life 
were valid under the English common law but, with one 
exception, the cases he cited in support of this proposi-
tion involved equitable life estates. 249 There are nine-
teenth century English cases which assume the validity 
of such a restraint on a legal estate for life. 250 Although 
the rule as to equitable life estates is probably other-
wise, 251 it would seem that the English law permits such 
248 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443); Anonymous, 
Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, Y.B. 10 Hen. VII, 
Mich., pl. 28 (1494); Anonymous, Y.B. 13 Hen. VII, Pasch., pl. 9 
(1498); Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. Rep. 97 (1539); Newis v. 
Lark, 2 Plow. 403, 75 Eng. Rep. 609 (1571); Earl of Arundel's Case, 
3 Dyer 342b, 73 Eng. Rep. 771 (1575); Croker v. Trevethin, Cro. 
Eliz. 35, 78 Eng. Rep. 301 (1584); Ruddall v. Miller, 1 Leon. 298, 74 
Eng. Rep. 271 (1586); Arton v. Hare, Poph. 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 
(1595); Sharington v. Minors, Moore K.B. 543, 72 Eng. Rep. 746 
(1599); Anonymous, l Brownl. & Golds. 44, 123 Eng. Rep. 655 (1616); 
Muschamp v. Bluet, J. Bridg. 132, 123 Eng. Rep. 1253 (1617); Crusoe 
ex dem. Blencowe v. Bugby, 3 Wils. K.B. 234, 95 Eng. Rep. 1030 
(1771); Roe ex dem. Hunter v. Galliers, 2 T.R. 133, 100 Eng. Rep. 72 
(1787); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 
1264 (1798). Lord Kenyon's opinion in the last case seems to approve 
all penalty restraints on alienation except those on estates in fee simple 
and on barring an entail by common recovery or statutory fine. Id. 
at 61. 
249 RESTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 72-73 (1895). As Gray pointed 
out, the ratio decidendi of the first case holding valid a penalty re-
straint on alienation of an equitable life estate, Lockyer v. Savage, 2 
Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (1733), is the analogy to restraints in 
leases for years. This reasoning is equally applicable to a legal life 
estate. The one exception is the first case cited in note 250 infra. 
25~ Craven v. Brady, L.R. 4 Eq. 209 (1867); Blackman v. Fysh, [1892] 
3 Ch. 209 (Ct. App.). 
251 Re Mair, Williamson v. French, [1909] 2 Ch. 280. 
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restraints on legal estates only if they benefit the rever-
sion or remainder, and that they are void if solely for 
the protection of the life tenant himself or of a stranger 
to the title to the land involved.252 
The American cases tend, like the English, to hold 
valid a provision in a conveyance creating an estate for 
life for forfeiture of the estate upon alienation, volun-
tary or involuntary, although there are a few cases hold-
ing such provisions invalid and a few holding, illogically, 
a provision for forfeiture to someone other than the crea-
tor of the estate valid, but one for forfeiture to the creator 
of the estate void. 253 The Restatement of Property takes 
the position that a provision in a conveyance of a life 
estate for forfeiture upon alienation is valid whether the 
forfeiture is to the creator of the estate or another.254 So 
far it reflects settled English law. The Restatement goes 
beyond this,, however, by asserting the validity of penalty 
restraints on alienation of estates for life which are not 
imposed for the benefit of the reversioner or remainder-
man. Thus it declares that a life tenant may provide 
validly in a conveyance of his entire estate that the trans-
feree will forfeit the estate by alienation. 255 Such a 
252 Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. REv. 236 at 244 
(1917); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 23 IowA L. REv. 
1 at 11-13 (1938). This conclusion seems inevitable from the principles 
upon which the cases referred to in notes 247 and 248, supra, are 
grounded. 
253 The cases are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d 
ed., 72-89 (1895); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Prop-
erty," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.50 (1952); Manning, "The 
Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARv. L. 
REV. 373 at 394-398 (1935); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation 
of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1207-1211 (1935). 
254 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §409, Illustrations 1, 6 (1944). 
255 I d. Illustration 3. Comment a states that the normal objective 
of a restraint on alienation of an estate for life is the protection of the 
life tenant against his own indiscretions. It asserts that this is a 
worthy objective which ought to be carried out in the absence of 
substantial social objection. This was not the normal objective sought 
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provision violates the rule implicit in the English cases 
that a valid restraint upon alienation of a legal estate 
may be imposed only by the creator of the estate for 
the benefit of his reversion or of a remainder limited 
after the estate. Although it does not explicitly so state, 
the Restatement would appear to consider valid a con-
tract against alienation entered into between a life 
tenant and a stranger to the title, such as a neighboring 
proprietor. These extensions of the rules governing the 
validity of restraints on alienation of legal life estates 
seem inconsistent in principle with the doctrine of es-
tates upon which our land law is founded. 256 
In general, the Michigan statutes recognize legal life 
estates and accord to them the incidents which they had 
at common law. From 1847 to 1949 there were some 
statutory provisions which made important changes in 
the common law of estates for life, and there are still 
to be accomplished by such a restraint in the period during which the 
incidents of legal life estates became fixed. 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY 
oF ENGLlSH LAw 240-241 (1926). The normal objective in that period 
was the protection of the reversioner against having his land and 
buildings injured by an evil or incompetent tenant, and it was the 
worthiness of this objective which led to decisions that restraints on 
alienation of life estates were valid. The preface to the second edition 
of Gray's RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION (1895) is a forceful refutation 
of the view that "the protection of the life tenant against his own 
indiscretion" is a "worthy objective." As he points out, the placing 
of an owner of property of full age and sound mind under a sort of 
guardianship to ensure that his wrongdoing will injure only others 
and not himself is likely to weaken his character and harm society. 
Despite Gray's vigorous objections, the objective of protecting the 
owner has been recognized as a proper basis for restraints on aliena-
tion of interests under trusts. This is no reason for extending such 
recognition to legal estates. As Mr. Manning has observed, the legal 
life tenant who is in possession of the land is much more likely to 
secure credit on the basis of his apparent power of alienation than 
is the beneficiary under a trust of land in the possession of a trustee. 
Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 
48 HARV. L. REV. 373 at 398 (1935). 
256 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS 310 (1936). 
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some provisions which have a bearing on the validity 
and effect of restraints on alienation of such estates. 257 
25 7 Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided as follows: 
"Sec. 5. Estates . . . for life shall be denominated estates of free-
hold; ... 
"Sec. 6. An estate for the life of a third person, whether limited to 
heirs or otherwise, shall be deemed a freehold only during the life of 
the grantee or devisee, but after his death it shall be deemed a chat-
tel real. 
"Sec. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be limited unless to per-
sons in being at the creation thereof; and when a remainder shall be 
limited on more than two (2) successive estates for life, all the life 
estates subsequent to those of the two (2) persons first entitled thereto, 
shall be void, and upon the death of these persons, the remainder shall 
take effect, in the same manner as if no other life estate had been 
created. 
"Sec. 18. No remainder shall be created upon an estate for the life 
of any other person or persons than the grantee or devisee of such 
estate, unless such remainder be in fee; nor shall any remainder be 
created upon such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for the 
whole residue of the term. 
"Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon any such life 
estate, and more than two (2) persons shall be named as the persons 
during whose lives the estate shall continue, the remainder shall take 
effect upon the death of the two (2) persons first named, in the same 
manner, as if no other lives had been introduced. 
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a 
term of years, except to a person in being at the creation of such 
estate. 
"Sec. 24. Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections 
of this chapter, a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be 
created to commence at a future day, an estate for life may be created 
in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon. 
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which, 
in case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the 
precedent estate; and every such remainder shall be construed a con-
ditional limitation and shall have the same effect as such a limitation 
would have by law. 
"Sec. 29. When a remainder on an estate for life, or for years, 
shall not be limited on a contingency, defeating or avoiding such 
precedent estate, it shall be construed as intended to take effect only 
on the death of the first taker, or the expiration, by lapse of time, 
of such term of years."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2589, 2590, 2601, 2602, 
2603, 2605, 2608, 2611, 2613; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4072, 4073, 4084, 
4085, 4086, 4088, 4091, 4094, 4096; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8787, 8788, 
8799, 8800, 8801, 8803, 8806, 8809, 8811; How. Stat. §§5521, 5522, 
5533, 5534, 5535, 5537, 5540, 5543, 5545; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11523, 
11524, 11535, 11536, 11537, 11539, 11542, 11545, 11547; Comp. Laws 
(1929) §§12925, 12926, 12937, 12938, 12939, 12941, 12944, 12947, 
12949; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.5, 26.6, 26.17, 26.18, 26.19, 26.21, 26.24, 
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St. Amour v. Rivard 268 was a suit to construe a will 
which was executed in 1837 and became effective upon 
the death of the testator in 1841. After devising life 
estates in land to nine persons, the will provided, 
"Every single disposal of real estate made in this my 
testament, is only for the use and benefit of him or her 
in whose favor it is made, his or her life lasting, and that 
it is my formal will that neither my real estate nor any 
parcel thereof, will ever be sold or alienated in whatso-
ever manner-but that after the decease of those several 
to which shares or parcels of my real estate have been 
assigned, the said shares or parcels will remain for the 
use and benefit of the descendants of him or her to whom 
a shares (sic) has been assigned, their lives lasting, and 
so on, and in case of demise without posterity, the said 
share will accrue to the use and benefit of the owner or 
of the owners being of my relation or descendants, their 
life lasting, of the next share or shares, and so on as long 
as any posterity will exist, and in case of extinction to 
the next heirs." 
The named devisees, who were also some of the heirs 
at law of the testator, conveyed their interests to the 
plaintiff, who sought a determination that the will was 
void in toto and that he was entitled to partition. The 
court decided that the will was designed to set up a per-
petual succession of inalienable life estates. Rejecting 
a suggestion of counsel that the testator's intention could 
be carried out in part by ruling that the named devisees 
took estates for life with remainders in fee simple to 
their heirs, the court held that the entire will was void 
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, in 
26.27, 26.29; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.5, 554.6, 554.17, 554.18, 554.19, 
554.21 554.24, 554.27, 554.29. The effect of these statutes is discussed 
in detail in Chapter 19, infra. Sections 17, 18 and 19 were repealed 
by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws 
(1948) §554.52, as to conveyances executed and wills becoming effec-
tive after September 23, 1949. 
258 2 Mich. 294 (1852), Part Two, notes 39, 536, infra. 
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force in Michigan before 1847 and since 1949. Con-
sequently the heirs of the testator took the land in fee 
simple, free of the prohibition on alienation imposed 
by the will. 2511 
Hayward v. Kinney 260 was a suit to foreclose a mort-
gage given by Francis H. Strong in November, 1866. In 
June, 1866, when Francis H. Strong, Joseph T. Strong, 
Chester W. Strong, and Gertrude J. Cole were tenants 
in common in fee simple of the land, the last three 
united in a quit-claim deed to Francis H. Strong, 
"during his natural life-time, and his heirs and as-
signs of his heirs, forever, but not to be conveyed dur-
ing the life-time of the said Francis H. Strong." 
The defendant Kinney, a purchaser on execution 
sale against Francis H. Strong, contended that the quoted 
language imposed an effective prohibition on aliena-
tion of the life estate in three-quarters of the land con-
veyed by the deed, so as to make a voluntary conveyance 
or mortgage by Francis H. Strong ineffective. The court 
rejected this contention, saying, 
"These words, if effectual for any purpose, operate, 
and were evidently intended, as a condition subsequent. 
The deed created a life-estate merely in three-fourths of 
the premises, and the insertion of the words served to 
25 9 It may be that such a perpetual succession of life estates should 
be held void under the ancient common-law rule that a remainder 
may not be limited to the unborn child of an unborn person, rather 
than under the more recently developed Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See Whitby v. Mitchell, L.R. 44 Ch. Div. 85 (1890); 1 Fearne, CoN-
TINGENT REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 251, 565 (Butler's note) (1844); Sir 
Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 50a, 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527 at 530 
(1597); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 25 IowA L. REv. 
1 at 9-22 (1939); Part Two, note 13, infra. This is known variously 
as the old rule against perpetuities, the rule against double possibilities, 
and the rule in Whitby v. Mitchell. But see 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE 
INTERESTS 339-341 (1936). In any event, the result reached in St. 
Amour v. Rivard seems sound. Simes, id., 428-429. 
2so 84 Mich. 591, 48 N.W. 170 (1891). 
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make that an express condition which at common law 
was implied in every estate for life or years. 2 Bl. Comm. 
153. Such a condition, however, defeats the estate to 
which it is annexed only at the election of him who has 
a right to enforce it." 261 
The decision construes language of prohibition as a 
condition imposing a penalty restraint of forfeiture on 
alienation. As the cited passage in Blackstone relates 
to the common-law rule that a conveyance in fee by a 
life tenant forfeited his estate, it would seem that the 
court thought the condition was only against tortious 
alienation of the fee, not against mere alienation of the 
life estate itsel£.262 If so, the validity of the condition is 
supported by ancient authority.263 The case does not, 
then, decide whether a restraint on alienation of a life 
estate, by prohibition or penalty, is valid. 
Lariverre v. Rains 264 was a suit to quiet title brought 
by Peter Lariverre and Joseph Lariverre, Jr. In 1883 
Julia L. White executed an instrument which was, in 
effect, a covenant to stand seized, conveying to her hus-
band, Edward, "the use and occupancy as long as he 
u1 I d. at 599. 
262 Note 242 supra. 
268 Note 246 supra. At common law a conveyance by a life tenant 
of a greater estate than he had, by feoffment, fine or recovery, for-
feited his estate, destroyed contingent remainders dependent upon it, 
and complicated the enforcement of reversions and vested remainders. 
Until 1540, his suffering a common recovery barred even reversions 
and vested remainders. Stats. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 31 (1540); 14 Eliz., c. 
8 (1572); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities," 24 IowA L. REv. 
1 at 57-58 (1938); 25 IowA L. REv. 1 at 24 (1939). Such a conveyance 
by lease and release, bargain and sale, or covenant to stand seised did 
not have these effects, however, these being deemed "innocent" con-
veyances which passed only such estates as the conveyor had. As the 
innocent types of conveyances were invented after 1494 and as our 
statutes make all types of conveyance innocent (note 242 supra) it 
could be argued that a penalty restraint upon alienation in fee by a 
life tenant should have no greater validity than one upon alienation 
of the life estate itself. See 4 Kent, CoMMENTARIES oN AMERICAN LAw 
•82-84, •427-428; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §124, comment e (1936). 
264 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897). 
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shall live, in case he lives with her as long as she shall 
live, and sees fit to occupy the same as a residence and 
home" the west half of the tract of land involved. The 
instrument then conveyed to Joseph Lariverre, Sr., s~n 
of the donor and father of the plaintiffs, "the use and 
occupancy of the east half of (the tract) during his life, 
providing he sees fit to use and occupy the same so long 
as a home and residence," and proceeded as follows: 
"and by these presents conveys absolutely, subject 
to the above conditions, all of said (tract of land) to her 
said grandchildren, Joseph and Peter Lariverre, children 
of the said Joseph, her son, or to his heirs; it being ex-
pressly understood that, if her said son Joseph shall have 
more children at the time of his death, they shall share 
and share alike the said property. It is further under-
stood that in case of her death, and the death of her 
said husband, before the death of her said son Joseph, 
then he, her said son Joseph, shall have the use and 
occupancy during his life of (the whole tract) on the 
terms and conditions above specified, to wit, to be used 
and occupied by him as a home and residence. It being 
expressly understood and agreed that the right to use 
and occupy, as above stated, is intended to be a life in-
terest, and not transferable so far as the said Edward 
White and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., are concerned." 
In 1889 Julia L. White executed a conveyance in fee 
of the east half of the tract to her son Joseph Lariverre, 
Sr. and he executed a like conveyance to Maria B. Doyle. 
In the same year Julia L. White and Edward White 
executed a conveyance in fee of the west half of the tract 
to Maria B. Doyle. Maria B. Doyle took possession of 
the whole tract in 1889 and conveyed it to the defend-
ants in 1890. Julia L. White died while the suit was 
pending, but Edward White and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., 
were alive when the case was decided. The court held 
that the actions of Edward White and Joseph Lariverre, 
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Sr., in ceasing to occupy the land and attempting to 
convey to Maria B. Doyle, terminated their life estates 
and that the plaintiffs, remaindermen, were entitled to 
immediate possession, notwithstanding the fact that the 
two life tenants were still alive. The opinion contains 
no discussion of the validity of restraints on alienation 
and cites as authority for the result reached only Ryder 
v. Flanders/65 a case which has little bearing on the real 
problems involved. 
As it had in Hayward v. Kinney/66 the court in Lari-
verre v. Rains construed language which, taken literally, 
purported to prohibit alienation, as a provision for for-
feiture on alienation. As the provisions of the instru-
ment relative to occupancy were couched in language of 
limitation, this construction was probably sound. The 
court did not consider the possible application to that 
part of the instrument which concerned the west half 
of the tract of the Michigan statute then in force which 
invalidated more than two successive life estates. 267 Prob-
ably the application of that statute would not have af-
fected the result. The court also failed to consider the 
statute, which is still in force, providing that when a 
remainder on an estate for life shall not be limited on 
a contingency, defeating or avoiding the life estate, it 
shall be construed as intended to take effect only on the 
death of the life tenant.268 If the latter statute applied 
265 30 Mich. 336 (1874). This case involved a devise to the testator's 
widow during the term of her natural life, should she so long remain 
his widow and unmarried, and then "in either case" to his children. 
The widow remarried and, after one child had died, joined with some 
of the children in a conveyance to the other children. All that was 
decided was that the grantees in this deed owned the whole fee which, 
as the court pointed ,put, would be the case whether or not the limita-
tion over on remarriage was valid. 
266 Note 260 supra. 
267 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, note 257 supra. 
268 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §29, note 257 supra. 
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to the disposition in Lariverre v. Rains, it would seem 
that, upon the forfeiture of the estates of Edward White 
and Joseph Lariverre, Sr., the land would revert to Julia 
L. White and her heirs until the death of Edward and 
Joseph, Sr. It may be that the language limiting there-
mainder to the grandchildren was sufficient to prevent 
the operation of the statute; that is, to provide that they 
should take whenever and however the life estates were 
terminated. 
Lariverre v. Rains has been cited as something of a 
leading case in support of the proposition that penalty 
restraints on alienation of estates for life are valid. The 
opinion throws disappointingly little light on the prob-
lem. The conveyances by the life tenants were in fee, 
so the case may stand only for the ancient rule that 
restraints on tortious alienation are valid.269 Moreover, 
the occupancy provisions of the instrument involved 
seemed to be given more weight by the court in reach-
ing its conclusion than the language prohibiting aliena-
tion. 
Hamilton v. Wickson 270 was a suit to enjoin an action 
of ejectment. In 1870 Norman Hamilton leased 160 
acres to John and Adah Hamilton for the life of the sur-
vivor, reserving rent of a dollar a year. The lease pro-
vided, 
"And it is expressly understood, declared, and agreed 
by and between the parties hereto, and these presents are 
made upon the express condition, that the term hereby 
created sball not in any case be assignable by the said 
parties of the second part, or either of them, or by the 
survivor of them, nor shall the same be taken in execu-
tion, or be mortgaged, pledged, or in any way aliened; 
and that in the event of the said term hereby granted 
269 See notes 246 and 263 supra. 
210 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902). 
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and created, or the said demised premises, being assigned, 
mortgaged, pledged, or in any way aliened, sold, or taken 
in execution, or the said parties of the second part, or 
either of them or the survivor of them, becoming bank-
rupt or insolvent, or in case of the nonperformance of 
the covenants aforesaid, that then in either or any of such 
case or cases, the said term or estate hereby created or 
intended so to be shall immediately cease and determine, 
and these presents become void, and the said demised 
premises at once revert to the said party of the first part, 
his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, and he or 
they be thereupon at liberty to enter upon said demised 
premises, either with or without formal demand for pos-
session thereof, and the same to have again as of his or 
their forever (sic) estate, notwithstanding the said parties 
of the second part, or the survivor of them, may still be 
alive, anything herein contained to the contrary not-
withstanding." · 
Norman Hamilton died in 1874, devising the premises, 
subject to the lease, to the defendants pur autre vie, with 
contingent remainder to the sons of John Hamilton liv-
ing at the death of the survivor of John and Adah Hamil-
ton. In 1888 John and Adah Hamilton executed a deed 
purporting to convey a 50-foot strip of the land to a rail-
road. John Hamilton died in 1891, and the defendants 
commenced the action of ejectment sought to be enjoined 
against Adah Hamilton, claiming that the life estate was 
forfeited by breach of a covenant to repair and of the 
condition against alienation. The court reversed a decree 
which enjoined prosecution of the action of ejectment, 
saying, without other discussion or citation of authority 
on the restraint on alienation problem, 
"It seems not to be contested that, if the lease is a sub-
sisting, binding agreement, its covenants have been brok-
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en in such manner as to entitle the remainder-men to 
re-enter." 271 
The decision in Hamilton v. Wickson probably sup-
ports the proposition that a provision in a conveyance 
of a life estate that the estate shall be forfeited to the re-
versioner upon alienation by the life tenant is valid. Yet 
in it, as in the earlier cases, the alienation by the life 
tenants was a conveyance in fee. 272 Moreover, the effect 
of the decision is much weakened by the fact that it is 
based in part upon breach of the covenant to repair. In 
view of the facts that Norman and John Hamilton were 
brothers and that the life lease was, in some sense, a 
family settlement, it seems doubtful that the condition 
against alienation should be construed to forfeit the en-
tire 160 acres upon alienation of a 50-foot strip.273 
Heinze v. Heinze 214 was an action of assumpsit for use 
and occupation. The defendant, in consideration of one 
dollar, gave his mother a life lease of land providing that 
the lessee should not sublet without the written consent 
of the lessor. The defendant remained in possession and 
the mother's administrator brought this action after her 
death. The court, without discussion of the validity of 
the provision against subletting, held that consent in 
writing was not required for a subletting to the lessor 
himself. 
271 I d. at 76. The plaintiffs, Adah Hamilton, widow of John, and 
their children, relied primarily on a theory of resulting trust arising 
from the fact that John had paid the consideration for the original 
conveyance in fee to Norman, made prior to 1860. The court rejected 
this theory on the grounds the acceptance of the lease estopped the 
lessees from asserting title in fee and that the Michigan statutes have 
abolished resulting trusts. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §7; Comp. Laws 
(1857) §2637; Comp. Laws (1871) §4120; How. Stat. §5569; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §8835; Comp. Laws (1915) §11571; Comp. Laws (1929) §12973; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.57; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.7. 
212 See notes 246 and 263 supra. 
218 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §409, comment g. 
274 195 Mich. 365, 162 N.W. 121 (1917). 
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Hess v. Haas 275 was a suit to enjoin assertion of a for-
feiture of a life estate. In September, 1913, James Hess 
executed a lease of a farm to the plaintiff for the term 
of her life, to commence at his death. The lease con-
tained a covenant against assignment, transfer, or sub-
letting without the written assent of the lessor, and a 
provision for termination and re-entry by the lessor upon 
breach of any covenant. James Hess married the plain-
tiff in November 1913, divorced her in 1917, and died 
in 1922, devising the land to the defendants. The plain-
tiff leased the farm to one Laskey for a term of three 
years, and the defendants declared a forfeiture. The cir-
cuit court entered a decree for the plaintiff on the ground 
that a covenant against alienation of a life estate is void 
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. This decree 
was affirmed on the ground that the covenant against 
alienation, which was part of a printed form of lease, 
had been inserted by mutual mistake. Three justices 
dissented, asserting that Lariverre v. Rains 276 had held 
that forfeiture restraints upon assignment or subletting, 
inserted for the protection of the lessor, were valid in 
leases for life to the same extent as in leases for years. 
The majority opinion does not categorically deny this 
proposition but, by pointing out that the decision in 
Lariverre v. Rains was based largely upon the occupancy 
limitations involved in that case, throws some doubt 
upon the assertion of the dissenting justices. 
Kemp v. Sutton 277 was a suit to construe a will devising 
275 230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925). 
276 Note 264 supra. In Braun v. Klug, 335 Mich. 691 at 695, 57 
N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), note 162 supra, there is dictum to the effect 
that a restriction on alienation is not repugnant to the grant of a life 
esta.te. Tl_le ca~e held that a covenant in a conveyance in fee simple 
agamst alienation to anyone except the grantors and their heirs was 
void. 
277 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925), Part Three, notes 61, 
338, infra. 
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land to the testator's widow and four sons and the sur-
vivors and survivor of them during their natural lives, 
remainder upon the death of the survivor to the City of 
Sault Ste. Marie in fee simple. The will provided, 
''I further order and direct as a condition precedent 
to the enjoyment, devise and ownership and use of the 
life estates and interests herein devised, that each and all 
of the said devisees above named are absolutely pro-
hibited, from in any wise selling, mortgaging or incum-
bering, in any manner whatever, any part or portion of 
the said property above devised to them and each of 
them, and upon any violation of the same by any or all 
of the said devisees as to the same in this item set out; 
then I direct that each devisee or devisees so violating 
this item shall forfeit the share and portion herein de-
vised to them and the same shall revert to, and become 
the property of the other devisees above mentioned in the 
shares and under the terms herein set out in this my 
will." 
The court held that the will gave the individual de-
visees a single legal joint life estate for the life of the 
survivor, 278 and that this disposition did not violate a sta-
tute which was in force from 1847 to 1949 providing that 
the absolute power of alienation should not be suspended 
by a limitation, condition, or future estate for longer than 
two lives in being. 279 The opinion does not mention the 
278 This seems irreconcilable with other decisions that a conveyance 
to several persons as joint tenants and to the survivor creates a joint 
estate for the life of the first to die, with remainder to the survivor. 
Note 167 supra. 
279 Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provided, 
"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which 
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than 
is prescribed in this chapter; such power of alienation is suspended 
when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in 
possession can be conveyed. 
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended 
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than dur-
ing the continuance of two (2) lives in being at the creation of the 
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Michigan statutes then in force which prohibited more 
than two successive life estates 280 and does not discuss 
the validity of the quoted provision for forfeiture upon 
alienation other than to say that all the life tenants could 
unite with the city to convey a fee or release to a pur-
chaser from the city. The opinion has an important bear-
ing on the validity of restraints on alienation imposed 
between 1847 and 1949, however, in that it indicates that 
such a restraint was not affected by the mentioned sta-
tute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation so long as persons in being could unite to con-
vey a fee simple. 
The Michigan law of restraints on alienation of estates 
for life is not so certain as that relating to restraints on 
estates in fee simple. The denial in Mandlebaum v. Mc-
Donell281 of the validity of prohibitions on alienation, 
which would operate to force an owner to remain such 
against his will, probably extends to all legal estates. 
None of the cases involving restraints on life estates con-
tains a thorough discussion of the problem, but it is 
probable that our law as to penalty restraints is the same 
as the English, that is, a provision for forfeiture on alien-
estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next section. 
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a 
prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to 
whom the first (1st) remainder is limited shall die under the age of 
twenty-one (21) years, or upon any other contingency by which the 
estate of such persons may be determined before they attain their full 
age."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2598, 2599, 2600; Comp. Laws (1871) 
§§4081, 4082, 4083; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8796, 8797, 8798; How. 
Stat. §§5530, 5531, 5532; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11532, 11533, 11534; 
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12934, 12935, 12936; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.14, 
26.15, 26.16; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.14, 554.15, 554.16; repealed as 
to conveyance executed and wills becoming effective after September 
23, 1949 by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.49 (2); Comp. 
Laws (1948) §554.52. These statutes are discussed in detail in Chap-
ters 18, 20, and 21, infra. 
280 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§17, 18, 19, note 257 supra, discussed in 
detail in Chapter 19, infra. 
281 29 Mich. 78 at 83-91 (1874). 
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er the forfeiture is to the creator of the estate or another. 
As to inter vivos conveyances, the statute avoiding condi-
tions which are merely nominal and evince no intention 
of actual and substantial benefit to the party in whose 
favor they are to be performed must be borne in mind.282 
ation in a conveyance creating a life estate is valid wheth-
There is certainly nothing in the Michigan cases to sug-
gest that a restraint imposed for the benefit of anyone 
other than a reversioner or remainderman would be en-
forced. 
The Michigan statutes empower the circuit courts in 
chancery to direct the sale of land in fee simple upon 
petition by a legal life tenant and a showing that the 
rights of the interested parties would otherwise be jeop· 
ardized.283 The statute itself provides that, 
"No sale or conveyance of any kind shall be made of 
any property contrary to any specific provisions in regard 
thereto contained in the deed of conveyance, or in the 
will under which the petitioner holds the said prop-
erty." 284 
Accordingly, it would seem that a prohibition on the 
life tenant's compelling a sale of the remainder would be 
valid. The validity of a provision in a conveyance creat-
ing a life estate for forfeiture of his estate in the event 
of the life tenant's filing a petition under the statute re-
mains undecided. 285 
2s2 Comp. Laws (1948) §554.46, notes 143, 145 supra. 
283 Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws (1915) §§12716 
to 12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 619.70. This is 
a reenactment of Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) 
§§9234 to 9242. See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §124, comment i; §179, 
note (1936). 
284 Sec. 70. 
285 See PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Pt. II, Introductory Note 
(1944); Cf. id., §§428, 437. 
CHAPTER 5 
Present Legal Estates for Years 
LEASES for years were known as early as the twelfth century, but they can scarcely be said to have created estates in land until the latter part of the 
fifteenth. Until the third decade of the thirteenth cen-
ury, the lessee's interest was a purely contractual right, 
specifically enforcible by means of the action of coven-
ant, against the lessor and the latter's heir. He had no 
rights at all against the lessor's overlord, persons to whom 
the lessor transferred the fee, or strangers.286 After 1235 
the lessee had a remedy for recovery of possession from 
a transferee of the lessor who ejected him. 287 In the early 
part of the fourteenth century he acquired a right to 
maintain an action of trespass for money damages against 
a stranger who ousted him, 288 but he could not recover 
possession from such a stranger 289 until late in the fol-
lowing century.290 
From the fact that the interest of a lessee for years was 
looked upon as being in the nature of a chose in action 
rather than property, it might be assumed that it was 
inalienable. Such was not the case. From an early period 
a term of years was held to be assignable inter vivos, 291 
28 6 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I, 105-117 (1895). 
287 Snane v. Rumenal, Bract. N.B., pl. 1140 (1235). 
288 Star v. Anonymous, Y.B. 15 Edw. II, Hil., ff. 458, 458b (1321). 
289 Anonymous, Y.B. 33 Hen. VI, Mich., pl. 19 (1455). 
290 Anonymous, Y.B. 7 Edw. IV. Pasch., pl. 16 (1467); Anonymous, 
Y.B. 21 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 2 (1482); 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENG-
LISH LAW, 3d ed., 213-217 (1923). 
291 Fitz Henry v. Utdeners, Bract. N.B., pl. 804 (1233); Littleton, 
TENURES §319 (1481). 
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and, as it was looked upon as a chattel rather than as an 
estate in land, it was always transmissible by will. 292 In-
voluntary alienability of terms for years was more com-
plete than that of estates in fee and for life. Whereas, in 
the case of freehold estates, creditors could not acquire 
title but only a right to occupy until their claims were 
paid, 298 a leasehold estate could be seized and sold out-
right on execution.294 
As in the case of the estate for life, it was practically 
impossible at common law to create an inalienable estate 
for years, one which the tenant was bound to keep against 
his will, because a tortious conveyance by the tenant of 
a greater estate than he held 295 or the commission of 
waste 296 forfeited his estate. It is probable that the com-
mon law asserted the nullity of prohibitory restraints on 
alienation of estates for years before the era of reported 
cases. 297 The dearth of English authority on the point 
indicates that conveyancers always believed that restraints 
on alienation of leasehold interests by way of prohibition 
292 Note 286 supra; 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 
213-217 (1923). 
29 8 Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 18 (1285). 
29 4 Ibid.; Gilbert, LAw OF EXECUTIONS 19 (1763); Doe ex dem. 
Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798). 
295 Metteforde's Case, 3 Dyer 362b, 73 Eng. Rep. 813 (1578); Read 
v. Erington, Cro. Eliz. 322, 78 Eng. Rep. 571 (1594). 1 Coke, INSTI· 
TUTES 25lb, 330a (Butler's Note No. 285 to 13th ed. 1787). 
296 Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. I, c. 5 (1278). These rules of for-
feiture for the tenant's voluntary act would not, however, preclude 
the possibility of an effective prohibition of involuntary alienation. 
297 The Statute of Wales, 12 Edw. I, c. 10 (1284), which, while 
applicable only to Wales, reflects the English common law of the 
period, prohibited specific enforcement of covenants against alienation. 
At this period the term "covenant" was virtually synonymous with the 
later term "lease," and the action of covenant was that used for the 
specific enforcement of provisions of leases. Foresta v. Villy, Bract. 
N.B., pl. 1739 (1226); 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAw BEFoRE THE TIME oF EDWARD I, 106 (1895). 
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were void. The American writers and such case law as 
there is are in accord with this belief. 298 
As to penalty restraints, it was decided in 1443 that a 
condition in a lease for years that the lessee not grant 
his estate was valid and entitled the lessor, upon breach, 
to enter and so terminate the estate for years. 299 The 
reason given for the validity of such a restraint was the 
protection it afforded to the reversion. It should be noted 
that the point was decided at a time when long terms of 
years were little known, the rights of a lessee for years 
were still looked upon as primarily contractual and his 
interest had not yet attained the status of an estate in 
land. Nevertheless, the decision was followed in anum-
ber of cases decided after terms of years had become 
estates, and terms of five hundred and a thousand years 
had become common.300 It was later settled that a condi-
298 Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 277 (1895); Schnebly, 
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §26.51 (1952); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of 
Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1211-1212 (1935). Accord: 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944). Professor Schnebly notes, how-
ever, that there are some cases granting specific performance, by way 
of injunction, of covenants against alienation in leases, e.g., McEach-
arn v. Colton [1902] A.C. 104 (Judicial Committee; decided under 
the provisions of a peculiar statute in force in South Australia). 
299 Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VI, Hil., pl. 21 (1443), Paston, J-, dis-
senting. At the time of this decision long-term leases were virtually 
unknown because of the precariousness of the lessee's interest arising 
from the fact that the lessor could destroy it by suffering a common 
recovery. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 46a (1628). See Wind v. Jekyl, I P. Wms. 
572, 24 Eng. Rep. 522 at 523 (1719). The Statute of Gloucester, 6 Edw. 
I, c. 11 (1278), 2 Coke, INSTITUTES 321-324 (1641), empowered certain 
urban lessees to attack such collusive recoveries and Stat. 21 Hen. 
VIII, c. 15, §3 (1529) made them ineffective as against all lessees for 
years. Cf. Fratcher, "Defeasance as a Restrictive Device in Michigan," 
52 Mich. L. Rev. 505 at 534 (1954). 
soo Anonymous, Y.B. 8 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 3 (1493); Anonymous, 21 
Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 12 (I505); Anonymous, I Dyer 6b, 73 Eng. Rep. I5 
(1537); Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. Rep. 97 (1539); Earl of 
Arundel v. Lord Windsor, I Dyer 65a, 73 Eng. Rep. I38 (1549); 
Anonymous, Moore K.B. 11, pl. 40, 72 Eng. Rep. 405 (1550); Paschall 
v. Keterich, 2 Dyer 15lb, 73 Eng. Rep. 330 (1557); Anonymous, 3 
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tion of forfeiture upon involuntary alienation, as by 
bankruptcy, was likewise valid. 301 The cases evidence, 
however, a tendency to put a very narrow construction 
upon such conditions, so that no form of alienation is a 
breach unless clearly penalized by the language of the 
condition. The validity at common law of a provision in 
a lease that the term should be forfeited to someone other 
than the lessor upon alienation by the tenant is not clear 
because of the undeveloped state of the law of future 
interests in legal terms for years. If valid at all, such a 
gift over would have to be limited so as to take effect, if 
at all, within the period of the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities.302 It would seem that a condition of for-
feiture upon alienation in an assignment by a lessee of 
Leon. 67, 74 Eng. Rep. 545 (1576); Parry v. Herbert, 4 Leon. 5, 74 
Eng. Rep. 688 (1576); Moor v. Farrand, 1 Leon. 3, 74 Eng. Rep. 3 
(1587); Sir William More's Case, Cro. Eliz. 26, 78 Eng. Rep. 291 
(1583); Stewkley v. Butler, Moore K.B. 880, 72 Eng. Rep. 970, sub 
nom. Stukeley v. Butler, Hobart 168, 80 Eng. Rep. 316 (1615); Crusoe 
ex dem. Bleucowe v. Bugby, 3 Wils. K.B. 234, 95 Eng. Rep. 1030 
(1771); Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 
1264 (1798). It is noteworthy that two of these cases held the condition 
effective to restrain testamentary disposition of the estate. Anonymous, 
3 Leon. 67; Parry v. Herbert, supra. The clearest statement of the 
rule and its basis is the dictum in Sir Anthony Mildmay's Case, 6 Co. 
Rep. 40a at 43a, 77 Eng. Rep. 311 at 317 (1605): "So if a man makes 
a gift in tail, on condition that he shall not make a lease for his own 
life, it is void and repugnant; but if a man makes a lease for life or 
years, on condition that he shall not alien or lease the lands, it is 
good. For at the common law, lessee for life or years might commit 
waste, which was ad exhaereditationem of the lessor, and therefore 
there was a confidence betwixt the lessor and lessee, and therefore the 
lessor might restrain the lessee from aliening or demising to another, in 
whom perhaps the lessor had not such confidence. And therefore it 
is reasonable that when he who has the inheritance makes a lease for 
life or years, that he may restrain such particular tenants from alien-
ing or demising for the benefit of his inheritance." 
so1 Roe ex dem. Hunter v. Galliers, 2 T.R. 133, 100 Eng. Rep. 72 
(1787). But an ordinary condition against alienation was not con-
strued to penalize involuntary alienation, Doe ex dem. Mitchinson v. 
Carter, 8 T.R. 57, 101 Eng. Rep. 1264 (1798). 
ao2 See Simes, FuTURE INTERESTS §199 (1936). Professor Simes thinks 
that such a special limitation would be valid (§466). 
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his entire term is void at common law because not im-
posed for the benefit of a reversion. 303 
The American cases follow the English rule that con-
ditions against alienation in leases for years are valid. 304 
The Restatement of Property makes a distinction be-
tween leases for years which are executed as commercial 
transactions and those which are donative in character, 
such as terms limited in family settlements.305 As to the 
former, the Restatement affirms the validity of penalty 
restraints, including forfeiture to either the lessor or an-
other, when imposed for the benefit of the lessor and not 
in violation of the common-law Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. It would permit the assignor of a term to restrain 
future alienation, even though he retains no reversion, 
if he remains liable on the covenants of the lease. As to 
the latter, the Restatement would impose the rules which 
govern restraints on alienation on freehold estates of like 
duration, treating any lease which is not limited in dura-
tion by lives in being as governed by the rules applicable 
to estates in fee simple. 
The Constitution of Michigan provides that "No lease 
or grant of agricultural land for agricultural purpose for 
a longer period than 12 years, reserving any rent or serv-
8os 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 223a; Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 
L.Q. REv. 236, 238 (n. 3), 244 (1917); Gray, REsTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 
2d ed., 90 (1895); Simes, FUTURE INTERESTs §466. Cf. Doe ex dem. 
Duke of Norfolk v. Hawke, 2 East 481, 102 Eng. Rep. 453 (1802). 
304 Some are collected in Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation 
of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §26.51 (1952); Schnebly, 
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 
961, 1186 at 1211 (1935), and Simes, FuTURE INTERESTS §466 (1936). 
305 Sec. 410 (1944). Cf. Johnston v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 
337 Mich. 572 at 582, 60 N.W. (2d) 464 (1953), where Property Re-
statement, §489 (1944), making a similar distinction between commer-
cial and donative easements in gross, was quoted with approval. 
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ice of any kind, shall be valid." 306 Our statutes give es-
tates for years substantially the same incidents which they 
had at common law and codify the law of future interests 
in and following estates for years so as to make the rules 
governing such interests coincide, so far as possible, with 
the rules which govern like future interests in and fol-
lowing freehold estates.307 The statutes appear to make it 
clear that a term of years may be so limited as to pass to 
someone other than the lessor on the happening of a 
so6 CoNsT. 1908, Art. XVI, §10. CoNsT. 1850, Art. 18, §12, provided, 
"No lease or grant hereafter of agricultural land for a longer period 
than twelve years, reserving any rent or service of any kind, shall be 
valid." 
so1 Rev. Stat. 1946, c. 62, provided: 
"Sec. 5. . .. estates for years shall be denominated chattels real ...• 
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term 
for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon which it is 
limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during con-
tinuance of not more than 2 lives in being at the creation of such 
remainder, or upon the termination thereof. 
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a 
term of years, except to a person in being at the creation of such estate. 
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter contained relative to 
future estates, shall be construed to apply. to limitations of chattels 
real, as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute ownership of 
a term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the 
absolute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect to a fee. 
[Cf. §15, note 279 supra.] 
"Sec. 24. Subject to the rules established in the preceding sections 
of this chapter, a freehold estate, as well as a chattel real, may be 
created to commence at a future day; an estate for life may be created 
in a term of years, and a remainder limited thereon. 
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contingency, which in 
case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the prece-
dent estate; and every such remainder shall be construed a conditional 
limitation and shall have the same effect as such a limitation would 
have by law."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2589, 2604, 2605, 2607, 2608, 
2611; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4072, 4087, 4088, 4090, 4091, 4094; How. 
Stat., §§5521, 5536, 5537, 5539, 5540, 5543; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8787, 
8802, 8803, 8805, 8806, 8809; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11523, 11538, 
11539, 11541, 11542, 11545; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12925, 12940, 12941, 
12943, 12944, 12947; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.5, 26.20, 26.21, 26.23, 26.24, 
26.27; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.5, 554.20, 554.21, 554.23, 554.24, 554.27. 
Sections 20 and 23 were repealed, as to conveyances executed and 
wills becoming effective after September 23, 1949, by Act 38, P.A. 1949, 
§2, Mich. Stat. Ann §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. 
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contingency, provided there is no violation of the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities or other applicable 
rules of laW.308 
In Lee v. Payne/09 a decision affirming a judgment for 
the lessor in an . action for waste against an assignee of 
the lessee, the court said, 
"A lessee for years may assign his entire interest in the 
lease and premises, unless restrained by covenant not to 
assign without leave of the landlord, or he may underlet 
the whole or a part of the premises, for any less number 
of years than he himself holds." 310 
Copland v. Parker 811 was a proceeding by a lessor to 
recover possession of the demised premises before the 
end of the term on the ground the lessees had breached 
a covenant, "not to transfer this lease without the consent 
of the party of the first part." The report does not state 
whether the lease contained an express provision for for-
feiture on breach of covenant. The lessee appears to 
have let part of the premises for the whole of the un-
expired term. The court, in an oral opinion, held that 
there had been only a subletting and that an instruction 
sos The repeal in 1949 of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §23, note 307 supra, 
makes it less clear than it was before that it is possible to create future 
interests in legal terms of years. 
3o9 4 Mich. 106 (1856). 
310 Id. at 117. In Craig v. Crossman, 209 Mich. 462, 177 N.W. 400 
(1920), the court rejected a contention that a lease without provision 
against assignment was inalienable, saying that it was "by nature, 
assignable." In Patterson v. Butterfield, 244 Mich. 330, 221 N.W. 293 
(1928), the court, in answer to an argument that an obligation resting 
upon the lessee in a 99-year lease to erect a building precluded his 
subleasing, said (at 338), "In the absence of statutory or contractual 
restrictions, a lessee for years may assign or sublet his leasehold interest 
without the lessor's consent or an express provision in the lease 
giving him such right. . . ." 
311 4 Mich. 660 (1857). The plaintiff was represented by James V. 
Campbell, later Chief Justice of Michigan and Dean of the University 
of Michigan Law School. He contended that there had been an assign-
ment. Counsel on both sides assumed the validity of the covenant and 
cited English cases as to its proper construction. 
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by the trial court that the covenant extended to both 
assignment and subletting, was erroneous. 
Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Company 312 was an ac-
tion of ejectment for mining land. The plaintiff claimed 
under a 99-year lease of an undivided half of the mining 
rights given by the owner of the fee to one Graveraet, 
who assigned his interest to the plaintiff and another. 
The lease contained no provision against assignment by 
the lessee and expressly conferred rights on his assigns. 
The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the 
ground the lease conveyed only an incorporeal interest 
which could not be enforced in ejectment and said that, 
while the lessee in such a lease may assign the whole to 
a single individual or corporation, he may not, because 
of the nature of the interest, assign undivided interests 
to several persons. 
Randall v. Chubb 813 was a summary proceeding for 
possession of land. The plaintiff leased the land to Stod-
dard by an instrument which did not expressly restrain 
assignment, but which obligated the lessee to work the 
farm, using the lessor's implements but providing his 
own seed, and to deliver a third of the crops to the lessor. 
Stoddard assigned his interest to the defendant. The 
court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff, saying that 
such a lease is personal and nonassignable, and that an 
attempt to assign forfeits the lessee's estate. 
s12 36 Mich. 105 (1877). It is generally held that a profit a prendre 
in gross may not be assigned in parts to different persons, so that each 
assignee may exercise it separately, but that it may be assigned to 
several persons for exercise in common. Earl of Huntington v. Lord 
Mountjoy, Moore K.B. 174, 72 Eng. Rep. 513; 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 164b 
(1583); 3 Tiffany, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §847 (1939). 
81 3 46 Mich. 311, 9 N.W. 429 (1881). Accord: Lewis v. Sheldon, 103 
Mich. 102, 61 N.W. 269 (1894). Cf. Gravenburgh v. McKeough, 117 
Mich. 555, 76 N.W. 77 (1898); Vincent v. Crane, 134 Mich. 700, 97 
N.W. 34 (1903); Lowe v. Radecke, 204 Mich. 646, 171 N.W. 408 (1919). 
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Leduke v. Barnett 314 was a summary proceeding for 
possession of land. The plaintiff demised the premises 
to Sachen by a lease providing that the lessee should not 
release or assign the lease without the lessor's consent, 
and that in case of default in performance of any of the 
covenants the lessor might re-enter. The lessee gave the 
defendant permission to use one room for thirty days. 
The court affirmed a judgment for the defendant on the 
ground the plaintiff had failed to prove that the under-
letting was without his consent. Although assuming the 
validity of the condition, the court doubted whether 
there had been a breach, suggesting that a mere license 
was not a release or assignment. 
Walsh v. Martin 315 was an action of assumpsit for use 
and occupation. The plaintiff leased to Shatto for three 
years from 1877, the lessee covenanting not to assign or 
release without the written consent of the lessor and the 
lessor to be entitled to re-enter on breach of covenant. 
In 1879 the parties indorsed on the lease an extension to 
1884, "without altering the conditions thereof." In 1881, 
in consideration of the lessee's agreement to make im-
provements, the lessor endorsed on the lease, "I hereby 
give Shatto the privilege of occupying the store men-
tioned in this lease for ten years from 1884, the rent to 
be the same as at present." In 1886 Shatto assigned the 
lease to the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff attempted 
to raise the rent. The court assumed the validity of the 
covenant against assignment in the original lease but 
reversed a judgment for the plaintiff on the ground the 
1881 endorsement was a new lease, to begin in futuro~ 
without any provision against alienation, so that the as-
signment was effective against the lessor. 
314 47 Mich. 158, 10 N.W. 182 (1881). 
a1s 69 Mich. 29, 37 N.W. 40 (1888). 
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Wertheimer v. Hosmer 316 was a proceeding in man-
damus to compel dissolution of an injunction. Clark and 
Lane leased a store to Michell for four years, to be used 
for the sale of teas, coffees, spices, and similar goods, the 
lease providing that Michell should not sublet or permit 
the occupancy by any other party, without the written 
consent of the lessors. The report does not indicate 
whether the lease provided expressly for re-entry on 
breach of covenant. Michell, with the oral consent of 
the lessors, sublet the store to Sprague, to be used for 
the sale of musical instruments and sheet music. Sprague 
assigned his interest to William and Max Wertheimer, 
who began altering the premises for use as a "misfit-
clothing house." Clark and Lane then sued Michell, 
Sprague, and the Wertheimers in equity and procured 
ex parte an injunction restraining Michell and Sprague 
from using the premises for any purpose except the sale 
of teas, coffee, spices, similar goods and musical instru-
ments and restraining the W ertheimers from using or 
occupying the store or any part thereof. The court de-
clined to interfere with this injunction by mandamus. 
As to the contention of the defendants that the permis-
sion to sublet to Sprague terminated the provision against 
assignment, the court said, 
"A covenant not to assign or underlet the leased prem-
ises without the assent of the lessor is frequently inserted 
in a lease, and is regarded as a fair and reasonable coven-
ant. But a license once given removes the restriction 
forever, as the condition is treated as entire, and there-
fore not capable of being waived or released as to part; 
but in order to have that effect it must be such a license 
as is contemplated in the lease,-that is, if the lease pro-
vides that the license shall be in writing, an oral license 
:ne 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890). 
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is not good. It is not to be understood, however, that this 
written stipulation not to sublet unless by consent of the 
lessor, in writing, may not be waived by an oral agree-
ment; .... The agreement to waive the condition as to 
Sprague, however, was not a waiver of the condition in 
the lease as to other parties, .... " 817 
If the injunction in this case had been limited to en-
forcement of the use restriction, there could be no doubt 
of the soundness of the result. The injunction went 
farther, however, in that it restrained the assignees from 
occupying the premises for any purpose, despite the fact 
that the lessors had not elected to declare a forfeiture of 
the lease and had indicated their intention of holding 
the original lessee liable for rent. The effect of such 
specific performance of a covenant against alienation is 
to make it effective as a prohibition on alienation, forc-
ing the lessee to remain such against his will. Enforce-
ment of such a prohibition may have seriously undesir-
able results which mere forfeiture would not. Although 
an effective assignment of his lease does not ordinarily 
free the lessee from liability to the lessor for performance 
of its covenants, it does free him from other types of 
liability. The owner of a legal possessory estate in land 
is commonly personally liable to the state and its sub-
divisions for property taxes, bound to perform labor on 
the roads, criminally responsible for removal of snow 
and noxious weeds, and liable in tort to members of the 
817 I d. at 61. At common law a condition against assignment without 
the permission of the lessor was destroyed by the giving of permission 
for a single assignment; that is, the lessor had no right of entry if the 
assignee assigned without permission. Dumper's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 
119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110 (1603); see Anonymous, 1 Dyer 45a, 73 Eng. 
Rep. 97 (1539); Fox v. Whitchcocke, 2 Buist. 290, 80 Eng. Rep. 1129 
(1614). It would seem, however, that a covenant against assignment 
without the permission of the lessor may, by apt words, be made to 
run with the land, so that when an assignment is made with permission, 
the first assignee will be liable in damages for breach of covenant if he 
reassigns without permission. Williams v. Earle, L.R. 3 Q.B. 739 (1868). 
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public for non-repair of buildings. A tenant whose 
health or business has failed may be able to escape pecun-
iary liability to his lessor by forfeiture of his estate or 
bankruptcy, but if he is forced by injunction to retain 
the estate against his will he cannot escape these public 
obligations. The effect of such an injunction in connec-
tion with a long-term lease may be to reduce the tenant 
to a status of serfdom or peonage in which he is bound 
to the land and from which he can escape only by 
death.318 
Sommers v. Reynolds 819 was a summary proceeding for 
possession of a hall. The plantiff demised the hall to the 
trustees of the Royal Adelphia Godfrey Conclave No. 
131 by a lease which provided that the lessees should not 
release, assign, or sublet, except for society purposes, 
without the written consent of the lessor, and that the 
lessor might re-enter upon breach. The Royal Adelphia 
and Godfrey Conclave were dissolved, and twelve mem-
bers of the latter formed a Godfrey Club, which sublet 
the hall five nights a week to other societies. A judgment 
for the defendants was affirmed on the ground the coven~ 
ant was not breached by the dissolution or subletting. 
Darmstaetter v. Hoffman 320 was an action of assumpsit 
s1s See note 298 supra. If the doctrine of Wertheimer v. Hosmer 
should be extended so as to compel the lessee's next of kin, taking on 
intestacy, to retain the estate, it might permit the creation of a system 
of perpetual, hereditary serfdom, without the ameliorating customs 
which eased the lot of the mediaeval peasant. One may speculate as 
to whether the lessee's great-grandson could break his bond to the land 
by escape and hiding for a year and a day. 
3t9 103 Mich. 307, 61 N.W. 501 (1894). Cf. Struble v. Community 
Club, 218 Mich. 604, 188 N.W. 292 (1922). 
320 120 Mich. 48, 78 N.W. 1014 (1899). In Smith v. Applebaum, 241 
Mich. 493, 217 N.W. 401 (1928), a 99-year lease provided that the 
lessee might "not sell or assign this lease and be released from liability 
thereon" without providing a bond to secure performance of the 
covenants. The lessee assigned the lease without providing a bond. 
After accepting payments of rent from the assignee, the lessor sued the 
original lessee for rent which accrued later. The court affirmed a judg-
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for rent. Hubbard and King leased a saloon to the plain-
tiffs, who covenanted to pay the rent and not to assign 
or transfer the lease without the written consent of the 
lessors. Without obtaining the consent of the lessors, 
the plaintiffs assigned the lease to Kudner, and Kudner 
assigned to the defendant. The plaintiffs sued for rent 
which they had not paid to Hubbard and King. A judg-
ment for them was affirmed, the court saying that when 
a lease is properly assigned, the assignee is bound to pay 
the rent directly to the lessor, and the assignor cannot 
hold the assignee for rent unless he has first paid it to the 
lessor. The opinion states that where, however, there is 
a covenant against assignment which the lessor has not 
waived, the assignee is the assignor's tenant and liable to 
him rather than the assignor. The theory of this decision 
is that the original lessee could not divest himself of his 
estate without the consent of the lessor. If this is so, then 
a covenant against assignment is effective as a prohibition 
on alienation or disabling restraint which forces the 
lessee to remain such against his will. The unsoundness 
and undesirability of such a view have already been made 
manifest. 
Marvin v. Hartz 321 was a summary proceeding for pos-
session of land. The plaintiff demised to Berlin, the 
lessee covenanting not to assign, transfer, or sublet with-
ment for the lessor, saying that acceptance of rent "would not establish 
the fact that the realty company had been substituted as lessee in the 
place of the defendant," and that the assignment "in no way changed 
the relation of the parties." The result reached is sound, because an 
assignment does not relieve a lessee from performance of a covenant 
to pay rent in the absence of novation. The quoted language is unfor-
tunate, however, in suggesting that an assignment without permission 
has no effect at all. Unless effective prohibitions on alienation are 
possible, such an assignment does destroy privity of estate and liability 
based thereon. Cf. Mooradian v. Petroff, 254 Mich. 278, 236 N.W. 780 
(1931); Buhl Land Co. v. Franklin Co., 258 Mich. 377, 242 N.W. 772 
(1932). 
s21 130 Mich. 26, 89 N.W. 557 (1902). 
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out the written assent of the lessor, and the lease pro-
viding that the lessor might re-enter upon breach of cov-
enant. Berlin assigned to the defendant without the con-
sent of the lessor. A judgment for the defendant based 
on a directed verdict was reversed. This appears to be 
the only Michigan case in which a condition of forfeiture 
on alienation in a lease for years was enforced accord-
ing to its terms. 
Crouse v. Michell 822 was a suit to foreclose a lien on an 
estate for years. Parker leased land to Michell for a term 
of fifteen years, the lease providing that the lessee should 
not assign, transfer, or sublet without the written con-
sent of the lessor, and that the lessor might re-enter on 
breach of covenant. Michell, without the consent or 
knowledge of the lessor, assigned the lease to the plain-
tiffs as security for a debt. Later, Michell, with the writ-
ten consent of the lessor, assigned the lease to Ives and 
Sons, who did not know of the prior assignment. Coun-
sel for the defense contended that a court of equity 
should not enforce an assignment of a lease made in 
violation of its covenants, even against parties other than 
the lessor. The court, without deciding whether this con-
tention is correct, affirmed a decree for the plaintiffs on 
the ground that a mortgage of an estate for years or as-
signment for security is not a breach of a covenant against 
assignment. The opinion contains language to the ef-
fect that covenants against assignment of leases are not 
favored and will be strictly construed. 
Negaunee Iron Company v. Iron Cliffs Company 323 
was a suit to quiet title. In 1857, when the lessee had a 
two-stack furnace on nearby land, Harvey, in considera-
tion of a lump sum of $25,000, leased 646 acres to the 
322 130 Mich. 347, 90 N.W. 32 (1902). 
a23 134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1903). 
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Pioneer Iron Company for 99 years for the purpose of 
mining and quarrying ores and marble. The lease, 
which did not reserve rent, read, 
"Provided, it shall not quarry, mine, or remove any 
ores on said land except such as it shall actually convert 
into merchantable iron in its own furnaces or forges .... 
The rights and easements above mentioned shall descend 
to the corporate successors of the party of the second part, 
but not to its assigns." 
In 1866 the Pioneer Iron Company leased all its lands 
to the defendant Iron Cliffs Company, which soon after 
acquired the entire capital stock of the Pioneer Com-
pany. The charter of the Pioneer Company expired in 
1887 but was revived in 1889 under constitutional and 
statutory provisions adopted in the latter year. The 
furnace was dismantled in 1894. The plaintiffs acquired 
the reversion and used the land from 1870 to 1900, when 
the revived Pioneer Iron Company asserted a right to 
mine under the 1857 lease. The court affirmed a decree 
for the plaintiffs on the ground the lease conveyed only 
an incorporeal right which was appurtenant to the fur-
nace and was extinguished by the dismantling of the 
furnace. Having reached a decision on this ground, the 
court declined to consider the validity or effect of the 
provision that the lease should not "descend" to assigns 
of the lessee. That provision might be construed as 
either a prohibition on alienation or a limitation in-
tended to make the estate cease on alienation. The court 
agreed, in general, with a contention of the defendants 
that a court of equity should not enforce provisions for 
forfeiture in a lease, but should leave the lessor to his 
remedy at law. It pointed out, however, that in this case 
the reversioners had already effected a forfeiture by re-
entry and occupation for thirty years, so that all equity 
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was being requested to do was to enjoin threatened tres-
passes. 
Wray-Austin Machinery Company v. Flower 324 was a 
suit for subrogation to the rights of the lessee under a 
lease. Flower leased to Wray by an instrument which 
contained a covenant against assignment but not against 
subletting and an express provision for forfeiture on 
breach. Wray sublet to the plaintiff for the balance of 
the term. Wray having defaulted in payment of rent, 
Flower served him with a notice to quit, commenced a 
summary proceeding for possession before a circuit court 
commissioner, and took judgment by default. The sta-
tute then in force provided that no writ of restitution 
should issue on such a judgment if the defendant paid 
the rent due and double the costs within five days after 
entry of judgment.325 The day after the judgment was 
entered the plaintiff learned of it and paid the commis-
sioner the rent due and the exact amount of the costs. 
Flower refused to accept this money and commenced 
proceedings in mandamus to compel issuance of a writ 
of restitution. The plaintiff then sued Wray and Flower 
in equity, claiming that it was equitably entitled to an 
assignment of the lease and to be subrogated to Wray's 
statutory right of redemption. The court reversed a 
decree for the plaintiff, holding that, as against the lessor, 
:m 140 Mich. 452, 103 N.W. 873 (1905). In Ladas v. Psiharis, 241 
Mich. 101, 216 N.W. 458 (1927), a lease had been assigned to a part-
nership with the consent of the lessor. The lessor secretly gave one 
of the partners a renewal lease containing a covenant against assign-
ment without the consent of the lessor. It was held that the other 
partners were entitled to share in the lease, not only as against the 
lessee but as against the lessor who, under these circumstances, could 
be compelled to assent to an assignment to the firm. 
325 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 123, §26, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) 
§11177. The present statute omits the word "double." Act 314, P.A. 
1915, c. 30, §25, as amended; Comp. Laws (1915) §13253; Comp. Laws 
1929, §14988; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1999; Comp. Laws (1948) §630.25. 
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the plaintiff could not assert a right to an assignment of 
the lease, because such an assignment would entitle the 
lessor to a forfeiture of the estate. As the plaintiff had 
not tendered the full amount required by the statute, the 
court thought it unnecessary to decide whether a sub-
tenant, as such, could exercise the lessee's statutory right 
of redemption. 
Hilsendegen v. Hartz Clothing Company 826 was a sum-
mary proceeding for possession of parts of a store build-
ing. The plaintiff demised three connected stores and a 
basement to Hartz by a lease containing a covenant 
against assigning or subletting without the written con-
sent of the lessor, which was modified by a provision that, 
"Permission is hereby given second party to sublet 
portions or departments of said store for the same line 
of business, also the basement for any unobjectionable 
business, other than for saloon, restaurant, pawnshop 
and jewelry business." 
When the lease was made, Hartz was operating a cloth-
ing business in two of the stores and subletting the third 
to persons running a hat hospital and tailor shop. Hartz 
later organized the defendant clothing company and sub-
let the first two stores to it, excepting a space measuring 
fifteen by twenty feet in one corner. The court reversed 
a judgment for the plaintiff, holding that there had been 
no breach of the covenant and saying that provisions in-
volving forfeiture are not favored and should be con-
strued most strongly against the lessor. 
Hammond v. Hibler 327 was a suit for an injunction 
against sale of liquor. The plaintiffs leased land to 
326 160 Mich. 255, 130 N.W. 646 (1911). The lease contained an 
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant. 
327 168 Mich. 66, 133 N.W. 932 (1911). The lease contained an 
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant. 
128 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
Hinkle and Nolin for ten years, the lease providing "that 
no building or part thereof be sublet for or used as a 
saloon, or that the sale of intoxicating liquors of any form 
be permitted on said premises." Hinkle and Nolin as-
signed the lease to a corporation which sublet part of the 
premises to Harrington. The plaintiffs, in consideration 
of his paying them $100 a month, gave written permis-
sion for sale of liquor to Harrington "but not to his 
heirs, assigns, executors or administrators." A judgment 
creditor of Harrington levied on his leasehold interest, 
bought at the sale, and assigned the sublease to the de-
fendant. A decree for the plaintiffs was affirmed by a 
majority of four justices on the ground the permission 
given Harrington was inalienable. Three justices dis-
sented, relying on the statement in the opinion in Wert-
heimer v. Hosmer~ quoted above,328 that a condition 
against alienation is entire, cannot be waived in part, 
and is removed in toto by any waiver. One justice did 
not sit. The majority opinion is probably sound. What 
was waived was not the covenant against alienation but 
the use restriction and that by a license to Harrington 
which would be personal and nonassignable even with-
out express provision to that effect. Unlike Wertheimer 
v. Hosmer~ the decree in this case did not enforce a cov-
enant against alienation as a prohibition compelling a 
lessee to retain his estate against his will. 
Flynn v. Bachner 329 was a summery proceeding for 
possession of land. Plaintiff leased a store to defendants, 
s2s Notes 316 and 317 supra. The dissenting justices were concerned 
by the fact that the plaintiffs were willing to give the defendant per-
mission to sell liquor for a substantial consideration. Curiously, in 
view of its theory, the dissenting opinion would have conditioned a 
decree for the defendant on his paying the $100 a month which Har-
rington agreed to pay for his license. 
s29 168 Mich. 424, 134 N.W. 451 (1912). The lease contained an 
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant. 
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"for the term of three years . . . with the privilege of 
two years more at the expiration of said first three years, 
making, if said privilege of two years more is exercised, 
a total of five years, ... to be occupied for a glove store 
. . . . Said parties of the second part further covenant 
that they will not assign nor transfer this lease, but can 
sublet if the business is satisfactory to the party of the 
fi " rst part. 
The defendants, with the plaintiff's oral permission, 
sublet part of the store to Darr for the manufacture and 
sale of belts. Defendants elected to extend the lease for 
the additional two years. After the first three years had 
passed the plaintiff brought this proceeding on the theory 
that the permission to sublet expired at the end of that 
period. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on 
the ground the lease was for five years at the option of 
the lessee and the permission was coextensive with the 
lease. 
Patterson v. Carrel 330 was a summary proceeding for 
possession of land. Mars leased the premises to Castner, 
who covenanted not to sublet without the written assent 
of the lessor. The lease contained an express provision 
for re-entry on breach of covenant. The defendant pur-
chased Castner's business, took possession of the premises 
without formal assignment of the lease, and made re-
pairs. Mars accepted rent from the defendant and made 
no objection to the repairs. Mars conveyed the reversion 
to the plaintiffs. A judgment for the defendant was af-
firmed on the ground that, if there was any breach of the 
330 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912). Accord: Pearson v. Sullivan, 
209 Mich. 306, 176 N.W. 597 (1920). Acceptance of rent from the head 
lessee, with knowledge that he had sublet, was held to waive the breach 
in Struble v. Community Club, 218 Mich. 604, 188 N.W. 292 (1922). 
Cf. Weber v. Van Blerck Motor Co., 186 Mich. 449, 152 N.W. 1036 
(1915). 
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covenant against subletting, it was waived by Mars, and 
the waiver bound his transferees. 
Great Lakes Realty and Building Company v. Tur-
ner 331 was a suit to restrain forfeiture of a lease. The 
defendant demised land to Brown for 99 years by a lease 
in which the lessee covenanted to erect a building and 
not to assign, except by way of mortgage, until the build-
ing was completed. Express permission to release or sub-
let at any time was granted in the lease. Brown sublet 
the entire tract to the plaintiff for a term of fifty years 
and, by a separate instrument executed on the same day, 
contracted to assign the head lease to the plaintiff when 
the building was erected. The court affirmed an order 
overruling a demurrer to the bill of complaint, holding 
that a contract to assign is not a breach of a covenant 
against assignment. The case is significant in that it as-
sumes the validity of a condition against assignment in a 
lease for a term longer than twenty-one years. The build-
ing was to be erected in ten years, however, so the re-
straint on alienation was not coextensive in duration 
with the lease itself. 
McDonald v. Andrews 382 was a suit for specific per-
formance of an option. The defendants leased land to 
the plaintiff for five years, with an option to purchase. 
The lease contained a covenant against assigning or sub-
letting without the written assent of the lessors. The 
lease was not executed with the formalities required for 
recording and, to obtain a recordable instrument, the 
plaintiff assigned the lease to his sister, who quit-claimed 
back without taking possession. A decree for the plain-
3 31 190 Mich. 582, 157 N.W. 57 (1916). The lease contained an 
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant. 
332 199 Mich. 160, 165 N.W. 797 (1917). The lease contained an 
express provision for re-entry on breach of covenant. 
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tiff was affirmed on the ground an assignment without 
transfer of possession is not a breach of a covenant against 
assignment. This seems a sound application of the an-
cient common-law rule that restraints on alienation are 
enforced only to protect a reversioner or remainderman 
against waste. 
Miller v. Pond 333 was a summary proceeding for pos-
session of land. Sarah Burr leased to "Ische Bros., Will 
C. Ische and Chas. E. Ische, copartners" for five years, 
with the privilege of a five year extension. The lease 
contained a covenant not to assign, transfer, or sublet in 
whole or part without the written assent of the lessor 
and an express provision for re-entry on breach of cov-
enant. The plaintiff purchased the reversion. The Isches 
sold Pond a two-thirds interest in their business and ad-
mitted him into their partnership. A judgment for the 
defendants was affirmed on the ground that adding a 
partner to a lessee firm is not a breach of a covenant 
against assignment. The court said that the words "in 
whole or part" applied only to subletting. 
C. ]. Netting Company v. Sillman 334 was a suit tore-
strain summary proceedings for possession of land. The 
Sillmans leased land to the Chinese-American Realty 
Company for fifty years by an instrument which pro-
vided, 
"Said lessee shall not sell or assign this lease without 
the consent of the lessors in writing . . . . If this lease 
shall by operation of law devolve upon or pass to any 
person or persons other than said lessee (the foregoing 
being hereinafter referred to as events of defeasance) , 
333 214 Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921). Cf. Tierney v. McKay, 232 
Mich. 609, 206 N.W. 325 (1925), where the withdrawal of one of two 
partners from the lessee firm was held not to be a breach of a similar 
covenant. 
334 226 Mich. 307, 197 N.W. 545 (1924). 
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then the lessors may elect to declare the terms of this 
lease ended and exercise the right of reentry and re-pos-
session herein elsewhere conferred in case of default." 
The lessee erected a valuable building and mortgaged 
it for $75,000 to the Peninsular State Bank. The plaintiff 
levied on the leasehold under a judgment against the 
lessee and bought at execution sale. The lessors com-
menced summary proceedings to enforce a forfeiture, 
and the plaintiff started this suit, asserting equity juris-
diction on the ground, inter alia, that the condition was 
ambiguous. The court reversed an order denying a mo-
tion to dismiss, saying that the condition was not ambigu-
ous and that the only question was as to its validity, 
which could be determined at law. The opinion gives no 
intimation of the court's view as to the validity of a 
condition against involuntary alienation except to sug-
gest, indirectly, that it depends upon whether the sta-
tute permitting sale of estates for years on execution 885 
confers upon such estates an inseparable incident which 
cannot be restrained by condition. 
McPheeters v. Birkholz 886 was an action of trespass on 
the case for wrongful eviction. The defendants leased 
a farm to the plaintiff on shares for a year from June, 
1917. The plaintiff left on September 15, to be with 
his wife in another state during her confinement, leav-
ing a hired man in charge of the farm. A few days later 
the defendants seized possession of the farm by force. 
The court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff for triple 
385 
"Leasehold interests in lands shall be subject to levy and sale 
upon execution. Proceedings to and including the sale shall be the 
same in all respects as in the case of real estate sold on execution." 
Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 23, §141; Comp. Laws (1915) §12956; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §14676; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1640; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§623.141. 
sse 232 Mich. 370, 206 N.W. 196 (1925). 
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damages under the statute of forcible entry and detain-
er,337 saying that, although a lease on shares implies a 
covenant that the lessee will give the farm his personal 
attention, there was no breach in this instance and, even 
if there had been a breach, it would not have entitled 
the lessors to declare a forfeiture in the absence of an 
express provision therefor in the lease. The opinion 
states that, in general, breach of a covenant in a lease does 
not work a forfeiture in the absence of a provision for re-
entry but suggests that there may be an exception to 
that rule in the case of covenants against alienation. 338 
Webb v. Knauss 339 was a summary proceeding for pos-
session of land. The plaintiff demised land to Unger for 
99 years by a lease containing a covenant against assign-
ment without the written consent of the lessor and a 
provision permitting the lessee to sublet in whole or in 
part without such consent. Unger assigned to Knauss 
with the written permission of the lessor. Knauss died, 
and his widow succeeded to his interest. Mrs. Knauss, by 
an instrument purporting to be a sublease, transferred 
the whole of the unexpired term to the Houghtens. The 
Houghtens assigned to Flint. After learning of these as-
signments the plaintiff commenced a summary proceed-
ing for possession for nonpayment of rent against Mrs. 
Knauss, the Houghtens, and Flint, and took a judgment 
against all of them, which was paid by Mrs. Knauss. The 
337 Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 33, §19; Comp. Laws (1915) §13376; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §15113; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.2130; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§633.19; reenacting Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 111, §3; Comp. Laws (1857) 
§4717; Comp. Laws (1871) §6372; How. Stat., §7957; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §11206. 
sss 232 Mich. 377, 205 N.W. 199, citing Wray-Austin Machinery Co. 
v. Flower, 140 Mich. 452, 103 N.W. 873 (1905), note 324 supra. 
339 253 Mich. 197, 234 N.W. 154 (1931). The lease contained an 
express provision for re-entry on breach of condition. The estate for 
years passed to Mrs. Knauss by will. 
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plaintiff then commenced a summary proceeding for pos-
session against the same defendants on the ground the 
purported sublease from Mrs. Knauss to the Houghtens 
was an assignment and worked a forfeiture. The defend-
ants contended that the permission to assign to Knauss 
destroyed the whole covenant against assignment 340 and 
that, even if it did not, the lessor's taking a judgment for 
rent against the assignees waived the breach. The court 
held that the purported sublease was an assignment but 
affirmed a judgment for the defendants on the second 
ground urged by them, without discussing the first. The 
case is significant in that it assumes the validity of a re-
straint on alienation in a 99-year lease which is opera-
tive for the full term of the lease. 
The Michigan decisions clearly affirm the validity of 
a provision in a commercial lease for forfeiture to the 
lessor on alienation by the lessee. There is nothing in 
them to indicate that the rule is otherwise in the case of 
a provision intended to be operative for the full period 
of a lease for a very long term, such as a thousand years 
or 99 years renewable forever. There are no Michigan 
decisions on restraints on alienation of noncommercial 
leasehold interests, and there is nothing to suggest that 
the rule governing them is any different from that which 
applies to like restraints in commercial leases.341 No 
Michigan case deals with a provision for forfeiture to 
someone other than the lessor, but such a provision is 
probably valid.342 
Three Michigan decisions suggest that a covenant 
against alienation in a lease for years is, or may be made 
340 As to this contention, see the language in Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 
83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890), quoted at note 317 supra. 
341 Cf. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §410 (1944), note 305 supra. 
342 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §27, note 307 supra. 
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through specific performance by injunction to operate 
as, a prohibition on alienation which disables the lessee 
from transferring his estate and forces him to retain it, 
with all its burdens and public obligations, against his 
will,343 If this is so, the law of Michigan on this point 
is out of harmony with that of England and the great 
majority of jurisdictions in this country.344 It does not 
appear that the Michigan Supreme Court was fully 
aware when it rendered these decisions of their incon-
sistency with the principles of the common law as those 
principles have stood since the abolition of perpetually 
unbarrable entails in 1472. It is to be hoped that the 
court will overrule those three decisions and replace 
them with the sound rule of Mandlebaum v. McDonell 345 
that all prohibitory restraints on alienation of legal es-
tates in land are void. 
Public policy is no explanation of why every restraint 
on alienation of an estate in fee simple, even if limited 
in duration to a single day, is absolutely void, whereas 
restraints on alienation of estates for years are fully valid, 
although general in scope and extending for the full dur-
ation of the term, and although the term may be for a 
thousand years or more. The reversioner under a short 
term lease has a real interest in the integrity and good 
husbandry of his tenant; the reversioner under a thou-
sand year lease, particularly if no rent is reserved, has no 
substantial interest in his tenant's character or behavior; 
a restraint on alienation for his benefit means merely 
that he may impose a pecuniary mulct on the tenant as 
3 43 Wertheimer v. Hosmer, 83 Mich. 56, 47 N.W. 47 (1890); Darm-
staetter v. Hoffman, 120 Mich. 48, 78 N.W. 1014 (1899); Smith v. 
Applebaum, 241 Mich. 493, 217 N.W. 401 (1928). 
344 Notes 297 and 298 supra. 
345 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra. Accord with the rule pro-
posed by the text: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §405 (1944). 
136 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
a condition of assenting to a transfer. This was the prac-
tice of feudal overlords of tenants in fee simple until it 
was stopped by the enactment of the statute Quia Emp-
tores Terrarum. 846 Restraints on estates for long terms 
of years are as objectionable as those upon estates in fee 
simple. If the restraint extends to involuntary aliena-
tion, the impediment to creditors is manifest. Moreover, 
such restraints impede the economic utilization of land 
to its full capacity. An industrial concern may be finan-
cially unable to move its operations to a new and more 
suitable location if it cannot transfer its existing plant to 
another concern without paying a lessor a prohibitive 
fee. When land under a long term lease should have a 
new building and the lessee cannot finance construction 
without assigning or encumbering his estate, if the lessor 
insists upon the full anticipated gain from the venture 
as a condition of his assent, no building is likely to be 
built. Such restraints may also impede maximum utiliza-
tion of human capacities by restricting mobility. For 
example, a professional man whose chief asset is a rent-
free long-term lease of a house, subject to forfeiture on 
alienation, is financially bound to exercise his talents 
in the vicinity of the house although they might develop 
more fully and be of greater social utility in some other 
locality.847 It is probable that general restraints on alien-
ation of long-term leases will be used to evade the recent 
United States Supreme Court decisions prohibiting the 
enforcement of use restrictions ·against occupancy by 
members of a particular race.348 
346 Statute of Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290). See notes 7, 
104 supra. 
347 This is especially true of clergymen and university professors 
whose social value is high hut whose incomes are so low that the 
availability of a free house is likely to be decisive as to their location. 
See note 318 supra. 
a4s McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), reversing Sipes v. McGhee, 
316 Mich. 614, 25 N.W. (2d) 638 (1947). 
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It may be that we need a new statute Quia Emptores 
Terrarum to prohibit restraints on alienation of estates 
for years which are imposed for undesirably long per-
iods.349 Extension of the existing constitutional prohibi-
tion on long-term leases of agricultural land 350 to all 
types of leases would accomplish the purpose but might 
interfere unduly with flexibility in conveyancing. Per-
haps a statute providing that no restraint on alienation 
in a lease should be valid for more than twenty-one years 
after its execution would be desirable. 
349 Professor Gray suggested the need for legislation on the subject. 
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 90 (1895). 
aoo Note 306 supra. It should be noted that the prohibition has no 
application to a lease which does no't reserve rent or services. Hence 
the constitutional provision fails to regulate nonconunercial leases, the 
type which, as the Restatement of Property recognizes, are most likely 
to be used to set up objectionable perpetuities. 
CHAPTER 6 
Expectant Legal Interests in Land 
T HE common law recognized a number of interests in land which were not presently possessory but would or might become so. These included the 
interest of an owner of a freehold estate who had leased 
the land for a term of years, the interest of the owner of 
an estate for years who had sublet for a lesser term, and 
the interest of an owner of a freehold estate who had con-
veyed a lesser freehold estate. These interests were all 
known as reversions, but their incidents differed because 
the reversioner of the first type had seisin, whereas those 
of the other two types did not. From the end of the thir-
teenth century, the common law recognized the remain-
der, an estate limited in a conveyance to commence in 
possession upon the termination of a prior estate in tail, 
for life or for years created by the same conveyance.351 
The validity of contingent remainders was not recognized 
until the fifteenth century and then only when preceded 
by an estate of freehold. 352 From a very early period the 
law recognized the interesse termini) the interest of the 
owner of an estate for years which is to commence in the 
future. 353 The reversion, the remainder, and the interesse 
351 Fitz William v. Anonymous, R.S.Y.B. 33 Edw. I, 20 (1305). 
352 Sir Thomas Littleton seems to have considered contingent re-
mainders invalid. TENUREs, §72I (I481). Butler v. Bray, 2 Dyer I89b 
at I90b, 73 Eng. Rep. 4I8 at 420 (I560); Chudleigh's Case, I Co. Rep. 
I20a at I30a, I34b, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 at 296, 304 (I589-95); Goodright 
v. Cornish, I Salk. 226, 91 Eng. Rep. 200 (I694); 3 Holdsworth, Hrs-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., I34-I37 (I923); 7 id. 85 (I926). 
353 I Coke, INSTITUTES 45b, 46b. Strictly speaking, the interesse 
termini was not an estate, but it was much more than a mere pos-
sibility or right of entry or action. Saffyn's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 123b at 
138 
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termini were the only estates in expectancy known to the 
common law, but it also recognized certain other interests 
in expectancy which did not rise to the dignity of estates. 
These included the right of entry or of action of the dis-
seised or dispossessed owner of a possessory estate, the 
right of action of a reversioner or remainderman whose 
estate had been discontinued by the tortious operation of 
a conveyance made by the owner of the possessory estate, 
the right of entry retained by one who conveyed an estate 
subject to a condition subsequent, inchoate dower, and 
unassigned dower consummate. Whether the common 
law recognized the possibility of reverter, which is the 
interest, if any there can be, retained by one who has 
conveyed a determinable estate which is not on condi-
tion subsequent, is not clear.354 The Statutes of Uses and 
Wills added four types of estates in expectancy, the 
springing use, the shifting use, the springing executory 
devise, and the shifting executory devise. 355 
124b, 77 Eng. Rep. 248 at 250 (1605); 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF 
ENGLISH LAw 247 (1923); Bordwell, "Interests in Chattels Real and 
Personal," I Mo. L. REv. 119 at 133-137 (1936). 
354 E.g., the interest retained by A after conveying "to B and his 
heirs so long as the Penobscot Building shall stand." Challis, LAw OF 
REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., 263-268, 437-439 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., 24-44, 579-587 (1915). Professor Gray thought 
that the possibility of reverter was a form of reversion and that the 
statute Quia Emptores Terrarum prohibited the retention of any type 
of reversion on a conveyance in fee simple. Unfortunately, the courts 
in this country have not always been careful to distinguish, on the 
one hand, between the possibility of reverter and the right of entry 
for breach of condition subsequent, both of which are reversionary 
possibilities created according to the rules of the common law unmodi-
fied by statute, and, on the other hand, between these reversionary 
possibilities and the shifting use limited in favor of the grantor, 
operating under the Statute of Uses, which is not a reversionary 
possibility but a future estate. As to such shifting uses, see Digby, 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed., 354-356 (1892). 
355 Brooke, GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, "Feffements al Uses," pl. 30, 50 
(1573); Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 4th ed., 357-
359 (1892); 4 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 440, 474 (1924); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Introductory Note to Div. III (1936). 
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Reversions of all three types 356 and interessia ter-
mini 357 were, from an early period, as freely alienable 
inter vivos as like possessory estates. There is doubt as 
to the alienability of remainders at the early common 
law, but it was settled by the sixteenth century that vested 
remainders were transferable inter vivos.358 Contingent 
remainders and all of the other mentioned types of in-
terests in expectancy were inalienable at common law,359 
356 Freehold reversion expectant upon a term for years: Pesehale v. 
Fitz Aucher, Bract. N.B., pl. 533 (1231); Reversion in a term for years: 
Rawlyns's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 52a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1007 (1587); Reversion 
in fee expectant upon a lesser freehold: Cambridge v. Risle, R.S.Y.B. 
34 Edw. I, 314 (1306); Edward Fox's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. 
Rep. 616 (1609). So far as present rights against the tenant in pos-
session (rent due under a lease or sublease, etc.) attornment, voluntary 
or compulsory, was necessary to complete the transfer until Stat. 4 
Ann., c. 16, §9 (1705), but the reversion, so far as it was an interest 
in expectancy, passed by the grant or assignment, without attornment. 
Rawlyns's Case, supra. 
357 Bruerton v. Rainsford, Cro. Eliz. 15, 78 Eng. Rep. 281 (1583); 
Wheeler v. Thorogood, Cro. Eliz. 127, 78 Eng. Rep. 384 (1589); Saffyn's 
Case, 5 Co. Rep. 123b, 77 Eng. Rep. 248, sub nom. Saffyn v. Adams, 
Cro. Jac. 60, 79 Eng. Rep. 50 (1605). 
358 N. v. Crowe, R.S.Y.B. 21 Edw. I, 185, 189 (1293); Sheppard, 
TouCHSTONE oF CoMMON AssURANCEs 238 (1648). 
359 Contingent estates (remainders, uses, and executory interests), see: 
Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612); King v. 
Withers, Cases T. Talbot 117 at 123, 25 Eng. Rep. 693 at 695 (1735); 
Doe ex dem. Brune v. Martyn, 8 B. & C. 497 at 516, 108 Eng. Rep. 
1127 at 1134 (1828). A transfer for consideration of a shifting use was 
given effect in equity after the contingency occurred in Wright v. 
Wright, 1 Ves. Sr. 409, 27 Eng. Rep. 1111 (1749-50) and it was de-
cided in the nineteenth century that a contingent future estate could 
be transferred, by way of estoppel, by levying a fine, Doe ex dem. 
Christmas v. Oliver, 10 B. & C. 181, 109 Eng. Rep. 418 (1829), but the 
confusion in the authorities reflected in Doe ex dem. Brune v. 
Martyn, supra, indicates that the possibility of making an effective 
voluntary transfer of a contingent future estate in any way was, to 
say the least, highly doubtful throughout the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries. A contingent estate could be transferred by the com-
missioners in bankruptcy of the owner. Higden v. Williamson, 3 P. 
Wms. 132, 24 Eng. Rep. 1000 (1732); 1 Co. Rep. 66b, Fraser's Note z. 
Right of entry: Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540); Partridge v. Strange, 
I Plowden 77 at 88, 75 Eng. Rep. 123 at 140 (1552) (holding that 
such interests were inalienable at common law and that the statute 
subjected them to forfeiture for attempted alienation); Sir Moyle 
Finch's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 63a at 70a, 77 Eng. Rep. 348 at 362 (1606); 
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except that a right of entry on breach of condition sub-
sequent which was appurtenant to a reversion could be 
transferred with the reversion/60 and an otherwise in-
alienable interest in expectancy could be released to the 
owner of a present estate.361 Reversions in estates for 
years, the second type of reversion mentioned above, and 
interessia termini passed as chattel interests on the death 
of the owner and could always be bequeathed by will.862 
Reversions, remainders, and other interests in expectancy 
in fee were heritable, and those which were estates were 
devisable.863 This was the state of the English law when 
it was brought to Michigan by the Upper Canada statute 
of 1792.364 
The English authority on the validity of restraints on 
alienation of interests in expectancy is scanty. In 1382 
it was decided that a condition in a life lease, that if the 
Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. Forrester, 8 East 552, 103 Eng. Rep. 454 
(1809); Littleton, TENURES §347 (1481); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 265a 
(Butler's Note No. 212 to 13th ed., 1787); Dower: See 1 Coke, IN-
STITUTES 32b. 
3so Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 34, §1 (1540). 
S61 Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612). A 
married woman could not make an ordinary conveyance to her hus-
band or anyone else, but dower could be released by the husband and 
wife levying a fine or suffering a common recovery in favor of a pur-
chaser of the husband's estate. Id. at 49b, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1000; I 
Cruise, DIGEST OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND RESPECTING REAL PROPERTY 
187; 5 id., 178-179, 417. Curtesy initiate was not an interest in expec-
tancy but a present possessory estate for life. 
362 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 46b. 
363 King v. Withers, Cases T. Talbot 117 at 123, 25 Eng. Rep. 693 
at 695 (1735) (intestate succession); Selwyn v. Selwyn, 2 Burr. 1131, 
97 Eng. Rep. 750 (1761) (contingent executory interest devisable); 
Roe ex dem. Perry v. Jones, 1 H. Bl. 30, 126 Eng. Rep. 20 (1788) 
(contingent remainder devisable); Goodright ex dem. Fowler v. For-
rester, & East 552, 103 Eng. Rep. 454 (1809) (right of entry not de-
visable). The descent of a future interest was peculiar in that, when 
it became possessory, the heir of the person who had last acquired it 
by purchase (i.e., other than by descent) took. This was not neces-
sarily the heir of the last person who had owned the interest. 3 Simes, 
FUTURE INTERESTS 169 (1936). 
364 32 Geo. III, (Upper Canada), c. §3 (1792), note 33 supra. 
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lessor conveyed the reversion it should be forfeited to the 
life tenant, was void.365 In 1587 a provision in a will that 
if devisees of a contingent remainder in fee simple "go 
about to sell" before the remainder vested they should 
forfeit their estate was treated as valid.366 As contingent 
remainders were inalienable at that time, the decision is 
not conclusive as to the validity of a penalty restraint on 
alienation of a contingent future interest. The modern 
English cases indicate that such a restraint is valid, but 
they are not in harmony as to the validity of restraints 
on vested interests in expectancy.367 The weight of Amer-
ican authority tends toward the view that penalty re-
straints on alienation of contingent future interests in-
tended to operate only while they remain contingent, are 
valid, but that restraints on alienation of indefeasibly 
vested estates in expectancy are valid only to the extent 
that they would be valid as applied to like possessory 
estates. 368 
365 Plesyngton's Case, Bellewe 101, 72 Eng. Rep. 43 (1382); Statham, 
ABRIDGEMENT, Condicions, pl. 14. But see Perkins, PROFITABLE BooKE 
§§729, 730 (1642). It may be that this case was decided on the basis of 
the common-law rule that a condition could not enure to the benefit 
of anyone other than the lessor. The case was cited in support of this 
rule in Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, Hil., pl. 12 (1505). See Brooke, 
GRAUNDE ABRIDGEMENT, Conditions, pl. 83 (1573). If this is the basis 
of the decision in Plesyngton's Case, it is not of much help in deter-
mining the law of restraints on alienation. 
366 Large's Case, 2 Leon. 82, 3 Leon. 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 376, 620 
(1587). It was held that the giving of a 240-year lease by one of the re-
maindermen was not a breach of the restraint. 
367 Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d ed., 33-38 (1895); Schnebly, 
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PRoPERTY, §26.54 (1952); Sweet, "Restraints on Alienation," 33 L.Q. 
REv. 236 at 246 (1917); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation 
of Legal Interests," 44 YALE L.J. 961, 1186 at 1214-1215 (1935); 2 
Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS 311-312 (1936). 
368 The cases have been collected by Professors Schnebly and Simes, 
note 367 supra. Professor Schnebly says (AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
§26.53; p. 1213 of article), "No authority has been found which has 
divided the restraint, and upheld it for the period of time during which 
the future interest may remain non-possessory." 
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The Restatement of Property takes the position that 
all prohibitory restraints on alienation of future estates 
which would otherwise be alienable, that is, restraints 
which would compel the owner to remain such against 
his will, are void. 369 As to penalty restraints, the Restate-
ment considers a restraint which may last until after the 
interest becomes possessory or becomes indefeasibly 
vested is valid only if a like restraint on a possessory estate 
of the same duration would be. It takes no position on the 
validity of penalty restraints which are certain not to 
operate after the estate becomes possessory or indefeasibly 
vested.370 
The Michigan statutes codify the law of estates in ex-
pectancy and provide that they are descendible, devis-
able, and alienable, in the same manner as estates in pos-
session.371 Consequently the question of the alienability 
ss9 Section 405 and §411, comment a (1944). 
370 Section 411. The Restatement, unlike the Michigan statutes, 
treats reversions, possibilities of reverter, and rights of entry on breach 
of condition subsequent as future interests. Sec. 153, comment a; 
§154, comment e; §155; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §9; note 371 infra. The 
Restatement does not treat possibilities of reverter and rights of entry 
as future estates, however, and it does not deal with inchoate dower 
and curtesy initiate. Sections 154 (3), 155, 153 (I) (2). 
371Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 266, §24, provided: "When any contingent re-
mainder, executory devise, or other estate in expectancy, is so granted 
or limited to any person, that in case of his death before the happening 
of the contingency, the estate would descend to his heirs in fee simple, 
such person may, before the happening of the contingency, sell, assign, 
or devise the premises, subject to the contingency." This was super-
seded by the following provisions of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, which are 
still in force: 
"Sec. 7. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are di-
vided into estates in possession, and estates in expectancy. 
"Sec. 8. An estate in possession is where the owner has an im-
mediate right to the possession of the land; an estate in expectancy is 
where the right to the possession is postponed to a future period. 
"Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy are divided into, First. Estates com-
mencing at a future day, denominated future estates; and, Second. 
Reversions. 
"Sec. 10. A future estate is an estate limited to commence in pos-
session at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent 
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of contingent future estates has not been in doubt here. 372 
The questions which have caused difficulty have been 
those which involve interests in expectancy which are 
not estates. Until the rule was changed by statute in 
1847, Michigan held that a disseisee, that is, the owner 
estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a 
precedent estate, created at the same time. 
"Sec. 11. When a future estate is dependent upon a precedent 
estate, it may be termed a remainder, and may be created and trans-
ferred by that name. 
"Sec. 12. A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor 
or his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession on 
the determination of a particular estate granted or devised. 
"Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or contingent: They are 
vested when there is a person in being who would have an immediate 
right to the possession of the lands, upon the ceasing of the inter-
mediate or precedent estate. They are contingent whilst the person 
to whom, or the event upon which they are limited to take effect 
remains uncertain. 
"Sec. 35. Expectant estates are descendible, devisable and alien-
able in the same manner as estates in possession. 
"Sec. 42. All expectant estates, except such as are enumerated and 
defined in this chapter, are abolished."-Comp. Laws (1857) §§2591 
to 2597, 2619, 2626; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4074 to 4080, 4102, 4109; 
Comp. Laws (1897) §§8789 to 8795, 8817, 8825; How. Stat., §§5523 to 
5529, 5551, 5558; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11525 to 11531, 11553, 11560; 
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12927 to 12933, 12955, 12962; Mich. Stat. Ann., 
§§26.7 to 26.13, 35, 42; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.7 to 554.13, 554.35, 
554.42. See also §§14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, notes 257, 279, 
307 supra. The effect of these statutes is discussed in Chapter 11, Sec' 
tion C., infra. 
Despite sections 9 and 10, it has been held that a reversion expec-
tant upon an estate for years is a present estate in possession. Toms 
v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). See PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT §154, comment f; Cf. Challis, LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY, 
3d ed., 99-100 (1911). 
372 Inter vivos transfer: Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 
428 (1927). But see Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W. 
556 (1914) (holding that a conveyance by a contingent remainderman 
was void because she was a married woman). Transfer by bankruptcy: 
Horton v. Moore, (6th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 189, cert. den., Moore 
v. Horton, 311 U.S. 692 (1940), rehearing den. 311 U.S. 728 (1940). 
Transfer by will: see L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 
N.W. 1077 (1891). Intestate descent: Curtis v. Fowler, 66 Mich. 696, 
33 N.W. 804 (1887). The problem was complicated, however, by 
decisions finding an implied condition of survivorship until the estate 
vested. Thus, in Hadley v. Henderson, 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75 
(1921) a shifting executory interest to a daughter in case a devisee in fee 
died without issue was held to "lapse" upon the death of the daughter 
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of land in the adverse possession of another, could not 
convey it to anyone except the person in possession. 373 
Similarly, until the rule was abrogated by statute in 1931, 
it was held that a right of entry on breach of condition 
subsequent not appurtenant to a reversion was inalien-
able and that an attempt to transfer such a right for-
feited it.374 A right of entry on breach of condition sub-
before the first devisee, and in In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234 
N.W. 141 (1931), cert den. sub nom. Dellbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 
665 (1931) a contingent remainder to nieces and nephews if a life 
tenant should die without issue was held to "lapse" as to nieces and 
nephews who predeceased the life tenant. See 2 Simes, FUTURE IN-
TERESTS 90-95 (1936). In an attempt to overrule these decisions the 
legislature, by Act 2ll, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.47; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §554.101, provided: "In all cases where the owner of an ex-
pectant estate, right or interest in real or personal property, shall die 
prior to the termination of the precedent or intermediate estate, if the 
contingency arises by which such owner would have been entitled to an 
estate in possession if living, his heirs at law if he died intestate, or 
his devisees or grantees and assigns if he shall have devised or con-
veyed such right or interest, shall be entitled to the same estate in 
possession." The statute has been treated as effective for the intended 
purpose but not retroactive. Stevens v. Wildy, 281 Mich. 377, 275 
N.W. 179 (1937); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Company, 300 Mich. 575, 
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). See part Two at notes 261-266 infra. 
sn Bruckner's Lessee v. Lawrence, 1 Doug. 19 (Mich. 1843) [hold-
ing that Stat. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §1 (1540) note 359 supra, to the same 
effect, was not in force here, but that a conveyance by a disseisee was 
void at common law as an act of maintenance]; Stockton v. Williams, 
I Doug. 546 (Mich. 1845) (giving limited effect to the conveyance); 
Hubbard v. Smith, 2 Mich. 207 (1851); Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24 
(1870). Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 65, §7, provided, "No grant or conveyance 
of lands or interest therein, shall be void for the reason that, at the 
time of the execution thereof such lands shall be in the actual pos-
session of another claiming adversely." Comp. Laws (1857) §2726; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §4209; How. Stat. §5657; Comp. Laws (1897) 
§8961; Comp. Laws (1915) §ll693; Comp. Laws (1929) §13283; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §26.526; Comp. Laws (1948) §565.7. Probably the statute 
transforms the right of entry of a disseisee into a present possessory 
estate. 
374 Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 
308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923); County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 
279, 220 N.W. 801 (1928); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beards-
lee, 248 Mich. ll2, 226 N.W. 867 (1929); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. 
Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Avery v. Consumers Power 
Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Dolby v. State Highway 
Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State 
Highway Commissioner, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938). Contra, 
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sequent appurtenant to a reversion expectant upon an 
estate for years is alienable with the reversion, 375 and the 
same seems to be true as to a right of entry on breach of 
condition subsequent appurtenant to a reversion expect-
ant upon a freehold estate, even though created after 
the repeal of the English statutes and before the enact-
ment of the Michigan statute of 1931.376 Michigan prob-
ably recognizes the existence of possibilities of reverter 
and holds them inalienable, the 1931 statute being 
limited to rights of entry on breach of condition subse-
quent.377 Inchoate dower may be released to the hus-
as to the forfeiture: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §160, Comment C. (1948 
Supp.). Act 219, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.851; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §554.ll1, provides: "The reversionary interest in lands con-
veyed on a condition subsequent may be granted, conveyed, trans-
ferred or devised by the owner of such interest, and by the subsequent 
grantees or devisees thereof, either before or after the right of re-entry 
becomes effective: Provided, That this act shall not affect any such 
interest created before it takes effect." A right of entry on breach of 
condition subsequent reserved in a conveyance in fee must be distin-
guished from the title remaining in an owner in fee who has granted 
an easement determinable upon cessation of the prescribed use. The 
fee subject to the easement may be transferred. Mahar v. Grand Rapids 
Terminal Ry. Co., 174 Mich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913). See Quinn v. 
Pere Marquette Ry. Co., supra. 
375 Patterson v. Carrel, 171 Mich. 296, 137 N.W. 158 (1912); Miller 
v. Pond, 214 Mich. 186, 183 N.W. 24 (1921). 
376 Hamilton v. Wickson, 131 Mich. 71, 90 N.W. 1032 (1902); Hess 
v. Haas, 230 Mich. 646, 203 N.W. 471 (1925); 3 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS 
162 (1936). 
377 Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870); School District No. 5 of 
Delhi v. Everett, 52 Mich. 314, 17 N.W. 926 (1883); Fractional School 
District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929). See 
Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 
(1931). The Michigan Supreme Court has not always been careful 
of its terminology and has sometimes tended to confuse the common-
law possibility of reverter with the right of entry on breach of con-
dition subsequent. Although both of these interests are inalienable if 
created before the 1931 statute and the possibility of reverter is 
probably still inalienable, it would seem that a shifting use limited to 
the grantor should be alienable like any other future estate. See note 
354 supra; 3 Simes, FuTURE INTERESTS 159-160 (1936). As to the 
validity of a limitation of a shifting use to the grantor, see 1 Simes, 
273-274. 
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band 378 or to a purchaser of the fee, 379 but unassigned 
dower is otherwise inalienable, even after it has become 
consummate by the death of the husband.380 
Walton v. Torrey 381 was a suit to restrain eviction pro-
ceedings. A testator devised land to his widow for life, 
remainder to his children in fee simple with a proviso 
that it should "remain undivided in the use, occupation 
and possession of all my children now living, until the 
youngest child attains the age of 21 years." The widow 
and those children who were of age executed convey-
ances purporting to transfer their interests to the defend-
ant, and later, before the youngest child was 21, brought 
378 Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563 (1877); Rhoades v. Davis, 
51 Mich. 306, 16 N.W. 659 (1883); Owen v. Yale, 75 Mich. 256, 42 
N.W. 817 (1889); Wright v. Wright, 79 Mich. 527, 44 N.W. 944 (1890); 
Dakin v. Dakin, 93 Mich. 284, 56 N.W. 562 (1893); Chittock v. Chittock, 
101 Mich. 367, 59 N.W. 655 (1894); McKelvey v. McKelvey, 112 Mich. 
274, 70 N.W. 582 (1897); La Plant v. Lester, 150 Mich. 336, 113 
N.W. 1115 (1907); In re Berner's Estates, 217 Mich. 612, 187 N.W. 
(1912); Hagerty v. Union Guardian Trust Co., 258 Mich. 133, 244 N.W. 
211. (1932). As between the husband and wife, the consideration for 
such a release must be adequate: Wright v. Wright, supra; Bechtel 
v. Barton, 147 Mich. 318, 110 N.W. 935 (1907). 
379 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 66, §13; Comp. Laws (1857) §2784; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4281; Comp. Laws (1897) §8930; How. Stat. §5745; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11662; Comp. Laws (1929) §13080; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §26.229; Comp. Laws (1948) §558.13. Inchoate dower is bound by 
the wife's joinder in the husband's mortgage, Oades v. Standard Savings 
& Loan Assn., 257 Mich. 469, 241 N.W. 262 (1932), or executory land 
contract, Hendricks v. Wolf, 279 Mich. 598, 273 N.W. 282 (1937). 
Cf. Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193 (1864). A wife may give 
her husband a power of attorney to bar dower by joining her in his 
conveyances. Continental National Bank v. Gustin, 297 Mich. 134, 
297 N.W. 214 (1941). 
sso Inchoate dower: Lott v. Lott, 146 Mich. 580, 109 N.W. 1126 
(1906); Cf. Raynor v. Lee, 20 Mich. 384 (1870); Unassigned dower 
consummate: Galbraith v. Fleming, 60 Mich. 408, 27 N.W. 583 (1886). 
However, in Johnston v. Loose, 201 Mich. 259, 167 N.W. 1021 (1918), 
where the widow quit-claimed unassigned dower to the plaintiff and 
later released it to the heirs, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled 
in equity as against both the widow and the heirs to compel the 
widow to secure admeasurement of her dower and convey it to him. 
381 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich, circa 1836). The restraint also involved 
possessory estates. This aspect of the case has been discussed above 
at note 135. 
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this suit. The interests of the minor children had been 
conveyed to the defendant under probate court license. 
An injunction was dissolved, the Chancellor holding that 
the restraint was upon partition, not upon alienation, 
and that its validity need not be decided. He stated that 
provisions in restraint of alienation are not to be favored. 
Mandlebaum v. McDonell 382 was a suit to quiet title. 
A will, as construed by the court, devised land to the 
testator's widow for life with remainder in fee simple to 
his three sons, a grandson, Ellen Daily and Ann Baxter, 
the interests of the latter two being subject to a condi-
tion subsequent requiring them to live with the widow 
until they married. The will provided: 
"the same to remain unsold until (the grandson) shall 
be twenty-five years of age, or until twenty-one years from 
the date hereof, in case of his death, and not then to be 
sold in case my wife is still living, and that she remains 
my widow, and until after her death." 
The will also stated that the devises were upon condi-
tion that, until the period mentioned had elapsed, 
"it shall not be competent for any of my devisees here-
inbefore named to either dispose of, alienate, mortgage, 
barter, pledge or transfer any portion of the real estate 
... , either directly or indirectly, upon any pretext what-
ever, .... All documents or instruments whatever, ex-
ecuted by any of my devisees, which shall be in contra-
vention of the true intent and meaning of this, my last 
will and testament, shall be deemed and be taken to be 
null and void and of no effect whatever." 
The three sons and the grandson were the sole heirs 
at law. Ann Baxter did not live with the widow until 
her marriage; Ellen Daily did. The widow did not 
remarry. After the marriage of Ellen Daily, she, the 
382 29 Mich. 78 (1874). Also discussed above at note 138. 
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widow, the three sons and the grandson, who was not 
yet 25, executed conveyances under which the plaintiff 
claimed. The court affirmed a decree for the plaintiff, 
holding that the conveyances were effective to give the 
plaintiff an absolute title in fee simple. The court 
thought the language of the will was intended to impose 
a prohibition on alienation and held that such a restraint 
upon a vested remainder in fee simple is void, saying 
also that a forfeiture restraint upon alienation of a 
vested remainder in fee simple is likewise void. The 
opinion states, 
"Nor does the fact that, in the case of an executory 
devise, or in that of a contingent remainder, or any other 
interest not vested, a restriction upon the power of the 
devisees to sell before it shall become vested in interest, 
would be good, in any manner tend to sustain such a 
restriction upon a vested estate in fee." 888 
Harlow v. Lake Superior Iron Company 884 was an 
action of ejectment brought by an assignee of an un-
divided half of a 99-year lease. The lease, given by the 
owner in fee simple of the land, demised an undivided 
half of the land for mining purposes, and provided, 
"I hereby agree and bind myself not to sell, assign, 
or encumber said undivided interest hereby leased, 
unless said (lessee), his heirs or assigns, shall have the 
first refusal to purchase said undivided one-half, .... " 
A judgment for the defendants was affirmed on the 
ground the lease demised only an incorporeal interest 
which could not be subdivided or recovered in eject-
ment. The opinion contains language suggesting the 
validity of the pre-emptive option granted by the quoted 
provision of the lease.885 
sss 29 Mich. 78 at 88-89 (1874). 
384 36 Mich. 105 (1877). Also mentioned above at note 312. 
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Lariverre v. Rains 386 was a suit to set aside convey-
ances as a cloud on title. Mrs. White executed an instru-
ment conveying to her husband an estate for his life to 
commence at her death, then to her son Joseph an estate 
for his life, providing each "sees fit to use and occupy 
the same so long as a home and residence," and the fee 
simple expectant upon the prior life estates to the chil-
dren of Joseph, 
"It being expressly understood and agreed that the 
right to use and occupy, as above stated, is intended to 
be a life interest, and not transferable," 
so far as the husband and Joseph were concerned. Later 
Mr. and Mrs. White conveyed the land in fee to Doyle, 
who conveyed to the defendants. Mrs. White died and 
the children of Joseph brought this suit in the lifetime 
of Mr. White and Joseph. The court reversed a decree 
for the defendants, holding that the life estates of Mr. 
White and Joseph were forfeited by alienation and ceas-
ing to occupy the land. The opinion takes no account 
of the facts that Joseph had not attempted to convey his 
future life estate and that he could have no right to 
occupy before that estate became possessory. As both 
life estates were future interests, the decision seems to 
stand for the proposition that a penalty restraint upon 
alienation of a vested future estate for life is valid even 
though so phrased as to continue after the estate becomes 
possessory. 
Portage Grange No. 16 v. Portage Lodge No. 340 881 
was a suit to restraint interference with the plaintiff's 
lessee. The plaintiff leased a lodge room to the defen-
386 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897). Also discussed at note 264 
supra. 
s87 141 Mich. 402, 104 N.W. 667 (1905). Also discussed above at note 
168. 
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dant, for use in common by both parties, the lease pro-
viding that the premises "cannot be leased or rented to 
any lodge" without the consent of both. The plaintiff, 
without the consent of the defendant, leased the room to 
the Ladies of the Modern Maccabees, for use in common 
with the defendant. The defendant refused to allow the 
ladies to use the room. The court affirmed a decree 
for the defendant, assuming without discussion the va-
lidity of the restraint on alienation. If the plaintiff was 
the owner in fee simple, 888 the decision operates to en-
force as a prohibition a restraint on alienation of a rever-
sion in fee. This is clearly in conflict with Mandlebaum 
v. McDonell. 889 Even if the interest of the plaintiff was 
less than a fee, the decision is in conflict with the well-
settled rules that no prohibitory restraint on alienation 
of a legal interest is valid and that restraints on alienation 
may be imposed only for the benefit of a reversion or 
remainder in the land. 
Des Grand Champ v. Duflo 890 was a suit to construe 
a will which devised a life estate to the testator's brother, 
remainder to some of the testator's heirs. A clause of 
the will relating to the remainder provided, "It is my 
wish that the property .... remain unsold .... I make 
a8s The pleadings indicate that, some twenty-five years before this 
litigation, the two organizations which were the principal parties to 
it, agreed informally to purchase land and erect a hall on it coopera-
tively with a view to use in common. Title was taken in the name 
of the plaintiff grange alone because the defendant lodge was unin-
corporated. The defendant lodge contended that the 99-year lease 
involved in the litigation did not correctly represent the original 
understanding. Record, pp. I, II, 12, 19, 20. The opinions of both 
the circuit and supreme courts treat the plaintiff grange, however, as 
owning a fee simple in severalty, subject only to the 99-year lease. 
If, as perhaps should have been done, the plaintiff grange had been 
treated as holding the legal fee on trust for itself and the defendant 
lodge, the problem involved would have been one of the law of trusts. 
389 Note 382 supra. 
39o 169 Mich. 104, 135 N.W. 98 (1912). 
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this request because it was the wish of my father that 
the Fisheries remain unsold and be known as the Duflo 
property." The court held that this provision was not 
intended to be mandatory, but that if it were it would 
be void. 
Con-ant v. Stone 891 was a suit to construe a will pro-
viding, 
"My said son to have the use and income from said 
estate so long as Lizzie Rice, his present wife, remains 
as his legal wife, but in case of her death or in case of a 
legal separation and divorce from my said son, I then 
give, devise and bequeath to my said son and to his heirs 
and assigns forever, said above mentioned interest in my 
estate." 
Later clauses provided that the son should forfeit his 
interest in the income if he attempted to transfer it and 
directed the executors to sell all real esate and reinvest 
within seven years. The son died a month after the 
testator, still living with his wife Lizzie. The court held 
that the condition regarding the wife being precedent, 
it made no difference whether it was contrary to public 
policy. The condition not having been performed, the 
fee did not pass to the son under the will. Although the 
condition in question was the one which related to mar-
391176 Mich. 654, 143 N.W. 39 (1913). The case involved real 
estate only. There is dictum in Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich. 601 
at 603, 146 N.W. 208 (1914), that when an illegal condition precedent, 
interfering with the marriage relationship, is annexed to a bequest 
of personal property, only the condition is void and the bequest is 
effective as if there had been no condition. The Restatement of 
Property applies the rule of the Dusbiber case, as to conditions 
precedent which are illegal for some other reason than as restraints on 
alienation, to both real and personal property. §424, comment d; 
§425, comment h; §426, comment e; §427, comment f; §428, comment 
l; §429, comment j; §433, comment f (1944). Both the rule laid down 
by Conant v. Stone and that of the Restatement are criticized in 
Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations: Effect of Illegality," 47 
MrcH. L. REv. 759-774 (1949). 
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riage rather than the one which restrained alienation, 
the decision is significant for purposes of the law of re-
straints on alienation because it indicates that a restraint, 
although illegal, will be effective if so imposed as to be a 
condition precedent to the vesting of a future interest. 
Watkins v. Minor 392 was a suit for specific perform-
ance of an option. Elizabeth Minor conveyed land in 
fee simple to her son Clarence, his estate to commence 
at her death, by a deed providing, "said second party is 
not to convey or encumber said property during the life-
time of said first party." Clarence, during his mother's 
lifetime, gave the option in question, and the mother 
was alive during the pendency of this suit to enforce it. 
A decree for the plaintiff was affirmed on the ground the 
restraint on alienation was void. The court relied upon 
Mandlebaum v. McDonell,898 using language indicating 
that every restraint on alienation of an. indefeasibly 
vested future estate in fee simple, whether by way of 
prohibition or of penalty, is void. The case is signifi-
cant in establishing that all such restraints are void, even 
though so worded as not to be operative after the estate 
becomes possessory. 
Portage Grange No. 16 v. Portage Lodge No. 340 894 is 
clearly wrong and ought to be overruled. Disregarding 
it entirely and giving full scope to the opinion in Man-
dlebaum v. McDonell,895 it is possible to sum up the 
Michigan law of restraints on alienation of legal interests 
in expectancy as follows: Every prohibitory restraint on 
s92 214 Mich. 308, 183 N.W. 186 (1921). At common law the interest 
conveyed to Clarence would have been a springing use. Our statutes 
permit the creation of such an interest (Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §24, 
uote 257, supra) but probably term it a remainder. Part Two, note 180 
infra. 
a9s Note 282 supra. 
s94 Note 387 supra. 
895 Note 382 supra. 
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an otherwise alienable interest in expectancy, designed 
to compel the owner of the interest to remain such in 
spite of his efforts to rid himself of it, is void. All penalty 
restraints on alienation of indefeasibly vested estates in 
expectancy are void, even though so phrased as to be 
operative only while the estate remains non-possessory, 
unless a similar restraint on a like possessory estate would 
be valid. Penalty restraints on contingent interests in 
expectancy, so phrased as to be conditions precedent to 
the vesting of the interest and to terminate on the vesting 
of the interest are probably valid, even though the ex-
pectant interest is in fee simple. 896 Whether penalty re-
straints on alienation of expectant interests in fee which 
are vested subject to open or subject to divestment, re-
mains undecided. Doubt exists as to whether a penalty 
restraint on a contingent or defeasibly vested interest in 
expectancy, so phrased as to remain operative after the 
interest becomes indefeasibly vested, is valid in part, as 
to the period before the interest vests indefeasibly. Upon 
principle, restraints of the types described in the last 
two sentences should be held to be invalid, unless a 
similar restraint upon a present possessory interest would 
be valid. 
396 It should be borne in mind that the Michigan statutory definitions 
of vested and contingent interests may not be wholly in accord with 
the common-law rules of distinction between such interests. 1 Simes, 
FuTURE INTERESTS §89 (1936); Roberts, "Transfer of Future Interests," 
30 MicH. L. REv. 349 at 350-351 (1932); Chapter 11, Section C, infra. 
CHAPTER 7 
Legal Interests in Chattels Personal 
A. THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LAND AND CHATTELS 
SIR EDWARD COKE, in commenting on Section 360 of Littleton's Tenures/01 said, 
"if a man be possessed of a lease for years, or of a 
horse, or of any other chattell reall or personall, and 
give or sell his whole interest or propertie therein upon 
condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the 
same, the same is void, because his whole interest and 
propertie is out of him, so as he hath no possibilitie of 
reverter, and it is against trade and traffique, and bar-
gaining and contracting between man and man: ... " 402 
The precise meaning of the Lord Chief Justice is not 
as clear as might be desired, but the passage probably 
asserts two reasons for the invalidity of a condition sub-
sequent, providing for forfeiture on alienation, incident 
to a transfer of a chattel: (1) that a legal interest analog-
ous to a possibility of reverter or right of entry on breach 
of condition subsequent cannot exist in a chattel per-
sonal, and (2) that such a condition is in illegal restraint 
of trade. 
The first asserted reason involves the problem of the 
possibility of creating legal interests in expectancy in 
chattels personal. As Professor Maitland remarked, the 
law of personal property is "backward and meagre." 403 
By comparison to the land law, the law of chattels per-
sonal is relatively undeveloped and such full develop-
401 Note 110 supra. 
402 1 INSTITUTES 223a. 
403 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 1 IMI' 
OF EDWARD l, 181 (1895). 
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ment as there is is fragmentary and disconnected. The 
reasons are largely historical. In the centuries when the 
doctrine of estates in land was being developed and de-
fined, the common chattels, animals, foodstuffs, and 
clothing, were not of a nature to encourage attempts to 
create complex and divided titles. The Mediaeval 
Church's prohibition of interest prevented extensive 
security transactions. The tremendous current invest-
ment of wealth in bonds, corporate stock, and life insur-
ance policies, which we look upon as property for some 
purposes, is wholly a modern development. Moreover, 
whereas the law of land was developed and unified by a 
single tribunal, the Court of Common Pleas, the law of 
chattels was created by numerous courts with divergent 
systems of jurisprudence and varying concepts of policy. 
The ecclesiastical courts of the English dioceses handled 
probate of wills and administration of estates according 
to rules of canon law which varied with the customs of 
the several sees. Their jurisdiction was of doubtful ex-
tent, interfered with by the jealousy of the common-law 
courts and eventually absorbed in large part by the High 
Court of Chancery. The courts of common law pro-
vided most of the protection of chattels against crime 
and tort, but the High Court of Admiralty, administer-
ing a system based on the Roman civil law, had a part 
in developing the law of ships and other marine prop-
erty. Until its competing courts, administering diver-
gent systems of law, were consolidated in the nineteenth 
century, England was in no position to develop a com-
plete and unified law of personal property which could 
stand beside the elaborate scheme of the land law!04 
The law of chattels developed by the common-law 
4A>4 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 351-360, 534-
595 (1923); 7 id. 447-515 (1926). 
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courts has two striking omissions. First, it contains no 
concept of ownership of chattels like that of ownership 
of land. It is, rather, a law of rights to possession of 
chattels and injuries to such rights. The only common-
law actions for specific recovery of chattels, replevin 
and detinue, could be converted into actions for money 
damages at the will of the defendant. 405 The owner of 
a freehold interest in land had remedies at law, the real 
actions and, later, ejectment, by which he could secure 
the land itself. As has been seen, the owner of a chattel 
real acquired a like remedy.406 The "owner" of chattels 
personal never did. So far as the common-law courts 
are concerned, his only right was to bring an action for 
money damages for wrongful taking or detention. 407 
Second, the law of chattels has no doctrine of estates, 
of ownership divided into temporal segments. At the 
beginning of the thirteenth century the common law 
was consistent in requiring, as to both land and chattels, 
a delivery of possession to effectuate a transfer of a pro-
prietary interest.408 During that century the requirement 
was modified as to land by the recognition of the re-
mainder. A single livery of seisin to A could be made 
to pass a life estate to A and a remainder in fee, a present 
proprietary right to future possession, to B. 409 The en-
4()5 Anonymous R.S.Y.B. 14, 15, Ed. III, 30 (1340); Anonymous, Y.B. 
1 Hen. V, Hil., pl. 4 (1413); Peters v. Heyward, Cro. Jac. 682, 79 
Eng. Rep. 591 (1624). 
4()6 Snane v. Rumenal, Bract. N.B., pl. 1140 (1235); Anonymous, 
Y.B. 7 Ed. IV, Pasch., pl. 16 (1468); Anonymous, Y.B. 21 Ed. IV, 
Mich., pl. 2 (1482). ~ 
407 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 322 (1923); 
7 id., 455-456 (1926). Equity will, under some circumstances, compel 
delivery of unique chattels. Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273, 23 Eng. Rep. 
465 (1684); Duke of Somerset v. Cookson, 3 P. Wms. 390, 24 Eng. Rep. 
1114 (1735); Fells v. Read, 3 Ves. Jr. 70, 30 Eng. Rep. 899 (1796). 
4<lS 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 354 (1923). 
409 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I, 25 (1895). 
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actment in 1535 of the Statute of Uses,uo which converted 
the Chancery-developed uses into legal estates, made it 
possible to create legal future interests, by way of spring-
ing and shifting use, without any livery of seisin. 411 
Neither modification was extended to chattels. The 
common-law courts would not permit delivery of a chat-
tel personal to A to operate to create a limited interest in 
A and a future interest in B; it passed the whole title to 
A.412 The Statute of Uses applied only to interests in 
land, so interests in chattels created by way of use re-
mained purely equitable, without recognition or means 
of enforcement by the common-law courts.413 The only 
temporally divided ownership in chattels recognized at 
common law was the bailment. The bailor has a pro-
prietary interest in expectancy analogous to a reversion 
expectant upon an estate at will or for years in land. 
Unlike the lessor, however, he has no effective common-
law means of compelling the bailee to return the goods 
at the expiration of the term.414 Probably because of 
this lack of a specific remedy, the law of bailment has 
developed along contract, as distinguished from property, 
lines. Apart from the quasi-reversionary interest of the 
bailor, English law to this day does not permit the crea-
tion inter vivos of a legal property interest in expec-
tancy in chattels personal.'ns 
410 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535). 
411 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 83 (1926). 
412 Anonymous, BRooK's NEw CAsES 60, 73 Eng. Rep. 874 (1509-
1546). 
413 Bacon, READING UPON THE STATUTES OF UsES 43 (1804). 
414 Notes 405, 407, supra. 
415 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 470-471 (1926); Good-
eve, MoDERN LAW oF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 8th ed., 10-11 (1937); Wil-
liams, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 18th ed., 48, 
438 (1926); Oliver, "Interests for Life and Quasi-Remainders in 
Chattels Personal," 24 L.Q. REv. 431-439 (1908). Professor Gray 
thought that chattels personal could be transferred subject to a con-
dition subsequent, but he cited no authority for the proposition. 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §78 (1915). Accord: with Gray: 
Perkins, PROFITABLE BooKE §712 (1642). 
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The local canon law administered by the ecclesiastical 
courts, to whose judgments the courts of common law 
gave grudging recognition, permitted the transmission 
of chattels personal by will. Until the late seventeenth 
century, testamentary power of disposition of personalty 
by will was, however, much restricted by local custom, 
a married man usually having such power over only a 
third of his goods. 416 Unlike a devise of land under the 
sixteenth century Statute of Wills,m a bequest of chat-
tels was not a direct transfer of legal title to the legatee. 
Legal title to all personal property of the deceased passed 
to his executor,418 and the only right of a legatee was to 
have the ecclesiastical court compel the executor to carry 
out the provisions of the will. Except for the fact that 
he was controlled by the ordinary of the diocese rather 
than the High Court of Chancery, the executor was, for 
all essential purposes, a trustee, holding legal title subject 
to duties owed to creditors and legatees.419 
Even by will it was not possible to make a temporal 
division in the legal title to chattels personal. They 
could not be bequeathed to A for life, remainder to B. 
When the executor transferred them to A, A took the 
whole title.'20 In the fifteenth century, however, a method 
416 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 550-563 (1923). 
417 32 Hen. VIII, c. I (1540). 
418 Anonymous, Y.B. 14 Hen. IV, Hil., pl. 37 (1412); Anonymous, 
Y. B. 2 Ed. IV, Mich., pl. 1 (1462). 
419 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw, 3d ed., 519-595 (1923). 
By the seventeenth century the High Court of Chancery had assumed 
concurrent jurisdiction with the ecclesiastical courts to compel exec-
utors to carry out legacies, acting on the theory that an executor 
was a trustee, liable to account in equity as such. Cliffe v. Cliffe, 
Monro, ACTA CANCELLARIAE 425 (1575); Browne v. Purton, Tothill 86, 
21 Eng. Rep. 131 (1589); Yelverton v. Newport, Tothill 129, 21 Eng. 
Rep. 144 (1593); Bloomer's Case, Cary 27, 21 Eng. Rep. 15 (1604); 
Wickham v. Dighton, Monro, AcTA CANCELLARIAE 109 (1607); Earl 
of Pembroke v. Zouch, Tothill 130, 21 Eng. Rep. 145 (1631); Goffin, 
THE TESTAMENTARY EXECUTOR IN ENGLAND AND ELSEWHERE 74 (1901). 
4zo Note 412 supra; Anonymous, March 106, pl. 183, 82 Eng. Rep. 
432 (1641). 
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of creating future interests in chattels by will was de-
veloped. Chattels could be bequeathed to the executor, 
with directions to permit A to use and occupy them for 
life, then to transfer them to B.421 In later centuries, 
when most of the enforcement and interpretation of wills 
shifted to the High Court of Chancery, wills purporting 
to create legal future interests in chattels tended to be 
construed as bequests of use and occupation, thus per-
mitting their enforcement.422 
It appears, therefore, that Sir Edward Coke's first 
reason 423 suggests one major difference between the law 
of restraints on alienation of land and that of restraints on 
alienation of chattels, namely, that the limited possibili-
ties of creating interests in expectancy in chattels great-
ly restrict the available devices for imposing restraints. 
His second reason suggests another major difference. 
Land was not looked upon as an article of commerce in 
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and that re-
mained so, as to estates of inheritance, throughout the 
mediaeval period. Hence the law of restraints on aliena-
tion of estates in fee simple and fee tail, developed dur-
ing that period, is a law governing donative and testa-
421. Anonymous, 37 Hen. VI, Trin., pl. 11 (1459); Fitz-James's Case, 
Owen 33, 74 Eng. Rep. 879 (1565); note 412 supra. See Welcden v. 
Elkington, 2 Plowd. 516, 75 Eng. Rep. 763 (1578); Paramour v. Yardley, 
2 Plowd. 539, 75 Eng. Rep. 794 (1578). The trust being a much 
more satisfactory device for creating future interests in chattels, the 
law of legal future interests in chattels was never developed fully in 
England and there is much doubt as to their incidents and theoretical 
basis. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§77-86, 789-856 
(1915); 7 Holdsworth,. HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 471-478 (1926); Bord-
well, "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," 1 Mo. L. REv. 119, 
127-132, 137-141 (1936); Oliver, "Interests for Life and Quasi-Re-
mainders in Chattels Personal," 24 L.Q. REv. 431-439 (1908); Simes, 
"Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE L.J. 771-803 (1930). 
See Part Two, note 167 infra. 
422 Catchmay v. Nicholas, Rep. temp. Finch 116, 23 Eng. Rep. 63 
(1673). Other cases are collected in Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUmEs 
§85n (1915). 
423 Note 402 supra. 
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mentary transactions. In the later Middle Ages lease-
hold interests did become articles of commerce, and, 
as has been seen, a different set of rules developed as to 
them. The mediaeval reason for restraining alienation 
of estates in fee was to keep land in the family. This 
type of restraint was not permitted. The mediaeval rea-
son for restraining alienation of leasehold interests was 
to protect reversioners and remaindermen against waste. 
This type of restraint, imposed largely for commercial 
reasons, was permitted. In modern times land has be-
come an article of commerce and a new reason for re-
straining alienation of estates in fee, to protect the 
character of a neighborhood, has appeared. But the law 
as to restraints on estates of inheritance had become 
too well settled for change, and the old rules, developed 
when land was not a commercial commodity, were ap-
plied to a new situation. Chattels, on the other hand, 
have always been articles of commerce, and rules govern-
ing restraints on their alienation did not become fixed 
during the mediaeval period. The mediaeval rules gov-
erning donative and testamentary dispositions of land 
may be followed as to like dispositions of chattels, but 
we cannot be certain that they are applicable to com-
mercial transactions involving chattels. Certainly there 
are substantial differences in the considerations of policy 
which affect the two types of transactions. 
A third major difference between the law of restraints 
on alienation of land and that of restraints on alienation 
of chattels should be noted. The law as to land de-
veloped fully centuries ago; that as to chattels is rela-
tively modern, incomplete, and rapidly developing. The 
rules as to land were developed in connection with the 
doctrine of estates and became fixed in the mediaeval 
period, when status was dominant. Indeed, the very 
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word "estate" is a variant of "status." 424 English law 
knows no estates in chattels, and the rules governing 
restraint on their alienation, so far as there are any, were 
developed in an era when the concept of contract was 
dominant; when courts were impatient with the fixed 
and arbitrary rules of the mediaeval common law and 
anxious to enforce the intention of parties to contracts 
so long as they did not contravene current concepts of 
public policy. The era of laissez faire has waned.425 We 
have entered upon a new era of status, of fixed and arbi-
trary rules imposed by government fiat. It seems prob-
able that the law of restraints on alienation of chattels 
will complete its development in a setting of strict gov-
ernment regulation of property, business, and human 
relationships. Already legislative and administrative re-
strictions have an important place in the field. Very 
likely there will eventually be rules as to restraints on 
alienation of chattels as complete, precise, and strict as 
those which relate to land. We cannot predict their 
exact nature, but we can be reasonably sure that, insofar 
as commercial transactions are concerned, they will not 
be the same rules which the judges of the Plantagenet 
period developed as to restraints on alienation of land. 
424 Pollock 8c Maitland, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAw BEFORE THE TIME 
OF EDWARD I, 11 (1895); Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 1-3 
(1931). It should be borne in mind, too, that the legislative declaration 
[stat. Quia Emptores Terrarum, 18 Edw. I, stat. 1, c. 1 (1290)] that 
estates in fee simple were alienable and the judicial declaration 
[Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), note 67 
supra] that entails were barrable were the results of socio-economic 
conflicts in which powerful interests were opposed to alienability. The 
general alienability of chattels has never been questioned or opposed 
and there has never been a problem of preventing potent economic 
forces from making chattels generally inalienable. 
425 Keynes, THE END OF LAisSEZ-FAIRE (1926). 
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B. DONATIVE AND TESTAMENTARY TRANSACTIONS 
In England the impossibility of inter vivos creation of 
interests in expectancy in chattels and the unsuitability 
for the purpose of the devices of bailment and contract 
have tended to restrict attempts to restrain the alienation 
of chattels to the trust device and provisions in wills for 
forfeiture on alienation. The possibilities of the trust 
will be explored with restraints on equitable interests. 
In connection with a bequest of the use and occupation 
of chattels for life or a term of years, the English courts 
would probably sustain the validity of a provision for 
forfeiture on alienation by way of executory bequest to 
another. 4!26 They have held such a provision void when 
attached to a bequest of the general property in chat-
tels.427 As to testamentary restraints, then, the English 
law of chattels appears to follow that of land. 
Probably because of misinterpretation of a passage in 
Blackstone's Commentaries/28 most American courts 
have tended to assume that interests in expectancy in 
chattels, of the types permissible in land, can be created 
426 This is the rule as to life interests in chattels bequeathed in 
trust. The cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS oN ALIENATION, 2d 
ed., §7!J (1895). In England the rules governing restraints on aliena-
tion of equitable interests tend to follow those which apply to 
equivalent legal interests. 
427 Bradley v. Peixoto, 3 Ves. Jr. 324, 30 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1797); 
Rishton v. Cobb, 5 Myl. & Cr. 145, 41 Eng. Rep. 326 (1839). In 
Powell v. Boggis, 35 Beav. 535, 55 Eng. Rep. 1004 (1866) there was a 
bequest of corporate stock to a sister for life, then to be sold by the 
executors and the proceeds divided among nephews and nieces. A 
provision of the will that the legacy of any nephew or niece should 
be forfeited if he aliened his interest before distribution was held to 
be a void restraint on alienation. 
428 "If a man either by deed or will limits his books or furniture to 
A for life, with remainder over to B, this remainder is good." 2 
COMMENTARIES •398; see 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 471 
(1926). Professor Bordwell has suggested that Blackstone probably 
had a deed of trust in mind. "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," 
1 Mo. L. REv. 119 at 141 (1936). 
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by deed as well as by wil1.429 There is substantial author-
ity in this country for the validity of legal interests in 
non-consumable chattels which correspond to the rever-
sion, the remainder, the shifting use, and the shifting 
executory devise in land.430 It has been suggested that 
interests analogous to the possibility of reverter and the 
right of entry on breach of condition subsequent are 
possible.431 In the setting of this development the Amer-
ican writers have maintained and such decisions as there 
are tend to confirm the view that the rules governing the 
validity of prohibitions and provisions for forfeiture on 
alienation of legal interests in chattels are the same 
as those which apply to similar restraints on alienation 
of estates in land of like duration.482 For this purpose, 
429 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3d ed., §§88-98 (1915) Bord-
well, "Interests in Chattels Real and Personal," 1 Mo. L. REv. 119 at 
141-144 (1936); Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE 
L.J. 771-803 (1930). 
4so The cases are collected in Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels 
Personal," 39 YALE L.J. 771 at 783-785 (1930). The validity of future 
interests in personalty corresponding to remainders, created by will, 
was recognized in Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890); 
Michigan Trust Co. v. Hertzig, 133 Mich. 513, 95 N.W. 531 (1903); 
Sellick v. Sellick, 207 Mich. 194, 173 N.W. 609 (1919), and Hankey v. 
French, 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937). A transfer of corporate 
stock, reserving a life interest, which is really a conveyance of a spring-
ing executory interest in personalty, was held valid in Bloodgood v. 
Terry, 134 Mich. 305, 96 N.W. 446 (1903). See Part Two, note 167 
infra. 
431 Simes, "Future Interests in Chattels Personal," 39 YALE L. J. 
771 at 785-787 (1930); 2 Schouler, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PERSONAL 
PRoPERTY, 3rd ed., §309 (1896); see Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUmEs 
§78. See Gamble v. Gates, 92 Mich. 510, 52 N.W. 941 (1892). 
4 3 2 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §§27, 28, 78, 105, 134 
(1895); 2 Simes, FUTURE INTERESTS §§446, 447, 456, 457, 463, 465 
(1936); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.18 (1952). The articles of Pro-
fessor Schnebly ["Restraints Upon the Alienation of Legal Inter-
ests," 44 YALE L.J. 961-995, 1186-1215, 1380-1408 (1935)] and Mr. 
Manning ["The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 
48 HARV. L. REv. 376-406 (1935)] do not discuss the law of chattels 
personal. The RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY does not discuss restraints 
on alienation of chattels personal, saying, "The problems thereby 
raised and the considerations which enter into their solution are to 
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the general property in a chattel is assimilated to an 
estate in fee simple in land, a treatment suggested by the 
passage from Coke quoted at the beginning of this 
section. 433 
State v. Dunbar Estate 434 was a claim against the 
guardian of a lunatic for the cost of the ward's care in 
an asylum. The only assets in the hands of the guardian 
were funds bequeathed to the ward by a will which pro-
vided, 
"I direct that income and principal also shall be re-
ceived by all beneficiaries free and clear of their debts, 
contracts, anticipations, and alienations, and of all 
liability for or by reason of the same, and from all levies, 
attachments and executions. Payments must be made 
either directly to the beneficiaries, or upon their respec-
tive orders, signed not more than three months before-
hand." 
A judgment allowing the claim was affirmed, the court 
saying, 
"We do not think the language open to the construc-
tion that, after the fund had in fact come into the hands 
of the legatee, it should not be liable for his subsequent 
engagements." 435 
Abrey v. Duffield 436 was a suit to construe a will, a 
codicil to which provided that, "my son Thomas is to 
have the use and possession of [a piano] during his life, 
but that the same is not to be disposed of by him." The 
validity of this restraint on alienation was not decided or 
discussed. 
such an extent different, in a state of flux and subjected to statutory 
provisions, that it is undesirable to treat them. . . ." Div. IV, Part II, 
Introductory Note. 
433 Note 402 supra. 
m 99 Mich. 99, 57 N.W. 1103 (1894). 
435 99 Mich. 104-105, 57 N.W. 1104. 
436 149 Mich. 248, 112 N.W. 936 (1907). 
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Turnbull v. Johnson 437 was a suit to rescind for fraud 
a sale of corporate stock. The stock, with other property, 
had been bequeathed to the testator's widow, "to be 
hers absolutely during her lifetime, and at her death 
what of the same might be left to my two sons, . . . , 
share and share alike, and their heirs forever." The 
widow, the sons, and a bank to which the stock had been 
pledged assigned the stock to the defendant. The sons 
brought suit, claiming that their joinder in the assign-
ment had been procured by fraud. A decree for the 
defendant was affirmed on the general ground the will 
operated to place the entire title to the stock in the 
widow, so that the sons had no interest in it. The court 
cited Jones v. Jones 438 and some of the line of cases fol-
lowing it which hold, in effect, that a gift over on failure 
of the first taker to alienate inter vivos is repugnant to 
a grant or devise in fee simple because it is a restraint 
on testation and intestate descent.439 The decision in 
Turnbull v. Johnson follows what is probably the gen-
eral rule in this country, that an executory bequest over 
on failure of a legatee of the entire title to personalty 
to alienate inter vivos is void as a restraint on testation 
and intestate distribution.440 
W essborg v. Merrill 441 was an appeal from a probate 
order of distribution. The testator bequeathed corpo-
rate stock to three trustees to pay the income to his wife 
and five children "and to their respective heirs, share and 
share alike," until August 11, 1914. The will provided, 
437 153 Mich. 228, 116 N.W. 1009 (1908). 
438 25 Mich. 401 (1872), note 181 supra. 
439 Note 182 supra. Glover v. Reid, 80 Mich. 228, 45 N.W. 91 (1890), 
which involved personalty, held such a gift over valid where the first 
taker was given only a life interest with a limited power of disposition 
inter vivos. 
440 Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §56a; cf. §65 (1895). 
Annotation, 17 A.L.R. (2d) 7-227 (1951). 
441195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917). 
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"After August 11, 1914, the stock shall be equally di-
vided among them ... , and each may dispose of his or 
her own stock at will, under this condition, however, that 
the stock shall be sold to one of their own number, to 
keep it in the family, providing the price obtained is as 
good as any outsider will give." 
One of the daughters died in 1913, bequeathing her 
estate to the respondent in trust. The probate order, 
which distributed a child's share in the stock to the re-
spondent, was affirmed without comment on the validity 
of the restraint on alienation. Inasmuch as the respon-
dent was not one of the children, the effect of the decision 
was to hold the restraint inoperative as to a disposition 
by will. The restraint was, in effect, a pre-emptive op-
tion which, in the case of land, would seem to be valid 
under Michigan law despite the fact that it was perpetual 
and so, under the law of most jurisdictions, in violation 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities.442 
Hankey v. French 443 was a suit to construe a will. Tes-
tator bequeathed to his wife, 
"the use and income of my share or interest in the busi-
ness of R. T. French & Sons, wheresoever conducted, 
provided, however, that my interest in said business is 
not to be sold or disposed of, but that the business is to 
be continued and that my share of the profits arising 
from the conduct of said business is to be paid to my 
wife, ... , so long as she shall remain my widow. 
"Paragraph 3. I give, devise and bequeath to my 
children, ... , in equal shares, my interest in the part-
nership of R. T. French & Sons, after the death of my 
wife, ... , or in the event of her remarriage, and I do 
further especially direct that my interest in the partner-
442 Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659, 225 N.W. 620 (1929); notes 
230, 231 supra. 
443 281 Mich. 454, 275 N.W. 206 (1937). 
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ship of R. T. French & Sons shall not be sold or dis-
posed of during the minority of either of my said sons." 
The circuit court held that the interest in the partner-
ship, which owned land, was personalty, that the restraints 
on alienation imposed by the second and third para-
graphs of the will were void,444 and that the bequest was 
adeemed by a change in the partnership which occurred 
between the date of the will and the death of the testator. 
There was no appeal from the first two conclusions. The 
decree was reversed and a decree ordered in "accord-
ance with the quoted language of the will," the Supreme 
Court holding that there had been no ademption. The 
opinion does not discuss the validity of either restraint 
on alienation, but, in view of the nature of a chancery 
appeal, the decision is probably some authority for the 
proposition that a prohibition on alienation in a bequest 
of personalty is void, both as to a life interest and as to 
a succeeding interest in the nature of a remainder in 
fee. 
The authorities are scanty but, such as they are, they 
indicate that, in donative and testamentary transactions, 
Michigan tends to apply to restraints on alienation of 
interests in chattels personal the rules which govern the 
validity of similar restraints on estates in land of like 
duration. If so, it may be assumed that all prohibitory 
restraints, those which would compel the owner of a 
legal interest in a chattel to remain owner in spite of 
his attempt to transfer it, are void. Penalty restraints by 
way of forfeiture on alienation are void if attached to a 
gift or bequest of the otherwise absolute general prop-
444 The Supreme Court opinion indicates that the decree below held 
only the restraint imposed by paragraph 3 void. 281 Mich. 454 at 459. 
The actual decree of the circuit court, however, determined that the 
restraints imposed by paragraphs 2 and 3 were both void. Record, 
p. 29. 
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erty in chattels. Penalty restraints on a bequest of an 
interest in chattels for life or years, by way of a provision 
for an executory bequest to another in the event of 
alienation, are probably valid. A provision in a gratui-
tous bailment for life or a term of years that the bailor 
may treat the bailment as terminated and retake pos-
session if the bailee transfers his interest to another is 
almost certainly valid.445 Whether a provision in a gra-
tuitous bailment for forfeiture on alienation to someone 
other than the bailor would be valid is highly doubtful, 
in view of the lack of authority for the creation of future 
interests in chattels by transactions inter vivos. 
C. COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
The interest of a bailee of chattels under a pawn or 
under that type of hiring known in the Roman law as 
locatio rei 4416 corresponds to the interest of a lessee of 
land for life or years. In the thirteenth century the lease 
of land was commonly given as security for money lent, 
thus serving the same purpose as the pawn. 447 The simi-
larity between a demise of land to be used for commer-
cial operations of the lessee and the demise of a ship for 
like use is evident. At the beginning of that century 
the interests of the lessee of land and the bailee of chat-
tels were treated much alike, primarily as personal con-
tract rights against the lessor or bailor rather than as 
interests in property in rem.448 Although estates for years 
in land remained personal property, the development of 
remedies for their specific enforcement and their use in 
4 45 See Bringloe v. Morrice, 1 Mod. 210, 86 Eng. Rep. 834 (1675). 
4416 For the classification of bailments see Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. 
Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (1703); Story, LAW OF BAILMENTS, 9th ed., 
§§3-9 (1878). 
447 3 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 215 (1923). 
448 I d. at 213, 336-351. 
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donative and testamentary transactions tended toward 
their treatment more as property than as personal con-
tract rights. The bailment, on the other hand, has re-
mained a topic of the law of contract and tort, more an 
aspect of commercial law than that of property. Hence, 
whereas the interest of the lessee for life or years is 
prima facie alienable,449 the interest of the bailee is 
treated as personal to himself and inalienable in most 
cases, even when his interest is not terminable at the 
will of the bailor.450 
The general rule that the interest of a bailee is inalien-
able has some exceptions. The pawnee may transfer his 
interest in the pawn with an assignment of the debt.451 
Although the English view is that the interest of a bailee 
who has a common-law artisan's lien is inalienable/52 
some American states, including Michigan, permit such 
a bailee to assign the lien with his claim against the 
bailor.453 The interest of a hirer under a hire-purchase 
contract is assignable,454 as is that of a purchaser under a 
conditional sale contract.455 Assignments and subcharters 
«9 Notes 236, 291, 292 supra. 
4so Story, BAILMENTS §234; I Williston, SALES oF Goons, 2d ed., 332 
(1924). 
451 Mores v. Conham, Owen 123, 74 Eng. Rep. 946 (1609); Donald 
v. Suckling, L.R. I Q.B. 585 (1866); Drake v. Cloonan, 99 Mich. 121, 
57 N.W. 1098 (1894); other American cases are collected in Brown, 
PERSONAL PROPERTY 579n (1936). 
452 Legg v. Evans, 6 M. & W. 36, 151 Eng. Rep. 311 (1840). 
458 Gardner v. LeFevre, 180 Mich. 219, 146 N.W. 653 (1914). Other 
cases are collected in Brown, PERSONAL PROPERTY 534n (1936). 
454 Whiteley, Ltd. v. Hilt, [1918] 2 K.B. 808 (C.A.). This is assumed 
by the Hire-Purchase Act, I & 2 Geo. VI, c. 53, §21 (1938). 
455 The cases are collected in I Williston, SALES §332n (1924). Hoar, 
CoNDITIONAL SALES 59, 345 (1937). As to the right of possession of a 
chattel mortgagor, see Cadwell v. Pray, 41 Mich. 307, 2 N.W. 52 
(1879); Daggett, Bassett & Hills Co. v. McClintock, 56 Mich. 51, 22 
N.W. 105 (1885). In Michigan, however, it is dangerous for a chattel 
mortgagor or conditional sale contract vendee to assign his interest. 
Act 328, P.A. 1931, §175, Mich. Stat. Ann. §28.374, Comp. Laws (1948) 
§750.177, provides: "Any person who shall ... dispose of any personal 
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are common in connection with the demise of ships. 456 
Normally the bailee under a fixed-term bailment or bail-
ment lease may transfer his interest.457 
The theory of the cases holding the interest of the 
bailee under some types of bailment alienable is that, 
in those situations, the element of personal trust is not 
so prominent as in the ordinary bailment relationship. 
Even in such situations, the terms of the bailment may 
indicate that personal trust is intended. Hence, the text-
writers assert that the terms of a bailment under which 
the bailee's interest would otherwise be alienable may 
validly restrain alienation by providing that alienation 
by the bailee will terminate the bailment and entitle the 
bailor to immediate possession.458 This is closely analog-
ous to a provision for forfeiture on alienation in a lease 
of land for life or years, inserted for the protection of the 
reversioner. It would seem, therefore, that the law of 
restraints on alienation of the bailee's interest in a chat-
property held by him subject to any chattel mortgage or written 
instrument intended to operate as a chattel mortgage, or any lease or 
written instrument intended to operate as a lease, or any contract to 
purchase not yet fulfilled with intent to injure or defraud the mort-
gagee, lessor or vendor under such contract or any assignee thereof, 
shall ... be guilty of a felony." It has been held under this statute 
that mere proof of a sale raises a presumption of intent to defraud. 
Bowen v. Borland, 257 Mich. 306, 241 N.W. 201 (1932). As the word 
"injure" might mean mere inconvenience, the lessee or conditional 
vendee of chattels assumes a serious risk in transferring his interest. 
456 E.g., Rutherford, Sender 8c Co. v. Goldthorpe, Scott 8c Wright, 
Ltd. [1922] 1 K.B. 508. 
457 Dean v. Whittaker, 1 Car. 8c P. 347, 171 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1824); 
Duffell v. Spottiswoode, 3 Car. 8c P. 435, 172 Eng. Rep. 490 (1828); 
Goddard, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS, 2d ed., 
§120 (1928); Story, CoMMENTARIEs oN THE LAw oF BAILMENTS, 9th ed., 
§§324, 413n (1878); see Legg v. Evans, 6 M. 8c W. 36, 151 Eng. Rep. 
311 (1840); Donald v. Suckling, L.R. 1 Q.B. 585 (1866). 
458 1 Halsbury, LAws oF ENGLAND 555 (1907); Pereira, LAw OF HIRE 
AND HIRE-PURCHASE 120 (1939); Brown, PERSONAL PROPERTY 579n 
(1936). The Hire-Purchase Act, 1 8c 2 Geo. VI, c. 53, §7 (1938) and 
the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, §13, assume the validity of suci1 
provisions. See Whitney v. McConnell, 29 Mich. 12 (1874). 
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tel is in general accord with the law as to restraints 
on estates in land of like duration. Unlike the case of 
land, however, it is probable that the provision for for~ 
feiture must be in favor of the bailor; the bailee's interest 
probably cannot be made to shift to a third party on 
alienation. 
Commercial sales in the early Middle Ages were 
normally direct transactions between producer and con~ 
sumer. The farmer brought his produce to market and 
sold to the town housewife. The artisan sold his manu-
factures in his own shop or the local market to pur-
chasers who bought for personal use. In this setting the 
Mediaeval Church developed its doctrine of just price, 
which applied to both prices and wages. Under this doc-
trine the just price was, in general, the actual cost of 
production plus an amount sufficient to enable the pro-
ducer to maintain himself and his family in the cus-
tomary manner of persons of his status; the just wage 
was an amount sufficient to enable the laborer to main-
tain himself and his family according to his status. The 
just price did not fluctuate with supply and demand. 
For the seller to raise prices because of scarcity was to 
make an unearned and immoral profit. For the buyer 
to seek a lower price because of a glut on the market was 
to take an unfair advantage of the producer. For the 
laborer to ask higher wages because of a shortage of labor 
or because the product of his labor was more valuable 
than that of other persons of like status was wrongful. 
Thus the doctrine tended to condemn competition and 
all profits and wages which were more than the amount 
necessary for the subsistence of the producer or laborer 
according to the fixed customs of his social status. 459 
459 Cunningham, GROWTH oF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND CoMMERCE DuR-
I:'IG THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES, 6th ed., 461 (1915); O'Brien, AN 
LEGAL INTERESTS IN CHATTELS PERSONAL 173 
The theory of this early period had no place for the 
trader, the person who purchased goods for resale, 
whether wholesaler or retailer. With the growth of 
towns and the expansion of foreign commerce in the 
later Middle Ages, however, the necessity and value of 
the labor of those who provided transportation and stor-
age of goods received grudging ecclesiastical recognition. 
Trade was still regarded as fraught with temptation to 
sin, however, and the wholesaler was looked upon with 
particular suspicion. Resale by traders was governed by 
the doctrine of just price. The resale price should be 
the cost price plus the actual cost of transportation, stor-
age, or labor performed in improving the goods, plus an 
amount sufficient to enable the trader to maintain him-
self and his family in the manner customary to persons 
of his status. Speculative trading, purchasing with a 
view to deriving profit from an advance in the market 
price, was improper in all circumstances.460 
Corollary to the doctrine of just price was a doctrine 
that the parties to sales, because of ignorance and the 
temptation to seek an unjust profit, were ordinarily 
unfit to fix the just price with accuracy. Hence prices, 
wages, the quality of goods and the details of commerce 
should be prescribed by public authority and enforced 
by governmental agencies.461 
ESSAY ON MEDIAEVAL ECONOMIC TEACHING 102-106, 109-123 (1920). 
Dr. O'Brien suggests that, in some circumstances, elements other than 
the cost of production and the labor of the producer might enter 
into the computation of the just price, but these two elements were 
dominant in the process, pp. 112-120. Tawney, RELIGION AND THE 
RISE OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 27-28, 35, 38. 
46o O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 144-151, 
152-155 (1920). It should be noted that, as an aspect of the prohibition 
of usury, the price in a credit sale was not allowed to be larger than 
in a cash transaction and, of course, the seller might not charge interest 
on the unpaid balance. Id. at 119. Tawney, RELIGION AND THE RISE 
OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 37-38. 
461 O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 106-109 
(1920); Tawney, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, 1950 ed., 41-42. 
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Mediaeval English law reflects the doctrine of just 
price and its corollary. From Norman to Tudor times 
prices, wages, quality of goods, the training of artisans, 
and the most minute details of commercial activity were 
strictly regulated to eliminate competition, "unjust" 
prices, and unearned profits. Some of this regulation was 
done by the central government directly, through sta-
tutes, orders in council, and royal proclamations. Most 
of it was delegated to chartered companies, boroughs and 
markets, which exercised their powers under the super-
vision of the central government. Competition was elim-
inated in many fields by the grant of monopolies to in-
dividuals or chartered companies.4~2 Evasion of local 
regulations and speculation in commodities were forbid-
den by drastic provisions of the criminal law which de-
nounced as "forestalling" purchasing or contracting to 
purchase merchandise en route to any city, port, market, 
or fair from inland or overseas, and attempts to raise the 
prices or encourage the withholding from sale of such 
merchandise.463 This operated to confine trading to areas 
where regulation could be effective. 
The Reformation weakened the influence of the Ro-
man Catholic doctrine of just price, but it did not result 
in any relaxation of government controls of commerce. 
Instead, they became more extensive and better en-
m 2 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 314-387 (1924); I Cun-
ningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN MoDERN 
TIMES, 4th ed., 285-308 (1907); Bindoff, TUDOR ENGLAND, 288-289, 305-
306 (1950). 
463 Stat. 51 Hen. III, stat. 6, c. 3, §5 (1266); 25 Edw. III, stat. 4, c. 3 
(1350); confirmed by 2 Ric. II, stat. 1, c. 2 (1378); explained by 5 & 6 
Edw. VI, c. 14, §I (1552). The statute of 51 Hen. III forbade purchase 
at a market before it opened. This suggests the primary purpose of 
these penal statutes: to confine trading to public markets where it 
could be regulated effectively. The mediaeval authorities were trying 
to eliminate "under the counter" sales. There were other statutes on 
the subject. Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 
MICH. L. REV. 365-376 (1929). 
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forced. In the Tudor, Stuart, and Hanoverian periods, 
the motive of regulation ceased to be the enforcement 
of just prices and the elimination of unjust profits and 
became that of the mercantile system, the enhancement 
of the power, prestige, and wealth of the national state in 
peace and war. The new regulation permitted large 
profits when they served to encourage the growth of in-
dustries deemed desirable. It did not, however, tolerate 
profiteering in food. 464 By a statute of Henry VIII, the 
central government assumed direct control of the regu-
lation of food prices.465 A statute of Edward VI restated 
the old criminal law of forestalling and prohibited "re-
grating," reselling of foodstuffs purchased in a fair or 
market, in a fair or market held at the same place or 
within four miles thereof, and "ingrossing," which the 
statute declared was committed when any person or per-
sons, 
"get into his or their hands, by buying, contracting or 
promise-taking, other than by demise, grant, or lease of 
land or tithe, any corn growing in the fields, or any other 
corn or grain, butter, cheese, fish, or other dead victuals 
whatsoever, within the realm of England, to the intent 
to sell the same again.'' 466 
Sir Edward Coke thought that the quoted language 
was only designed to prohibit resale in gross and did not 
prevent purchase of foodstuffs for resale at retail, <WT but 
464 Note 462 supra; Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND 
CoMMERCE DuRING THE EARLY AND MIDDLE AGES, 6th ed., 470-472, 
481-483 (1915); Tawney, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM, 1950 
ed., cc. II, III, IV. 
465 Stat. 25 Hen. VIII, c. 2 (1533). This act did not abolish local price 
regulation but authorized price-fixing by the Council when local regu-
lation was inadequate. For the operation of the price and wage regu-
lation systems under Elizabeth, see Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH 
INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN MoDERN TIMES, 6th ed., 25-36, 85-99 (1919). 
466 Stat. 5 8c 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §§2, 3 (1552). 
467 3 INsTITUTES, *195-196. Sheppard, GRAND ABRIDGEMENT, Part II, 
226-227 (1675) is positive on this point, stating that resale at retail 
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the broad language of the statute appears to condemn the 
whole business of trading in groceries, wholesale and re-
tail alike. In 1620 a grocer was prosecuted for buying 
twenty quarters of wheat, making it into starch, and 
selling the starch to several persons. The Court of King's 
Bench held that this was not a violation of the statute, 
which tends to confirm Coke's view.468 However, prose-
cutions under the statute were begun against ordinary 
retailers of butter and cheese who sold in the normal 
course of business.4611 A statute of 1623 declares that the 
statute of Edward VI made "no proviso" for retailers, 
that they had been troubled by prosecutions under it, 
and provides that it shall not prevent licensed cheese-
mongers from retailing butter and cheese in London.410 
After the Restoration, the central government ceased 
to enforce or supervise the enforcement of regulations 
governing prices, wages, and the quality of goods. Local 
regulatory bodies tended to relax or break down en-
was ingrossing if, but only if, the resale price was unreasonable. The 
first statutory use of the term "ingross" seems to have been in 37 
Edw. III, c. 5 (1363), which complains "that the merchants, called 
grocers, do ingross all manner of merchandise vendible; and suddenly 
do enhance the price of such merchandise within the realm, putting 
to sale by covin and ordinance made betwixt them, called the fra-
ternity and gild of merchants, the merchandises, which be most dear, 
and keep in store the other, till the time that dearth or scarcity be of 
the same .... " This suggests that the offense was hoarding with a view 
to making an unjust profit on resale;· not the mere business of engaging 
in the wholesale or retail grocery trade. 
468 Davison v. Culier, J. Bridg. 5, 123 Eng. Rep. ll60 (1620). Similar 
decisions are collected in Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and En-
grossing," 27 MicH. L. REv. 365 at 378n (1929). 
469 E.g. Bedoe v. Alpe, W. Jones 156, 82 Eng. Rep. 83 (1622). The 
vague language of the statute worked a serious hardship on legitimate 
merchants because the mode of enforcement was by qui tam actions 
brought by mercenary informers. It was probably cheaper to buy off 
these informers than to defend even groundless prosecutions. 
47o Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 22 (1623). This statute also freed London 
retailers from the inhibitions of Stat. 3 & 4 Edw. VI, c. 21 (1549) 
which explicitly forbade wholesale dealing in butter and cheese and 
restricted retail sales to quantities not in excess of a waye of cheese or a 
barrel of butter. 
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tirely. There was little to prevent speculators from 
making large profits through resale of commodities ex-
cept the occasional activities of informers who brought 
qui tam actions for penalties under the old statutes.471 
The statute of Edward VI was repealed in 1772,472 but 
as late as 1800 a person was convicted of ingrossing by 
buying a fifth of the hops on sale at Worcester Market 
with a view to resale when the price went up.413 The 
court held that the repeal of the statute did not abolish 
the common-law crime of ingrossing and rejected the 
contention of the defendant's counsel that there could 
not be a conviction without proof of intent to resell in 
gross, that is, wholesale. 
The writings of the Physiocratic School in France and 
of the English economists Adam Smith and David Ri-
cardo effected a profound change in the general attitude 
toward commerce and resulted by 1846 in a revolution 
in British policy. The new view was that prosperity 
could best be served by removing all restrictions from 
industry and trade, by allowing prices and wages to be 
471 Cunningham, GROWTH OF ENGLISH INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE IN 
MoDERN TIMES, 6th ed., 202-206 (1919). 
4 72 Stat. 12 Geo. III, c. 71 (1772). This also repealed Stat. 3 & 4 
Edw. VI, c. 21 (1549), note 470 supra. 
473 The King v. Waddington, I East 143, 102 Eng. Rep. 56 (1800). 
Lord Kenyon's opinion states that he had read Adam Smith's Wealth 
of Nat ions to inform himself on the economic problems involved but 
was not convinced of the advantages of unregulated trade. 1 East 
157, 102 Eng. Rep. 62. Senator Benjamin thought that the crime was 
committed only when the purchase was of large quantities [TREATISE 
ON THE LAw OF SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY, 7th ed., 530 (1931)] 
but the butter and cheese cases throw some doubt on this. The opin-
ions in The King v. Waddington do indicate, however, that the evil 
of the offense lay in the tendency to enhance prices. Compare 3 Coke, 
INSTITUTES, *195-196. This definition of the evil accords with the 
language of a statute of Henry III or Edward I. 1 Stat. of the Realm, 
203-204; Herbruck, "Forestalling, Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MicH. 
L. REV. 365 at 374-375 (1929). Theoretically market manipulations 
could not enhance prices fixed by law, but mediaeval regulators, like 
modern ones, had troubles with the "black market." 
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fixed by supply and demand, by the enlightened self-
interest of the individuals concerned in free and unregu-
lated competition. Under it, competition was seen as 
a public good instead of an evil to be suppressed by 
elaborate regulation. The old statutes fixing wages and 
prices, regulating the quality of goods, limiting by licen-
sing the persons who could engage in trades, and pro-
hibiting unjust profits, were repealed. The crimes of 
forestalling, regrating, and engrossing were abolished.474 
The era of laissez faire had begun; for the first time in-
dividuals were free to fix prices, wages, and the terms of 
commercial transactions by private contract, subject only 
to newly developed doctrines that contracts must not be 
in restraint of trade. 
The term "restraint of trade" was not new, but it 
acquired a wholly new meaning. Cases decided as early 
as the fifteenth century had declared that all contracts 
in restraint of trade were contrary to public policy and 
void.475 But those cases were decided in an era when 
wages, prices, quality of goods, the right to engage in 
trade, and the terms of commercial transactions were 
governed by minute regulations. These regulations left 
474 Stats. 3 Geo. IV, c. 41 (1822); 5 Geo. IV, c. 66 (1824); 5 Geo. IV, 
c. 95 (1824); 7 & 8 Viet., c. 24 (1844). The list of statutes repealed by 
the last act gives some indication of the elaborateness of the mediaeval 
and mercantile systems of regulation. See Herbruck, "Forestalling, 
Regrating and Engrossing," 27 MICH. L. REv. 365 (1929). 
475 Dyers' Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. V, Pasch., pl. 26 (1415); Colgate v. 
Bachelor, Cro. Eliz. 872, 78 Eng. Rep. 1097 (1601); Ipswich Tailors' 
Case, 11 Co. Rep. 53a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1218 (1614). In a period when 
the Crown was granting patents of absolute monopoly of the manu· 
facture and sale of common commodities to court favorites who were 
not businessmen at all, for the sole purpose of permitting the patentees 
to make enormous profits out of licensing such manufacture and sale, 
the word "monopoly" also had a meaning quite different from the 
current use of the term. See The Case of Monopolies, 11 Co. Rep. 
84b, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602); 4 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 349-353 (1924); Formoy, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN 
CoMPANY LAw 11-16 (1923). 
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virtually no sphere of operation for private commercial 
contracts; such a contract was in "restraint of trade" if 
it attempted to vary the applicable regulations. It was 
void for the same reason that private contracts purport-
ing to fix prices or rents higher than those set by the 
American war time price and rent control regulations 
were void. The whole mediaeval system was designed 
to prevent competition; hence a contract designed to 
foster competition was void. Under the new system of 
laissez faire, free competition was looked upon as an im-
portant object of public policy. In its new sense, "re-
straint of trade" means restraint of competition. This 
radical change in the meaning of the term must be borne 
in mind in the use of old authorities on the subject. 
Moreover, the old cases involved contracts by skilled 
artisans not to engage in their trades. In an era when 
the right to engage in a skilled trade involved seven 
years' apprenticeship and membership in a local guild, 
enforcement of such a contract meant a change of status 
for the artisan. In the mediaeval view, everyone was born 
to his status, and the policy of the law was to keep him 
in it. The doctrine of just price, allowing the producer 
exactly enough profit to enable him to maintain his 
status, tended toward this end by preventing the seller 
of goods from rising above or falling below his fixed 
status. In this view, a contract in "restraint of trade" 
was objectionable because it was an attempt to change 
hereditary status by contract. It is strange that nine-
teenth century judges who admired the heroes of Horatio 
Alger should have applied precedents based on such 
principles to invalidate contracts regulating resale of 
goods. 
The reign of laissez faire in England lasted for about a 
century, the period between the end of the Napoleonic 
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wars and the beginning of World War I and the longest 
period during which Europe has been free of general 
wars. Since then there has been increasing governmental 
regulation of wages, prices, and the terms of commercial 
transactions. The current tendency is toward govern-
ment ownership of industry. Freedom of private con-
tract in commercial transactions had a brief existence, 
and it is not surprising that the law governing the extent 
to which restraints may be placed on resale of chattels 
by that means has not attained complete development. 
It has attained some development, and that development 
merits examination. 
The growth of the practices of marketing commodi-
ties under brand names and of advertising the merits of 
these products in media of wide circulation creates in 
the manufacturer of such a product a strong economic 
interest in controlling its resale for the protection of the 
good will achieved by the brand name. To ensure that 
his product is effectively marketed throughout the 
country he is likely to wish to allot areas for resale to 
wholesalers and retailers. He has an interest in seeing 
that the public everywhere can depend upon his product 
being marketed in quantities and quality which are uni-
form and consistent with his advertising. He has an inter-
est in controlling resale prices, both to enhance the ef-
fectiveness of his advertising and to prevent seriously 
adverse effects on his whole scheme of distribution. If 
one druggist in a community sells Dr. Galen's Kidney 
Pills at a price below wholesale cost with a view to induc-
ing customers to come to his store and buy other goods, 
the other druggists in the community cannot afford to 
sell them at all and will persuade their customers to buy 
a substitute, with the result, in the long run, that much 
of the value of the manufacturer's advertising is lost. 
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The manufacturer may, of course, control all this by 
retailing his own product, but this is scarcely feasible 
for the manufacturer of a single drug or a few types of 
canned foods. Hence the manufacturer has an interest 
in binding wholesalers and retailers of his product to 
abide by the conditions he imposes upon resale. 
English manufacturers have placed chief reliance, in 
their efforts to control the prices and conditions of re-
sale of their products, on trade associations comprising 
all or virtually all the manufacturers and wholesalers in 
a given field. The Tobacco Trade Association, the Pro-
prietary Articles Trade Association (drugs), and the 
Motor Trade Association are examples. The rules of 
these associations prohibit wholesalers from selling to re-
tailers who have not agreed to sell only at prices fixed by 
the manufacturers and approved by the association. If 
a retailer sells in violation of the restrictions imposed 
upon him, his name is placed on a "stop list," and no 
wholesaler will sell him anything.476 Thus if a druggist 
attempts to sell Dr. Galen's Kidney Pills at a cut price, 
he will be unable to buy any drugs at all from any 
British wholesaler. The British courts have upheld the 
lawfulness of these associations and their "stop-list" de-
vice.477 
The trade association device is not always available and 
effective. The manufacturer may wish to seek enforce-
ment in the courts of direct contracts with retailers regu-
47& Dix, LAW RELATIVE To CoMPETITIVE TRADING 83-109 (1938); RE-
PORT OF THE CoMMITTEE ON REsALE PRICE MAINTENANCE (Cmd. 7696, 
1949). The committee recommended that these practices be made 
illegal. 
477 Thorne v. Motor Trade Association, [1937] A.C. 797. Combi-
nations which restrict competition against the public interest may, in 
some cases, be prohibited or regulated by administrative bodies under 
the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 
1948, 11 & 12 Geo. VI, c. 66. 
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lating resale prices and of contracts binding wholesalers 
to sell only to retailers who agree to maintain the prices 
prescribed by the manufacturer. The British courts are 
willing to enforce both types of contract specifically by 
injunction against the contracting parties.478 There are 
suggestions in the opinions that such a contract might 
be illegal if calculated to produce a pernicious monopoly, 
but none seems to have been held invalid on that 
ground. 4711 
Sometimes a retailer who is not a party to a price 
maintenance contract secures a stock of brand-name 
goods by deceiving a wholesaler or retailer who is a party 
to such a contract or through mistake or deliberate 
breach of contract on the part of such a party. Such a 
retailer might conceivably, under some circumstances, 
be liable to the manufacturer in tort for inducing breach 
of contract.480 Manufacturers have sought to bind him 
by their price regulations on the theory that an equitable 
restriction was imposed on the goods, either by the con-
tract with the wholesaler or through notice attached to 
the goods. The equitable restriction on use of land was 
developed in the nineteenth century by extension of the 
rules of covenants running with the land and has been 
buttressed by analogies to conditions subsequent and 
easements.481 Easements and transfers on condition sub-
sequent are unknown in the law of chattels. Dictum in 
478 Elliman, Sons & Co. v. Carrington and Son, Ltd., [19011 2 Ch. 
275; Palmolive Co., Ltd. v. Freedman, [1928] Ch. 264 (C.A.). En-
forcement will be denied if the contract is clearly unreasonable as 
between the parties. Joseph Evans & Co. v. Heathcote, [1918] I K.B. 
418. 
479 Attorney-General v. Adelaide Steamship Co., [1913] A.C. 781, 795. 
48Q Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). 
481 Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848); Clark, 
REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 
149-157 (1929); Elphinstone, CoVENANTS AFFECTING LAND 69-76 (1946); 
Jolly, RESTRICTIVE CoVENANTS AFFECTING LAND, 2d ed., 1-18 (1931). 
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a sixteenth century case denied that covenants could run 
with the title to chattels as they may with the title to 
land.482 In consequence, the English courts have held 
that ordinary chattels cannot be subjected to equitable 
use restrictions.483 Hence price maintenance schemes are 
not enforcible by judicial means against dealers who are 
not parties to contracts binding them to observe the 
scheme. The British courts make an exception in the 
case of patented articles, holding that the patent entitles 
the patentee to impose restrictions on their resale which 
run with the goods and bind every taker with notice.484 
The law of commercial dealing in chattels is compli-
cated in the United States by the fact that the Federal 
Constitution empowers Congress to regulate commerce 
with foreign nations, and among the several states, and 
with the Indian tribes, but leaves the regulation of other 
commerce to the states.485 Nineteenth century federal 
policy favored, in general, freedom of contract and free-
dom of competition in domestic commerce. A feeling 
that freedom of contract was being used to hamper free 
competition to an undesirable extent led to the enact-
ment in 1890 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, which pro-
vided, 
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
482 Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16a, 16b-17a, 77 Eng. Rep. 72, 74 
(1583). There is another difficulty: equitable restrictions on the use 
of land must be appurtenant to an estate in the same or neighboring 
land. Milbourn v. Lyons, [1914] 2 Ch. 231 (C.A.); London County 
Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 (C.A.); Torbay Hotel Co. v. 
Jenkins, [1927] 2 Ch. 225. 
483 Taddy v. Sterious, [1904] 1 Ch. 354; McGruther v. Pitcher, 
[1904] 2 Ch. 306 (C.A.); Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co., Ltd. v. Self-
ridge &: Co., Ltd., [1915] A.C. 847; Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on 
Chattels," 41 HARv. L. REv. 945-1013 (1928). Some contrary decisions 
in this country are discussed in Waite, "Public Policy and Personal 
Opinion," 19 MrcH. L. REv. 265-282 (1921). 
484 National Phonograph Co. v. Menck, [19ll] A.C. 336. 
485 Art. I, §VIII, d. 3; Amendment X. 
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otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, 
is hereby declared to be illegal." 486 
It has been suggested that the generality of the lan-
guage of this act made it forbid the normal transactions 
of business, that "Business men now enjoy liberty only 
according as the prosecuting authorities indulge them in 
the open breach of the law." 487 In this respect the act 
resembles the statute of Edward VI against ingrossing 
which, if read literally, forbade all trade in foodstuffs. 488 
The interpretation of the statute in the federal courts 
tends to justify this criticism. The earlier federal de-
cisions, both before and after the statute, affirmed the 
validity of resale price maintenance contracts and sug-
gested that our law would follow the British. 489 Then, 
beginning in 1907, a series of decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the Circuit Courts of Appeals completely re-
versed the rules, holding, in effect, that schemes for retail 
price maintenance by contract or equitable restriction 
are illegal at common law and· under the statute and 
seriously curtailing even the manufacturer's right to re-
fuse to sell to dealers who habitually cut prices.490 
486 Act July 2, 1890, §1, 26 Stat. L. 209, 15 U.S.C. (1946) 1. 
487 Montague, "Business Enterprise and the Law," 193 N. AM. REv. 
694 at 704 (1910). 
488 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §3 (1552); notes 466-470, 472 supra. 
489 The cases are collected in Seligman and Love, PRICE CuTTING AND 
PRICE MAINTENANCE 43-52 (1932). 
49o E.g., John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, (6th Cir. 1907) 153 
F. 24; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 
373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911); United States v. Schrader's Sons, 252 U.S. 
85, 40 S.Ct. 251 (1920). Other cases are collected in Seligman and 
Love, PRICE CUTTING AND PRICE MAINTENANCE 52-82 (1932). This line 
of cases is effectively criticized in Waite, "Public Policy and Personal 
Opinion," 19 MicH. L. REv. 265-282 (1921). This is not the place for 
an extended discussion of the intricacies of interpretation of the federal 
antitrust laws and related statutes. As to the special problem created 
by patent monopolies, see United States v. New Wrinkle, 342 U.S. 
371, 72 S.Ct. 350 (1952). 
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The Miller-Tydings Amendment of 1937 491 inserted a 
proviso in the Sherman Act to the effect that contracts 
permitted by state law prescribing minimum prices for 
products sold under trade-mark or brand name should 
not be illegal by reason of that act or the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.492 The proviso does not permit con-
tracts between producers, between wholesalers, between 
retailers, or between others in competition with each 
other; that is, it limits them to contracts between a pro-
ducer and his distributors or between a wholesaler and 
his retail outlets. By the end of 1936, 14 states had 
enacted statutes, commonly called "fair trade" laws,493 
authorizing resale price maintenance contracts as to 
trade-marked and brand named goods. In 1937, 28 more 
states enacted such statutes, and by 1950, 45 states had 
such legislation in force.494 State statutes enacted in 1933 
and thereafter contained a "non-signer" provision to the 
effect that whenever a producer has entered into a price-
maintenance contract, price-cutting by anyone, whether 
or not a party to the contract, is actionable. The Su-
preme Court had held in 1936 that such a provision was 
valid, under the Fourteenth Amendment, as to trans-
actions in intra-state commerce.495 It was decided in 1953 
that a 1952 amendment to the Sherman and Federal 
Trade Commission Acts permitted the enforcement of 
m Act Aug. 17, 1937, tit. VIII, 50 Stat. L. 693, 15 U.S.C. 1. 
492 Act Sept. 26, 1914, 38 Stat. L. 717, as amended, 15 U.S.C. 41, et seq. 
493 It is of interest to note that seventeenth century smugglers who 
violated the trade regulations imposed under the mercantile system 
referred to their operations as "fair trade." Scott, GuY MANNERING, c. 4. 
494 Dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J ., in Schwegmann Brothers 
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 at 398, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951). See 
Grether, PRICE CoNTROL UNDER FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION (1939). 
495 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 
U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139 (1936). 
186 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
such "non-signer" provisions as to transactions in inter-
state and foreign commerce. 496 
A Michigan statute enacted in 1899 makes illegal and 
unenforcible contracts fixing resale prices in terms so 
broad as to make it questionable whether even an agree-
ment between partners as to the prices at which their 
firm will sell is not illegal.497 This statute, like the Sher-
496 Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Markets v. Eli Lilly & Co., 205 
F. (2d) 788 (5th Cir. 1953), certiorari denied, 74 Sup. Ct. 71 (1953). 
The amendment was made by the McGuire Act of July 14, 1952, 66 
Stat. 632, 15 U.S.C. 45, which was designed to overcome the decision 
in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 
S.Ct. 745 (1951) that the Miller-Tydings Amendment did not permit 
their enforcement in interstate and foreign transactions. 
497 
"Sec. 1. That a trust is a combination of capital, skill or arts 
by two or more persons, firms, partnerships, corporations or associations 
of persons, or of any two or more of them, for either, any or all of 
the following purposes: 
"1. To create or carry out restrictions in trade or commerce; 
"2. To limit or reduce the production, or increase or reduce the 
price of, merchandise or any commodity; 
"3. To prevent competition in manufacturing, making, transporta-
tion, sale or purchase of merchandise, produce or any commodity; 
"4. To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public 
or consumer shall be in any manner controlled or established, any 
article or commodity of merchandise, produce or commerce intended 
for sale, barter, use or consumption in this State; 
"5. It shall hereafter be unlawful for two or more persons, firms, 
partnerships, corporations or associations of persons, or of any two or 
more of them, to make or enter into or execute or carry out any con-
tracts, obligations or agreements of any kind or description, by which 
they shall bind or have bound themselves not to sell, dispose of or 
transport any article or any commodity or any article of trade, use, 
merchandise, commerce or consumption below a common standard 
figure or fixed value, or by which they shall agree in any manner to 
keep the price of such article, commodity or transportation at a fixed 
or graduated figure, or by which they shall in any manner establish or 
settle the price of any article, commodity or transportation between 
them or themselves and others, so as to directly or indirectly preclude 
a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any pur-
chasers or consumers, in the sale or transportation of any such article 
or commodity, or by which they shall agree to pool, combine or directly 
or indirectly unite any interests that they may have connected with 
the sale or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its 
price might in any manner be affected. Every such trust as is defined 
herein is declared to be unlawful, against public policy and void .... 
"Sec. 8. That any contract or agreement in violation of the pro-
visions of this act shall be absolutely void and not enforceable either 
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man Anti-Trust Act 498 and the statute of Edward VI, 41111 
if literally interpreted, would forbid virtually all trade. 
Like them it is an example of a type of legislation which 
is an invitation to tyranny, branding legitimate business-
men as criminals and subjecting them to the caprice of 
prosecuting officials. There are mischievous types of 
monopoly which ought to be criminal. It is unfortunate 
that our legislatures have been unwilling to undertake 
the difficult task of defining them with precision so that 
traders who wish to abide by the law might be able to 
determine what activities are permitted and what are not. 
Hunt v. Riverside Co-operative Club 500 was a proceed-
ing to restrain violation of the act of 1899. The defen-
dant was an association comprising all seven of the 
plumbing supply dealers and 131 of 168 master plumbers 
in the City of Detroit. Its rules provided that the whole-
salers would sell only to master plumbers at prices fixed 
by a committee of the association, the prices to master 
plumbers who were not members to be 15% to 30% 
higher than those charged members. An injunction 
against enforcement of these rules was granted, the court 
saying that such a price-fixing arrangement, designed to 
create a monopoly, was illegal at common law. Unques-
tionably the arrangement violated the act of 1899, so 
there can be no proper criticism of the result reached. 
in law or equity."-Act 255, P.A. 1899, Comp. Laws (1915) §§15013, 
15020; Comp. Laws (1929) §§16647, 16654; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.31, 
28.36; Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.701, 445.708. Sec. 1 was amended by 
Act 60, P.A. 1925, to exempt farm and dairy cooperatives. Act 229, 
P.A. 1905, Comp. Laws (1915) §§15027 to 15032; Comp. Laws (1929) 
§§16661 to 16666; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§28.51 to 28.55; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§445.761 to 445.767 supplemented the Act of 1899 by prohibit-
ing contracts requiring dealers to handle only one make of machinery, 
tools, implements, vehicles, or appliances designed for use in produc-
tive industry. 
498 Note 486 supra. 
499 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 14, §3 (1552); notes 466, 470, 472 supra. 
5oo 140 Mich. 538, 104 N.W. 40 (1905). 
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If by "common law" is meant the English law of 1607, 
however, it will be recalled that such price-fixing by 
local gilds was looked upon as the normal and proper 
method of determining just prices. 
W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester 501 was a suit by a 
drug manufacturer against a retailer to restrain price-
cutting. The plaintiff manufactured Hill's Cascara Bro-
mide Quinine and marketed it through wholesalers who 
contracted not to resell to retailers disapproved by the 
plaintiff. In order to secure approval, retailers were re-
quired to contract with the plaintiff not to sell at less 
than the price marked on each package of the drug. The 
defendant entered into such a contract in March, 1906, 
and complied with it until December, 1907, when it was 
rescinded by mutual consent. Soon after, the defendant 
secured a supply of Hill's Cascara Bromide Quinine from 
a wholesaler, who did not know of the rescission of the 
contract, and began retailing the product at a cut price. 
A decree dismissing the bill of complaint was affirmed. 
The court held that the plaintiff's system of retail price 
maintenance was illegal, both under the statute and at 
common law, relying entirely upon the federal decisions 
in John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman 502 and Dr. Miles 
Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.503 and quoting the follow-
ing from Judge Lurton's opinion in the Hartman case: 
"'A prime objection to the enforceability to [sic] such 
a system of restraint upon sales and prices is that they 
offend against the ordinary and usual freedom of traffic 
in chattels or articles which pass by mere delivery. The 
right of alienation is one of the essential incidents of a 
right of general property in moveables, and restraints 
5{)1 163 Mich. 12, 127 N.W. 803 (1910). 
502 (6th Cir. 1907) 153 F. 24, note 490 supra. 
503 (6th Cir. 1908) 164 F. 803, affd. 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376 (1911), 
note 490 supra. 
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upon alienation have been generally regarded as obnoxi-
ous to public policy, which is best subserved by great 
freedom of traffic in such things as pass from hand to 
hand. General restraint in the alienation of articles, 
things, chattels, except when a very special kind of prop-
erty is involved, such as a slave, or an heirloom, have 
been generally held void. "If a man," says Lord Coke, 
in Coke on Littleton, s. 360, "be possessed of a horse or 
any other chattel real or personal, and give his whole in-
terest or property therein, upon condition that the donee 
or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is void, be-
cause his whole interest and property is out of him so as 
he hath no possibility of reverter; and it is against trade 
and traffic and bargaining and contracting between man 
and man." It is also a general rule of the common law 
that a contract restricting the use or controlling subsales 
cannot be annexed to a chattel, so as to follow the article 
and obligate the subpurchaser by operation of no-
tice.' " 504 
The quotation from Sir Edward Coke suggests that 
the rule laid down by these cases proscribes even a single 
contract restricting resale of a single chattel under cir-
cumstances which involve neither monopoly nor any ef-
fect on general market conditions. The fact that Coke is 
disqualified as an authority in this field by the vastly 
different economic and legal setting in which he wrote 
has already been suggested. Despite this reliance upon 
a line of reasoning which would apply to a single con-
tract as well as to an extensive system designed to estab-
lish a monopoly, the opinions in both the Hartman and 
Gray and Worcester cases expressly state that a single 
contract is not governed by the same rule of illegality.505 
504 163 Mich. 12 at 23-24, 127 N.W. 803, quoting from 153 F. 24 
at 39. 
005 153 F. 24 at 37; 163 Mich. 12 at 21, 127 N.W. 803. "A single con-
tract, although it be such as, taken alone, may not be within the rule at 
common law against contracts in restraint of trade, which is one of a 
great number of identical contracts made between the producer of an 
unpatented article of commerce and dealers therein, forming a 
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In their attempt to state the common law in a situation 
governed by statute, these opinions add confusion to the 
common law. It seems unfortunate that the court was 
not content to rest its decision in W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray 
& Worcester on the Michigan statute of 1899.506 
Mulliken v. Naph-Sol Refining Co.507 was an action for 
damages for breach of contract. The plaintiff, a whole-
saler and retailer of gasoline, sent a letter to the defend-
ant, agreeing to buy his gasoline requirements for a year 
from defendant at one and three quarters cents per gal-
lon below the retail price set by the defendant for the 
Grand Rapids area. It contained no agreement by the 
plaintiff to abide by the retail prices so set. The parties 
dealt on this basis for nine months. There was dispute 
as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant refused to 
deal. The circuit judge directed a verdict for the de-
fendant on the ground that, although the plaintiff had 
promised to buy gasoline, the defendant had not con-
tracted to sell it. A judgment for the defendant was af-
firmed on the sole ground that the contract was illegal 
'system' of contracts, which, taken as a whole, materially affects the 
public interests by stifling competition and trade in said article, is an 
unreasonable restraint, and within the rule at common law against 
contracts in restraint of trade, if, from an examination of the workings 
of the whole system, it appears that the restraint is actually, though 
not ostensibly, the main result and object of the system of contracts, 
and not merely ancillary or incidental to another and legitimate 
object." Ibid. One could wish that the common law prohibited such 
sentences as that quoted. 
soo The opinion concludes with this passage: "But we place our 
decision upon the ground that complainant's system of contracts deals 
with the manufactured product of its secret process, and not with the 
process itself, and that the system of contracts, being a restraint upon 
free competition, falls within the common-law prohibition of restraints 
of trade, and is void. 
"Having reached this conclusion, it is unnecessary to decide whether 
or not such contracts are illegal and void under the statute of this 
State." 163 Mich. 12 at 26, 127 N.W. 803. 
5()7 302 Mich. 410, 4 N.W. (2d) 707 (1942). The facts are not made 
clear in the opinion but are brought out in the record. 
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because it provided for the setting of retail prices by 
the defendant, the court citing Hunt v. Riverside Co-
operative Club 508 and the Act of 1899.509 The opinion 
contains the following language: 
"In a reply brief appellant contends that the opening 
statement did not disclose a void contract and that the 
agreement 'was a good deal like a lease arrangement.' A 
lease is a contract and would be void under the statute 
quoted if it was for a purpose prohibited by law. So far 
as we are able to determine from this record, the arrange-
ment between the parties was more nearly that of prin-
cipal and agent, and an agency for an illegal purpose is 
void, just as is a contract for an illegal purpose." 510 
This language would seem to condemn as illegal a re-
tail merchant's prescribing the prices at which his sales 
clerks are to sell his goods. Such a construction of the 
Act of 1899 is certainly possible, but one may question 
whether the legislature really meant to restrain ordinary 
trade practices to such an extent. 
Staebler-Kempf Oil Co. v. Mac's Auto Mart, Inc. 511 
was a suit to restrain the sale of gasoline at prices below 
those fixed by the plaintiff. In 1946 the plaintiff con-
veyed land in Ann Arbor to Martin Sales & Service Co. 
in fee simple by a deed containing a covenant by the 
grantee that if it built a filling station on the land it 
would purchase all its requirements of gasoline, oil, and 
lubricants from the plaintiff and would retail such pro-
ducts at the prices customarily furnished to other dealers 
in the area. The covenant provided that it should run 
with the land and be operative for ten years. In 194 7 
5o8 Note 500 supra. 
509 Note 497 supra. 
51o 302 Mich. 410 at 413-414, 4 N.W. (2d) 707. 
511 329 Mich. 351, 45 N.W. (2d) 316 (1951). Cf. Knoop v. Penn 
Eaton Motor Oil Co., 331 Mich. 693, 50 N.W. (2d) 329 (1951). 
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Martin Sales & Service Co. conveyed the land to the de-
fendant by a deed containing the same covenant. The 
plaintiff sold 1,600 gallons of gasoline to the defendant 
and then requested the defendant to enter into a resale 
price maintenance contract of the type the plaintiff re-
quired of its retail dealers. The defendant declined. A 
decree restraining the defendant from selling at prices 
below those which the plaintiff prescribed for retailers 
bound by contract to it was affirmed. Without referring 
to the well-settled rule that use restrictions on land must 
be appurtenant to neighboring land,S12 the court held 
that the covenant imposed a reasonable and valid use 
restriction which ran with the land and bound the de-
fendant. As to the Act of 1899, the court said: 
"The statute, if read literally, would seem to support 
the defendant's contentions. However, the statute does 
not define restraint of trade, and the definition has been 
judicially supplied. It has long been held that a contract 
would not be construed as in restraint of trade unless 
the restraint was unreasonable .... 
"The cases cited by the appellant are not in point. 
Hunt v. Riverside Co-Operative Club, supra,513 and Mul-
liken v. Naph-Sol Refining Co., supra,514 involved agree-
ments which were patently injurious to the interests of 
the public. W. H. Hill Co. v. Gray & Worcester, supra,515 
was decided prior to our Court's interpretation of the 
act of 1899 in People, ex rel. Attorney General v. Detroit 
512 Note 482 supra; Baxter v. Ogooshevitz, 205 Mich. 249, 171 N.W. 
385 (1919). A condition subsequent against sale of liquor in a convey-
ance of land in fee, inserted for the purpose of keeping employees of 
the grantor's saw mill sober, was enforced in an action of ejectment in 
Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885). A similar condition, 
inserted for the purpose of protecting the grantor's saloon against com-
petition, was enforced by injunction in Watrous v. Allen, 57 Mich. 
362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885). 
513 Note 500 supra. 
514 Note 507 supra. 
515 Note 501 supra. 
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Asphalt Paving Co.~ supra~516 and does not represent the 
current judicial interpretation of the statute, nor do the 
facts present as fair and compelling a business purpose 
as is present in the instant case. 
"In view of our decision there is no need to discuss the 
effect of the Michigan fair trade act, ... on this coven-
ant." 517 
The Michigan Fair Trade Law of 1937 518 provides 
that contracts relating to the sale or resale of a com-
modity bearing the trade-mark, brand, or name of the 
producer or owner and which is in fair and open com-
petition with similar commodities produced by others 
shall not be deemed in violation of state law because 
they provide that the buyer will not resell at less than 
the price fixed by the seller or that the buyer will not 
resell except to persons who agree to maintain resale 
prices. The act contains a "non-signer" provision, as 
follows: 
"Sec. 2. Wilfully and knowingly advertising, offering 
for sale or selling any commodity at less than the price 
stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant to the 
provisions of section 1 of this act, whether the person so 
516 244 Mich. 119, 221 N.W. 122 (1928). This was a quo warranto 
proceeding under the Act of 1899 against a corporation organized by 
the four principal paving contractors in Detroit to effect a partial 
consolidation of their businesses. 
s11 329 Mich. 351 at 356, 358, 45 N.W. (2d) 316 (1951). 
518 Act 50, P.A. 1937, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§19.321 to 19.324; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§445.151 to 445.154. Act 135, P.A. 1913, Comp. Laws 
(1915) §§15041 to 15048; Comp. Laws (1929) §§16683 to 16690; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §§28.71 to 28.77; Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.791 to 445.798, 
prohibits petroleum distributors from making geographical price dis-
criminations for the purpose of destroying the business of a competi-
tor. This, of course, was an earlier legislative recognition of the fact 
that unregulated competition is not always of public benefit. Such con-
tracts intended to injure or destroy a competitor were prohibited in 
the petroleum and bakery trades by Act 282, P.A. 1937, Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§§28.78 (1) to 28.78 (14); Comp. Laws (1948) §§445.171 to 445.184. 
The latter act also prohibits sale of petroleum and bakery products 
below cost with intent to injure or destroy a competitor. 
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advertising, offering for sale or selling is or is not a party 
to such contract, is unfair competition and is actionable 
at the suit of any person damaged thereby, and may be 
enjoined by a court of competent jurisdiction." 
Notwithstanding the earlier decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States that such a "non-signer" pro-
vision did not violate the Federal Constitution, 519 the 
Michigan Supreme Court held in Shakespeare Company 
v. Lippman's Tool Shop Sporting Goods Company 520 
that Section 2 was void under the State Constitution as 
to a "non-signer." 
Except as to transactions governed by the Fair Trade 
Act, the law of restraints on resale of chattels is in an un-
happily confused state. The old common law developed 
in a period when competition was looked upon as evil, 
and close public regulation of prices and commercial 
transactions was the normal rule. The nineteenth cen-
tury revolution in thought and public policy, which 
exalted free competition and unregulated trade as an im-
portant object of society, made it difficult for the courts 
to make wise use of the precedents laid down in the old 
era. The anti-trust legislation of the turn of the cen-
tury, which tended to class all restraints on competition, 
regardless of size or importance, with pernicious mono-
polies, added to the confusion. The recent realization, 
partly recognized by statute, that completely unregulated 
5 1 9 Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., 299 
U.S. 183, 57 S.Ct. 139 (1936), note 495 supra. 
520 334 Mich. 109, 54 N.W. (2d) 268 (1952). In Weco Products Co. 
v. Sam's Cut Rate, Inc., 296 Mich. 190, 295 N.W. 6ll (1941) an 
injunction against a "non-signer" was dissolved on the grounds that 
its price-cutting was not wilful and knowing and that the plaintiff 
had been guilty of inequitable behavior. An injunction against a "non-
signer" was denied in Miles Laboratories, Inc. v. Simon, (D.C. Mich. 
1940) 33 F. Supp. 962 on the ground that the defendant's practice of 
selling at the price set by the producer, without adding the state sales 
tax, was not a violation of the act. 
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competition is not always publicly desirable has com-
plicated the situation still further. In the present state 
of the authorities it would be unwise to attempt to pre-
dict the validity of restraints on resale of chattels im-
posed in a commercial transaction where no elements of 
pernicious monopoly are present. May, for example, an 
artist who sells a painting to a museum at a low price in 
consideration of the vendee's contracting not to resell to 
a private collector for ten years, enforce the contract? His 
object, keeping the painting on public display, could be 
accomplished by means of the trust device. Whether the 
law of restraints on alienation of legal interests prevents 
its being accomplished by the device of contract, we do 
not know. 
Shares in business enterprises, including partnerships, 
joint-stock companies, and corporations, have come to be 
treated as property for some purposes. The same may be 
said as to certain types of contract rights, notably such 
evidences of debt as bonds, debentures, and notes, in-
surance policies, and annuity contracts. Indeed, much 
of the wealth of the modern community is invested in 
property of these types. Shares in partnerships involve 
not only property interests but mutual agency, mutual 
trust and confidence in business skill, and liability for 
debts. Hence their alienability may be and usually is, 
much restricted.521 Shares in joint-stock companies and 
corporations involve powers of management and rights 
of association; corporations often perform quasi-govern-
mental functions. Both the shareholder and the public 
have an interest in ensuring competency and continuity 
of management, which is sometimes protected by re-
5 21 Lindley, LAw oF PARTNERSHIP •186-187; •593-594 (ed. 1860); 
Uniform Partnership Act, Act 72, P.A. 1917, §§24 to 28; Comp. Laws 
(1929) §§9864 to 9868; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§20.24 to 20.28; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§449.24 to 449.28. 
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straints on alienation of shares.522 Their free alienabi-
lity has been further restricted by statute to protect the 
public against the promotion of fraudulent schemes and 
unsound enterprises. 523 The rules as to transferability 
of bonds and notes have evolved as parts of the law of 
contracts and negotiable instruments. Insurance policies 
and annuity contracts involve elements which are peculi-
arly personal, relating to the character, health, and habits 
of the holders.524 In consequence of their peculiarities, 
special rules of law, much of it statutory, governing the 
transferability of shares in business enterprises and the 
mentioned types of intangible property, have developed. 
522 Annotation: Validity of restrictions by corporations on alienation 
or transfer of corporate stock, 65 A.L.R. 1159-1186 (1930); 138 A.L.R. 
647-657 (1942). Our statutes expressly permit restraints on the aliena-
tion of stock in nonprofit corporations, co-operative corporations and 
partnership associations limited. Act 327, P.A. 1931, §§102, 119; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §§21.103, 21.120; Comp. Laws (1948) §§450.102, 450.119; 
Act. 191, P.A. 1877, §4, as amended, How. Stat. §2368; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §6082; Comp. Laws (1915) §7953; Comp. Laws (1929) §9912; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §20.94; Comp. Laws (1948) §449.304. The Uniform 
Stock Transfer Act, Act 106, P.A. 1913, §15, Comp. Laws (1915) 
§II934, Comp Laws (1929) §9534, Mich. Stat. Ann. §19.345; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §441.15, appears to recognize such restraints as to stock 
of profit corporations, but see Lufkin Rule Co. v. Secretary of State, 
163 Mich. 30, 127 N.W. 784 (1910). Compare Bronson Electric Co. v. 
Rheubottom, 122 Mich. 608, 81 N.W. 563 (1900); Weiland v. Hogan, 
177 Mich. 626, 143 N.W. 599 (1913); Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 
210 N.W. 209 (1926); Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 
290 N.W. 367 (1940); Weber v. Lane, 315 Mich. 678, 24 N.W. (2d) 
418 (1946). In Barnes Co., Inc. v. Folsinski, 337 Mich. 370, 60 N.W. 
(2d) 302 (1953), an agreement between a corporation and one of its 
officers to whom it sold stock that the stock should be inalienable 
except to the corporation and should be repurchased by the corpora-
tion when, by reason of death or otherwise, he ceased to be employed 
by it, was enforced. Cf. Part Two, note 385 infra. 
523 Bubble Act, 6 Geo. I, c. 18, §§18-21 (1720); Formoy, HISTORICAL 
FouNDATIONS oF MoDERN CoMPANY LAw 47-88 (1923); Dubois, THE 
ENGLISH BusiNESs CoMPANY AFTER THE BuBBLE ACT 1720-1800, 1-12 
(1938); Lindley, LAW OF PARTNERSHIP *145-154 (ed. 1860); Blue Sky 
Law, Act 220, P.A. 1923, as amended, Comp. Laws (1929) §§9769 to 
9801; Mich. Stat. Ann §§19.741 to 19.773; Comp. Laws (1948) §§451.101 
to 451.133. 
524 Grismore, "Effect of a Restriction on Assignment in a Contract," 
31 MICH. L. REV. 299-319 (1933). 
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These rules sometimes permit, incident to the creation 
of the interests or to commercial transactions involving 
them, restraints on alienation of types which would be 
invalid if applied to ordinary legal interests in land or 
chattels. Discussion of the validity of restraints on aliena-
tion of these special types of "property" which arise from 
or are related to their peculiar character is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
CHAPTER 8 
Equitable Interests and Interests 
Subject Thereto 
A. THE ORIGIN OF EQUITABLE ESTATES 
I N THE Middle Ages a conveyance of land to a mon-astic corporation resulted in a serious loss of income 
to the feudal overlord. As such corporations never 
died, the overlord ceased to receive the reliefs payable 
on the death of a tenant and to enjoy the feudal incidents 
of wardship and marriage of minor heirs. Monks could 
not be compelled to perform military services, and it 
was difficult or impossible to compel a monastery to per-
form other services incident to tenure. The twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries saw great expansion in monastic 
land holdings and consequent loss to the king and other 
overlords in income and military strength. A statute 
was enacted in 1279 to put an end to conveyances to mon-
astic corporations without the consent of the injured 
overlords. It provided that, when such a conveyance was 
made, the overlord might enter within the year and for-
feit the tenant's estate. 525 
The great Benedictine and Cistercian orders, which 
specialized in agriculture, already owned many estates 
and probably were not greatly hurt by the new statute.526 
525 Statute of Mortmain, 7 Edw. I, stat. 2 (1279). 
526 The Cistercians, for example, reached England in 1127, built a 
hundred monasteries in the century which followed, and added only 
one between 1227 and the dissolution of the monasteries under Henry 
VIII. Butler, "Cistercians," ENcYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, lith ed. (1910). 
It would seem from this that the order had reached its full develop-
ment some fifty years before the Statute of Mortmain. 
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Their corporate wealth enabled them to pay for licenses 
from the overlords to purchase land. The newer Domin-
ican and Franciscan orders of friars, who preached and 
ministered unto the poor, the sick, and the aged in towns, 
much like the modern Salvation Army, were, however, 
hampered in their efforts to acquire sites for hospitals 
and homes for the poor and aged. To avoid the statute 
they resorted to the device of having land conveyed to 
the municipal corporation, which agreed informally to 
allow them to use it.527 That this palpable evasion of the 
statute of 1279 was tolerated for over a century was prob-
ably due to the facts that the friars usually acquired only 
relatively small parcels in towns, rather than large tracts 
of agricultural land, and that their activities were of 
recognized public benefit. The friars' device was de-
prived of its efficacy by a statute of 1391, which attacked 
it from two directions by providing that conveyances to 
municipal corporations should be within the statute of 
1279 and that conveyances to anyone to the use of religi-
ous persons should also be within that statute.528 
Long before 1391, the advantage of the use device to 
lay landowners was seen, and it was adopted by their con-
veyancers. An elderly landowner whose heir was a minor 
daughter could avoid the onerous feudal burdens of re-
lief, wardship, and marriage which would otherwise arise 
upon his death by conveying to several young friends as 
joint tenants to hold to the use of himself and his heirs. 
The feudal dues incident to death would not then arise 
until the death of the last joint tenant and even this could 
be avoided by adding new tenants as the original ones 
527 Maitland, EQUITY, 2d ed., 24-25 (1936). The use device seems to 
have been known before the statute. See Quency v. Prior of Barnwell, 
Bract., N.B., pl. 999 (1224). 
528 Stat. 15 Ric. II, c. 5, §§5, 7 (1391). See 23 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1531). 
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died. The rule prohibiting devise of freehold estates 529 
could be avoided by a conveyance to the use of the con-
veyor for life and thereafter to such uses as he might by 
will appoint.530 The Wars of the Roses, with their fre-
quent changes of dynasty and numerous prosecutions for 
treason, gave every politically active landowner a strong 
motive for placing the title to his land in the names of 
persons who were unlikely to be attainted of treason, since 
attainder involved forfeiture of all lands to the Crown.531 
Conveyances to the use of laymen were not interfered 
with by legislation for some two centuries, except to the 
extent that they were used to defraud creditors or to de-
feat a reversioner's action for waste.532 It would seem that 
most of the land in England was conveyed to uses during 
this period.m 
The common-law courts would not enforce the rights 
of the cestui que use or beneficiary against the feoffee to 
uses, who held the legal title. 534 From the end of the 
fourteenth century, however, the lord high chancellors, 
who were nearly always bishops, did so. 535 After some 
hesitation, the chancellors undertook to enforce the use 
5 29 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE 
TIME OF EDWARD I, 312-328 (1895); note 8 supra. 
530 Bacon thought that this was the chief reason for the rise of the 
use device. READING UPoN THE STATUTES oF UsEs 20-21 (ed. 1804). See 
Maitland, EQUITY, 2d ed., 25-26 (1936); Jenks, SHORT HISTORY OF ENG-
LISH LAw, new ed., 104 (1934); Sullivan, HISTORICAL TREATISE ON THE 
FEUDAL LAw 166-167 (1772); Stat. 4 Hen. VII, c. 4 (1487); 7 Hen. VII, 
c. 3 (1490); 3 Hen. VIII, c. 4 (15ll). 
531 Sanders, UsEs AND TRusTs, 5th ed., 16-17 (1844). 
532 Stat. 50 Edw. III, c. 6, §2 (1376); I Ric. II, c. 9 (1377); 4 Hen. 
IV, c. 7 (1402); II Hen. VI, cc. 3, 5 (1433). 
5 33 1 Coke, INSTITUTES •272a; Sanders, USES AND TRUSTS, 5th ed., 17 
(1844). 
534 Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, Pasch., pl. 9 (1464). 
535 Godwyn v. Profyt, Sel. Cases in Chancery (S.S.) 48 (1396-1399); 
Ames, "Origin of Uses and Trusts," 21 HARv. L. REV. 261 at 262, 274 
(1908); Brown, "Ecclesiastical Origin of the Use," 10 NoTRE DAME 
LAWYER 353 at 361-366 (1935). 
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against the heir of the feoffee to uses 536 and against per-
sons to whom the feoffee conveyed the legal title, if they 
had notice of the use or had not paid a valuable consider-
ation.537 As the cestui que use was nearly always in actual 
possession of the land, it followed as a practical matter 
that the feoffee to uses could not convey the legal title 
free of the use. 
The use device was intended to give the cestui que use 
all the advantages of full ownership of the land, less some 
of the burdens of ownership, and with the additional 
power of devising his interest. In its enforcement of uses, 
the High Court of Chancery brought this intention to 
full realization. It enforced estates in uses, in fee simple, 
in fee tail, for life and for years, which corresponded to 
the legal estates in land.538 Estates in expectancy by way 
of reversion, remainder, and springing and shifting use 
were possible. The estate of the cestui que use was de-
visable by will 539 and alienable inter vivos.540 By a sta-
tute of 1483 he was empowered to convey the legal title 
without the consent of its holder.541 Thus the cestui que 
use had greater powers of alienation than a legal owner. 
Then, in 1535, the Statute of Uses converted the equit-
able estate of the cestui que use into a legal estate of like 
536 Anonymous, Keilway 42, 72 Eng. Rep. 200 (1502). 
5 31 Anonymous, Y.B. 11 Edw. IV, Trin., pl. 13 (1471); Anonymous, 
Y.B. 14 Hen. VIII, Mich., pl. 5 (1523); Abbot of Bury v. Bokenham, 
1 Dyer 7b, 73 Eng. Rep. 19 (1536). The arguments in this case are 
an elaborate discussion of the effect of a conveyance by the feoffee 
to uses. 
5ss Turner, THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 7-8 (1931). 
539 Rothanhale v. Wychingham, 2 Cal. Proc. Ch. iii (1413-1422); 
Williamson v. Cook, Sel. Cas. in Chan. (S.S.), pl. 118 (1417-1424); note 
530 supra. 
540 Bacon, READING UPON THE STATUTES OF UsEs 16 (1642); Cruise, 
EssAY ON UsEs §36 (1795); Gilbert, LAw OF UsES AND TRUSTS, 2d ed., 26 
(1741); Holmes, CoMMON LAW 408 (1881); Sanders, EssAY ON UsES AND 
TRUSTS, 4th ed., 65 (1823). 
541 Stat. 1 Ric. Ill, c. 1 (1483). 
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quantity.542 This put an end to uses as such. Neverthe-
less, in the two centuries which followed, the High Court 
of Chancery developed three types of equitable estates 
which resembled the old use in many respects and had 
most of its characteristics, the trust, the equity of redemp-
tion, and the vendee's interest under an executory land 
contract. These three have much in common, but the 
latter two differ from the former in that the legal title 
of the mortgagee and the vendor is, in part, beneficial to 
him, whereas that of the trustee is not. Hence separate 
treatment is desirable. 
B. TRUSTS IN THE ABSENCE OF STATUTE 
The Statute of Uses in terms deprived the High Court 
of Chancery of all jurisdiction over uses created on free-
hold estates in land. It had no application to estates for 
years and uses in chattels.543 Soon after the enactment of 
the statute, it was held that it did not apply, even though 
the feoffee to uses had an estate of freehold, if the con-
veyance imposed active duties upon him.544 A century 
after the statute, the High Court of Chancery began to 
enforce as an equitable estate, the use on a use.545 In 
these four situations, namely, those of estates for years, 
chattels personal, active trusts, and the use on a use, re-
542 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. lO (1535). 
5 4 3 It should be noted that it is the freehold or non-freehold character 
of the legal estate of the feoffee to uses or trustee which governs the 
applicability of the statute, not the character of the estate of the 
cestui que use or cestui que trust. See Bacon, READING UPON THE STA· 
TUTE OF USES 42 (1642); Sanders, USES AND TRUSTS, 4th ed., 87 (1823). 
544 Anonymous, Brook's New Cases 94, 73 Eng. Rep. 888 (1545); 
Nevil v. Saunders, I Vern. 415, 23 Eng. Rep. 555 (1686). 
545 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557) (common-
law decision that use on a use is not within the statute); Sambach v. 
Dalston, Tothill 188, 21 Eng. Rep. 164 (1634) (chancery decision 
that use on a use is enforceable in Chancery); Ames, "Origin of Uses 
and Trusts," 21 HARV. L. REv. 261 at 270-274 (1908). 
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lationships much like that of the old use were treated in 
Chancery as trusts. The holder of the legal title was a 
trustee and the equitable beneficiary a cestui que trust. 
The High Court of Chancery developed and enforced 
the rights of the cestui que trust by analogy to those of 
the old cestui que use. In the law of trusts the develop-
ment of equitable estates and interests corresponding to 
legal estates and interests has been more full and ela-
borate than that of estates in uses. As Lord Mansfield 
said in a Chancery case, 
"The forum where they are adjudged is the only dif-
ference between trusts and legal estates. Trusts are here 
considered as between cestuy que trust and trustee (and 
all claiming by, through, or under them, or in conse-
quence of their estates), as the ownership or legal estate, 
except when it can be pleaded in bar of the exercise of 
this right of jurisdiction. Whatever would be the rule 
of law, if it was a legal estate, is applied in equity to a 
trust estate ..... the trust is the estate at law in this court, 
and governed by the same rules in general, as all real 
property is, by limitation ..... cestuy que trust is actually 
and absolutely seised of the freehold in consideration of 
this court; and therefore .... the legal consequences of 
an actual seisin of a freehold, shall, in this court, fol-
low .... " 546 
The rules as to alienation by a trustee were the same 
as those which applied to conveyances by a feoffee to 
uses.547 If the trustee conveyed the trust property to a 
purchaser who had notice of the trust or who had not 
paid value, the purchaser took subject to the trust.548 
Moreover, unless, under the terms of the trust, the 
546 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden 177, 223-226, 28 Eng. Rep. 652, 670-671 
(1759). 
547 Note 537 supra. 
s4s Bovey v. Smith, 1 Vern. 144, 23 Eng. Rep. 377 (1682, 1692); 
Saunders v. Dehew, 2 Vern, 271, 23 Eng. Rep. 775 (1692); Pye v. 
Gorge, 1 P. Wms. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323 (1710). 
204 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
trustee had power to make such a sale or power to ap-
point his own successor, the alienee would be compelled 
to reconvey or to convey to a new trustee appointed by 
the High Court of Chancery.549 The heir, devisee, and 
levying creditor of the trustee likewise took subject to 
the trust.550 A bona fide purchaser for value of the legal 
estate of the trustee took free of the trust, 551 but the 
trustee who conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for value 
in breach of trust would be compelled to make restitu-
tion to the trust estate by repurchasing the property or 
purchasing property of like type and value.552 Thus the 
trust became a very effective means of restraining aliena-
tion of the legal title to interests in land or chattels. The 
trustee, however, does not hold his title beneficially. It 
is beneficial ownership, the actual right to use and enjoy 
land and goods, which is the primary concern of the law 
of restraints on alienation. 
The cestui que use was usually in possession of the 
land; the cestui que trust normally is not in possession of 
the trust property. The rights of the cestui que use were 
established by custom as a property interest before the 
High Court of Chancery began to enforce them; the 
rights of the cestui que trust were a creation of that court 
and so appeared more like a chose in action than a prop-
549 Anonymous, 3 Swanst. 79a, 36 Eng. Rep. 781 (c. 1800); note 
548 supra. 
550 Heir, devisee, or legatee; Mortimer v. Ireland, 6 Hare 196, 67 Eng. 
Rep. 1138 (1847); note 536 supra. The dower of the trustee's widow 
was also subject to the trust, which meant, practically, that she had 
no dower. Noel v. Jevon, 2 Freeman 43, 22 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1678); 
Hinton v. Hinton, 2 Ves. Sr. 631 at 634, 28 Eng. Rep. 402 at 404 
(1755). Creditor levying without notice of the trust: Newlands v. 
Newlands, 4 My. & Cr. 408, 41 Eng. Rep. 158 (1840); Whitworth v. 
Gaugain, 3 Hare 416, 67 Eng. Rep. 444 (1844). 
551 See Bassett v. Nosworthy, Rep. temp. Finch 102, 23 Eng. Rep. 55 
(1673); note 537 supra. 
552 Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see 
Tipping v. Piggot, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. ll20 (1711). 
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erty interest. Choses in action were generally inalien-
able.553 In consequence of these differences between the 
estate of the cestui que use and the interest of the cestui 
que trust, the early decisions treated the interest of the 
beneficiary of a trust as a chose in action which could be 
transmitted by will but was not transferable inter vivos.554 
By the seventeenth century, however, the property ana-
logy prevailed, and a cestui que trust could transfer his 
interest inter vivos as freely as he could an equivalent 
legal estate.555 
It having been determined that equitable estates and 
interests correspond to legal estates and interests of the 
same duration and that, like legal estates and interests, 
they have an incident of alienability, it would seem to 
follow that the rules which govern restraints on aliena-
tion of legal estates and interests apply as well to equit-
able estates and interests of the same types. Such, with 
an exception which is more apparent than real, was the 
English law. It will be recalled that restraints on aliena-
tion assume two forms, the prohibition, which, if valid, 
would make a conveyance by the owner or a levy by his 
creditors wholly ineffective, leaving the ownership in 
him, and the penalty restraint, designed to penalize 
alienation by forfeiture of the interest or otherwise. As 
has been seen, prohibitions on alienation of legal in-
terests in property are always void, whether the property 
is land or chattels and whether the interest is perpetual, 
for life, or for a term. In England the same rule of null-
s5s Ames, "The Inalienability of Choses in Action," LECTuREs oN 
LEGAL HISTORY 210-218 (1913). 
554 Anonymous, 3 Dyer 369a, 73 Eng. Rep. 827, Jenk. 245, 145 Eng. 
Rep. 172 (1580); Earl of Worcester v. Finch, 4 Coke, INSTITUTES 85, 
2 Anderson 162, 123 Eng. Rep. 600 (1600); Holmes, COMMON LAW 
409 (1881). 
555 Warmstrey v. Lady Tanfield, 1 Ch. R. 29, 21 Eng. Rep. 498 
(1628). 
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. ity was applied to prohibitions on alienation of the in-
terest of a cestui que trust.556 The rule had one ex:ception 
in that an effective prohibition could be imposed on 
alienation by a married woman of her separate equitable 
estate.557 As Professor Gray has observed, this exception 
was not really in conflict with the rule as to legal in-
terests, since a married woman could not hold legal title 
to chattels at common law and could not convey her 
legal title to land by ordinary means.558 As to penalty 
restraints, the English equity rules likewise follow the 
rules at law. A provision for forfeiture on any alienation 
of an equitable estate in fee simple or an equivalent in-
terest in chattels is void. 559 A provision for forfeiture on 
alienation of an equitable life estate is valid, whether the 
556 Brandon v. Robinson, 18 Ves. Jr. 429, 34 Eng. Rep. 379 (1811); 
Jones v. Salter, 2 Russ. & M. 208, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1815); Barton v. 
Briscoe, Jac. 603, 37 Eng. Rep. 978 (1822); Graves v. Dolphin, I Sim. 
66, 57 Eng. Rep. 503 (1826); Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Russ. & M. 
197, 39 Eng. Rep. 370 (1831); Brown v. Pocock, 2 Russ. & M. 210, 
39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1833). Other cases are collected in Gray, REsTRAINTS 
ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §§105-112, 134-168 (1895). If the cestui's interest 
is limited to a right to support or to such sums as the trustees in their 
discretion choose to pay him, the purchaser or creditor may not 
acquire much. 
557 Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025 (1817); 
Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. & Cr. 377, 41 Eng. Rep. 147 (1840); Baggett 
v. Meux, I Ph. 627, 41 Eng. Rep. 771 (1846). The restraint was 
effective, however, only while the woman was married, ceasing upon 
her husband's death. Jones v. Salter; Barton v. Briscoe, note 556 
supra. The Married Women (Restraint Upon Anticipation) Act. 1949, 
12, 13 & I4 Geo. VI, c. 78, §I (I), provides, "No restriction upon 
anticipation or alienation attached, or purported to be attached, to 
the enjoyment of any property by a woman which could not have 
been attached to the enjoyment of that property by a man shall be 
of any effect after the passing of this Act." This statute replaced a 
similar enactment which applied only to restraints imposed after 
1935. The Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 
25 & 26 Geo. V, c. 30, §2. 
55S Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., §§140-141, 269 (1895). 
559 Re Dugdale, [ 1888] 38 Ch. Div. 176; Corbett v. Corbett, [1888] 
13 P. Div. 136, 14 P. Div. 7; Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 
§20 (1895). As in the case of legal estates in fee simple (as to which 
see note 128 supra), the rules as to restraints which are limited as to 
proscribed alienees are confused. Gray, id., §§35-39. 
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alienation restrained be voluntary or involuntary, if the 
trust is created by someone other than the life cestui. 560 
If, however, the cestui que trust for life or years is the 
settlor of the trust, a provision for forfeiture of his estate 
on involuntary alienation is void.561 
Where it has not been affected by statute, American 
law follows, in general, the English view as to the effect 
of a trust in restraining alienation of the legal title to 
property. That is to say, a transfer by the trustee under 
power expressly or impliedly granted by the instrument 
creating the trust conveys the property to the transferee 
free of trust; 5~2 a transfer by the trustee which violates 
the provisions of the trust conveys the legal title but not 
necessarily free of the trust. If the transfer is to a pur-
chaser who has notice of the trust, 563 or to a donee, 564 the 
transferee takes subject to the trust and may be com-
pelled to reconvey to the trustee or to a successor trustee. 
If the transfer is to a bona fide purchaser for value, with-
out notice of the trust, the transferee takes free of the 
trust,565 but the trustee may be compelled to make resti-
56o Lockyer v. Savage, 2 Strange 947, 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (1733). 
Numerous cases in accord are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS oN ALIENA-
TION, 2d ed., §78 (1895). 
561 Higinbotham v. Holme, 19 Ves. Jr. 88, 34 Eng. Rep. 451 (1812). 
Other cases are collected in Gray, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION, 2d ed., 
§§91, 93-95. The validity of a restraint on voluntary alienation of the 
life interest of a cestui que trust who is also the settlor of the trust 
is doubtful. I d., §§96-100. 
562 TRusTs REsTATEMENT §283 (1935); 2 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §283 
(1939). 
5~3 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §288 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §288 
(1939). The cases are collected in 1 Perry, LAW oF TRusTs AND 
TRUSTEES, 7th ed. §217n (1929). 
564 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §289 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §289 
(1939). The cases are collected in Scott and in Perry, note 563 supra. 
56 5 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §284 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §284 
(1939). The cases are collected in Perry, supra note 563, §§218-22lnn. 
One who purchases in good faith and for value, without notice of the 
trust, from a transferee of the trustee who had notice or who did not 
pay value, also takes free of the trust. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §287 
(1935); 2 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §287 (1939). 
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tution to the trust estate.566 
As to penalty restraints on alienation by the cestui que 
trust of his equitable interest, American law likewise 
tends to follow the English view. That is to say, pro-
visions for forfeiture on alienation are generally void 
when annexed to an equitable estate in fee simple or an 
interest in personal property of equivalent duration/67 
and they are generally valid when annexed to an equit-
able interest for life or years.5(18 As to restraints on alien-
ation by way of prohibition, however, the American law 
has diverged widely from the English and from the rules 
governing restraints on legal interests. Where the only 
interest of a cestui que trust is to receive the income from 
the trust property for his life, part of his life, or a term 
of years, most American courts will enforce specifically 
a provision in the instrument creating the trust prohibit-
ing the cestui que trust from transferring his interest and 
his creditors from reaching it.569 This "spendthrift trust" 
doctrine is an extension of the English enforcement of 
prohibitions on alienation of the equitable estates of 
married women, but it is not restricted to married wo-
men or incompetents. Moreover, the American decisions 
treat the interest of the cestui que trust under a trust for 
his support as inalienable even in the absence of an ex-
566 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §§202, 205, 208 (1935); 2 Scott, LAW OF 
TRUSTS §§202, 205 208 (1939). This is not so, generally, if the cestui 
que trust consented to the transfer at or before the time it was made, 
even though there are valid prohibitory restraints on alienation by 
the cestui of his own interest. TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §216; Scott, §216. 
567 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §150 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §150 
(1939); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.92 (1952). 
568 Ibid. 
569 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §152 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §152 
(1939); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 
AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY, §26.94 (1952). The cases are collected and 
discussed in Scott, §§152.1 to 152.6 and Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, 
2d ed., §§53-60 (1947). 
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press prohibition on alienation.570 As to equitable in-
terests in fee simple, whether in present enjoyment or in 
expectancy, and interests in personal property of like 
duration, there is considerable confusion in the Amer-
ican cases.571 The Restatement of Trusts takes the posi-
tion that prohibitory restraints on alienation of such in~ 
terests are invalid except that where, by the terms of the 
trust, the cestui que trust is entitled to have the income 
paid to him for life or a term of years, and thereafter to 
have the trust property conveyed to him or to those de-
riving title through him, a prohibition on voluntary or 
involuntary alienation of the right to income accruing 
during his life is valid.512 Spendthrift trust prohibitions 
are generally treated as ineffective against claims for 
necessaries supplied the cestui que trust, for services and 
supplies which preserve or benefit his interest in the 
trust, and for support or alimony of his wife and chil-
dren. 573 They are considered invalid as to a trust created 
by the cestui que trust himself. 574 
s1o TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §154 (1935); 1 Scott, LAw oF TRUSTS §154 
(1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§430 to 434 (1947). 
This is not so where the amount to be paid or applied by the trustee 
is a specified sum or is not limited to what is necessary for the educa-
tion and support of the cestui que trust, even though the primary 
purpose of the trust is support. TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, comment d; 
Griswold, §433. 
571 1 Scott, LAw oF TRUSTS §§153-153.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT 
TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§81-97, 102-106 (1947); Schnebly, "Restraints Upon 
the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §26.96 
(1952). 
572 Sections 151, 153 (1935). 
573 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §157 (1935); 1 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §§157-
157.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., c. 6 (1947). Section 
157 of the Restatement of Trusts was amended by the 1948 Supple-
ment to add claims by the United States or a state or subdivision 
thereof, to the list of claims against which spendthrift provisions are 
ineffective. 
574 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §156 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §§156-
156.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., c. 8, §282,1 (1947); 
Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.122 (1952). 
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C. MICHIGAN STATUTORY CHANGES IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
During the years 1825 through 1828, a commission of 
three eminent lawyers prepared a revision of the statutes 
of the State of New York which, with some changes, was 
adopted by the legislature and published as the Revised 
Statutes of 1829, effective January 1, 1830.575 According 
to tradition, the plan of the revision was drafted by 
Judge Henry Wheaton, a lifelong admirer of France who 
had studied civil law at Poitiers and translated the Code 
Napoleon into English. The revisers' notes, which dis-
cuss the history of uses and trusts in England, reflect this 
influence. They admit that uses had utility in relieving 
the burdens of the feudal system and introducing flex-
ibility in conveyancing, but they compare unfavorably 
the complexity of the English law caused by divided titles, 
legal and equitable, with the simple property provisions 
of the Code Napoleon and deplore the extent to which 
the High Court of Chancery nullified the Statute of Uses. 
The revisers thought that, if all feudal tenures and their 
incidents were abolished and a simple system of convey-
ing legal title was provided, there would be no need for 
uses or trusts, except those for the benefit of creditors 
and for the protection of incompetents.576 They accord-
ingly proposed a "modified abolition of uses and trusts," 
saymg, 
575 Preface, R.S.N.Y. 1829; 3 R.S.N.Y. 1829, 409 (ed. 1836); Butler, 
THE REviSION OF THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND THE 
REVISERS (1889). The original commission consisted of John Duer, 
Benjamin F. Butler and Henry Wheaton. Judge Wheaton accepted a 
diplomatic appointment in 1827 and was replaced by John C. Spencer. 
Butler later served as Attorney General under Jackson. Wheaton was 
reporter of the United States Supreme Court, had a long career as a 
diplomat, and became an autl!ority on international law. Duer later 
became a New York judge. Spencer was Secretary of War and of the 
Treasury under Tyler. 
s1s 3 R.S.N.Y., 579-587 (ed. 1836). 
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"As the creation of trusts is always in a greater or less 
degree the source of inconvenience and expense, by em-
barrassing the title, and requiring the frequent aid of a 
court of equity, it is desirable that express trusts should 
be limited as far as possible, and the purposes for which 
they may be created, strictly defined. The object of the 
Revisers in this section is to allow the creation of express 
trusts, in those cases and in those cases only where the 
purposes of the trust require that the legal estate should 
pass to the trustees. An assignment for the benefit of 
creditors, would in most cases be entirely defeated, if the 
title were to remain in the debtor, and where the trust 
is to receive the rents and profits of lands, and to apply 
them to the education of a minor, the separate use of 
a married woman, or the support of a lunatic or spend-
thrift, (the general objects of trusts of this description) 
the utility of vesting the title and possession in the 
trustees, is sufficiently apparent. After much reflection, 
the Revisers have not been able to satisfy themselves 
that there are any cases not enumerated in this section, 
in which, in order to secure the execution of the trust, 
it is necessary that the title or possession should vest in 
the trustees .... " 577 
As enacted in 1828, the New York Revised Statutes 
provided, 
"S. 45. Uses and trusts, except as authorized and 
modified in this Article, are abolished; and every estate 
and interest in lands, shall be deemed a legal right, cog-
nizable as such in the courts of law, except when other-
wise provided in this Chapter. 
"S. 47. Every person, who, by virtue of any grant, 
assignment or devise, now is, or hereafter shall be entitled 
to the actual possession of lands, and the receipt of the 
rents and profits thereof, in law or in equity, shall be 
deemed to have a legal estate therein, of the same quality 
and duration, and subject to the same conditions, as his 
beneficial interest. 
577 I d. at 585. 
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"S. 55. Express trusts may be created, for any or 
either of the following purposes: 
1. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors: 
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit of 
legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge 
thereon: 
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and 
apply them to the education and support) or either) 578 of 
any person, during the life of such person, or for any 
shorter term, subject to the rules prescribed in the first 
Article of this Title: 
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to 
accumulate the same, for the purposes and within the 
limits prescribed in the first Article of this Title.579 
"57. Where a trust is created to receive the rents and 
profits of lands, and no valid direction for accumulation 
is given, the surplus of such rents and profits, beyond 
the sum that may be necessary for the education and 
support of the person for whose benefit the trust is 
created, shall be liable, in equity, to the claims of the 
creditors of such person, in the same manner as other 
personal property, which cannot be reached by an execu-
tion at law. 
"60. Every express trust, valid, as such, in its crea-
tion, except as herein otherwise provided, shall vest the 
whole estate in the trustees, in law and in equity, sub-
ject only to the execution of the trust. The persons for 
whose benefit the trust is created, shall take no estate or 
interest in the lands, but may enforce performance of the 
trust in equity. 
"63. No person beneficially interested in a trust for 
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands, can assign 
or in any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights 
and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust for 
the payment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable. 
s1s Emphasis supplied. 
579 Part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. First, §37, limits accumulations to those 
for the benefit of minors during minority. Chapter 16, infra. 
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"64. Where an express trust is created, but is not con-
tained or declared in the conveyance to the trustees, such 
conveyance shall be deemed absolute, as against the sub-
sequent creditors of the trustees, not having notice of 
the trust, and as against purchasers from such trustees, 
without notice, and for a valuable consideration. 
"65. Where the trust shall be expressed in the in-
strument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance or 
other act of the trustees, in contravention of the trust 
shall be absolutely void. 
"68. Upon the death of the surviving trustee of an 
express trust, the trust estate shall not descend to his 
heirs, nor pass to his personal representatives; but the 
trust, if then unexecuted, shall vest in the court of chan-
cery, with all the powers and duties of the original 
trustee, and shall be executed by some person appointed 
for that purpose, under the direction of the court." 580 
In 1830, upon advice of the revisers, Subsection 3 of 
Section 55 was amended by striking out the words "edu-
cation and support, or either," and substituting the word 
"use." 581 
During the years 1844 through 1846, a revision of the 
statutes of Michigan was prepared by a single commis-
sioner, Judge Sanford M. Green, a former New York 
lawyer.582 Judge Green's draft contained a chapter on 
uses and trusts which incorporated, without change in 
580 Part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §§45, 47, 55, 57, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68. 
581 3 R.S.N.Y., 579 (ed. 1836). As to this, the revisers said, "The 
word 'use' includes education and support, and each of them. It will 
also include other purposes, which ought to be provided for." Ibid. 
As to the effect of the amendment, see Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 
2d ed., §§65, 66 (1947). 
5182 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. III; Weadock, "The Public Services of Sanford 
M. Green,'' 17 MicH. PIONEER AND HrsT. CoLLECTioNs, 2d ed., 357-369 
(1910); Howell N.P. 308; 117 MicH. xlvi. Green practiced at Browns-
ville, New York, 1833-1835, and married the daughter of a New York 
judge. He moved to Owosso, Michigan, in 1837 and became a state 
senator. He was a judge of the Michigan Supreme Court, 1848-1857, 
circuit judge at Pontiac, 1857-1867, and circuit judge at Bay City, 
1872-1887. 
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substance, the provisions of the New York statutes quoted 
above, as they had been amended in 1830. This was 
enacted, with two changes, as Chapter 63 of the Michigan 
Revised Statutes of 1846, which became effective March 
1, 1847, and is still in force. 583 The two changes made by 
the legislature were in the section listing permissible 
trusts (Sec. 55, New York; Sec. 11, Michigan):'84 Sub-
section 4 was amended to permit accumulations for mar-
ried women, not limited to minority, and a new Sub-
section 5 was added. The section, as enacted and in 
force in Michigan reads, 
"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or 
either of the following purposes: 
l. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors: 
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit 
of legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge 
thereon: 
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and 
apply them to the use of any person, during the life of 
such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules 
prescribed in the last preceding chapter: 
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to 
accumulate the same for the benefit of any married 
5ss Comp. Laws (1857) §§2631 to 2657; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4114 
to 4140; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8829 to 8855; How. Stat., §§5563 to 
5589; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11565 to 11591; Comp. Laws (1929) 
§§12967 to 12993; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.51 to 26.77; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§555.1 to 555.27. Sections I, 3, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, and 24, 
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, correspond, respectively, to §§45, 47, 55, 57, 60, 
63, 64, 65, and 68, R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second. Rev. 
Stat. 1846, c. 63, §2, copied from R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, 
art. Second, §46, provides, "Every estate which is now held as an use, 
executed under the laws of this state as they formerly existed, is 
confirmed as a legal estate." As the Statute of Uses was in force in 
New York prior to the revision of 1829, this section had extensive 
application there. It having been held in Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 
358 (1861) that the Statute of Uses was repealed in Michigan by the 
Act of September 16, 1810, note 38 supra, the section's application 
here is limited to uses created before 1810. 
584 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. V. 
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woman) or for either of the purposes and within the limits 
prescribed in the preceding chapter: 585 
5. For the beneficial interest of any person or per-
sons, when such trust is fully expressed and dearly de-
fined upon the face of the instrument creating it, subject 
to the limitations as to time prescribed in this title." 586 
The addition of Subsection 5 wholly altered the na-
ture of the legislation. As has been seen, the New York 
revisers intended to abolish all continuing trusts except 
those for the support and education of minors, married 
women, and incompetents. Their provisions as to the 
nature and inalienability of the interest of the cestui que 
trust were inserted with this in mind. The original New 
York statute did not carry out this intention perfectly 
because it failed to define the persons who could be bene-
ficiaries of a trust for education and support. Probably 
the revisers did not anticipate the creation of spendthrift 
trusts for the benefit of persons who were not incompe-
tent. The New York amendment of Subsection 3, made 
in 1830, altered the scheme to some extent by permitting 
trusts, for the life of any cestui que trust) not limited to 
education and support. The Michigan addition of Sub-
section 5 changed it wholly by permitting trusts for any 
purpose whatever, so long as the cestui que trust is not 
in possession. Yet the Michigan statutes retain the pro-
visions which make the interest of the cestui que trust 
5B5Emphasis supplied to show words not in the New York subsection. 
The reference to the "preceding chapter" is to Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, 
§37; Comp. Laws (1857) §2621; Comp. Laws (1871) §4104; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §8819; How. Stat. §5553; Comp. Laws (1915) §11555; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §12957; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.37; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§554.37, which was the same as N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, 
art. First, §37, note 579 supra. This section [Comp. Laws (1948) 
§554.37] was amended by Act 227, P.A. 1949, and repealed by Act 6, 
P.A. 1952. Chapter 16, infra. 
s.sa Rev. Stat. 1946, c. 63, §11, note 583 supra. 
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an inalienable chose in action, 587 despite their inappro-
priateness to trusts which are not for the education or 
support of minors, married women, or incompetents. 
Both the New York and Michigan statutes abolish 
trusts of land under which the cestui que trust is en-
titled to beneficial possession. 588 This eliminates several 
types of trust which would have been valid in England 
after the High Court of Chancery had created the excep-
tions to the Statute of Uses discussed above.589 These 
are the trust of an estate for years, the use on a use, and 
the trust under which the trustee has active duties. None 
of these was executed by the English Statute of Uses, 
whether or not the cestui que trust was entitled to pos-
session. The New York and Michigan statutes execute 
them, that is, destroy the estate of the trustee and con-
vert the interest of the cestui que trust into a legal estate, 
when the cestui is entitled to possession and the receipt 
of the rents and profits. 
D. PERMISSIBLE DURATION OF TRUSTS OF LAND 
English law imposes no limit on the duration of trusts. 
If a conveyance is made to A and his heirs upon trust for 
B and his heirs, A holds a legal fee simple and B an 
equitable fee simple, both of which are potentially per-
petual. Inasmuch as the estates of both are alienable, 
B can terminate the trust at any time by having A con-
vey to him, by conveying to A, or by joining A in a 
conveyance to a third party. When the estates of the 
trustee and the cestui que trust are inalienable, however, 
as they are in New York and Michigan in the case of 
587 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §§57, 60, 63, 
note 580 supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 16, 19, note 583 supra. 
588 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §47, note 580 
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §3, note 583 supra. 
589 At notes 543-545. 
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trusts for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands/90 
the trust is indestructible and some limit on duration is 
desirable. The language of Subsection 3 of the New 
York and Michigan statutes defining permissible trusts 
might have been construed to limit the duration of any 
trust created thereunder to the life of a single beneficiary. 
It has not been so construed in either New York of Mich-
igan. However, the preceding article of the New York 
statutes provided, 
"S. 15. The absolute power of alienation, shall not 
be suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, 
for a longer period than during the continuance of not 
more than two lives in being at the creation of the estate, 
except in the single case mentioned in the next sec-
tion." 691 
Before the Revised Statutes of 1846 were adopted, the 
New York courts had held that, because of the inalien-
ability of the interest of the cestui que trust~ a trust for 
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands suspended the 
absolute power of alienation, and, therefore, Section 15 
limited the duration of such trusts to two lives in being.592 
590 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. I, tit. II, art. Second, §63, note 580 
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra, quoted in the text 
at note 621 infra. 
591 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. First, §15. Rev. Stat. 1846, 
c. 62, §15, Comp. Laws (1857) §2599; Comp. Laws (1871) §4082; 
Comp. Laws (1897) §8797; How. Stat. §5531; Comp. Laws (1915) 
§11533; Comp. Laws (1929) §12935; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.15; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §554.15 was identical. The next section originally pro-
vided: "s. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a 
prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons 
to whom the first remainder is limited, shall die under the age of 
twenty-one years, or upon any other contingency, by which the estate 
of such persons may be determined before they attain their full age." 
The meaning and effect of §16 are discussed in Chapter 21, Section 
D, infra. Sections 554.14 to 554.20 of Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) were 
repealed by P.A. 38 in 1949. See note 594 infra. 
592 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16 
Wend. 61 (1836); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT App., c. A, 1[17 (1944); see 
Powell and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRK CoN-
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Section 15 was adopted here in 1846, and the decisions 
under it were to the same effect.593 A Michigan statute 
of 1949 repealed Section 15 and reestablished the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities as to interests in land 
created by wills becoming effective and deeds executed 
after September 23, 1949.594 This repeal raises the ques-
tion of the permissible duration of a trust for receipt of 
the rents and profits of lands. 
Subsection 3 permits only trusts, "to receive the rents 
and profits of lands, and apply them to the use of any 
person, during the life of such person, or for any shorter 
term." Although, as has been noted, this does not limit 
the duration of trusts, it does limit in quantity the equit-
able interest of any one beneficiary to a life interest. 
This being so, there can be no such thing as an equitable 
CERNING PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS 63-73 [New York Legis-
lative Document (1936) No. 65 (H)]. 
5
'
93 Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Foster v. 
Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 
196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 
N.W. 660 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 
190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 
242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 
Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 
485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). The types of trusts affected by §15 are 
discussed in Chapter 20, Section C, infra. The computation of the 
permissible period is discussed in Chapter 21, infra. In most of 
the cases the problem was complicated by contentions that not only the 
trust itself but future interests subject to it or expectant upon it 
offended section 15. It was held formerly that section 15 limited the 
duration of charitable trusts. Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark 
v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879); see Scudder v. Security 
Trust Co., 238 Mich. 318, 213 N.W. 131 (1927). This effect of the 
section was eliminated by Act 122, P.A. 1907, superseded by Act 280, 
P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915) §11099; Comp. Laws (1929) §13512; 
Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.1191; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.351, and supple-
mented by Act 373, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) §13517; Mich. Stat. 
Ann. §26.1201; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.381. The history and present 
status of charitable trusts in Michigan are discussed in Chapter 15, 
infra. 
594 Act 38; P.A. 1949, Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.49 (1), 26.49 (2), 26.49 (3); 
Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.51, 554.52, 554.53. See Miller v. Curtiss, 
328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 834 (1950). 
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fee simple under Subsection 3. There can be a succession 
of equitable life interests followed by a legal remainder 
in fee, but each life interest and the remainder must vest 
within the period of the common-law Rule Against Per-
petuities which is, generally speaking, lives in being and 
twenty-one years. Thus the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
although not itself a rule limiting the duration of trusts, 
operates in conjunction with the language of Subsec-
tion 3 to impose what amounts to a limitation on the 
duration of trusts created under that subsection. 
Subsection 5, which is peculiar to Michigan, permits 
trusts for "the beneficial interest of any person or per-
sons ..... subject to the limitations as to time prescribed 
in this title." The reference was to Section 15, now re-
pealed, so it would seem that there is now no limitation 
on the duration of trusts created under this subsection; 
that is, the interest of the cestui que trust may be an 
equitable fee simple. As the interest of the cestui que 
trust under a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits 
of lands is inalienable, it becomes material to inquire 
whether it is permissible to create a trust for the receipt 
of the rents and profits of lands under Subsection 5. If 
so, it may now be possible to set up a perpetual trust of 
land under which the interest of the cestui que trust) 
although in fee simple, will always be inalienable, except 
to the extent that the statutes permit his creditors to 
reach the surplus of income beyond that necessary for 
his education and support. 595 Such a trust would have 
595 Rev. Stat. (1846) c. 63, §§13, 19, note 583 supra. These sections 
correspond to sections 57 and 63 of the New York statute, quoted in the 
text at note 580 supra. The Restatement of Trusts takes the position 
that a trust may not be made indestructible beyond the period of the 
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Section 62, comment k (1935). 
Professor Scott agrees with th1s position but cites no authority for it. 
LAw oF TRUSTS §62.10 (1939). This problem is discussed further in 
Chapter 15, Section B (4), infra. As England has not made trusts 
220 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
the undesirable characteristics of the perpetually un-
barrable entail, which the English courts abolished in 
1472.500 
Two types of trusts for the receipt of the rents and 
profits of land may possibly be sustainable under Sub-
section 5. Subsection 3 permits only trusts to "apply" 
the rents and profits of land to the use of any person. It 
could be argued that when the trust is to receive the rents 
and profits and pay them over to the cestui que trust, 
the trust falls under Subsection 5 rather than Subsection 
3. The New York courts have decided that a trust to 
receive the rents and profits and pay them over to the 
beneficiary falls under Subsection 3,597 but these decisions 
might not be followed in Michigan because they were 
rendered after 1846 and because, as New York has no 
Subsection 5, the only alternative there to sustaining such 
trusts under Subsection 3 would be to hold them void. 
Subsection 3 permits trusts to apply the rents and profits 
of lands to the use of any person only "during the life of 
such person, or for any shorter term." It could be argued 
that, if the trust is to apply the rents and profits to the use 
of B and his heirs, it cannot be sustained under Subsec-
tion 3 but can be under Subsection 5. To maintain this 
argument it is necessary to assert that Subsection 3 does 
not prohibit the creation of any trust to apply the rents 
and profits of land to the use of beneficiaries so long as it 
is not created under that subsection. In view of the unde-
sirability of permitting perpetual trusts under which 
the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable, the 
indestructible by statute and does hot permit them to be made inde-
structible by restraints on alienation, the question cannot arise there. 
596 Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), note 
67 supra. 
597 Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297 (1849); Cochrane v. Schell, 140 
N.Y. 516 (1894); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT App., c. A, 1!18 (1944). 
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Michigan Supreme Court may hold that Subsections 3 
and 4 are the only authority for the creation of trusts for 
the receipt of the rents and profits of lands. If so, the 
menace of perpetually inalienable equitable estates in 
fee simple will be averted. 
E. STATUTORY INALIENABILITY OF INTERESTS 
UNDER TRUSTS OF LAND 
As to alienation by the trustee, the New York and 
Michigan statutes introduce three changes in the Eng-
lish law. First, when the trust is not contained or de-
clared in the conveyance to the trustees, subsequent credi-
tors of the trustee without notice of the trust may levy 
on the trust property free of the trust. 598 The English 
rule was otherwise. 599 Second, the legal estate of the 
trustee is not devisable and does not pass to the trustee's 
heir upon intestacy.~oo As to this, also, the English rule 
was otherwise.601 Third, when the trust is contained or 
declared in the conveyance to the trustee, a transfer by 
the trustee in breach of trust is absolutely void.602 In 
England such a transfer effectively conveyed the legal 
title to the transferee, who took it subject to the trust.603 
This provision that the trustee's transfer in breach of 
trust is a complete nullity, even when the cestui que trust 
requests a transfer, can cause seriously undesirable situa-
598 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §64, note 580 
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §20, note 583 supra. 
599 Note 550 supra. 
600 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §68, note 580 
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §24, note 583 supra. 
601 Note 550 supra. 
60 2 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §65, note 580 
supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §21, note 583 supra. 
603 Note 551 supra. There can be no problem of a bona fide pur-
chaser for value without notice of the trust in this situation because 
the declaration of trust in the trustee's chain of title is notice to pur-
chasers from him. 
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tions where the trust property is salable but is deteriorat-
ing, requires repairs which the trustee cannot finance, or 
will produce no income without improvements which 
the trustee cannot finance or is not empowered to make. 
Under the English law, a conveyance by the trustee would 
carry the legal title and the concurrence of the cestui 
que trust would bar his interest.~05 A statute enacted in 
1887 was designed to ameliorate the situation by em-
powering the circuit court in chancery to authorize testa-
mentary trustees without power of sale to sell the trust 
property free of trust and hold the proceeds in trust.~06 
The 1887 act provides however, that, 
"No sale or conveyance of any kind shall be made of 
any property contrary to any specific provision in regard 
thereto contained in the deed of conveyance, or in the 
will under which the petitioner holds the said 
property." 607 
Young v. Young 608 was a suit by trustees for permis-
sion to sell land in fee. The land was devised to the 
plaintiffs in trust to pay the rents and profits to named 
persons for ten years, if either of two children of the 
605 See note 566 supra. 
606 Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) §§9234 to 
9242. Re-enacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws 
(1915) §§12716 to 12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. 
Stat. Ann., §§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 
619.70; note 283 supra. Cf. Act 258, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) 
§§13518 to 13521; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1211 to 26.1214; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§554.401 to 554.404, relating to charitable dispositions, note 
224 supra. 
607 Act. 233, P.A. 1887, §9; Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §70; Comp. 
Laws (1915) §12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §14412; Mich. Stat. Ann. 
§27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §619.70. The term "deed of convey-
ance" is explicable by the fact that the statute permits legal life 
tenants holding under deed or will to petition for sale of the fee, 
although it applies only to trustees under wills. 
6os 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931). See Garrison v. Hecker, 
128 Mich. 539, 87 N.W. 642 (1901); Hall v. Williamson, 304 Mich. 
657, 8 N.W. (2d) 869 (1943). Cf. Trustees of the M.J. Clark Memorial 
Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927). 
EQUITABLE INTERESTS 223 
testator should so long live, legal remainder to the two 
children for their lives, legal remainder in fee to their 
issue or the issue of the survivor of them. The will 
expressly denied the trustees power to sell and directed 
them to hold the property intact during the term of the 
trust. It also provided that the children should not 
have power to sell or mortgage during their lives. Before 
the ten years expired, a hotel building on the land 
burned and the trustees could not finance construction 
of any building which would produce income or pay 
the taxes without income. A decree directing sale and 
the substitution of the proceeds for the original trust 
property was affirmed after the expiration of the ten 
years. The court held that courts of equity have in-
herent power, independent of statute, to permit devia-
tion from terms of trusts restricting alienation and that 
the quoted section of the 1887 act did not restrict this 
non-statutory power. The opinion does not refer to the 
section of the Revised Statutes which makes "absolutely 
void" every sale or conveyance by trustees in contraven-
tion of the trust 609 and does not discuss the validity of 
the provisions of the will imposing a prohibition on 
alienation of the legal life estate of the children. The 
result reached in Young v. Young is clearly desirable and 
in harmony with the general Anglo-American law of 
trusts.610 Nevertheless, it flatly contravenes the Michi-
gan statutes. The decision amounts to a partial judicial 
repeal of the arbitrary and virtually unworkable system 
set up by the New York revisers and a return to the 
so9 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §21, note 583 supra, adopting R.S.N.Y. 
1829, part II, c. 1, art. Second, §65, note 580 supra. The New York 
statute has been amended to permit the result reached in Young v. 
Young. N.Y. Real Property Law §105. 
610 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §167 (1935); Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS §167 
(1939). 
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principles of the English law of trusts, which those re-
visers sought to abolish. 
Bennett v. Chapin illl was a suit to construe a will. 
The testatrix devised two lots and other property to her 
executors upon trust to provide for the education and 
support of her daughter during minority, then to pay 
her a thousand dollars a year until she reached the age 
of thirty-five, when the property was to be transferred 
to her. If the daughter died before reaching thirty-five, 
her issue were to succeed to her rights and, if she was 
not survived by issue, the property was to be conveyed 
to testatrix's husband. The will provided that the lots 
should not be sold for less than $16,500. After the death 
of the testatrix's husband, the daughter, aged thirty-one 
and without issue, sued for a determination that she had 
power to terminate the trust and sell the two lots for 
$10,000. A decree dismissing her bill was reversed. The 
court held that the daughter had an indefeasibly vested 
il11 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). See Part Two, note 466, infra. 
The case is not followed when there are non-consenting contingent 
beneficiaries. Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910); 
In re Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). In 
Blossom v. Anketell, (D.C. Mich. 1921) 275 F. 947, the sole bene-
ficiary was not allowed to terminate a trust, the terms of which did 
not entitle him to the principal during his life-time unless the trustees, 
in their discretion, chose to convey it to him. The decision seems 
inconsistent, in principle, with Bennett v. Chapin. In Hunt v. Hunt, 
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900), land was devised to trustees to 
convert into personalty and pay the income to a son for life, then to 
pay over to the heirs, devisees or legatees of the son. It was held that 
the son was not entitled to terminate the trust. In Conover v. Hewitt, 
125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900), land was conveyed to a trustee 
to apply the rents and profits to the use of William Fitzhugh during 
his life and after his death to apply them to the use of his wife and 
children during the life of the wife, remainder at her death to the 
children. After the death of William his widow released her interest 
to the other beneficiaries. They sued to compel immediate termi-
nation of the trust and were granted the relief sought. This decision 
goes further than Bennett v. Chapin by holding not only that the 
beneficiaries of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land may 
compel its termination but that one such beneficiary may transfer his 
interest to another. 
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estate in fee simple and that the restraint on alienation 
was void, citing Mandlebaum v. McDonell 612 and a pas-
sage in Gray's Rule Against Perpetuities stating the Eng-
lish rule that when property is given to trustees to trans-
fer to a beneficiary upon his reaching a certain age and 
there is no one else beneficially interested, the bene-
ficiary may compel the trustees to convey to him before 
he reaches the specified age, despite the fact that termi-
nation will defeat a material purpose of the trust.618 The 
opinion does not mention the Michigan statutes relative 
to trusts of land. That the decision is in conflict with 
those statutes is abundantly clear from the New York 
decisions on the point.614 It is also in conflict with the 
rule generally followed in this country in the absence 
of statute.615 In this case, as in Young v. Young~ the 
result reached is desirable and in harmony with the Eng-
lish law of trusts. 
Fredericks v. Near 616 was an action of assumpsit. The 
defendants conveyed land owned by them by the en-
tirety to the plaintiff. The plaintiff and defendants 
entered into a substantially contemporaneous agreement 
providing that the plaintiff held as trustee for the pur-
pose of selling the land and paying a debt owed by the 
defendant husband, and that the defendants jointly and 
severally agreed to pay any deficiency. Being unable 
e12 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 138 supra. 
61s The passage quoted by the court is in §120, 3d ed. (1915). It 
collects the English cases and follows the English view that all prohi-
bitions on alienation, on legal or equitable interests, are void, except 
on the separate equitable estate of a married woman. 
614 See Matter of Wentworth, 230 N.Y. 176, 129 N.E. 646 (1920) 
and other cases cited in Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, 2d ed., 526 
(1947). 
615 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §337, comments j, k (1935); 3 Scott, LAw 
OF TRUSTS §337.3 (1939); Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §513 
(1947). This is known as the Rule in Claflin v. Claflin [149 Mass. 19, 
20 N.E. 454 (1899)]. 
616 260 Mich. 627, 245 N.W. 537 (1932). 
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to effect a sale, the plaintiff, with the consent of the 
creditor, reconveyed the land to the defendants. The 
defendant husband was later discharged in bankruptcy. 
The plaintiff sought to hold the defendant wife liable 
personally on the assumption of liability in the trust 
agreement. A judgment for the defendants was affirmed, 
the court saying, 
"We recognize the rule that a trustee, without the 
consent or acquiescence of the beneficiary, cannot sur-
render the trust estate, but, in the case at bar, the trustee, 
the cestui que trust1 and settlors were all sui juris1 and 
could, by mutual consent, terminate the trust and re-
store the status quo." 617 
This language appears to be a statement of the rule, 
which is well settled in England and in states where it 
has not been altered by statute, that the settlor and 
cestui que trust may always terminate a trust, even 
though termination will defeat a material purpose of the 
trust, provided the cestui que trust is fully competent 
and there are no other beneficiaries affected.618 In New 
York this rule is not applicable to trusts for receipt of 
the rents and profits of land created under Subsections 
3 and 4 because the statutes make the interests of both 
trustee and cestui que trust inalienable.619 It would seem 
that the New York rule should apply in Michigan to 
trusts created under Subsections 3, 4, and 5, and that, if 
the opinion in Fredericks v. Near holds otherwise, it is 
wrong. The trust involved in the case was, however, 
created under Subsection 1 of the statute, and the right 
of the beneficiary was to receive a sum in gross. Conse-
617 ld. at 631. 
618 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT §338 (1935); Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS §338 
(1939). In England the consent of the settlor is not required. 
619 Note 614 supra. 
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quently the interest of the beneficiary was alienable by 
the express provisions of the statute, and the decision is 
sound on its factS.620 
The statutory prohibition on voluntary alienation of 
the cestui's interest under a trust for the receipt of the 
rents and the profits of land has no express exceptions. 
It reads, "No person beneficially interested in a trust 
for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands, can assign 
or in any manner dispose of such interest." 621 The de-
cision in Bennett v. Chapin 622 makes an exception to the 
statute, permitting a cestui que trust, who is entitled 
to a conveyance of the trust property in fee upon reach-
ing a stipulated age, to terminate prematurely a trust 
for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands. The 
New York courts hold that the statutory prohibition on 
voluntary alienation does not apply to the interest of a 
cestui que trust who was the settlor of the trust.623 The 
Michigan Supreme Court has given some indication that 
it may not follow this view.62" Apart from these two 
situations, there appears to be no exception to the statu-
tory rule that the cestui of a trust for the receipt of the 
rents and profits of land cannot voluntarily alienate his 
interest.625 
62o Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra, corresponding to 
R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §63, quoted at note 
580 supra. 
621 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, note 583 supra. But see note 611 supra. 
622 Note 611 supra. 
623 Newton v. Hunt, 134 App. Div. 325, 119 N.Y.S. 3 (1909), affd. 
201 N.Y. 599, 95 N.E. 1134 (1909); see Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 
316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898.) 
624 See Hackley v. Littell, 150 Mich. 106 at 116, 113 N.W. 787 (1907). 
625 See Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 380, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); 
Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570 at 575, 128 N.W. 761 (1910); In re 
Allen's Estate, 240 Mich. 661 at 664-665, 216 N.W. 446 (1927) (imply-
ing that the cestui's interest is not transmissible by will). But see 
Alberts v. Steiner, 237 Mich. 143, 211 N.W. 46 (1926), where the 
cestui que trust did not contest the validity of her mortgage and the 
mortgagee was allowed to reach the rents and profits. The opinion 
does not refer to the statute. 
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With regard to involuntary alienation, Chapter 63 
of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provides, 
"Sec. 13. When a trust is created to receive the 
rents and profits of lands, and no valid direction for 
accumulation is given, the surplus of such rents and 
profits, beyond the sum that may be necessary for the 
education and support of the person for whose benefit 
the trust is created, shall be liable in equity, to the claims 
of creditors of such person, in the same manner as other 
personal property which cannot be reached by an execu-
tion at law." 626 
As was to be expected, this provision was interpreted 
to mean that creditors cannot reach the rents and profits 
to the extent that they are necessary for the education 
and support of the cestui que trust.fl21 The right of 
creditors to reach the surplus was complicated by con-
tradictory provisions of Chapter 90 of the Revised Sta-
tutes of 1846 which permitted judgment creditors of a 
cestui que trust to reach his interest under the trust, 
"except where such trust has been created by, or the 
fund so held in trust has proceeded from, some person 
other than the defendant." 628 If the provisions of Chap-
ters 63 and 90 are read literally, it would appear that 
the interest of a cestui que trust under a trust for the 
receipt of the rents and profits of land could not be 
reached by his creditors at all if he was not the settlor 
626 Note 583 supra. 
627 Cummings v. Corey, 58 Mich. 494, 25 N.W. 481 (1885). In this 
case the life beneficiary, whose interest was in question, was also the 
trustee. The trust was created by the will of another. 
628 Emphasis supplied. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 90, §§24, 25. Repealed, 
Act 184, P.A. 1851. Reenacted, Act 120, P.A. 1855; Comp. Laws (1857) 
§§3478, 3479; Comp. Laws (1871) §§5060, 5061; How. Stat. §§6614, 
6615; Comp. Laws (1897) §§436, 437. Reenacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, 
c. 6, §4 (6); Comp. Laws (1915) §12302; Comp. Laws (1929) §13944; 
Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.545 (b); Comp. Laws (1948) 606.4 (6). These 
sections correspond to R.S.N.Y. 1829, part III, c. 1, tit. 2, art. Second, 
§§38, 39. See: Schnebly, "Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §26.105 (1952). 
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of the trust, and could be reached only as to the surplus 
income above his needs for education and support if he 
was the settlor.629 Such is not the present judicial inter-
pretation. The courts hold that, if the cestui que trust 
was the settlor, Chapter 63 has no application and Chap-
ter 90 has full application, so that the entire income, 
not merely the surplus above what is necessary for sup-
port and education, may be reached by creditors.630 If 
the cestui que trust was not the settlor, Chapter 90 has 
no application and Chapter 63 applies, so that the sur-
plus of rents and profits beyond what is necessary for 
the support and education of the cestui is accessible in 
equity by his creditors.631 Of course, in no case may 
his interest be reached by attachment at law.632 
F. SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS OF PERSONALTY 
The New York statute "Of Uses and Trusts" is Article 
Second of Title II of Chapter I of Part II of the Revised 
629 This was the result reached by the earlier New York cases. They 
are collected in Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §70n (1947). 
630 Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); Gilkey v. 
Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 715 (1910). 
631 Spring v. Randall, 107 Mich. 103, 64 N.W. 1063 (1895). But in 
Gilkey v. Gilkey, note 630 supra, it was held that no part of the interest 
of the beneficiary under a trust for support from the rents and profits 
of land created by another could be reached to satisfy a decree for 
alimony. The court made no mention of either statute, saying merely 
that payment of alimony was not within the uses to which the trustee 
was authorized to apply the income. See notes 570, 573 sup11a as to 
the treatment of trusts for support in states where the law has not 
been altered by statute. See Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 
N.W. 712 (1902). 
632 Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358 (1861); Allen v. Merrill, Lynch & 
Co., 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923). Neither may it be reached 
by execution at law, id.; Gorham v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247 (1871), or 
by garnishment, Peninsular Savings Bank v. Union Trust Co., 127 Mich. 
355, 86 N.W. 798 (1901). That is, the interest of a cestui que trust 
being purely equitable, is accessible to creditors only in equity. Obli-
gations created by the trustee which bind the trust estate would seem, 
also, to be enforcible against the trust property only in equity. Feld-
man v. Preston, 194 Mich. 352, 160 N.W. 655 (1916). See: Packard v. 
Kingman, 109 Mich. 497 at 507-508, 67 N.W. 551 (1896). 
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Statutes of 1829. Title II is entitled, "Of the Nature and 
Qualities of Estates in Real Property, and the Alienation 
Thereof." Chapter I is entitled, "Of Real Property, 
and of the Nature, Qualities and Alienation of Estates 
Therein." This gives the impression that the statute was 
intended to govern only trusts of freehold estates in land. 
N everthe1ess, Article First of Title II contains several 
provisions relative to estates for years, which it declares 
shall be chattels real,633 and the revisers' notes make it 
clear that they intended the section abolishing trusts 
which entitle the cestui que trust to possession ~34 to 
apply to trusts of estates for years.635 There seems never 
to have been any doubt that the section limiting the 
purposes for which trusts might be created did not apply 
to trusts of other types of personal property, and New 
York decisions rendered as late as 1862 held that the 
sections making the interest of the cestui que trust in-
alienable did not apply to such trusts.686 Nevertheless, 
on the basis of New York statutes governing personal 
property, it was settled in 1865 that the interest of the 
cestui of a trust for the receipt of income from personal 
property was subject to the same inalienability as that 
of the cestui of a trust for the receipt of the rents and 
profits of land.637 
The Michigan statute "Of Uses and Trusts" is part 
of Title XIV of the Revised Statutes of 1846, which 
bears the same title as Chapter I of Part II of the New 
York Revised Statutes of 1829. Michigan never adopted 
633 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c. I, tit. II, art. First, §5. Rev. Stat. 1846, 
c. 62, §5, is the same. 
634 R.S.N.Y. 1829, part II, c 1, tit. II, art. Second, §47. Rev. Stat. 
1846, c. 63, §3, is the same. 
~35 3 R.S.N.Y. 584 (ed. 1836). 
636 The cases are collected in Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., 
§69 (1947). 
637 Graff v. Bonnett, 31 N.Y. 9 (1865). 
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the New York personal property statutes. Consequently 
the Michigan statute "Of Uses and Trusts," Chapter 63 
of the Revised Statutes of 1846, has no application to 
trusts of personal property, other than chattels real, 
and they are governed by the English rules of equity, as 
modified by judicial decision.638 Moreover, when the 
trust instrument directs the trustee to convert land into 
personalty, the doctrine of equitable conversion applies, 
and the trust is treated as one of personal property, un-
affected by the provisions of Chapters 62 and 63 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1846.639 
If, then, a trust is of personal property, other than 
chattels real, or is treated as such, the normal Anglo-
638 Ledyard's Appeal, 51 Mich. 623, 17 N.W. 208 (1883); Hopkins v. 
Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Moore v. O'Leary, 180 
Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914). 
639 Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Ford v. Ford, 
80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890) (direction to convert Michigan land 
into Missouri land exempted trust from the statutes); Michigan Trust 
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gettins v. Grand 
Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Floyd v. Smith, 
303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 
626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939). These cases involved the question of 
whether Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15, note 591 supra, applied to the 
trusts involved, but the same result should be reached as to the applica-
tion of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, note 583 supra. It was sug-
gested in Thatcher v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church 
of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877), that if the terms of a trust give 
the trustee power of sale, a trust does not offend Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 
62, §15, regardless of duration. It does not follow that such a trust 
would cease to be one for receipt of the rents and profits of land and 
so free from the prohibition on alienation of the cestui que trust's 
interest imposed by Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, until the land is 
actually sold. The suggestion in the Thatcher case was questioned in 
Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), and later 
overruled by a decision that a power of sale for reinvestment does not 
exempt a trust of land from the provisions of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, 
§15. Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901). See Chapter 
20, Section B (3) infra. Of course, if a trust of land is valid and the 
trustee actually does sell the land and reinvest in personalty under a 
power conferred on him by the terms of the trust, the trust ceases to 
be one for receipt of the rents and profits of land and the statutory 
prohibition on alienation of the beneficiary's interest imposed by Rev. 
Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§13, 19, ceases to operate. 
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American rules of equity apply to transfers of the legal 
title by the trustee, and the interest of the cestui que 
trust is freely alienable and accessible to his creditors 
unless the terms of the trust itself validly restrain aliena-
tion.640 As has been seen, the "spendthrift trust" doc-
trine accepted in most American states permits the im-
position of a prohibitory restraint on alienation when 
the only rights of the cestui que trust are to receive the 
income from the trust property during his life or some 
shorter period.641 When the cestui que trust also has 
rights in the principal, there is less harmony as to the 
validity of such a prohibitory restraint, especially when 
it purports to restrain alienation of the interest in the 
principal as well as the right to the income.'642 
Hackley v. Littell 643 was a proceeding in equity, 
brought by the trustee, to set aside assignments of her 
interest made by a cestui que trust. In 1887 Mrs. Littell 
transferred $50,000 to a trustee, to pay the income to her 
during her lifetime and transfer the principal to others 
upon her death. The trust instrument provided that 
Mrs. Littell could not anticipate, transfer, or assign any 
part of the income or principal. In 1901 the trustee 
sued Mrs. Littell in equity and in 1902 a decree was 
entered declaring that the trust was a valid spendthrift 
trust which Mrs .. Littell had no right to terminate and 
under which she was entitled only to the income. In 
1905 Mrs. Littell made several security assignments of 
her interest under the trust and the assignees claimed 
the income. A decree determining that the assignments 
were "void and of no effect," and directing the trustee 
640 Alienability of cestui's interest: Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92. 
89 N.W. 712 (1902). 
641 Note 569 supra. 
642 Notes 571, 572 supra. 
643 150 Mich. 106, 113 N.W. 787 (1907). 
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to continue paying the income directly to Mrs. Littell, 
was affirmed on the ground the 1902 decree was res 
judicata of the spendthrift character of the trust. All 
of the justices seemed to assume the validity of spend-
thrift trusts. One justice dissented on the ground that 
spendthrift provisions are ineffective as to the interest 
of a cestui que trust who is also the settlor; that is, that 
a person may not set up a spendthrift trust for himsel£.644 
The majority of the court agreed that, in view of the 
provisions of Chapter 90 of the Revised Statutes of 
1846,645 "one may not declare a trust in his own property, 
reserving a beneficial interest in himself, which interest 
shall not be subject to proceedings by a judgment credi-
tor" 646 but questioned whether the settlor of a trust 
may not bar his own voluntary alienation of his interest 
under it. The form of the litigation suggests a factor 
in the spendthrift trust problem which is seldom empha-
sized, that spendthrift provisions are often inserted in 
trust instruments not so much to protect the cestui que 
trust against his own folly as to protect the trustee against 
the trouble of dealing with the claims of creditors and 
assignees. 
Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank 641 was a 
proceeding for approval of a compromise brought under 
a statute permitting the competent living persons whose 
interests will be affected to compromise any good faith 
contest of the admission of a will to probate, or any good 
644 See note 574 supra; Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 
715 (1910). 
645 Note 628 supra. 
646 150 Mich. 116, 113 N.W. 791. Accord: Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 
Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 715 (1910). 
647255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931). Accord: Hay v. LeBus, 317 
Mich. 698, 27 N.W. (2d) 309 (1947). It is not made certain in the 
opinion or the record in the Rose case that there was no land involved, 
but the will contained a direction to convert land to personalty. The 
Hay case involved a trust of both land and personalty. 
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faith controversy as to the construction of a will, subject 
to approval of the probate or circuit court.648 The 
statute provided for the appointment of a guardian ad 
litem to represent unborn and unascertained persons 
with contingent interests. The will involved, which was 
contested on the ground of mental incapacity of the 
testator, bequeathed personal property to a trustee to 
pay the income to the testator's son during his lifetime 
and, upon his death, to transfer the property to the 
then living lawful heirs of the testator. The will directed 
that the son's interest should not be liable for his debts. 
The compromise agreement provided that the property 
covered by the trust should be turned over to the son, 
free of trust. The trustee and the guardian ad litem for 
future contingent interests appealed from a decree ap-
proving the compromise. The decree was reversed on 
the grounds that the trust set up by the will was a 
spendthrift trust under which the beneficiary's interest 
was inalienable by virtue of Section 19 of Chapter 63, 
Revised Statutes of 1846, and that a court of equity has 
no power to terminate a spendthrift trust prematurely. 
The opinion overlooks the facts that the will imposed 
no restraint on voluntary alienation by the son and that 
648 Act 249, P.A. 1921, Comp. Laws (1929) §§15581 to 15584; re-
enacted, Act 288, P.A. 1939, c. 2, §§45 to 48; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§27.3178 
(115-118); Comp. Laws (1948) §§702.45 to 702.48. Sec. 47 provides, 
in part, "such court shall, if such contest or controversy shall appear 
to be in good faith and if the effects of such agreement upon the estates 
and interests of the persons and interests so represented by any 
fiduciary or guardian ad litem and upon any inalienable estate or 
interest shall be found to be just and reasonable, make an order ap-
proving such agreement. . . ." Emphasis supplied. The underlined 
words were in the statute when the compromise involved in the Rose 
case was entered into. Compromise agreements modifying trusts with-
out spendthrift provisions have been approved, even when the modifi-
cation involved acceleration of payments to beneficiaries. Metzner v. 
Newman, 224 Mich. 324, 194 N.W. 1008 (1923); Detroit Trust Co. v. 
Neubauer, 325 Mich. 319, 38 N.W. (2d) 371 (1949). 
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Chapter 63 has no application to trusts of personal prop-
erty. It also fails to distinguish between an attempt to 
terminate prematurely a valid trust and a compromise 
agreement made under the statute where there is real 
question as to whether the will creating the trust is 
valid. If the decision had been based on the unfairness 
of the agreement to the unascertained contingent re-
maindermen, no quarrel could be found with it. It would 
also be justified if based on a finding that the will con-
test was not in good faith but a mere subterfuge for get-
ting rid of the spendthrift trust.649 The opinion as writ-
ten seems unsound and leaves the law on the points 
involved in an unhappily confused state. 
In re Ford's Estate 650 was a proceeding under the 
statute involved in the Rose case for approval of a com-
promise agreement as to the construction of a will. The 
will provided that, on the death of the testator's widow, 
certain assets should be used to create two trusts, one 
for the benefit of each of the testator's sons and the issue 
of such son. It authorized the trustees, in their discre-
tion, to pay $100 a month from income to each son and 
directed them to pay a third of the corpus of his trust 
to each son on reaching 30, a third on reaching 35, and 
the balance on reaching 40. Other paragraphs provided, 
"Should either or both of my sons at any time or times 
develop spendthrift or disorderly habits, my trustees are 
authorized and empowered to withhold from such son 
any part of the income and any part of the distributable 
corpus provided herein directed to be paid to any bene-
ficiary. 
"The trustee shall not be permitted nor authorized to 
649 See Griswold, SPENDTHRIFT TRusTs, 2d ed., §522 (1947). 
65o 331 Mich. 220, 49 N.W. (2d) 154 (1951). The trustees had con-
verted the real property in the estate into personalty before the date 
of the compromise agreement. 
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recognize any assignment of interest or principal herein 
directed to be paid to any beneficiary." 
The testator died in 1942, when his son Milton was 
29 and his son Melvin was 27. Milton died in 1944, 
after his thirtieth birthday. After Melvin reached 35, 
he, Milton's administratrix, guardians for the living chil-
dren of the two sons, and the widow of the testator, 
entered into the compromise agreement, providing for 
immediate distribution of the entire corpus of Milton's 
trust, one-third to his estate and two-thirds to his child, 
immediate distribution of two-thirds of the corpus of 
Melvin's trust to him, the payment of the full income 
of the balance of Melvin's trust to him, and the distribu-
tion of the remaining corpus to him on reaching 40. A 
guardian ad litem for interested persons not in being 
appealed from a judgment approving the compromise 
on the grounds that the will did not authorize any dis-
tribution prior to the death of the testator's widow and 
that immediate distribution would constitute premature 
termination of spendthrift trusts. The judgment was 
affirmed on the ground that the trusts were not spend-
thrift trusts because of the cestuis' interest in principal. 
The decision appears to stand for the proposition that, 
if the cestui has an interest in the principal, spendthrift 
provisions are void, even as to his interest in income. 
Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co.651 was a suit to sur-
charge trustees for breach of trust. Catherine A. Peck 
bequeathed personal propertyvalued at about $415,000 
to the Michigan Trust Company and Percy S. Peck, upon 
trust to pay the income to Percy S. Peck during his life-
est 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W. 744 (1935). The trust consisted exclu-
sively of personalty at the time it was created. The trustees later 
acquired real estate valued at $1,579.68, evidently by foreclosure of a 
mortgage and a land contract. 
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time, remainder as he should by will appoint or, in 
default of appointment, to his issue. The will provided, 
"No person beneficially interested in any legacy or 
devise given by this will to my said Trustee or Trustees 
shall have power to assign, convey, pledge, hypothecate 
or anticipate the payment of any sum or delivery of any 
property which may at any time be or become due or 
payable by way of income or principal, under the terms 
of this will; and if any such assignment, conveyance, 
pledge, hypothecation or other instrument by way of 
anticipation is executed, the same shall be void and of 
no effect, and shall not be recognized by my Trustee 
or Trustees, and it or they shall have power to withhold 
further payment to such person so beneficially interested 
in such legacy or devise, until such assignment, convey-
ance, pledge, hypothecation or other instrument shall 
be withdrawn or canceled, in such manner as shall be 
satisfactory to my said Trustee or Trustees." 
The trustees lent $162,000 of trust funds to Percy S. 
Peck, taking as security mortgages on land valued at 
about twice that amount which he owned individually. 
The children of Percy S. Peck brought this suit in their 
father's lifetime, contending that the loans to him were 
in violation of the spendthrift clause and impaired their 
interests as contingent remaindermen. The court held 
that the transactions in question did not violate the 
spendthrift clause, which the court treated as valid. The 
case is interesting in that it suggests the validity of a 
prohibitory restraint on alienation of a beneficiary's 
right to receive income for life, even though the bene-
ficiary has a power of disposition of the remainder inter-
est in the principal.652 The particular spendthrift clause 
es2 In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948), in-
volved the same trust. Percy S. Peck was adjudicated a bankrupt in 
1935 and his interest under the trust assigned to the plaintiff by his 
trustee in bankruptcy. The court held no interest under the trust, in 
income or principal, passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. 
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is also interesting because it contained a provision for 
forfeiture on alienation as well as a general prohibition 
on alienation.653 
Wyrzykowski v. Budds 654 was a garnishment proceed-
ing against a city to reach instalments of pension due 
the principal defendant, a retired city policeman. The 
pension fund, comprising employer and employee con-
tributions, was established by the city charter, which pro-
vided that pensioners could not assign their rights and 
that pension payments due should not be subject to 
legal process for the debts of the pensioner. The writ 
was served after a check had been drawn in favor of the 
principal defendant but before it had been delivered 
to him. A judgment quashing the writ was affirmed. 
The court thought that the pension payments were gifts 
rather than income payable under a trust, but it sus-
tained the validity of the charter provisions by analogy 
to like provisions of spendthrift trusts. 
It is apparent from the cases that Michigan sustains 
the validity of spendthrift trusts of personal property. 
The precise limits of the spendthrift trust doctrine in 
this state have not yet been set. Whether as a matter 
of policy spendthrift trusts should be allowed, that is, 
whether prohibitions on alienation of equitable interests 
in property should be enforced, is gravely doubtful. As 
Dean Griswold has pointed out, the whole spendthrift 
trust doctrine in this country has probably grown up 
as a result of misunderstanding and confusion.655 Pro-
653 For an example of a discretionary trust, of the type which is used 
in England to serve the purpose of spendthrift trusts, because they 
are invalid there, see Boyer v. Backus, 282 Mich. 593, 276 N.W. 564 
(1937). 
654 324 Mich. 731, 37 N.W. (2d) 686 (1949); accord: Wyrzykowski 
v. City of Hamtramck, 324 Mich. 738, 37 N.W. (2d) 689 (1949). 
655 SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, 2d ed., §§25-32 (1947). 
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fessor John Chipman Gray's classic work on Restraints 
on Alienation 656 is an eloquent attack on the whole doc-
trine, based on history, logic, and policy. No satisfactory 
answer to the arguments against spendthrift trusts ad-
vanced in the Preface to the Second Edition of that work 
has been made. Even if spendthrift trusts are to be 
allowed, there is no adequate reason for the distinctions 
which exist in this state between trusts of land and trusts 
of personal property. Some arguments can be made in 
favor of permitting the settlor of a trust to impose pro-
hibitory restraints on the alienation of the interest of 
the cestui que trust. None can be advanced in favor of 
the Michigan statutes which make the interest of the 
beneficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits 
of land inalienable even though the settlor wishes it to 
be alienable. Those statutes have caused much confu-
sion. Their application to trusts which involve both 
land and personal property raises serious questions. Re-
gardless of the desirability of spendthrift trusts, those 
statutes should be repealed. 
G. CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
As has been seen, although a condition subsequent 
in general restraint of alienation in a conveyance of 
legal title in fee simple to a private person is always 
void,j\57 such a condition in a conveyance of legal title 
in fee simple to a charitable or public corporation is 
valid.658 The same problem can arise as to a conveyance 
sss (1st ed. 1885); (2d ed. 1895). See note 255 supra and Schnebly, 
"Restraints Upon the Alienation of Property," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, §26.100 (1952). 
657 Notes 108, 109 supra; Mand1ebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 
(1874), note 138 supra. 
658 Note 222 supra; County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 
N.W. 801 (1928), note 223 supra; Trustees of the M. J. Clark Memorial 
Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927). 
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to the trustee of a charitable trust. Michigan refused to 
enforce charitable trusts until they were authorized by 
statute in 1907.659 A statute enacted in 1925 provides 
that when land is conveyed to a charitable use, subject 
to such a condition, and it becomes impossible or imprac-
ticable to use the land in the manner specified, the cir-
cuit court may authorize sale of the land free of the con-
dition of forfeiture. 660 It would seem that such con-
ditions in general restraint of alienation are still valid, 
however, and will entitle the grantor to assert a for-
feiture upon alienation other than pursuant to the 
statute. 
H. MORTGAGES AND EXECUTORY LAND CONTRACTS 
The Mediaeval Church did not permit Christians to 
charge interest on a loan of money 661 or on the unpaid 
balance of the purchase price due under a sale on 
credit.662 The Law of Moses prohibited Jews charging 
interest on loans to Jews 1163 but not on loans to Gen-
tiles.664 As the Jews in England were liquidated or ex-
659 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 
3 N.W. 207 (1879); Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 
141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896); Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 
499 (1903); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908); 
McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, US N.W. 985 (1909); Stoepel v. 
Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910); Act 122, P.A. 
1907, note 593 supra; Chapter 15 infra. 
66o Act 258, P.A. 1925; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13518 to 13521; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §§26.12ll to 26.1214; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.401 to 
554.404, quoted in the text at note 224 supra. 
661 O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMic TEACHING 166-193 
(1920). The rule was based on Aristotle's theory of the sterility of 
money and upon LuKE, 6:34, 35 (Authorized Version 1611). 
ss2 O'Brien, AN EssAY ON MEDIAEVAL EcoNoMIC TEACHING 119 (1920). 
Similarly, it was sinful to charge a larger price in a credit sale than in 
a cash sale. Id. at 119, 187-189. 
663 EXODUS, 22:25; LEVITICUS} 25:36, 37; DEUTERONOMY} 23:19 
(Authorized Version 1611). 
664 DEUTERONOMY} 23:20 (Authorized Version 1611). 
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iled under Edward I and Jews were not permitted in 
the country from then until the seventeenth century, 
their exemption from the ban was not a factor in the 
development of the later mediaeval law. Throughout 
the Middle Ages, English law reinforced the prohibi-
tion of canon laW.665 Consequently, one in need could 
borrow money commercially only by means of a subter-
fuge. The needy landowner could make an outright 
sale of an estate for years; the needy merchant could sell 
a share in his business. The doctrine of just price would, 
of course, require such sales to be at that price. 
Security transactions were permissible, so long as the 
lender did not seek interest. One early form was that 
of giving the lender a lease for years with a provision 
that he should have a fee if the loan was not repaid by 
the expiration of the term. 666 A later form was substan-
tially that of the modern mortgage, a conveyance in fee 
simple to the lender, subject to a condition subsequent 
which entitled the borrower to re-enter upon payment 
of the debt, or to a covenant by the lender that he would 
reconvey the fee upon payment of the debt.667 Under 
either form of mortgage the lender took possession im-
mediately upon the execution of the mortgage and held 
it until the debt was paid in full. He was expected, in 
theory, to apply the entire rents and profits in reduc-
tion of the debt. In practice, mortgagees must have 
contrived to make a surreptitious profit out of their pos-
sss LEGES EDw. CoNFEssoRis, c. 37 (1043; re-enacted, 1066; ed. 1840); 
Stat. 15 Edw. III, stat. 1, c. 5 (1341), 1 Statutes of the Realm 296; 
3 Hen. VII, cc. 5, 6 (1487), 2 Statutes of the Realm 514, 515; 8 Holds-
worth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 100-102 (1926). 
6661 Coke, INSTITUTES 217a; 2 Pollock & Maitland, HISTORY oF ENG-
LISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME oF EDWARD I, 25, 117-122 (1895); Turner, 
THE EQUITY OF REDEMPTION 18 (1931). 
667 1 Coke, INsTITUTES 208a-208b; Turner, THE EQUITY OF REDEMP-
TION 18 (1931). 
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session of the mortgaged land, or such transactions would 
not have been as common as they were. In the condition 
type of mortgage in fee, the interest in the land retained 
by the mortgagor was a mere right of entry. In the 
covenant type his retained interest was a pure chose in 
action, a right to sue for specific performance of the cove-
nant. Neither of these interests was alienable,668 and 
neither entitled the mortgagor to possession until the 
debt was paid in full. If the debt was not paid in full 
by the due date, the fee simple title of the mortgagee be-
came absolute, and the mortgagor had nothing. 
As commercial activity increased, the Church relaxed 
slightly in its attitude toward credit transactions, permit-
ting a lender to receive damages if the debt was not paid 
on time, at least if he could show that he suffered loss 
due to the default.669 By the fifteenth century it was 
recognized that inability to take advantage of an oppor-
tunity for a profitable investment constituted such loss. 
As a merchant or trader could always show "loss" of 
this type, it became common to make gratuitous loans 
for very short periods with a provision for payment of 
interest in the form of liquidated damages, to begin on 
the nominal due date of the loan.670 In such a trans-
action neither party expected that the debt would be 
paid on the nominal due date. These ecclesiastical re-
laxations of the prohibition on interest were reflected in 
668 1 Coke, INSTITUTES, 210a; Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 19 
(1931). 
669 O'Brien, AN EssAY oN MEDIAEVAL EcoNOMIC TEACHING 184-187 
(1920). If the penalty for default (poena conventionalis) was stated 
in the instrument evidencing the debt, the creditor could collect it 
without proof of damage; if not, he had the burden of proving injury 
(damnum emergens). The loss usually shown was some calamity which 
necessitated the creditor himself borrowing money. 
67o !d. at 187-193; 8 Holdsworth, HisTORY oF ENGLISH LAw 103 
(1926). Compensation for this type of loss was called "lucrum cessans." 
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an English statute of 1494.671 Nevertheless, neither the 
Mediaeval Church nor the mediaeval law permitted a 
loan of money upon interest which was payable from the 
date of the loan. 
The Protestant Reformation brought a change in at-
titude. Some of the reformers, notably Calvin and Me-
lancthon, approved of interest at fair rates, and it had 
become evident to many that to permit the charging of 
interest at regulated rates was better than to drive bor-
rowers to the use of subterfuges which really entailed 
greater expense to them. A statute of 1545 permitted 
charging up to ten per cent per annum interest on loans, 
including those secured by mortgage on land.612 Some 
Protestant leaders retained the mediaeval attitude to-
ward interest, however, and the statute was repealed in 
1552.678 A statute of 1623 permitted collection of inter-
est at not to exceed eight per cent per annum, 674 and the 
charging of interest has been lawful, so far as the secular 
government is concerned, since then. 
The permission to charge interest made it possible for 
a mortgagee to make a reasonable return on his invest-
ment without taking possession of the land. In the seven-
teenth century it became common for the mortgagee to 
permit the mortgagor to remain in possession until de-
fault. The mortgagor still had no right to possession in 
671 Stat. 11 Hen. VII, c. 8 (1494), 2 Statutes of the Realm 574. 
s12 Stat. 37 Hen. VIII, c. 9, §§3, 4 (1545); 8 Holdsworth, HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 108-109 (1926). 
673 Stat. 5 & 6 Edw. VI, c. 20 (1552). The statute imposed penalties 
of forfeiture of the sum lent, imprisonment, and fine for charging inter-
est. The penalties were removed, where the interest did not exceed 
10%, by 13 Eliz. c. 8, §§2, 5, 9 (1570) and 39 Eliz. c. 18, §§12, 33 (1597), 
but these statutes did not permit collection of the interest. 
674 Stat. 21 Jac. I, c. 17, §2 (1623), made permanent, 3 Car. I, c. 4, 
§5 (1627). The rate was reduced to 6% by 12 Car. II, c. 13, §2 (1660), 
and to 5% by 12 Anne, stat. 2, c. 16, §1 (1713). All statutory restric-
tions on charging interest were repealed by 17-18 Viet. c. 90 (1854). 
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the absence of express agreement.675 So far as the law 
was concerned, the mortgagor in possession was a mere 
tenant at will or for years of the mortgagee.676 At com-
mon law, if the mortgage debt was not paid on the due 
date, the mortgagee became the absolute owner of the 
fee.677 
By default in payment on the due date, the mortgagor 
was likely to lose his land for an inadequate considera-
tion. In the course of the seventeenth century, the High 
Court of Chancery began to grant relief from these for-
feitures, considering that interest was adequate compen-
sation to the mortgagee for delayed payment. The 
mortgagor who had defaulted in payment and so had 
lost all his rights in the land at law was permitted to 
sue in equity for redemption. Upon payment of the 
debt, with interest, the mortgagee would be compelled 
to reconvey the land to the mortgagor.678 The High 
Court of Chancery did not, however, interfere with the 
mortgagee's right to possession pending full redemp-
tion.679 If the mortgage entitled him to possession from 
its date, he retained that right. If it entitled him to take 
possession on default, he could still do so, and could 
keep possession until redemption. The equity of re-
675 Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 88-90 (1931); see Chris-
tophers v. Sparke, 2 Jac. & W. 223 at 234, 37 Eng. Rep. 612 (1820). 
676 Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 91-105 (19lH). 
677 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 205a and Butler's Note 96 to Uth ed. (1787). 
e1s Turner, THE EQUITY oF REDEMPTION 17-42 (1931); Master and 
Fellows of Emanuel College, Cambridge, v. Evans, 1 Chan. Rep. 18, 
21 Eng. Rep. 494 (1625). As a necessary corollary to this creation of 
an equity of redemption without definite limitation in duration, the 
High Court of Chancery developed a correlative remedy for the mort-
gagee who wanted his money. He could sue for foreclosure of the 
equity of redemption, that is, for a decree requiring the debtor to 
pay by a fixed date or lose his equity of redemption through sale of 
the land to satisfy the debt. How v. Vigures, 1 Chan. Rep. 32, 21 
Eng. Rep. 499 (1628). 
679 See Marquis Cholmondeley v. Lord Clinton, 2 Mer. 171, 359, 35 
Eng. Rep. 905, 976 (1817). 
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demption was only a right of the mortgagor to pay the 
debt and recover the land after the due date of the 
mortgage. 
It will be recalled that, at law, the rights of the mort-
gagor under the condition for re-entry or covenant for 
reconveyance were personal and inalienable.680 In Chan-
cery, however, the equity of redemption became an 
equitable estate in land, equivalent in quantity to the 
mortgagor's former legal estate. It was as freely alien-
able 6 s1 and devisable 682 as like legal estates. By the 
eighteenth century, Lord Hardwicke could say: 
"An equity of redemption has always been considered 
as an estate in the land, for it may be devised, granted, 
or entailed with remainders, and such entail and re-
mainders may be barred by a fine and recovery, and there-
fore cannot be considered as a mere right only, but such 
an estate whereof there may be a seisin; the. person 
therefore intitled to the equity of redemption is con-
sidered as the owner of the land, and a mortgage in fee 
is considered as personal assets." 683 
The High Court of Chancery would not countenance 
any provision in a mortgage which would defeat, dog, 
or fetter the equity of redemption. In the words of 
Lord Northington, 
"A mortgagee can never provide at the time of making 
the loan for any event or condition on which the equity 
of redemption shall be discharged, and the conveyance 
absolute. And there is great reason and justice in this 
rule, for necessitous men are not truly speaking, free 
680 Note 668 supra. 
681 Notes 683, 686 infra. It was accessible, in equity, to the creditors 
of the mortgagor. Cole v. Warden, 1 Vern. 410, 23 Eng. Rep. 550 
(1686); Plucknet v. Kirk, 1 Vern. 411, 23 Eng. Rep. 551 (1686). 
682 Cooper v. Cooper, Nelson 153, 21 Eng. Rep. 813 (1689). 
683 Casborne v. Scarfe, 1 Atk. 603 at 605, 26 Eng. Rep. 377 (1737). 
There is similar language in Frederick v. Aynscombe, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 
594, 22 Eng. Rep. 499 (1667-1744). 
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men, but, to answer a present exigency, will submit to 
any terms that the crafty may impose upon them." 684 
From these principles it followed that any provision 
in a mortgage restricting devolution of the equity of 
redemption upon the death of the mortgagor 685 or re-
straining inter vivos alienation by him,686 is void. Even 
a provision giving the mortgagee an option to purchase 
the land for a fair price upon default is unenforcible.687 
As the mortgagee is the legal owner of the land, his 
estate, too, is freely alienable.688 
Most American states now treat the mortgagor as the 
legal owner of the land and the interest of the mortgagee 
as a mere lien. Where this is so, the validity of restraints 
on alienation of the mortgagor's interest is determined 
by the rules applicable to legal estates. Where the equity 
of redemption remains an equitable estate, the Restate-
ment of Property takes the position that restraints on 
its alienation are valid only if a like restraint would be 
valid as to an equivalent legal estate.689 Such cases as 
6 84 Vernon v. Bethell, 2 Eden. 110 at 113, 28 Eng. Rep. 838 (1762). 
Lord Hardwicke stated the rule in similar language in Toomes v. 
Conset, 3 Atk. 261, 26 Eng. Rep. 952 (1745), adding, "and the reason 
is, because it puts the borrower too much in the power of the lender, 
who, being distressed at the time, is too inclinable to submit to any 
terms proposed on the part of the lender." 
s8s Anonymous, 2 Freeman 84, 22 Eng. Rep. 1073 (1681); Ord v. 
Smith, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 600, 22 Eng. Rep. 504 (1725). In the latter 
case the mortgagor's heir was allowed to redeem 26 years after default. 
The rule was otherwise at law. Littleton, TENURES, §337 (1481). 
686 Howard v. Harris, 1 Vern. 190, 23 Eng. Rep. 406 (1683); see 
Floyer v. Lavington, 1 P. Wms. 268, 24 Eng. Rep. 384 (1714). 
687 Willett v. Winnell, 1 Vern. 488, 23 Eng. Rep. 611 (1687); Jen-
nings v. Ward, 2 Vern. 520, 23 Eng. Rep. 935 (1705); Orby v. Trigg, 
9 Mod. 2, 88 Eng. Rep. 276, 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 599, 22 Eng. Rep. 503 
(1722) (pre-emptive option). 
sss Baker v. Kellet, 3 Ch. Rep. 23, 21 Eng. Rep. 717 (1668); Phillips 
v. Vaughan, 1 Vern. 336, 23 Eng. Rep. 504 (1685); Williams v. Spring-
field, 1 Vern. 476, 23 Eng. Rep. 602 (1687). 
689 Section 415 (1944). 
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there are appear to support this proposition.e90 There-
fore, if the equitable estate of the mortgagor is in fee 
simple, every prohibition on alienation or condition in 
general restraint of its alienation is void. 
Before the Statute of U ses,691 legal possessory estates 
in land could not be conveyed without a formal livery 
of seisin. In equity a bargain and sale, that is, an execu-
ted contract of present sale, raised a use in the bar-
gainee. That is to say, although a mere agreement of 
present sale and payment of the purchase price did not 
transfer the legal title, the vendor stood seised to the 
use of the vendee. After the Statute of Uses, this use 
became a legal estate.692 In consequence, after the statute 
the deed of bargain and sale became a common method 
of conveying the legal title to land. 
In later centuries the High Court of Chancery, through 
the device of granting specific performance of executory 
contracts for the sale of land, developed the rights of 
the vendee under such a contract by analogy to the old 
rights of the bargainee under an executed bargain and 
sale. When a contract was entered into, binding the 
vendee to pay the purchase price in the future and the 
vendor to convey upon receipt of the price, the vendee 
became the owner in equity and the vendor a sort of 
trustee of the legal title. Lord Hardwicke stated the 
basis of the doctrine in these words: 
"that which is contracted for valuable consideration to 
be done, will by the court be considered as done; all the 
consequences arising as if it had been so, and as if a 
e9o Goddard, "Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31 
MICH. L. REV. 1 at 6-8 (1932); Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 400 (1850), 
note 136 supra. 
691 Stat. 27 Hen. VIII, c. 10 (1535). 
692 Tyrrel's Case, 2 Dyer 155a, 73 Eng. Rep. 336 (1557). 
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conveyance had been made of the land at the time to 
the vendee." 698 
In holding that the vendee bears the risk of loss by 
fire, Lord Eldon said, 
"for if the party by the contract has become in equity 
the owner of the premises, they are his to all intents 
and purposes. They are vendible as his, chargeable as 
his, capable of being incumbered as his; they may be de-
vised as his; they may be assets; and they would descend 
to his heirs." 694 
As these statements indicate, the rights of the vendee 
under an executory contract for sale of land are not a 
mere chose in action, they are an equitable estate in the 
land of the same duration as the legal estate contracted 
for. This being so, the equitable estate of the vendee is 
freely alienable and his transferee is entitled to spe-
cific performance of the contract against the vendor.695 
As Lord Eldon put it, 
"Being, as I say they were, the owners of the estate 
in equity, they had a right, .... to sell such right, title, 
and interest as they had. . . . It is extremely clear that 
an equitable interest under a contract of purchase, may 
be the subject of sale." 696 
It will be apparent that, as developed by the High 
Court of Chancery, the rights of a vendee under an 
693 Attorney-General v. Day, 1 Ves. Sr. 218 at 220, 27 Eng. Rep. 992 
(1748). 
694 Paine v. Meller, 6 Ves. Jr. 349 at 352, 31 Eng. Ree. 1088 (1801). 
See Capel v. Girdler, 9 Ves. Jr. 509, 32 Eng. Rep. 700 (1804). 
695 Seton v. Slade, 7 Ves. Jr. 265, 32 Eng. Rep. 108 (1802); Wood v. 
Griffith, 1 Swans. 43, 36 Eng. Rep. 291 (1818); Nelthorpe v. Holgate, 
1 Coli. 203, 63 Eng. Rep. 384 (1844); see Dyer v. Pulteney, Barn. C. 
160, 27 Eng. Rep. 596 (1740); Anonymous v. Walford, 4 Russ. 372, 38 
Eng. Rep. 845 (1828). 
696 Wood v. Griffith, note 695 supra, at 1 Swans. 53, 55-56, 36 Eng. 
Rep. 295 (1818). The vendor's interest is also alienable. Turner v. 
Wright, 4 Beav. 40, 49 Eng. Rep. 252 (1841); Hadley v. The London 
Bank of Scotland, Ltd., 3 De G., J. & S. 63, 46 Eng. Rep. 562 (1865). 
EQUITABLE INTERESTS 249 
executory contract for the sale of land were virtually 
identical with those of a mortgagor under the type of 
mortgage which was, in form, an absolute conveyance 
in fee to a mortgagee who covenanted to reconvey upon 
payment of the debt secured. In each case the legal title 
was held as security for a debt and subject to a covenant 
to convey upon payment. In each case the beneficiary 
of the covenant was entitled to specific performance of 
it upon payment and, pending payment, was treated as 
~quitable owner of the land, with full power of aliena-
don inter vivos and by will. In each case the equitable 
owner was not entitled to possession prior to payment 
in full unless the terms of the transaction gave him such 
a right, and, if they did, his possession was merely that 
of a tenant for years or at will, subject to the restrictions 
which apply to such tenancies. In each case equity 
deemed time not to be of the essence and would com-
pel conveyance even though the payment was not made 
on time.~97 The one difference between them was that 
whereas, in the case of a mortgage, the High Court of 
Chancery would never give effect to any provision which 
tended to make time of the essence and so shorten or cut 
off the equity of redemption, in the case of the executory 
land contract, time could be made of the essence by 
express stipulation.698 Inasmuch as the typical English 
executory land contract contemplated a cash sale, so that 
cutting off the vendee's right to performance upon de-
fault in payment deprived him only of the bargain and, 
perhaps, a small deposit, whereas cutting off an equity 
of redemption meant allowing the mortgagee to have 
the land for an inadequate price, this difference is 
understandable and appropriate. 
697 Seton v. Slade, note 695 supra. 
698Jbid. 
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The early Michigan cases treat the mortgage as it was 
treated in England. The mortgagee was entitled to take 
possession of the land upon default and to keep it until 
the mortgagor redeemed, without bringing foreclosure 
proceedings, and equity would not interfere with the 
mortgagee's doing so.699 The mortgagee could maintain 
an action of ejectment immediately upon default, with-
out foreclosing/00 A statute of 1843 changed the situa-
tion as to mortgages of land by providing, 
"That no action of ejectment shall hereafter he main-
tained by a mortgagee or his assigns or representatives, 
for the recovery of the mortgaged premises, until after a 
foreclosure of the mortgage, and the time for redemp-
tion thereof shall have expired." 701 
The Michigan Supreme Court has given the statute a 
very broad interpretation, holding that it prevents the 
mortgagee from taking possession by self-help 70·2 and 
that it invalidates every provision in a mortgage which 
would give the mortgagee a right to possession or the 
rents and profits before foreclosure and the expiration 
699 Stevens v. Brown, Walk. Ch. 41 (Mich. 1842); see Stout v. Keyes, 
2 Dougl. 184 (Mich. 1845). 
1oo Mundy v. Monroe, 1 Mich. 68 (1848), holding Act. 62, P.A. 
1843, unconstitutional insofar as it puported to deprive mortgagees 
under mortgages executed before its effective date of this right. As to 
chattel mortgages the old rule still prevails: the mortgagee may bring 
replevin immediately upon default. Tannahill v. Tuttle, 3 Mich. 104 
(1854). See: Daggett, Bassett & Hills Co. v. McClintock, 56 Mich. 51, 
22 N.W. 105 (1885); Woods v. Gaar, Scott & Co., 93 Mich. 143, 53 
N. W. 14 (1892). 
101 Act 62, P.A. 1843; superseded by Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 108, 
§61, Comp. Laws (1857) §4614; Comp. Laws (1871) §6263; How. Stat. 
§7847; Comp. Laws (1897) §11006; re·enacted, Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 
29, §54, Comp. Laws (1915) §13221; Comp. Laws (1929) §14956; Mich. 
Stat. Ann. §27.1967; Comp. Laws (1948) §629.54, which provides, "No 
action of ejectment shall hereafter be maintained by a mortgagee, or 
his assigns or representatives, for the recovery of the mortgaged 
premises, until the title thereto shall have become absolute upon the 
foreclosure of the mortgage." 
102 Baker v. Pierson, 5 Mich. 456 (1858); Newton v. McKay, M 
Mich. 380 (1874); Albright v. Cobb, 34 Mich. 316 (1876). 
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of the period of redemption allowed therein. 703 Michi-
gan has adopted the view that the mortgagor's interest 
is a legal estate and that of the mortgagee a mere lien.704 
Michigan follows the English rule that the vendee 
under an executory contract for the sale of land 
is the equitable owner of the land.705 A land contract 
does not necessarily entitle the vendee to possession, and 
the act of 1843 has no application to land contracts. 
Therefore, a provision in a land contract which au-
thorizes the vendor to take possession on default is 
valid. 706 In consequence of these differences between 
1oa Hazeltine v. Granger, 44 Mich. 503, 7 N.W. 74 (1880); Nusbaum 
v. Shapero, 249 Mich. 252, 228 N.W. 785 (1930); Equitable Trust 
Co. v. Milton Realty Co., 261 Mich. 571, 246 N.W. 500 {1933); Bankers 
Trust Co. of Detroit v. Russell, 261 Mich. 579, 246 N.W. 504 (1933); 
American Trust Co. v. Michigan Trust Co., 263 Mich. 337, 248 N.W. 
829 (1933); Equitable Trust Co. v. Wetsman, 264 Mich. 26, 242 N.W. 
480 (1933); Lambrecht v. Lee, 264 Mich. 56, 249 N.W. 490 (1933); 
Detroit Trust Co. v. Lipsitz, 264 Mich. 404, 249 N.W. 892 (1933); 
Reserve Loan Life Ins. Co. v. Witt, 264 Mich. 536, 250 N.W. 301 
(1933); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Commercial Realty Co., 265 
Mich. 604, 251 N.W. 786 (1933); but see Michigan Trust Co. v. 
Lansing Lumber Co., 103 Mich. 392, 61 N.W. 668 (1894); Kelly v. 
Bowerman, 113 Mich. 446, 71 N.W. 836 (1897); First National Bank 
of Ionia v. Gillam, 123 Mich. 112, 81 N.W. 979 (1900). Cf. Hogsett v. 
Ellis, 17 Mich. 351 (1868); Wagar v. Stone, 36 Mich. 364 (1877); 
Beecher v. Marquette & Pacific Rolling Mill Co., 40 Mich. 307 (1879); 
Fifth National Bank v. Pierce, 117 Mich. 376, 75 N.W. 1058 (1898); 
Straus v. Barbee, 262 Mich. 113, 247 N.W. 125 (1933); Bennos v. Wader-
low, 291 Mich. 595, 289 N.W. 267 (1939); Lendzion v. Senstock, 300 
Mich. 346, I N.W. (2d) 567 (1942). The rule has been modified by a 
statute which permits a trust mortgage to contain an assignment of 
rents and profits. Act 228, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) §§13498 to 
13499; Mich. Stat. Ann. §§26.1131, 26.1132; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§§554.211, 554.212. There are numerous cases construing the statute. 
704 Dougherty v. Randall, 3 Mich. 581 (1855); Caruthers v. Hum-
phrey, 12 Mich. 270 (1864); See Gorham v. Arnold, 22 Mich. 247 at 
250 (1871). Accord as to chattel mortgage: Randall v. Higbee, 37 Mich. 
40 (1877). But as to the alienability of the interest of a chattel 
mortgagor, see note 455 supra. 
1os Bowen v. Lansing, 129 Mich. 117, 88 N.W. 384 (1901). 
706 Belding v. Meloche, II3 Mich. 223, 71 N.W. 592 (1897); Smith 
v. Sherman, 265 Mich. 590, 251 N.W. 920 (1933); see Lendzion v. 
Senstock, 300 Mich. 346, 1 N.W. (2d) 567 (1942). Cf. Batty v. Snook, 
19 Mich. 231 (1858). 
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the mortgage and the land contract, it is common in 
Michigan to effect credit sales of land by means of execu-
tory land contracts instead of by conveyance to the ven-
dee with purchase money mortgage back to the vendor. 
There is no doubt that the interest of the vendee under 
such a contract is alienable by assignment, subcontract, 
or conveyance in the absence of valid restraints on 
alienation imposed in the contract.707 The extent to 
which such restraints are effective is not so clear. 
Waiver of provisions in land contracts which required 
assignments by the vendee to be made in a particular 
manner or only with the consent of the vendor has been 
found in a number of cases, without definite decision as 
to the validity of the provisions. 708 
Welling v. Strickland 709 was a suit by the original 
vendee for specific performance of a land contract. The 
contract provided that the vendee should not assign the 
contract or sublet the farm or any part thereof without 
the written consent of the vendor, and that any breach 
would work an immediate forfeiture. The vendee sublet 
most of the farm without permission and defaulted in 
payments. The vendor took possession and notified the 
vendee that the contract was forfeited. Specific per-
formance was denied, the opinion suggesting that the 
subletting alone was enough to work a forfeiture. 
101 Brin v. Michalski, 188 Mich. 400, 154 N.W. 110 (1915); Range v. 
Davison, 242 Mich. 73, 218 N.W. 789 (1928). See: Wing v. McDowell, 
Walk. Ch. 175 (Mich. 1843) (mortgage). 
708 Peters v. Canfield, 74 Mich. 498, 42 N.W. 125 (1889); 'Maday v. 
Roth, 160 Mich. 289, 125 N.W. 13 (1910); Henze v. Saunders, 215 
Mich. 646, 184 N.W. 443 (1921); Distasio v. Gervasio, 234 Mich. 482, 
208 N.W. 440 (1926); Mueller v. Bankers Trust Co. of Muskegon, 
262 Mich. 53, 247 N.W. 103 (1933); Whitley v. Tessman, 324 Mich. 215, 
36 N.W. (2d) 724 (1949). Cf. Rathbun v. Herche, 323 Mich. 160, 35 
N.W. (2d) 230 (1948). 
1o9 161 Mich. 235, 126 N.W. 471 (1910). 
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Rodenhouse v. De Golia 710 was a suit to rescind an 
assignment of a land contract. In 1908 Langereis sold 
on land contract to Thomas. In August, 1913, Thomas 
sold to Vreeland by a subcontract providing that the 
vendee might not assign, transfer, lease, or sublet with-
out the consent of the subvendor and for forfeiture on 
breach. Thomas later assigned the subvendor's interest 
under the subcontract to Langereis, the original vendor. 
In 1915 Vreeland assigned the subvendee's interest under 
the subcontract to De Golia, and the latter assigned it 
to Rodenhouse. These assignments were made without 
the consent of Langereis, and he refused to recognize 
them. Rodenhouse then sued De Golia to rescind the 
assignment to him. A decree granting rescission was 
affirmed. 
Cutler v. Lovinger 711 was a suit for specific perform-
ance of a subcontract for sale of land. Milligan sold 
the land to the defendants by a contract providing that 
they could not assign their interest without the consent 
of the vendor. The defendants, without Milligan's con-
sent, contracted to assign their interest to the plaintiff. 
The defendants refused to perform on the ground Milli-
gan would not consent. Milligan testified that he was 
willing to convey to the defendants upon payment of 
the balance due him. A decree for the plaintiff was 
affirmed, the court saying that the defendants could bind 
themselves by a contract to assign their interest even if 
an assignment would not be effective against Milligan. 
This seems obvious. One who owns no interest in land 
at all may bind himself by a contract to convey it. The 
decision demonstrates that a provision against assign-
ment in a land contract will not be enforced as a prohibi-
no 198 Mich. 402, 164 N.W. 488 (1917). 
m 212 Mich. 272, 180 N.W. 462 (1920). 
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tion on alienation in the sense that an attempt by the 
vendee to alienate imposes no obligation upon him what-
ever. 
Hull v. Hostettler 712 was a suit for specific perform-
ance of a contract for exchange of lands. The defendants 
were to assign their interest as vendees under a land con-
tract which contained a covenant against assignment 
without the consent of the vendor but no provision for 
forfeiture on breach. The defendants executed such an 
assignment but refused to complete the rest of the ex-
change. Their vendors intervened to assert a forfeiture 
of the contract for assignment without consent. A de-
cree granting specific performance was affirmed, the 
court holding that such a provision against assignment 
does not prevent assignment and does not give a right 
of forfeiture on breach in the absence of specific pro-
vision therefor. The court implied that the vendors' 
remedy, if any, was by action for breach of covenant. 
This is a clear decision that a provision against assign-
ment in a land contract will not be enforced as a pro-
hibition on alienation. If valid at all, it can only be as a 
penalty restraint. 
Porter v. Barrett 713 was a summary proceeding for pos-
session of land. The plaintiffs sold land to Parent by a 
contract which provided, "This land is sold upon express 
condition that the ... same shall never be sold or rented 
to a colored person." Parent assigned to Barrett with 
the consent of the vendors. Barrett, by separate execu-
tory contract, sold the land to Robinson, a colored per-
son. The plaintiffs asserted a forfeiture for breach of 
the condition. A judgment for the defendants on pro-
712 224 Mich. 365, 194 N.W. 996 (1923). 
713 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925). Also discussed above at note 
158. 
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cedural grounds was affirmed on the ground the condi-
tion was void as an illegal restraint on alienation of an 
estate in fee simple. 
William F. Nance Realty Co. v. Wood-Wardowski 
Co.m was a suit to set aside foreclosure of a land con-
tract and for specific performance. The defendants solcl 
land to Nance by a contract which provided, 
"no assignment or conveyance by the purchaser shall 
create any liability whatsoever against the seller until 
a duplicate thereof duly witnessed and acknowledged, 
together with the residence address of such assignee, 
shall be delivered to the seller and receipt thereof in-
dorsed hereon." 
Nance quit-claimed his interest to the plaintiff cor-
poration, of which he was president, without compliance 
with the quoted provision. There having been default 
in payments, the defendant instituted summary pro-
ceedings against Nance and secured a judgment of resti-
tution. The amounts due were not paid within the 
grace period allowed by the statute authorizing such pro-
ceedings. ns A decree dismissing the bill was affirmed. 
The decision does not enforce a forfeiture for violation 
of the provision against assignment; it merely holds that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to equitable relief from 
forfeiture for default in payments. 
Sloman v. Cutler 716 was an action of assumpsit for 
payments due under a land contract. The plaintiffs, 
114 242 Mich. 110, 218 N.W. 680 (1928). 
m Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 30, §25, as amended by Act 243, P.A. 1917; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §13253; amended, Act 373, P.A. 1927; Comp. Laws 
(1929) §14988; amended, Act 122, P.A. 1933; Mich. Stat. Ann. §27.1999; 
Comp. Laws (1948) §630.25. The grace period was 30 days when this 
case was decided. It was increased to 90 days by the 1933 amendment. 
na 258 Mich. 372, 242 N.W. 735 (1932). Accord: Zeidler v. Bur-
lingame, 260 Mich. 596, 245 N.W. 527 (1932); Windmill Point Land 
Co. v. Jackson, 269 Mich. 50, 256 N.W. 619 (1934). 
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husband and wife, sold land of the husband by a con-
tract providing that the vendee might not assign with-
out the consent of the vendors and for forfeiture on 
breach. The vendee assigned his interest to the defen-
dant who, in consideration of the plaintiff husband's 
consent to the assignment, assumed performance of the 
vendee's obligations. The defendant contended that the 
provision against assignment was a void restraint on 
alienation, and, therefore, that the consent to assign-
ment was not consideration for his undertaking. A judg-
ment for the defendant was reversed, the court holding 
that such a restraint on assignment is valid while the 
contract remains executory as a protection to the ven-
dor's security interest. 
Jankowski v. Jankowski 111 was a suit to restrain sum-
mary proceedings for possession of land. The defendants 
sold land to the plaintiffs Jankowski by a contract which 
provided that the vendees should not assign or convey 
their interest or any part thereof without the consent 
of the vendors and for forfeiture on breach. The plain-
tiffs Jankowski, without the consent of the vendors, sold 
their interest by subcontract to the plaintiffs De Cour-
val and later assigned the head contract to the De Cour-
vals. The vendors declared a forfeiture for breach of 
the nonassignment clause and commenced the summary 
proceedings in question. A decree granting specific per-
formance to the plaintiffs De Courval was affirmed. The 
court repeated the statement made in the opinion in 
Sloman v. Cutler that restrictions on assignment in a 
land contract are valid while the contract remains ex-
ecutory, "for the reason that the seller has a right to 
see that the property is kept in the hands of a respon-
m 311 Mich. 340, 18 N.W. (2d) 848 (1945). 
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sible person," 718 hut held that equitable relief from for-
feiture under the facts of the case was appropriate. 
The opinion in Sloman v. Cutler is the most extended 
discussion which the Michigan Supreme Court has made 
of the validity of provisions in land contracts restraining 
assignment. It was based on an amicus curiae brief pre-
pared by Professor Edwin C. Goddard of the University 
of Michigan Law School, who later published his view 
that such provisions are valid.719 His argument is by 
analogy to the lease for years, pointing out that the land 
contract vendor has an interest similar to that of the 
lessor in preventing waste. Professor Goddard was care-
ful to observe, however, that "most cases hold that when 
the assignee tenders to the vendor full performance of 
the contract the vendor can no longer object," 720 which 
points to the fact that the vendee under a long-term 
executory land contract, like the mortgagor under the 
English decisions, has two distinct interests. One inter-
est is purely legal. It includes his right at common law 
to have possession pending full payment, which is mere-
ly a legal estate for years, and his right to sue the vendor 
at law for damages for breach of contract. This legal 
interest may properly be made subject to strict forfeiture 
on alienation. The other interest, the right to specific 
performance in equity of the vendor's covenant to con-
vey in fee upon full payment, is an equitable fee simple, 
11s !d. at 344. 
719 "Non-Assignment Provisions in Land Contracts," 31 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1-15 (1932). See Grismore, "Effect of a Restriction on Assignment 
in a Contract," 31 MICH. L. REv. 299 at 316-319 (1933). Cf. Cornelius, 
LAw oF LAND CoNTRACTS §§172, 173 (1922). Mr. Cornelius expresses 
understanding of the harshness and inequity of strict enforcement of 
such provisions. It is not solely a problem of logic but of the lives and 
life savings of people of modest means. 
12o 31 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1 at 13 (1932). 
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alienation of which should not be subject to restraint by 
any condition or penalty whatever.721 
An example will demonstrate the inequity of permit-
ting forfeiture of the equitable fee. A professional man 
purchases a home on executory land contract for a total 
price of $20,000, payable in instalments. When he has 
paid $19,000, his health fails and he is unable to pay the 
balance. He assigns his interest to another who immed-
iately tenders payment of the full balance. To allow 
the vendor to forfeit the contract, take back the house, 
and keep the $19,000, would be grossly unfair. If he 
has such rights he is likely to exact a heavy pecuniary 
mulct for his consent to assignment; in effect, to get a 
larger price than that for which he agreed to sell. It 
was to prevent just such exactions that the statute Quia 
Emptores T errarum 722 was enacted. 
The decision in Jankowski v. Jankowski indicates that 
the Michigan Supreme Court appreciates the problem 
and has not forgotten its great decision in Mandlebaum 
v. McDonell. 723 Nevertheless, the field of equitable re-
lief against forfeiture of land contracts will require much 
extension and development before the land contract 
purchaser attains the degree of protection against op-
pression which courts of equity have afforded the mort-
gagor since the seventeenth century. 
121 This is substantially the position taken by the PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT §416 and comment e. 
m 18 Edw. I, stat. 1 (1290); notes 6, 104 supra. 
12a 29 Mich. 78 (1874), note 1lJ8 supra. 
PART TWO 
THE COMMON-LAW RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES 
CHAPTER 9 
Source, Nature and Local Reception 
A. THE ENGLISH BACKGROUND 
EVERY mature system of law which recognizes priv-ate property and permits its alienation has to 
contend with the man of property who seeks to 
found and endow a family by tying up his wealth so 
that his descendants will enjoy it in perpetuity without 
being able to dissipate it. If he is permitted to do so, 
the property involved is perpetually withdrawn from 
commerce and thus is unavailable for purchase by per-
sons who could make better use of it than the descen-
dants of the founder. Those descendants cannot mort-
gage or sell the property to meet urgent current needs 
and may be unable to use the property to their own 
best advantage because they cannot finance improve-
ments by mortgage or by sale of a part. They are dis-
couraged from making even those improvements which 
they can finance by their inability to sell or control 
more than a life interest in the property.1 Moreover, 
the general existence of such perpetuities tends towat:d 
the concentration of the bulk of the community's wealth 
in a few families who constitute a hereditary aristocracy 
of wealth without obligation, and frequently without the 
motive or ability, to use it productively, with the con-
sequent reduction of the rest of the population to a 
1 Scrutton, LAND IN FETTERS, (1886) is an eloquent exposition of the 
evils of such fetters. See also PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, 
Introductory Note (1944). 
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state of poverty and dependence. These disadvantages 
have led most systems of law to place some limitations 
on the creation of "perpetuities" or upon the duration 
of the restraints on alienation which they involve.2 
Part One of this work describes the attempts of Eng-
lish landowners to create perpetuities by two methods, 
the entail and the direct restraint ori alienation. After 
1613 the entail could not be used to create a perpetuity 
because any tenant in tail could convey a fee simple by 
suffering a common recovery, and his power to do so 
could not be restricted by any prohibition, condition, 
or limitation.3 A perpetual prohibition on alienation of 
a fee simple would tend to create a perpetuity worse than 
an unbarrable entail because no tenant could convey 
even an estate for his own life. As has been seen, such 
prohibitions were void after the enactment of the sta-
tute Quia Emptores Terrarum.4 The common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities, which is the subject of Part Two, 
was developed by the English courts to restrict the crea-
tion of perpetuities by a third method, the remote future 
interest. 
2 Butler's Note 77, V (7) to I Coke, INSTITUTES, 13th ed., 19la (1787); 
Strickland v. Strickland, [1908] A.C. 551. In English legal usage, the 
term "perpetuity" originally meant an unbarrable entail. The mean-
ing was later extended to include the perpetual freehold, as to which 
see note 13, infra. In modern legal writing the term usually refers to 
a future interest the vesting of which is postponed to some remote 
time. Sweet, "Perpetuities," 15 L.Q.R. 71-85 (1899). The word has 
sometimes been used to describe a perpetual estate conveyed to an 
ecclesiastical corporation and a perpetually indestructible trust. All 
of these uses of the word involve situations in which the title to 
property is tied up in such a manner as to impede alienation for an 
extended period. 
a Taltarum's Case, Y.B. 12 Edw. IV, Mich., pl. 25 (1472), Part One, 
note 67 supra; Partington's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 35b, 7? Eng. Rep. 976 
(1613), Part One, note 76 supra. 
4 Statute of Westminster III, 18 Edw. I, stat. I (1290); Chapter 3 
supra. 
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The sole freehold future estate known to the common 
law was the remainder.5 A remainder could be created 
only incident to the conveyance to a definite living per-
son of a present possessory estate for life or in tail and 
so as to become possessory immediately upon the expira-
tion of the preceding "particular" estate. Andrew Baker 
could not convey land to John Stiles effective after ten 
years or upon the death of Andrew.6 He could convey 
land to James Thorpe for life or in tail, remainder to 
John Stiles. A remainder could not be limited upon a 
fee simple. Andrew Baker could not convey to James 
Thorpe and his heirs, remainder to John Stiles and his 
heirs.7 A remainder could not be so limited as to cut off a 
5 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §918 (1915). The com-
mon law recognized another type of freehold estate which was expec-
tant as to possession, the reversion. Part One, note 356 supra. The 
reversion was looked upon, however, not as a future estate but as the 
unconveyed residue of a present estate. I Coke, INSTITUTES 22b (1628); 
3 Sheppard, ABRIDGMENT 220 (1675). As tenure existed between the 
reversioner and the tenant of the particular estate, a reversion was a 
present seigniory. Note, R.S.Y.B. 22 Edw. I, p. 641 (1294); 2 Coke, 
INsTITUTES 504 (1641). In any event a reversion cannot offend the 
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities because it is always deemed 
vested, even though expectant upon a particular estate in tail, for life 
or for years on special limitation. 2 Cruise, REAL PROPERTY, 1st Am. 
ed., 457 (1808); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§113-113b, 
205, 283 (1915); 1 Simes, LAW OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §47 (1936); 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment e. (1944). It will be recalled 
that the statute Quia Emptores Terrarum forbade the retention of a 
reversion on a conveyance in fee simple. 2 Cruise Id. 455; Part One, 
note 354 supra. 
6 Hogg v. Cross, Cro. Eliz. 254, 78 Eng. Rep. 510 (1591); Barwick's 
Case, 5 Co. Rep. 93b, 77 Eng. Rep. 199 (1598). 
7 Dean and Chapter of St. Paul's Case, Dyer 33a, 73 Eng. Rep. 73 
(1536); 1 Coke, INSTITUTES 18a (1628); 2 Sheppard, ABRIDGMENT 43, 
3 id. 221, 226 (1675). See: Anonymous, Dyer 3b at 4a, 73 Eng. Rep. 8 
at 9 (1527); Willion v. Berkley, I Plowden 223 at 248, 75 Eng. Rep. 
339 at 379 (1559); Wellock and Hammon's Case, 2 Leon. 114, 74 Eng. 
Rep. 403-404 (1589); Edward Seymour's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 95b at 97b, 
77 Eng. Rep. 1074 (1612); Pills v. Brown, Palm. 131 at 138, 81 Eng. 
Rep. 1012 at 1016 (1620); Pell and Browne's Case, 2 Roll. Rep. 216 at 
220, 81 Eng. Rep. 760 at 763 (1620). But see: Gardner v. Sheldon, 
Vaughan 259 at 269, 124 Eng. Rep. 1064 at 1069 (1670). A remainder 
on a fee simple would not necessarily cut off the preceding estate prior 
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preceding estate prior to its normal expiration. Andrew 
Baker could not convey land to Lucy Baker for life but 
if Lucy remarry, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs.8 
The mediaeval law would not permit a "gap in seisin" 
during which there would be no possessory freehold 
tenant responsible for the feudal duties owed by the 
land to its overlord. Hence a remainder could not be 
so limited as to take effect in possession at some time 
subsequent to the expiration of the preceding estate. 
Andrew Baker could not convey to James Thorpe for 
life, remainder two years after the death of James to 
John Stiles and his heirs.9 
By 1550 it was settled that a remainder could be con-
tingent, that is, subject to a condition precedent which 
might not occur at or before the expiration of the pre-
ceding particular estate?0 Because of the rule against 
to its normal expiration because the fee simple might be on special 
limitation (e.g. to John Stiles and his heirs so long as London Bridge 
shall stand), and even a fee simple absolute may expire upon extinc-
tion of heirs, in which case there is an escheat. 
s Corbet's Case, I Co. Rep. 83b at 86b, 76 Eng. Rep. 187 at 195 
(1600); 3 Sheppard, ABRIDGMENT 223 (I675). See Coithirst v. Bejushin, 
I Plowden 2Ia at 25a, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 at 39 (I550). This is a corol-
lary of the rule that only the grantor or his heirs may take advantage 
of a condition subsequent. I Coke, INsTITUTES 2l4a (I628); Sheppard, 
ToucHSTONE OF CoMMON AssuRANCES I49 (I648). But a remainder 
may follow a particular estate on special limitation (e.g. to Lucy 
Baker during widowhood, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs). 1 
Coke, INSTITUTES 214b (1628). 
s See Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a at I30a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 
at 296 (I595); Archer's Case, I Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 at 
I5I-I57 (1597); Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. I9a at 2Ia, 76 Eng. Rep. 
668 at 674 (I587). This rule led the courts to decide that where land 
was limited to a man for life, remainder to his son, a posthumous son 
could not take because of the gap in seisin between his father's death 
and his birth. The House of Lords held, however, that a posthumous 
son could take in remainder under a will. [Reeve v. Long, I Salk. 227, 
91 Eng. Rep. 202 (1694)] and Stat. IO & 11 Gul. III, c. 16 (I699) pro-
vided that he could do so under an inter vivos conveyance. 
10 Colthirst v. Bejushin, I Plow. Comm. 21, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (1550). A 
contingent remainder required a preceding freehold estate to support 
it; an estate for years would not do. Butler v. Bray, 2 Dyer 189b, 
73 Eng. Rep. 4I8 (1560); Goodright v. Cornish, I Salk. 226, 91 Eng. 
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gaps in seisin, however, such a remainder could never 
take effect unless the condition precedent actually did 
occur at or before the termination of the preceding 
estate. For example, a remainder to a person not in 
being was subject to the condition precedent of the re-
mainderman coming into being and could not take 
effect if he failed to do so at or before the expiration of 
the preceding estate. If Andrew Baker conveyed to 
James Thorpe for life, remainder to the eldest son of 
John Stiles, and James died before John had a son, the 
contingent remainder could never become effective, even 
though John later did have a son.u Moreover, this rule 
operated to destroy a contingent remainder if the pre-
ceding particular estate was extinguished or prematurely 
terminated before the remainder vested, that is, the 
condition precedent occurred. This happened if the 
tenant of the particular estate, whether for life or in 
tail, suffered a common recovery in fee simple, and in 
several other situations.12 If· Andrew Baker conveyed 
to John Stiles for life or in tail, remainder to the eldest 
son of John, John could destroy the contingent re-
Rep. 200 (1694). A vested remainder on a term of years (e.g. Andrew 
Baker to James Thorpe for ten years, remainder to John Stiles and 
his heirs) was valid not as a remainder but as a present estate subject 
to a eossessory term. Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 19a, 76 Eng. Rep. 
668 (1587). 
11 Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597). 
12 Idem.; Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628); 
Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 Wms. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671); 
Pigott, CoMMON REcoVERIES, 2d ed., 125 (1770); 1 Fearne, CONTIN-
GENT REMAINDERS, 5th ed., •465-469 (1795). Any act by which the 
life tenant's estate was destroyed or turned into a mere right of action 
had this effect. There was destruction by forfeiture if the life tenant 
was convicted of treason or felony or made a feoffment or levied a fine 
in fee, and destruction by merger if he acquired the reversion or re-
mainder following the contingent remainder. The life tenant's estate 
was turned into a mere right of action if he was disseized and the dis-
seisor died. 
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mainder by suffering a common recovery before he had 
a son. 
Before the destructibility of contingent remainders was 
settled, attempts were made to create perpetuities by 
means of the "perpetual freehold" or endless series of life 
estates. Andrew Baker might convey land to John Stiles 
for life, remainder to the eldest son of John for life, re-
mainder to the eldest son of John's eldest son for life and 
so on, ad infinitum. If such attempts had succeeded in 
their purpose, the alienability of the fee simple would 
have been restrained forever; none of the successive 
tenants for life could have conveyed more than his life 
estate. They did not succeed. The courts held not 
merely that such contingent remainders were destruc-
tible but that those after the first were void ab initio; 
that a remainder could not be limited to the unborn 
child of an unborn life remainderman.18 The rule so 
established, sometimes called the Old Rule Against Per-
petuities, meant practically that remainders following 
life estates in family settlements must become possessory 
within lives in being plus a period of gestation. 
1s Haddon's Case, cited in Perrot's Case, Moore 368 at 372, 72 Eng 
Rep. 634 at 637 (1594); Whitby v. Mitchell, L.R. 44 Ch. Div. 85 
(1890); 1 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 251, 565 (Butler's 
Note) (1844). See Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a at 138a, 76 Eng. 
Rep. 270 at 320 (1595); Sir Hugh Cholmley's Case, 2 Co. Rep. 50a 
at 51b, 76 Eng. Rep. 527 at 530 (1597); Duke of Marlborough v. Earl 
Godolphin, 1 Eden 404 at 415, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 at 745 (1759). But 
see: Manning and Andrews Case, 1 Leon. 256, 74 Eng. Rep. 234 
(1576). The rule was applied to an equitable contingent remainder 
in In re Nash [1910] 1 Ch. 1. This rule, known variously as the Old 
Rule Against Perpetuities, the Rule Against Double Possibilities, and 
the Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, has been a subject of controversy be-
tween legal scholars, who disagree as to whether it was superseded by 
the modern Rule Against Perpetuities. 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE 
INTERESTS. §486 (1936); Bordwell, "Alienability and Perpetuities V," 
25 IowA L. REv. 1, 16-22 (1939). In any event it has been abolished 
by statute in England [15 Geo. V, c. 20, §161 (1925)] and has not 
been applied in this country. 
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In the latter half of the seventeenth century, convey-
ancers perfected a device, called the strict settlement, 
which proved effective in preventing the destruction of 
contingent remainders.14 When his daughter Lucy mar-
ried John Stiles, Andrew Baker might convey land to 
nominees to the use of John and Lucy for 99 years if 
either should so long live, remainder to the use of trus-
tees for the lives of John and Lucy upon trust to pre-
serve contingent remainders, remainder to the use of 
the unborn children of the marriage in tail. The Sta-
tute of Uses operated to transform the uses of John, 
Lucy, the trustees, and the unborn children into legal 
estates, but it did not execute the trust to preserve 
contingent remainders because it was a use on a use. 
fhe result was that the trustees took a present vested 
estate pur autre vie~ subject to the term of years of John 
and Lucy, with a legal contingent remainder in tail to 
the unborn children.16 As the trustees, not John and 
Lucy, held the particular estate, John and Lucy could 
14 Sir Orlando Bridgman (chief justice of the Court of Common 
Pleas. 1660-1668; lord keeper, 1667-1672) and Sir Geoffrey Palmer have 
usually been credited with inventing the strict settlement. 2 Blackstone, 
CoMMENTARIEs, Cooley's 2d ed., 172 (1872); 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY 
oF ENGLISH LAw 112 (1926); Lord Hardwicke, L.C. in Garthv. Cotton, 
3 Atk. 752 at 753-755, 26 Eng. Rep. 1231 at 1232-1233 (1753). One of 
Bridgman's early forms of strict settlement is reprinted in App. 3 to 
Holdsworth, op. cit., at 547-559. Sir Frederick Pollock has pointed out, 
however, that the essentials of the device were in use a century before 
Bridgman. THE LAND LAws, 3rd ed., 224 (1896). 
1s Another form of strict settlement, which was more questionable, 
was a conveyance to the use of John for life, remainder to the use of 
trustees to preserve contingent remainders for the life of John, re-
mainder to the use of John's unborn children. Logically the remainder 
to the trustees in this case would seem to be contingent and so de-
structible. Nevertheless it was held to be vested and indestructible as 
in the type of settlement described in the text. Duncomb v. Duncomb, 
3 Lev. 437, 83 Eng. Rep. 770 (1697); see Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem. 
Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 (1740). A third form of strict 
settlement, which is clearly valid and more likely to be found in the 
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not destroy the contingent remainder.16 Although the 
trustees, as tenants of tl;le particular estate, had legal 
power to destroy the contingent remainder, anyone who 
took title from them with knowledge of the trust or 
without paying a valuable consideration would be com-
pelled in equity to recreate the contingent remainder.17 
If the trustees conveyed to a bona fide purchaser for 
value, they could be compelled in equity to buy land 
of equal value and convey it to the wronged contingent 
remaindermen.18 Moreover, none of the contingent re-
maindermen could dock the entail during the lifetime 
of either of his parents or during his own minority be-
cause a common recovery could be suffered by a tenant 
in tail only after he was of age 19 and with the cooperation 
of the tenant of the possessory freehold;20 in this case the 
trustees. Andrew Baker's strict settlement could not be 
destroyed until John and Lucy were dead and their child 
who took the first remainder in tail was twenty-one years 
old. If the remainder in tail under a strict settlement 
was to a posthumous child, the settlement might be in-
destructible for lives in being plus a minority and a 
period of gestation. 21 This was the most durable "perpe-
United States than the other two, is a conveyance to the use of 
trustees for the life of John upon trust for John and to preserve con-
tingent remainders, remainder· to the use of John's unborn children. 
See Moody v. Walters, 16 Ves. Jr. 283, 33 Eng. Rep. 992 (I809). 
1s Penhay v. Hurrell, 2 Vern. 370, 23 Eng. Rep. 834 (1702); Park-
hurst v. Smith ex dem. Dormer, 6 Brown 351, 2 Eng. Rep. 1127 
(1740); Garth v. Cotton, 3 Atk. 752, 26 Eng. Rep. 123I (I753). 
11 Pye v. Gorge, I P. Wms. 128, 24 Eng. Rep. 323 (1710), aff'd 
sub nom. Gorges v. Pye, 7 Brown 221, 3 Eng. Rep. I44 (I712); see 
Else v. Osborn, I P. Wms. 387, 24 Eng. Rep. 437 (I717). 
1s Mansell v. Mansell, 2 P. Wms. 678, 24 Eng. Rep. 913 (1732); see 
Tipping v. Piggot, I Eq. Cas. Abr. 385, 21 Eng. Rep. 1120 (1711). 
19 Pigott, CoMMON REcoVERIES, 2d ed., 60 (1770). 
20 Parkhurst v. Smith ex dem. Dormer, 6 Brown 35I, 2 Eng. Rep. 
1127 (1740); Pigott, CoMMON REcovERIES, 2d ed., 28, 41 (I770). 
21 Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 365 
(1897). See Reeve v. Long, I Salk. 227, 91 Eng. Rep. 202 (I694); 
Stat. IO & 11 Gul. III, c. 16 (1699). 
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tuity" which could be created by means of the contingent 
remainder. 
For centuries the ingenuity of English conveyancers 
was devoted to attempts to establish perpetuities by 
creating indestructible future interests in remote unborn 
generations. Some of these failed. Because a tenant for 
years could not suffer a common recovery, an entail of 
a term would be unbarrable. It was held that a term 
of years could not be entailed and that an attempt to 
entail one gave the whole term to the first taker.22 Fu-
ture interests created by way of use executed by the 
Statute of Uses or devise under the Statute of Wills, if 
so limited as to become possessory upon the expiration 
of a preceding estate of freehold, were held to be con-
tingent remainders, destructible as such.28 When the 
fee simple was conveyed to trustees upon trust for an 
equitable tenant in tail, the cestui que trust in tail could 
bar the entail and destroy future interests limited to fol-
low, or in defeasance of, the estate tail by suffering a 
common recovery.24 
Some of the conveyancers' attempts to create inde-
structible future interests in unborn generations suc-
ceeded. Although in strict common-law theory there is 
no such thing as a remainder in personal property, it 
22 Tatton v. Mollineaux, Moore K.B. 809, 72 Eng. Rep. 920 (1610); 
Lovies's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 78a, 77 Eng. Rep. 1043 (1613); Sanders v. 
Cornish, Cro. Car. 230, 79 Eng. Rep. 801 (1631); Grig v. Hopkins, 1 
Sid. 37, 82 Eng. Rep. 955 (1661). 
2s Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 76 Eng. Rep. 270 (1595); 
Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597); Smith v. 
Belay, Cro. Eliz. 630, 78 Eng. Rep. 870 (1597); Purefoy v. Rogers, 2 
Wms. Saund. 380, 85 Eng. Rep. 1181 (1671). 
24 North v. Way, 1 Vern. 13, 23 Eng. Rep. 270, sub nom. North 
v. Williams, 2 Ch. Ca. 63, 78, 22 Eng. Rep. 848, 855 (1681); Brydges 
v. Brydges, 3 Ves. Jr. 120, 30 Eng. Rep. 926 (1796). Similarly a cestui 
que trust in tail could bar his issue by levying a fine as fully as if he 
had the legal estate. Basket v. Pierce, 1 Vern. 226, 23 Eng. Rep. 431 
(1683). 
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was possible by will to limit chattels real or personal to 
one person for life, with future interests following which 
could not be destroyed by the first taker. If Andrew 
Baker devised a term of 500 years to John Stiles for life 
and then to the eldest son of John, John could not de-
stroy the executory interest of the unborn son.25 Fu-
ture interests created by way of use executed by the 
Statute of Uses or devise under the Statute of Wills 
which could not have taken effect as remainders because 
they followed a fee simple, cut off a preceding estate 
prior to its normal expiration, or created a gap in seisin 
were held valid and, if not preceded by an estate tail, 
indestructible by holders of prior interests. If Andrew 
Baker conveyed or devised land "to James Thorpe and 
his heirs but if James die in the lifetime of John Stiles 
then to John and his heirs," James could not destroy 
the executory interest of John.26 Equitable future inter-
ests subject to a trust, whether or not they could take 
effect as remainders, and whether in land or personalty, 
were indestructible by holders of prior equitable inter-
ests not in tail; if Andrew Baker conveyed land to trus-
tees upon trust for John Stiles for life and then for the 
eldest son of John in tail, John could not destroy the 
equitable contingent remainder of his unborn son.27 
The decisions that executory interests and equitable 
25 Matthew Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 
(1609). 
26 Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620); Pigott, 
CoMMON REcovERIES, 2d ed., 127, 134 (1770). 
21 Hopkins v. Hopkins, 1 Atk. 581, 26 Eng. Rep. 365 (1738); At-
torney-General ex rei. University of Cambridge v. Lady Downing, 
Wilm. 1, 97 Eng. Rep. 1 (1767); Astley v. Micklethwait, L.R. 15 Ch. D. 
59 (1880). See: Cole v. Moore, Moore K.B. 806, 72 Eng. Rep. 917 
(1607); Symance v. Tattam, 1 Atk. 613, 26 Eng. Rep. 385 (1737). As 
has been seen, however, an equitable tenant in tail could bar equitable 
remainders following the estate tail, whether vested or contingent, by 
suffering a common recovery. Note 24 supra. 
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future interests were indestructible would have made 
possible the perpetual tying up of land in a family had 
not the English courts, in a long series of cases which 
was not complete until the nineteenth century, created 
the modern common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 28 
The Rule in its developed form, unlike the old restric-
tions on contingent remainders, did not limit the time 
when future interests must become possessory.211 It was 
phrased rather in terms of remoteness of vesting. Every 
indestructible future interest must be so limited that it 
must necessarily vest, if at all, within lives in being 
plus one or more actual periods of gestation, plus an 
actual minority or twenty-one years in gross. Any future 
interest not so limited was void. Andrew Baker could 
convey or devise land to John Stiles for life, remainder 
to the eldest son of John in fee simple, but if such eldest 
son died during his minority then to the eldest son of 
John's eldest son in fee simple. This would be valid 
even though both the eldest son of John (who took a 
contingent remainder) and his eldest son (who took a 
shifting executory interest) were posthumous. Andrew 
Baker could convey or devise land to John Stiles for life, 
then to Lucy Baker for 21 years, then to the oldest living 
descendant of John in being at the expiration of the 21 
years. The Rule permitted some perpetuities which 
2s For detailed historical studies of the development of the modern 
Rule Against Perpetuities see Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 
180-200, 205-217 (1911); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., c. 
5 (1915); 7 Holdsworth, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 215-228 (1926); 
Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§477-489 (1936). PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, Introductory Note and §374, Comment a 
(1944) contain a shorter account of the development. 
29 E.g. if Andrew Baker conveys to Lucy Baker in fee simple but, 
if Lucy die unmarried, to James Thorpe in fee tail, remainder to 
John Stiles in fee simple, the limitation to John Stiles does not 
violate the Rule because it must vest, if at all, on the death of Lucy. 
although it may not become possessory for centuries. Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §206 (1915). 
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were indestructible for slightly longer than the strict 
settlement. Its detailed application will be considered 
in subsequent chapters. 
B. MICHIGAN's RECEPTION OF THE RULE 
The common law of England was received as the law 
of Michigan in the last decade of the eighteenth cen-
tury.80 By this time the modern Rule Against Perpetui-
ties had become part of the English common law, its 
general nature was well understood, and most of its ap-
plications were either settled or forseeable. There is no 
doubt that, in receiving the common law, Michigan re-
ceived the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
By the end of the seventeenth century it had been 
settled that a future interest which must necessarily vest 
within lives in being plus an actual minority plus one 
or more actual periods of gestation did not offend the 
rule.31 It had also been settled that a future interest 
which must necessarily vest within lives in being plus 
one year in gross did not violate the Rule. 32 When Eng-
lish law came to Michigan, the only question relative to 
the permissible period of postponement of vesting under 
the Rule Against Perpetuities which was still undecided 
was that of the maximum allowable number of years in 
gross. Before that numerous dicta had suggested that 
30 Either by Stat. 32 Geo. III (Upper Canada), c. 1, §3 (1792), 
Part One, note 33 supra, or by the Law of the Northwest Territory of 
July 14, 1795, Laws of the Territory of the United States North-West 
of the Ohio, 175, 176 (1796), Part One, note 34 supra. Stout v. Keyes, 
2 Doug. 184 (Mich. 1845); Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); 
Reynolds v. McMullan, 55 Mich. 568, 22 N.W. 41 (1885), Part One, 
note 41 supra. 
:n Taylor v. Biddall, 2 Mod. 289, 86 Eng. Rep. 1078 (1678); Reeve 
v. Long, 1 Salk. 227, 91 Eng. Rep. 202 (1694). 
32 Loyd v. Carew, Prec. Ch. 72, 24 Eng. Rep. 35 (1697); Marks v. 
Marks, 10 Mod. 419, 88 Eng. Rep. 789 (1718). 
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this was twenty-one years.33 Sir William Blackstone in 
his Commentaries) published in 1766 and vastly influ-
ential in America, adopted the same view, 34 and this was 
established as the law of England by a decision in 1833.35 
Such a decision was predictable when Michigan adopted 
the common law, and the rule it announced may be 
considered as part of that law.116 
As has been seen, the modern common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities was developed to prevent the crea-
tion of perpetuities by means of executory interests and 
equitable contingent remainders, both of which. future 
interests were indestructible by the tenant in possession. 
When Michigan received the common law, the English 
courts had not yet decided that the Rule applied to 
legal contingent remainders in land, 37 but it was evi-
33 Massingberd v. Ash, 2 Ch. Rep. 275 at 282-283, 21 Eng. Rep. 677 
at 679 (1685); Goodtitle ex dem. Gurnall v. Wood, Willes 211 at 
213, 125 Eng. Rep. 1136 at 1137 (1740); Duke of Marlborough v. Earl 
Godolphin, I Eden 404 at 418, 28 Eng. Rep. 741 at 746 (1759); Good-
man v. Goodright ex dem. Williams, 2 Burr. 873 at 879, 97 Eng. Rep. 
608 at 611 (1759); Buckworth v. Thirkell, 3 B.&P. 652, note, 127 Eng. 
Rep. 351 at 353 (1785); Jee v. Audley, I Cox 324 at 325, 29 Eng. 
Rep. 1186 at 1187 (1787). 
34 2 Blackstone, CoMMENTARIEs, 1st ed., 174 (1766). As to the influ-
ence of Blackstone in this country, see Cahill, JuDICIAL LEGISLATION 
9 (1952). 
35 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). 
ae PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, Introductory Note, p. 
1441 (1944). 
a1 It had long been assumed that equitable contingent remainders, 
because they were indestructible, were subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, and this was decided in Abbiss v. Burney, 17 Ch. D. 211 
(1881). English writers differed as to whether legal contingent re-
mainders were properly subject to the Rule. Challis, LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 197-200, 213-217 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§284-298 (1915); . 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE 
INTERESTs, §505 (1936). That they are subject to the rule was indi-
cated by several judicial dicta [Cattlin v. Brown, 11 Ha. 372 at 374, 
68 Eng. Rep. 1319 at 1320 (1853); Re Frost, 43 Ch. D. 246 at 254 
(1889)] and definitely decided in Re Ashforth, [1905] I Ch. 535. 
Accord: Whitby v. Von Luedecke, [1906] 1 Ch. 783. Stat. 15 Geo. V, c. 
20, §1 and First Schedule, Part I (1925) transformed all contingent 
remainders into equitable estates, so the question can no longer arise 
in England. 
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dent that the policy underlying the Rule extended to 
contingent remainders which are indestructible. Michi-
gan statutes have made legal contingent remainders in-
destructible by the tenant in possession since 1838.38 
St. Amour v. Rivard 311 was a suit to construe the will 
of a testator who died in 1841. As interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, the will purported to devise life estates 
in land to nine persons with contingent remainders for 
life to the children of the first tenants, remainders for 
life to the children of the children, and so on forever. 
This, then, was an attempt to create a "perpetual free-
hold" or endless series of life estates in successive gene-
rations. As has been seen, the English courts thwarted 
such attempts in the sixteenth century by devising the 
so-called Old Rule Against Perpetuities, the rule that 
a contingent remainder could not be limited to the child 
of an unborn life remainderman.40 The Michigan Court, 
after carefully distinguishing between contingent re-
mainders and executory interests, tracing the develop-
ment in England of the modern common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities through 1833 and noting that it 
was developed primarily to restrict executory interests, 
held the devises void in toto for violation of the modern 
common-law Rule. This decision appears to stand for 
four important propositions: (l) Michigan received the 
ss Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258, §4; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §32; Comp. Laws 
(1857) §2616; Comp. Laws (1871) §4099; Comp. Laws (1897) §8814; 
How. Stat., §5548; Comp. Laws (1915) §11550; Comp. Laws (1929) 
§12952; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.32; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.32. Case 
v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889); Jeffers v. Sydnam, 129 
Mich. 440, 89 N.W. 42 (1902). Chene v. Bank of Michigan, Walk. Ch. 
511 (Mich. 1844) may amount to a decision that a contingent re-
mainder created in 1806 was destructible by the tenant in possession. 
aD 2 Mich. 294 (1852). The language of the will is quoted and 
another aspect of the case discussed in Part One supra at notes 
258-259. 
4o Part Two, note 13 supra. 
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modern Rule Against Perpetuities as part of the com-
mon law of England; (2) The Rule Against Perpetuities 
was received in the completely developed form which 
it attained in England in 1833, not in the rudimentary 
form of some date prior to its complete evolution;41 
(3) The modern Rule Against Perpetuities applies to 
legal contingent remainders;42 and (4) The so-called 
Old Rule Against Perpetuities, that a contingent re-
mainder could not be limited to the child of an unborn 
life remainderman, was never received as law in Michi-
gan.43 
The Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846/' which be-
came effective March 1, 1847, contained a chapter (62) 
on estates in land taken from the New York Revised 
Statutes of 1829.45 This chapter contained a number 
of provisions designed to prevent the creation of unde-
sirable perpetuities by means of future freehold and 
leasehold interests in land. 46 The meaning and applica-
tion of these provisions will be discussed in detail in Part 
Three of this work. For present purposes it is sufficient 
to note that the most important of them provided, in 
41 Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, Div. IV, Part I, Introductory 
Note, p. 1441 (1944). 
42 Accord as to indestructible contingent remainders: PRoPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment b (1944); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE 
INTERESTS, §505 (1936). Legal contingent remainders in Michigan land 
have been indestructible since 1838. Part Two, note 38 supra. 
43 Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment q. (1944); 2 
Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §487 (1936). 
4
' As to the drafting of which see Part One at note 582 supra. 
Chapter 62 differs in several important respects from the equivalent 
New York provisions. 
45 As to the drafting of which see Part One at note 575 supra. 
4s Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 23; Comp. 
Laws (1857) §§2598-2604, 2607; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4081-4087, 4090; 
Comp .. Laws (1897) §§8796-8802, 8805; How. Stat. §§5530-5536, 5539; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §§11532-11538, 11541; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12934-
12940, 12943; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.14-26.20, 26.23; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§554.14-554.20, 554.23. Repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2; 
Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. 
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effect, that every future estate should be void in its 
creation which should suspend the absolute power of 
alienation for a longer period than during the con-
tinuance of two lives in being at the creation of the 
estate.47 This statutory provision differed substantially 
in phraseology, theory, and application from the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities. The common-law 
Rule is phrased in terms of remoteness of vesting; it has 
no application to vested interests and does not prohibit 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation as such. 
The statutory provision, on the other hand, did not in 
terms prohibit remoteness of vesting. 
It is evident that a limitation of a future interest might 
violate the statutory provision although it would not vio-
late the common-law Rule.48 Conversely, although the 
47 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14, 15, 16, note 46 supra. These sections 
read as follows: 
"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its creation, which 
shall suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period 
than is prescribed in this chapter: Such power of alienation is sus-
pended, when there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee 
in possession can be conveyed. 
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be suspended 
by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period than 
during the continuance of two lives in being at the creation of the 
estate, except in the single case mentioned in the next section. 
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior 
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom 
the first remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one 
years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such 
persons may be determined before they attain their full age." 
•s Not only because the permissible period under the statute is 
shorter, but because some limitations which do not suspend vesting 
do suspend the absolute power of alienation. E.g. if Andrew Baker 
declared himself trustee of Blackacre to receive the rents and profits 
and apply them to the use of James Thorpe for life, then to the use 
of Lucy Baker for life, then to the use of John Stiles for life, then to 
the use of the children of John Stiles in fee, no part of the disposition 
would offend the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities because the 
three equitable life estates are presently vested, and the equitable 
contingent remainder to the children of John would necessarily vest, 
if at all, on the death of John, a life in being. The interests of both 
John and his children would, however, suspend the absolute power of 
SOURCE, NATURE AND LOCAL RECEPTION 275 
proposition is not so evident, a limitation which would 
violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities might 
not offend against the statute. If Andrew Baker con-
veyed land "to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as 
the Penobscot Building shall stand and then to John 
Stiles and his heirs," the executory interest of John 
Stiles would violate the common-law Rule because it 
might not vest within lives in being and 21 years, but 
it is arguable that it would not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation at all because James and John to-
gether might at any time convey an indefeasible estate 
in fee simple absolute.49 Chapter 62 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1846 did not expressly abolish the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities, but it has been settled 
that its provisions superseded the common-law Rule as 
alienation for longer than two lives in being because, under New York 
and Michigan law, neither the trustee nor the cestui of a trust for 
receipt of the rents and profits of land can alienate his interest. Part 
One supra, notes 592, 593. 
49 See: Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 
123 N.E. 736 (1919). At common law every unvested future interest 
suspended the absolute power of alienation because unvested future 
interests were inalienable. Part One, note 359 supra. As unvested legal 
future interests have been alienable in Michigan since 1838 (Part 
One, note 371 supra), they do not suspend the absolute power of 
alienation unless limited to unborn or unascertained persons. Torpy 
v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); Russell v. Musson, 240 
Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 
531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). See: Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 
Mich. 281 at 283-4, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 
226 Mich. 72 at 77, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gardner v. City National 
Bank &: Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 287, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, c. B, 1[53. But see: Toms v. Williams, 41 
Mich. 552 at 562, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 
73 N.W. 548 (1898). The limitation described in the text would, 
however, violate another provision of the New York Revised Statutes 
of 1829 (Part II, c. I, Tit. II, Art I, §24) that "a fee may be limited 
on a fee, upon a contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen 
within the period prescribed in this Article." This provision which, 
like the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, prohibits remoteness 
of vesting, was not adopted in Michigan. 
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to transactions regulated by the statutes, so that only the 
statutory provisions need be satisfied.50 
The New York Revised Statutes of 1829 extended the 
statutory provisions against perpetuities to all forms of 
property, real and personal.51 Chapter 62 of the Michi-
gan Revised Statutes of 1846 applied only to interests 
in land, including freehold interests and chattels real. 
In consequence, after March 1, 1847, the validity of 
limitations of future interests in land was governed, so 
far as perpetuity problems were concerned, solely by 
the provisions of Chapter 62 whereas limitations of fu-
ture interests in chattels personal and choses in action 
were, and still are, subject to the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities. 52 When a single limitation of a 
future interest embraced both land and other property, 
regardless of the relative amounts of each, the limitation 
5o Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Rodey 
v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937). But see: Michigan Trust 
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72 at 76-77, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). Accord: 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, 1J3. This problem cannot arise in 
New York because the courts there, in view of the statutory provision 
quoted in the preceding note, which was not adopted in Michigan, 
have held that the statutes prohibit suspension of vesting as well as 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation. Matter of Wilcox, 
194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco 
Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919); PROPERTY REsTATE-
MENT, App., c. A, 1111. Hence any limitation which would offend the 
common-law Rule would also violate the New York statutes. Powell 
and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE oF NEw YoRK CoNCERNING 
PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS 73-75 [New York Legislative 
Document (1936) No. 65 (H)]. 
51. Part II, c. 4, Tit. IV, §§1, 2. There were some slight differences 
between the treatment of interests in land and that of other property. 
52 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 (1879); Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 
533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 
(1888); Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Michigan 
Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Windiate v. 
Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 
Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937); Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 
N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, 
1!5, 50. Cf. Ledyard's Appeal, 51 Mich. 623, 17 N.W. 208 (1883); 
Hopkins v. Crossley, 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903); Moore v. 
O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914). 
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failed unless it conformed to both the statutory pro-
visions and the common-law Rule.68 
Because the Michigan statutes make both the estate of 
the trustee and the interest of the cestui que trust under 
a trust for the receipt of the rents and profits of land 
inalienable,54 every future interest under such a trust 
suspends the absolute power of alienation.55 In 1877 
the Michigan Supreme Court suggested that a trust, as 
such, did not suspend the absolute power of alienation 
if, by its terms, the trustee had discretionary power to 
sell the land constituting the corpus. 56 This suggestion 
58 State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898); Grand 
Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); 
Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 
587 (1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 
(1938) (land valued at $800; personalty at $56,054); De Buck v. Bous-
son, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., c. B, 1152. See: Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 370, 380, 36 
N.W. 419 (1888); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575 at 598, 
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). Cf. Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 562, 
2 N.W. 814 (1879); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 
660 (1917); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90 at 99, 273 N.W. 404 (1937). 
54 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§19, 21; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2649, 
2651; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4132, 4134; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8847, 
8849; How. Stat., §§5581, 5583; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11583, 11585; 
Comp. Laws (1929) §§12985, 12987; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.69, 26.71; 
Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.19, 555.21; quoted in the text, Part One, 
supra at note 580. 
ss Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Foster v. 
Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Otis v. Arntz, 198 
Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 199 Mich. 
630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 
Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 
Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & 
Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards' 
Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938), Chapter 20, Section C, 
infra. Cf. Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 
730, 3 N.W. 207 (1879). A present interest under such a trust also 
suspends the absolute power of alienation, but that is irrelevant to the 
question under discussion because the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities relates only to future interests. 
56 Thatcher v. Wardens & Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann 
Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877). See: Methodist Episcopal Church of 
Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730 at 740, 3 N.W. 207 (1879); Wilson v. 
Odell, 58 Mieh. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Fitzgerald v. City of Big 
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was questioned eleven years later 57 and overruled in 1901 
by a decision that a mere power of sale for reinvestment 
does not prevent a trust of land from suspending the ab-
solute power of alienation.58 It was settled by a number 
of decisions, however, that if the will or other instru-
ment of trust directed the trustee to sell land constitut-
ing the corpus of the trust and reinvest in other types 
of property, the doctrine of equitable conversion ap-
plied and the trust would be treated as one of chattels 
personal, unaffected by the provisions of Chapter 62 of 
the Revised Statutes of 1846.59 It follows that the validity 
of future interests under such a trust would be governed 
by the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.60 
Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., c. B, ~56, note 222. It does not follow that the validity of future 
interests under such a trust would be governed by the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities. The Thatcher case involved the validity 
of a vested legal remainder in fee simple following a trust which was 
to last for two lives and the time necessary to pay the second life 
cestui's expenses of last illness and burial. Records and Briefs, June 
Term 1877, No. 36. 
57 Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). 
58 Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901). Accord: 
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 
(1922); Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923); Gardner 
v. City National Bank 8c Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 
(1934); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938); 
PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, ~56; Chapter 20, Section B (3), 
infra. 
s9 Penny v. Croul, 76 ¥ich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889); Ford v. Ford, 
80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890) (direction to convert Michigan land 
into Missouri land exempted trust from the statutes); Michigan Trust 
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924) (devise to A for 
life, remainder to B as trustee to convert into money worked an 
equitable conversion on the death of A); Gettins v. Grand Rapids 
Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930): Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 
Mich. 626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939); Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 
N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., c. B, ~51; Chapter 
20, Section B (3), infra. See: Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 380, 36 
N.W. 419 (1888); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575 at 599, 
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). Cf. Joseph v. Shaw, 48 Mich. 355, 12 N.W. 
486 (1882). 
eo Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); 
Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). 
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Act No. 38 of the Public Acts of 1949 repealed the 
provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 
relating to perpetuities and suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation and declared: 
"The common law rule known as the rule against 
perpetuities now in force in this state as to personal 
property shall hereafter be applicable to real property 
and estates and other interests therein, whether freehold 
or non-freehold, legal or equitable, by way of trust or 
otherwise, thereby making uniform the rule as to per-
petuities applicable to real and personal property." 61 
This legislation makes it clear that limitations of fu-
ture interests in conveyances or wills becoming effective 
on or after September 23, 1949, are subject to one, and 
only one, rule against perpetuities, the modern common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities developed by the English 
courts between 1609 and 1833 and already in force in 
Michigan as to all limitations made prior to March 1, 
1847. The statute also makes it clear that Michigan 
decisions relative to the application of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities to dispositions of interests in property other 
than land made between 184 7 and 1949 are precedents 
for its application to limitations of interests in land made 
since 1949. 
61. Sec. 1; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (1); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.51. 
Sec. 2 [Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52] 
repealed Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14-20 and 23, Part Two, note 46 supra. 
Sec. 3 [Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (3); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.53] 
provides: "This act applies only to wills with respect to which the 
testator dies after the effective date of this act and to deeds and other 
instruments executed after the effective date of this act." The act 
became effective September 23, 1949. 
CHAPTER 10 
The Period of the Rule 
A. COMMENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD 
T HE RULE Against Perpetuities was developed to restrict the creation of remote future interests which were not destructible by the holder of the 
present interest. The Rule makes void any limitation 
of a future interest unless, at the moment when the inter-
est becomes indestructible, it is certain that it must vest, 
if at all, within the period of the Rule.il2 That period is, 
speaking generally, lives in being and twenty-one years. 
Ordinarily a future interest is indestructible from the 
time of its creation. Consequently the period of the Rule 
is normally computed from the time when the instrument 
creating the interest becomes effective. In the case of 
a deed, this is the time of delivery; in the case of a will, 
the death of the testator.68 If John Stiles transfers prop-
&2 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, 
Comment k. (1944). The meaning of the requirement of certainty of 
vesting will be discussed in the next chapter. 
&s Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §231 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §494 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, 
Comment b. (1944); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 
196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 
267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). A deed delivered in escrow 
does not operate as a conveyance until the occurrence of the condi-
tion of the escrow, but when that condition occurs its effectiveness 
dates back, for some purposes, to the time of the delivery in escrow. 
Sheppard, ToucHSTONE OF CoMMON AssURANCES 58-59 (1648). See: 
Butler and Baker's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 25a at 35b, 76 Eng. Rep. 684 
at 707 (1591). Cf. Avery v. Consumers Power Co., 265 Mich. 696 at 
700, 253 N.W. 189 (1934). The Restatement of Property takes no 
position as to the time from which the permissible period under the 
Rule Against Perpetuities is to be computed in the case of a deed 
delivered in escrow. §374, Comment b, Caveat (1944). 
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erty by deed to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the 
income to John for life, then to pay the income to John's 
youngest son for life, and then to transfer the property 
to the youngest grandson of John, the equitable con-
tingent remainder of the grandson is void under the rule. 
John's youngest grandchild cannot be ascertained until 
the death of the last of John's children which, since John 
may have children after the delivery of the deed to James 
Thorpe, may not occur within lives in being and twenty-
one years.64 The same limitation would, however, be 
valid in a will, because all of John's children must neces-
sarily come into being before the death of John, and 
the youngest of their children will certainly be ascer-
tainable and in being before the death of the last of 
John's children.65 
Future interests limited to follow, or in defeasance 
of, an estate tail are destructible by the tenant in tail.66 
Because of this, the English courts held that contingent 
remainders on estates tail and executory interests limited 
in defeasance of estates tail need not comply with the 
Rule Against Perpetuities.67 Andrew Baker could con-
vey land to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body, re-
mainder to the youngest descendant of John Stiles in 
being at the death of the last descendant of James. Like-
wise, Andrew Baker could convey land to James Thorpe 
64 2 Simes, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS, §494 (1936). 
65 See: Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885). 
66 Capel's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 61b, 76 Eng. Rep. 134 (1593); Benson 
v. Hodson, 1 Mod. 108, 86 Eng. Rep. 768 (1674). 
67 Nicholls v. Sheffield, 2 Bro. C. C. 215, 20 Eng. Rep. 121 (1787): 
Carr v. Earl of Erroll, 6 East 58, 102 Eng. Rep. 1209 (1805); Harrison 
v. Round, 2 De G., M. & G. 190, 42 Eng. Rep. 844 (1852); Portman 
v. Viscount Portman, [1922] 2 A. C. 473 (H.L.); Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§446-449 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FUTURE 
INTERESTS, §517 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment b. 
(1944). It should. be remembered that estates for years and other 
personalty could not be entailed. 
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and the heirs of his body, but if any tenant in tail fail 
to bear the name and arms of the grantor, then to John 
Stiles and his heirs. Michigan abolished estates tail in 
1821,68 but the principle that destructible future inter-
ests are not restricted by the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
although established by cases involving estates tail, is 
not limited to them. 
It is clear from the cases involving estates tail that, if 
a future interest will be destructible at all times until it 
vests, the Rule Against Perpetuities has no application 
to it.69 It would seem, moreover, that if a future interest 
is so limited as to be destructible for a time and then 
indestructible for a time before it vests, the Rule does 
apply to it, but the period of the Rule does not com-
mence until the interest becomes indestructible. 70 In 
jurisdictions where estates tail are permitted, an interest 
which follows an interest limited on or in defeasance of 
an estate tail would fall into this category. Andrew 
Baker might convey land to James Thorpe and the heirs 
of his body, remainder to Lucy Baker and her heirs, but 
if Lucy dies unmarried, to the youngest descendant of 
John Stiles in being at the expiration of the estate tail. 
In such a case the final executory interest would be de-
68 Act. Mar. 2, 1821, 1 Terr. Laws 815, Part One, note 82 supra; 
superseded by Rev. Stat. 1838, p. 258; superseded by Rev. Stat. 1846, 
c. 62, §§3, 4; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2587, 2588; Comp. Laws (1871) 
§§4070, 4071; Comp. Laws (1897) "§§8785, 8786; How Stat., §§5519, 
5520; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11521, 11522; Comp. Laws 
(1929) §§12923, 12924; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.3, 26.4; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §§554.3, 554.4; Part One, note 84 supra. 
69 Part Two, note 67 supra. 
70PRoPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373. (1944); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE 
INTERESTS, §§516, 517 (1936). Contra: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER· 
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §446 (1915). Professor Gray appears to have thought 
that if, in the absence of destructibility, the future interest would be 
void under the Rule, destructibility would not save it unless it was 
certain to vest at or before the termination of the period of destruc-
tibility. No Michigan authority on the point has been found. 
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structible during the continuance of the estate tail but 
indestructible thereafter during the life of Lucy. In all 
jurisdictions, including Michigan, a future interest may 
be destructible because of the existence of an unlimited 
power of appointment or of revocation.71 Andrew Baker 
might transfer property by deed to John Stiles for life, 
remainder to the youngest son of John Stiles for life, 
remainder as John may by will or deed appoint and, in 
default of appointment, to the youngest grandson of 
John. John Stiles might transfer property by deed to 
James Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John 
for life, then to pay the income to the youngest son of 
John for life, then to transfer the property to the young-
est grandson of John, reserving to the settlor an un-
limited power to revoke the trust. 72 In each of these 
examples, in the absence of the power, the period of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities would commence with the 
delivery of the deed and the ultimate remainder to the 
youngest grandson of John Stiles would, accordingly, be 
void. In each example, however, the presence of the 
power enables John Stiles to destroy the ultimate re-
mainder during his lifetime. This being so, it would 
seem that the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
n A power unlimited as to objects is ordinarily referred to as a 
general power. However, as the Michigan statutes confine the term 
"general power" over land to powers to appoint the full fee, it is 
best to avoid use of the term "general power" in Michigan when con-
sidering the question under discussion. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §6; 
Comp. Laws (1857) §2663; Comp. Laws (1871) §4146; Comp. Laws 
(1897) §8861; How. Stat., §5595; Comp. Laws (1915) §11597; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §13000; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.96; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§556.6. 
12 A similar type of destructibility would exist if John Stiles in-
sured his life and designated James Thorpe as beneficiary of the 
policy, upon the trusts described in the text, reserving power to 
change the designation of beneficiary. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, 
Comment e. (1944); Smith, PERSONAL LIFE INsuRANcE TRUSTS, §34.2 
(1950). 
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should be calculated from the death of John Stiles, in 
which case the ultimate remainder to the youngest grand-
son of John would be valid. 78 
It would seem that a future interest is destructible 
for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities only while 
some living person has unlimited and unconditional 
power to vest it in himself for his own exclusive bene-
fit. 74 In jurisdictions where estates tail still exist with 
the incidents they had in seventeenth-century England, a 
tenant in tail has such power over the future interests 
limited to follow, or in defeasance of, the estate tail. 
The holder of such an unlimited power of appointment 
or of revocation as those involved in the examples in 
the preceding paragraph does also. But a future interest 
is not destructible for the purpose under discussion 
merely because some living person may defeat it by 
the exercise of a power of appointment if the power may 
be exercised only by will, 75 if it may be exercised only 
1a PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment c. (1944); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §516 (1936). Another possible situation is 
that of a future interest which is so limited as to be indestructible for 
a period, then destructible for a period, then indestructible again 
for a period before it vests. Andrew Baker might transfer property 
by deed to John Stiles for life, remainder to the youngest son of John 
Stiles for life, remainder as the youngest son of John may, by deed 
or will becoming effective within twenty years after the death of 
John, appoint and, in default of appointment, to the youngest grand-
child of John. In such a case the Restatement takes the position that 
the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities is to be computed from 
the end of the period of destructibility, i.e., twenty years after the 
death of John or upon the earlier death of John's youngest son. §373, 
Comment d. (1944). 
74 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944). Professor 
Simes thinks that it is sufficient if a group of cotenants have jointly, 
as co-owners, such a power, 2 LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §515 (1936). 
75 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944). Cf. 2 Simes, 
LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§516, 538 (1936); 3 Walsh, CoMMENTARIES 
oN THE LAw oF REAL PRoPERTY, §340 (1947). But Rev. Stat. 1846, 
c. 64, §12, Comp. Laws (1857) §2669, Comp. Laws (1871) §4152, Comp. 
Laws (1897) §8867, How. Stat., §5601, Comp. Laws (1915) §11603, 
Comp. Laws (1929) §13006, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.102, Comp. Laws 
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upon performance of a condition precedent, such as the 
payment of money, 76 or if the exercise of the power is 
restricted to objects other than the holder of the power.77 
If Andrew Baker transfers property to John Stiles for 
life, remainder to the youngest son of John for life, re-
mainder as John may by will appoint and, in default 
of appointment, to the youngest grandson of John, the 
ultimate remainder is void under the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. If Andrew Baker transfers property to 
John Stiles for life, remainder to the youngest son of 
John for life, remainder as John may by will or deed 
appoint after paying $1,000 to St. Paul's Cathedral and, 
in default of appointment, to the youngest grandson of 
John, the ultimate remainder is likewise void. The same 
is true if Andrew Baker transfers property to John Stiles 
for life, remainder to the youngest son of John for life, 
remainder to such descendant of John as John may 
appoint and, in default of appointment, to the youngest 
grandson of John. 
A future interest is not destructible for this purpose 
(1948) §556.12, provides: "When a general and beneficial power to 
devise the inheritance, shall be given to a tenant for life or years, such 
tenant shall be deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition, 
within the meaning, and subject to the provisions of the last three 
preceding sections." It would seem that future interests subject to 
such a power are destructible for purposes of the Rule Against Per-
petuities. See Part Two, notes 293, 304, 305, 321 infra. 
76 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Comment e. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw 
oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §518 (1936). An option to purchase would be 
such a power. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 
N.W. 976 (1924) a testatrix devised land to her husband until his 
death or remarriage, "with right to spend the income and so much 
of the principal as he might desire for his support and comfort, and 
with power to sell and give conveyance," remainder to a trustee to 
convert into personalty and hold on trust for successive beneficiaries. 
The Court held that the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities com-
menced at the death of the testatrix rather than at the death of the 
husband. 
11 PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment d. (1944); 2 Simes, LAW 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §516 (1936). 
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merely because its owner is in being and ascertained and 
so can release or convey it. If Andrew Baker conveys 
land "to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the 
Penobscot Building shall stand and then to John Stiles 
and his heirs," the executory interest of John Stiles is 
void under the Rule although John could at any time 
release it to James Thorpe or unite with James to con-
vey an absolute fee simple.78 Neither is a future interest 
destructible for this purpose merely because some living 
person has power to sell the property involved free of 
the future interest if the proceeds of the sale will be 
subject to the future interest. A trustee can defeat fu-
ture interests in the trust property by selling it wrong-
fully to a bona fide purchaser or by selling it rightfully 
for reinvestment purposes under a power conferred by 
the trust instrument or an order of a court of equity, 
but he cannot do so for his own exclusive benefit be-
cause the proceeds of such a sale are subject to the future 
interest in trust/9 Statutes of many jurisdictions, in-
cluding Michigan, so authorize sale of property in which 
future interests exist, free of such interests, on petition 
1s Grey v. Montagu, 2 Eden 205, 28 Eng. Rep. 876 (1764); affd., 
3 Brown 314, 1 Eng. Rep. 1341 (H.L.1770); In re Johnson's Trusts, L.R. 
2 Eq. 716 (1866); In re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. Div. 401 (C.A. 1890); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Comment e. (1944); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FuTuRE INTERESTS, §514 (1936); 3 Walsh, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAw 
OF REAL PROPERTY, §§336 '(1947). Contra: Avern v. Lloyd, L.R. 5 Eq. 
383 (1868) (overruled by In re Hargreaves, supra). 
79 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §518 (1936); Michigan Trust 
Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gettins v. Grand 
Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Gardner v. 
City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270; 255 N.W. 587 (1934). 
so Act 314, P.A. 1915, c. 19, §§62 to 70; Comp. Laws (1915) §§12716 
to 12724; Comp. Laws (1929) §§14404 to 14412; Mich. Stat. Ann., 
§§27.1188 to 27.1196; Comp. Laws (1948) §§619.62 to 619.70. This is 
a reenactment of Act 233, P.A. 1887, as amended, Comp. Laws (1897) 
§§9234 to 9242. See: PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §124, Comment i.; §179, 
note (1936); Garrison v. Hecker, 128 Mich. 539, 87 N.W. 642 (1901); 
Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535, 77 A.L.R. 963 (1931). 
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of the owner of the present interest and judicial order. 
But such statutes provide that the proceeds of the sale 
shall be subject to the future interests, so the owner of 
the present interest does not have unlimited and un-
conditional power to destroy the future interest for his 
own exclusive benefit.81 
The application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to 
future interests which are subject to destruction by the 
exercise of a power of appointment has been touched 
upon. The Rule also applies· to powers of appointment 
themselves and to future interests created by their exer-
cise. In the application of the Rule to future interests 
created by the exercise of a power of appointment, the 
period of the Rule is in some cases computed from the 
effective date of the instrument creating the power and 
in others from the effective date of the instrument exer-
cising the power.82 The commencement of the period 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities in cases involving future 
interests created by the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment will be discussed in a later chapter in connection 
with the application of the Rule to such powers them-
selves.83 
B. COMPUTATION OF THE PERIOD 
In St. Amour v. Rivard 84 the Supreme Court of Mich-
igan held that an attempt to create a "perpetual free-
81 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §519 (1936). Cf. Michigan 
Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). 
82 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §§390-392 (1944); Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§514, 524 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE 
INTERESTS, §§534-539 (1936); 3 Walsh, CoMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY, §§340, 349 (1947). See: Gardner v. City National 
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 285, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). 
ss Chapter 13, Section C, infra. 
84 2 Mich. 294 (1852), discussed above at Part One, notes 258-259 
and Part Two, note 39. Cf. Brush v. Beecher, llO Mich. 597, 68 N.W. 
420, 64 Am. St. Rep. 373 (1896), indicating that an endless series of 
five-year terms, each limited on a condition precedent, would be void. 
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hold" or endless series of life estates in successive genera-
tions was void because it violated the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities. With respect to the period of the 
Rule, the Court said: 
"At first it was held that the contingency upon which 
the estate was to vest must happen within the compass of 
a life or lives in being, or a reasonable number of years; 
afterwards it was further extended to a child en ventre sa 
mere, at the time of the death of the father; subsequently 
it was extended to twenty-one years after the death of a 
person in being. * * * The period of limitation as now 
recognized is that laid down. by Lord Kenyon, in Long 
v. Blackall,85 7 T.R., 102, and is stated in these words: 'It 
is an established rule that an executory devise is good if 
it must necessarily happen within a life or lives in being, 
and twenty-one years and the fraction of another year, 
allowing for the time of gestation.' In an opinion distin-
guished for its learning and careful research, delivered 
by the Judges of England upon questions submitted to 
them by the House of Lords, in 1833, it was considered 
that twenty-one years was the limit, and that the period 
of gestation was to be allowed in those cases only in 
which gestation existed. Cadell v. Palmer}ro 10 Bing., 
140." 87 
Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co.88 was a 
suit to construe a will which created two trusts. The in-
come from each trust was to be paid to a named daughter 
of the testator for life. On the death of each life bene-
ficiary, the corpus of the trust was to be divided into 
equal parts, one for each of her children. Each child was 
ss 101 Eng. Rep. 875 at 877 (1797). 
sG 131 Eng. Rep. 859, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). 
s1 2 Mich. 294 at 297. 
88 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). As the testator died in 
1931 and the trusts included both land and other property, compliance 
with both the statute prohibiting the suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation and the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was 
required. Part Two, note 53 supra. 
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to receive the income from his part until twenty-five, 
then half the corpus, the income from the other half until 
thirty, and then the balance of the corpus. If any child 
died under thirty leaving issue, his share was to pass to 
his issue, subject to trust during minority. If any child 
died under thirty without surviving issue, his share was 
to pass to the trusts for the surviving children of the life 
beneficiary or, if there were none, to the trust for the 
other daughter of the testator. As the testator's daughters 
might have children after his death and the takers of the 
ultimate remainders could not be ascertained until the 
youngest of their children reached the age of thirty, the 
vesting of these remainders might not occur for lives in 
being (those of the two daughters) and thirty years. The 
Court accordingly held that they violated the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities, quoting the following 
from Halsbury's Laws of England as to the period of the 
Rule: 
" 'The rule stated more fully is as follows: 
" 'First, subject to the exceptions hereafter mentioned 
every future estate or interest in any kind of property, 
the rights in which are governed by the law of England, 
must be such that, at the time when the instrument creat-
ing it comes into operation, it can be predicated that, if 
the estate or interest vests at all, it must necessarily vest 
not later than at the end of a certain period. 
" 'Secondly, this period is the life of a person or the 
survivor of any number of persons in being at the time of 
creation of such future estate or interest, and ascertained 
for that purpose by the instrument creating the same, and 
21 years to be computed from the dropping of such life; 
but if no such person or persons are ascertained by the 
instrument, the period is 21 years computed from the 
time of creation of the future estate or interest. 
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" 'In the following paragraphs this period is called 
"the perpetuity period. 
" 'Thirdly, a child who is en ventre sa mere at the time 
of creation of an estate or interest, and is afterwards born 
alive, is deemed to be a person in being for the purposes 
both of the vesting of the estate or interest in him, and 
of being a life chosen to form the perpetuity period. The 
perpetuity period may, therefore, be apparently extended 
by a period or periods for gestation, but only in those 
cases where gestation actually exists. This branch of the 
rule is applied whether it is for the advantage of the 
unborn child or not. * * * 
" 'Fifthly, any estate or interest which does not neces-
sarily satisfy the above rule is void from its creation, and 
events, subsequent to the date of the instrument which, 
or subsequent to the death of the testator whose 'Will, 
created the estate or interest, which in fact make the 
vesting take place within the perpetuity period, have no 
effect so as to make the estate or interest valid.' " 89 
As the passage quoted by our Supreme Court from 
Halsbury's Laws of England indicates, the measuring 
lives in being must be those of persons "ascertained for 
that purpose by the instrument creating" the future in-
terest. This does not mean either that the persons whose 
lives are to be used as a measure must be named in the 
instrument or that the instrument must manifest an 
intention that the lives of particular persons should be 
used for that purpose; it means only that it must appear 
from the instrument that the future interest thereby 
limited must vest, if at all, within twenty-one years after 
ascertainable lives.90 Thus if John Stiles devises property 
to James Thorpe and his heirs "until my youngest grand-
89 267 Mich. 270 at 284-285, quoting from 22 Ha1sbury, LAws OF 
ENGLAND, §641, p. 302 (1912). 
9o PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment j. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §491 (1936). 
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son reaches twenty-one and then to such grandson and his 
heirs," the measuring lives are those of John's children, 
although they are not mentioned in the instrument and 
John may never have heard of the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities. Even if the grantor or testator expressly manifests 
an intention to suspend vesting for a period in excess of 
that permitted by the Rule, a future interest is valid if 
it must vest within the permissible period. If John Stiles 
devises property to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the 
income to John's children during their lives, then to pay 
the income to John's grandchildren until the youngest 
reaches twenty-five, then to transfer the property to the 
youngest grandson, "it being my intention to suspend 
the vesting of the ultimate remainder until twenty-five 
years after the death of the survivor of my children," the 
ultimate remainder will be valid if all of John's children 
predecease him because, in that event, the measuring 
lives in being will be those of John's grandchildren.91 
The measuring lives in being must be those of human 
beings; lives of animals, regardless of their life expect-
ancies/2 or of corporations 93 will not do. Although the 
measuring lives are usually those of persons who take 
something under the instrument creating the future in-
terest or their ancestors, and all of the reported Michigan 
cases involve measurement by the lives of such persons, 
91. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment k. (1944); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §231 (1915). 
92 In re Estate of Kelly, [1932] I.R. 255; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER-
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§228a, 906 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTuRE IN-
TERESTS, §491 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment h. 
(1944). See: Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y. Supp. 598 
(1932); Clark, "Unenforcible Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," 10 MICH L. REv. 31 at 40 (1911). Cf. In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 
552 (1889). 
93 Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
§374, Comment h. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §491 
(1936). 
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the instrument may by apt language designate as meas-
uring lives those of persons who take nothing under it 
and are not related to persons who do.94 John Stiles may 
devise property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until 
the death of the survivor of the present members of the 
Supreme Court of Michigan and then to my youngest 
male descendant living at the time of such death." Al-
though there is no definite limit to the number of meas-
uring lives in being which is permissible, they must be 
the live:s of persons who are not so numerous or so situ-
ated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreason-
ably difficult to obtain.95 John Stiles may devise property 
94 In re Villar, [1928] Ch. 471, aff'd., [1929] 1 Ch. 243 (C.A.); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment l. (1944); Gray, RULE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §216 (1915); 2 Simes, tAW OF FUTURE 
INTERESTS, §491 (1936). 
95 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 
(H.L. 1805). In his opinion in this case, the Lord Chancellor (Lord 
Eldon) made the classic statement of the rule: "The language of all 
the cases is, that property may be so limited as to make it unalienable 
during any number of lives, not exceeding that, to which testimony 
can be applied, to determine, when the survivor of them drops." 11 
Ves. Jr. at 146, 32 Eng. Rep. at 1043. Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUI· 
TIES, 3rd ed., §216 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §491 
(I936). In Cadell v. Palmer, I CI. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (I833), 
twenty-eight lives, and in Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 32I (1908), forty-
odd lives, were held not too numerous, but in In re Moore, [I901] 
I Ch. 936, measurement by the lives of "all persons who shall be 
living at my death" was held to be too indefinite. In re Villar, 
[I928] Ch. 471, affd., [I929] I Ch. 243 (C.A.), involved measure-
ment by the lives of the descendants of Queen Victoria living 
in 1926, of whom there were some 120. It was held valid. Accord: In re 
Khoo Cheng Teow, [1932.] Straits Settlements L.R. 226; In re Lever-
hulme, [1943] 2 All Eng. L.R. 274, 169 L.T. 294. PROPERTY RESTATE-
MENT, §374, Comment l. (1944) takes the position that the lives of 
the descendants of Queen Victoria living in 1941 would be too numer-
ous. Cf. In re Leverhulme, [1943] 2 All Eng. L.R. 274 at 280-281, 
169 L.T. 294 at 298. As the Restatement points out, the obscurity of 
the persons whose lives are involved has a bearing on the difficulty 
of proving their deaths. It is interesting to note that the future 
interests involved in Cadell v. Palmer, supra, created by the will of 
a testator who died in 1818, did not vest until I918. [1928] Ch. 478, 
note. In Hay v. Hay, 3I7 Mich. 370, 26 N.W. (2d) 908 (I947), per-
sonalty was bequeathed to a trustee to pay certain annuities and 
accumulate the rest of the income "for 2I years after the death of 
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to James Thorpe and his heirs "until the death of the 
survivor of my fourteen law partners and then to my 
youngest male descendant living at the time of such 
death." But the executory interest of John's youngest 
living male descendant would be void if he is to be as-
certained on the death of the survivor of "the persons 
listed in the Lansing City Directory on January I, 1954" 
or "those persons who crossed the Ambassador Bridge 
from Detroit to Canada on July 4, 1954," because these 
groups are too large and, in the case of the last example, 
too difficult to identify, to make proof of the deaths in-
cluded reasonably convenient. 
The Rule Against Perpetuities permits suspension of 
vesting until the expiration of a life or lives in being. In 
Palms v. Palms 96 property was bequeathed to trustees to 
pay half the income to the testator's son and half to his 
daughter for life. On the death of either, half the prin-
cipal was to be paid to the children of the deceased child, 
if any. If the child who first died had no surviving issue, 
the entire income was to be paid to the surviving child 
for life and, on his death, the principal was to go to his 
children. As all interests would necessarily vest on the 
my last surviving grandchild that shall be living at the time of my 
death," then to distribute the accumulated fund to the testator's 
heirs to be determined at that time. There were seven grandchildren 
living when the testator died. The bequest was treated as valid. 
1!6 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). This case involved a dis-
position which included both land and personalty and so was subject 
to the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Part Two, note 53 
supra. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 
(1924), a silver tea set was bequeathed to the testatrix's husband for 
life. The will further provided, "The Baker silver tea set shall go· to 
my son Stuart for his use only for his life, at his death it is to go to 
his child or children, if any, if none, to his brother Looe, if living, 
if not to his child or children, if any, and if none, to the said Marie 
Grampp." If Marie and her children were dead on the death of 
Stuart, the set was to go to two other named persons. These pro-
visions were held valid because vesting was not postponed beyond the 
lives of the husband and Stuart. 
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death of the surviving child, it was held that the limita-
tions did not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. In 
McLain v. Howald 97 a bequest to grandchildren of the 
testator to be ascertained on the death or remarriage of 
his wife was held valid. In Floyd v. Smith 98 property was 
bequeathed to a trustee to pay the income to four named 
children of the testator's sister and their issue until the 
death of the survivor of the four, and then to transfer the 
principal to the issue of the four living at the time of 
such death. A codicil transferred the interest of one of 
the four to his children. The Court held that the codicil 
was not intended to change the measuring lives, which 
were those of the four children of the sister and that, as 
the interests would all vest on the death of the survivor 
of these four, they were valid under the Rule. 
The Rule Against Perpetuities permits suspension of 
vesting for part or parts of a life or lives in being at the 
commencement of the period. Thus in Walton v. Tor-
rey 99 a devise to descendants of the testator to be ascer-
tained when the youngest of his children reached twenty-
one was treated as valid. So, likewise, in In re Dingler's 
97 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182, 77 Am. St. Rep. 597 (1899). In 
Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 186 (1880), 
a bequest to a daughter for life, remainder to her children and grand-
children, was treated as valid, it being construed to be to children 
and grandchildren in being at the death of the daughter. 
98 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). Both land and personalty 
were involved but, as the will contained a mandatory direction for 
conversion of land into personalty, the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities was alone applicable. Part Two, notes 59, 60 supra. 
99 Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 1840). The limitation was of land, but, 
as the testator died in 1825, its validity was governed by the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities. Similarly, in Toms v. Williams, 41 
Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879) the vesting of property bequeathed by 
a will was validly suspended until "the expiration of the minority of 
the youngest of the said children of my deceased brother, Gen. Thomas 
Williams." There were three such children, one of whom was of age 
when the testatrix died. 
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Estate 100 a bequest to descendants of the testatrix to be 
ascertained when two granddaughters, who were named 
in the will and alive when it took effect, reached the age 
of thirty, was held good. The Rule also permits suspen-
sion of vesting for lives in being at the commencement 
of the period plus part or parts of a life or lives not then 
in being which cannot exceed twenty-one years. Thus 
in Wilson v. Odell~ 101 a bequest to grandchildren of the 
testator to be determined after the death of the survivor 
of his children and on the majority of his youngest grand-
child was held valid under the Rule. 
The Rule Against Perpetuities does not permit sus-
pension of vesting for lives in being plus part or parts of 
a life or lives not in being which may exceed twenty-one 
years. This is one of the commonest types of violation 
of the Rule. In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker~ u 2 testatrix 
devised land to her husband until death or remarriage, 
then to a trustee to sell the land and hold the proceeds 
in trust to pay half the income to a son, Stuart, for life. 
The will, as construed by the Court, gave the remainder 
in half the corpus, after the death of Stuart, to those 
daughters of Stuart who reached twenty-five and those 
sons of Stuart who reached thirty. It was held that this 
1oo 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). The disposition was 
in a residuary clause which included both land and personalty and 
so was subject to the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Part 
Two, note 53 supra. In Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 255 Mich. 
436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931), a bequest of personalty to issue of a daugh-
ter to be determined when the youngest issue of the daughter in being 
at the death of the testatrix reached twenty-five was treated as valid. 
101 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885). 
102 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). This was a devise of land, 
but the will contained a mandatory direction to convert into money 
upon the death or remarriage of the testatrix's husband. It was held 
that this direction worked an equitable conversion to personalty, 
effective upon the death of the husband, so that the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities governed the validity of the subsequent 
limitations. See Part Two, notes 59, 60 supra. 
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disposition violated the Rule because Stuart might have 
children who would not reach the stipulated ages within 
twenty-one years after his death. In Gettins v. Grand 
Rapids Trust Co.,103 property was bequeathed to a trus-
tee to pay the income to the testatrix's daughter Belle for 
life and thereafter to her children, and to transfer a share 
in the corpus to each child of Belle on reaching twenty-
five, with limitations over in the event of any child dying 
under twenty-five. The limitations over on death under 
twenty-five were held void because they might postpone 
vesting until more than twenty-one years after Belle's 
death. Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co./0' 
which has already been discussed, involved the same type 
of violation of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
As the English authorities quoted by our Supreme 
Court indicate/05 the period of the Rule Against Per-
petuities may include any period or periods of gestation 
involved in the situation to which the limitation applies. 
That is, a child en ventre sa mere who is subsequently 
born alive is treated as a life in being under the Rule, 
1oa 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930). The will contained a man-
datory direction to convert land into personalty. The same result 
was reached on similar facts in Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 
588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932). Because the trust there included both land 
and personalty and there was no direction to convert, the Court based 
its decision on the statute forbidding suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation, saying that it was unnecessary to consider the application 
of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 
104 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), discussed above at Part Two, 
note 88. This aspect of the Rule has been modified in England by 
Stat. 15 Geo. V, c. 20, §163 (1925), which provides that any gift 
contingent upon a beneficiary or class of beneficiaries attaining or not 
attaining an age over twenty-one, and for that reason too remote, 
is to take effect by substituting twenty-one for the age stated. 
W5 St. Amour v. Rivard, 2. Mich. 294 at 297 (1852), quoting from 
Long v. Blackall, 7 T.R. 102, 101 Eng. Rep. 875 at 877 (1797), 
quoted in the text at Part Two, note 87 supra; Gardner v. City 
National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 284, 255 N.W. 587 
(1934), quoting from 22 Halsbury, LAws OF ENGLAND, §601 p. 302 
(1912), quoted in the text at Part Two, note 89 supra. 
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both for the purpose of receiving interests limited to it 
and for that of serving as a measuring life in being as 
to interests limited to others. In Chambers v. Shaw/06 a 
testator devised his estate to his wife for life with a 
provision that if a posthumous child should be born it 
would take half the estate, to commence in possession 
when it reached twenty-one, and that the wife would 
take the other half if she lived until the child was 
twenty-one, otherwise the child would take the whole. 
The testator died in September, 1860, a son was born 
in December, 1860, the son died in April, 1862, and the 
wife died in September, 1862. The Court held that the 
wife took the entire estate as sole heir of her son, saying 
that the first interest to the posthumous son vested on 
the testator's death. This case illustrates both the pur-
poses mentioned. The posthumous son was treated as 
a life in being for the purpose of the vesting of the half 
given him unconditionally and as a measuring life for 
the purpose of the vesting of the other half. It is per-
missible under the Rule to suspend vesting for any num· 
ber of periods of gestation actually involved in addition 
to lives in being and twenty-one years. It is possible to 
have as many as three such periods.107 John Stiles might 
1o6 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883). The will contained a manda-
tory direction to convert the land into personalty so the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities applied. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§30, 31; 
Comp. Laws (1857) §§2614, 2615; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4097, 4098; 
Comp Laws (1897) §§8812, 8813; How. Stat., §§5546, 5547; Comp. 
Laws (1915) §§11548, 11549; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12950, 12951; 
Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.30, 26.31; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.30, 554.31, 
provide: "When a future estate shall be limited to heirs, or issue, or 
children, posthumous children shall be entitled to take, in the same 
manner as if born before the death of their parents. 
"A future estate depending on the contingency of the death of any 
person without heirs or issue, or children, shall be defeated by the 
birth of a posthumous child of such person, capable of taking by 
descent." 
101 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §222 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAw oF FuTuRE INTEREsTs, §492 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, 
Comment p. (1944). 
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devise property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until 
my youngest grandchild is of age and then to my young-
est descendant in being." If John has a posthumous 
child which has a posthumous son who is the father 
of a child en ventre sa mere when he comes of age, the 
unborn child could take the executory interest limited 
to the youngest descendant of John in being. Periods of 
gestation are allowed under the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities only if gestation in fact exists; it is not permissible 
to suspend vesting for lives in being plus twenty-one 
years and nine months in gross.108 If John Stiles devises 
property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until twenty-
one years and nine months after the death of my young-
est child and then to my youngest descendant in being," 
the executory limitation is void although it must neces-
sarily vest within a period which might well be shorter 
than that involved in the preceding illustration. 
As the passage quoted by our Supreme Court from 
Halsbury's Laws of England 109 indicates, the period of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities is the life of a person or 
the survivor of a group of persons in being and ascer-
tained for that purpose by the instrument creating the 
future interest in question and twenty-one years, but if 
no such person or persons are ascertained by the in-
strument, the period is twenty-one years. Whether the 
term of years follpws lives in being or is itself the sole 
measure of the period, it may be in terms of a mi-
nority or minorities, as was the case in Wilson• v. 
1os Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), cited 
with approval in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 at 297 (1852). 
See: Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 284, 
255 N.W. 587 (1934) and authorities cited in the preceding note. 
1o9 Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 
284, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), quoting from 22 Halsbury, LAws OF ENG-
LAND, §601, p. 302 (1912), quoted in the text at Part Two, note 89 
supra. 
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Odell, 110 or a gross period of twenty-one years or less 
unrelated to minorities.111 Toms v. Williams 112 was a 
suit to construe the will of a testatrix who died in 1876 
owning the reversion under a forty-year lease given in 
1854 which required the lessor, at the expiration of the 
term in 1894, to pay for the lessee's improvements (a 
building costing some $50,000) or renew the lease for 
another forty years. The will gave the entire estate, in-
cluding personalty, to trustees who were to accumulate 
$5,000 per year of the income, use it to pay for the 
lessee's improvements in 1894, and then to transfer the 
corpus of the trust to three named persons "or the sur-
vivor of them, and to their heirs and assigns forever, as 
tenants in common." The Court held that the provision 
for accumulation for eighteen years did not exceed the 
period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, 
which the Court said was "any number of lives in being 
and twenty-one years, and of course for twenty-one years 
as a distinct period, independent of lives." 113 In Mark-
ham v. Hufford,114 testatrix bequeathed $500 to the pe-
titioner "to be paid to him at the expiration of two 
years from the date of my demise: Provided that he shall 
be deemed a reformed man, in the judgment of the 
executors of this will," otherwise to the Women's Chris-
110 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885), Part Two, note 101 supra. 
111 Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), cited 
with approval in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 at 297 (1852) and 
Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 571, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §223 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §493 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Com. 
ment m. (1944). . 
112 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). The surplus income above 
$5,000 per annum was to be accumulated until the expiration of the 
minority of the youngest of the three named persons and then paid 
over to them or the survivor of them. One of them was of age when 
the testatrix died. 
m 41 Mich. 552 at 571. 
n4 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222, 48 L.R.A. 580 (1900). 
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tian Temperance Union. It was held that this was a 
condition precedent which suspended vesting for only 
two years in gross and so was valid. In re De Rancourt's 
Estate 115 involved a bequest to a trustee to pay the 
income to the testator's heirs for fifteen years and then 
to transfer the corpus to the heirs of the testator deter-
mined according to the statute then in force. It was 
treated as valid. 
It will be recalled that if lives in being are to be used 
as all or part of the measure of the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, they must be the lives of persons 
ascertained for that purpose by the instrument creating 
the future interest; courts will not select lives not desig-
nated by the instrument or connected with its limita-
tions. As to the twenty-one year period, the Rule is 
not quite so strict. Thus if Andrew Baker devises prop-
erty to James Thorpe and his heirs "for the lives of 
James and all of his descendants living at the time of 
my death and for such period thereafter as the law per-
mits suspension of vesting and then to the youngest liv-
ing descendant of John Stiles" the words "such period 
thereafter as the law permits" are construed to mean 
twenty-one years, and the future interest of the young-
est descendant of John Stiles is, accordingly, valid.116 
11s 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891, 110 A.L.R. 1346 (1937). Both 
land and personalty were involved. In Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 
164 N.W. 498 (1917), land and personalty were devised to descendants 
of the testator to be ascertained twenty-five years after his death. The 
disposition was held void as violating the statute prohibiting suspen-
sion of the absolute power of alienation. Of course, it also violated 
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. 
us Pownall v. Graham, 33 Beav. 242, 55 Eng. Rep. 360 (1863); 
Fitchie v. Brown, 211 U.S. 321 (1908); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUI· 
TIES, 3rd ed., §§219, 219b (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, 
§495 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment n. and Illustra-
tion 4 (1944). In West Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Matlock, 212 S.W. 
937 (Tex. Com. App. 1919), "a reasonable time" was construed to 
mean twenty-one years. 
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The computation of the permissible period under the 
Rule Against Perpetuities may involve one, two, or all 
of the three elements, lives in being, periods of gesta-
tion, and twenty-one years. When more than one of 
these elements is involved in a situation, a period of 
gestation may precede or follow either or both of the 
others. Thus, as has been seen, if John Stiles devises 
property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until my 
youngest grandchild is of age and then to my youngest 
descendant in being at that time," a period of gestation 
may precede the measuring life in being of John's child, 
a second period of gestation may follow the life and pre-
cede the minority of the grandchild, and a third period 
of gestation may follow that minority. The element of 
twenty-one years, however, although it may follow lives 
in being, may not precede them, because the only per-
missible lives in being are lives in being at the com-
mencement of the period of the Rule.111 If John Stiles 
devises property to James Thorpe and his heirs "until 
the death of all of my descendants living twenty-one 
years after my death and then to my youngest descendant 
living at that time," the executory interest is void. John 
may have descendants in being twenty-one years after 
his death who were not in being when he died. 
Even though an instrument in terms suspends the 
vesting of a future interest until the happening of an 
event which may not occur within the period of the 
Rule, the interest is not void if it could not vest beyond 
the period, because the duration of the estate out of 
which it is created is limited. If Andrew Baker, ownirig 
an estate in Blackacre for the lives of Thomas Kempe, 
Roger White and Edward Willis, conveys his estate "to 
111 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment e. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §493 (1936). 
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James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot 
Building shall stand and then to John Stiles and his 
heirs," the executory interest of John Stiles is valid be-
cause it cannot vest after the death of the survivor of 
Thomas Kempe, Roger White, and Edward Willis.118 
This is probably an exception to the rule that the meas-
uring lives must be ascertained by the instrument creat-
ing the future interest. 
If an instrument postpones the vesting of a future 
interest until the happening of both of two conditions, 
one of which must occur within the period of the Rule 
and the other of which may not so occur, the future 
interest is void. If John Stiles devises property to James 
Thorpe and his heirs "for thirty years and until my 
children are all dead and then to my youngest descen-
dant living at that time," the future interest is in-
valid.119 If, on the other hand, the instrument postpones 
vesting only until the happening of that one of two 
alternative conditions which first occurs, the fact that 
one of the conditions might not be performed within 
the period of the Rule will not invalidate the future 
interest. In re Lamb's Estate 120 involved a will which 
left the estate to nine brothers and sisters of the textatrix 
and provided: 
"But in case of the death of any of the above-named 
legatees previous to the probating or execution of this, 
11s Low v. Burron, 3 P. Wms. 262, 24 Eng. Rep. 1055 (1734); Gray, 
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§225, 226 (1915); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment k. (1944). If the estate conveyed is one 
for the lives of ascertained living persons, it cannot violate the Rule 
because it cannot vest after the death of the survivor of those persons. 
119 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §374, Comment g. and Illustration 7 
(1944). 
120 122 Mich. 239, 80 N.W. 1081 (1899). Both land and personalty 
were involved. Cf. Calkins v. Smith, 41 Mich. 409, 1 N.W. 1048 
(1879); Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905). 
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my last will and testament, then I desire, will and be-
queath that the share of such deceased brother or sister 
shall revert to, and become the property of, the children 
of said deceased legatee; but, if said deceased legatee 
has no children living at the time of my decease, then 
the said deceased legatee's share of the property be-
queathed to him or her by the terms of this will shall 
revert to, and become a part of, the general fund to be 
divided among the surviving legatees named in this will." 
One of the brothers assigned his interest under the 
will and died before the estate of the testatrix was ready 
for distribution. The Court held that "execution" 
meant distribution and that the children of the brother, 
not his assignee, were entitled to the share which would 
have been his. This was a sound result because, al-
though distribution might not occur within the period 
of the Rule,121 the gift over would necessarily vest, if at 
all, on the death of the survivor of the brothers and 
sisters. 
121 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §374, Comment f. (1944). But see: Brandenburgh v. Thorn-
dike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 (1885); Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 
299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893). 
CHAPTER 11 
The Requirement ofCertaintyofVesting 
A. CERTAINTY 
T O SATISFY the Rule Against Perpetuities, a fu-ture interest must be so limited that at the com-mencement of the period of the Rule,122 it is cer-
tain that the interest must vest, if at all, within the period. 
This does not mean that the interest must be certain to 
vest; if it did a future interest could not be limited to an 
unborn person. What it does mean is that there must be 
certainty that the interest cannot vest at some time be-
yond the period of the Rule.128 If Andrew Baker con-
veys property to John Stiles, who has no children, for 
life, remainder to the eldest son of John, the contingent 
remainder may never vest because John may not have a 
son. But the remainder will either vest or fail at the 
death of John, so it is valid under the Rule.124 
The time when the certainty must exist is that of the 
commencement of the period of the Rule. Events which 
occur before the commencement of the period are con-
sidered in determining the validity of a limitation.125 If 
1.22 As to which see Chapter 10, §A, supra. 
12a Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 180 (1911); Simes, 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS 370 (1951). 
124 See, e.g., Stevens v. Wildey, 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937). 
12s Vanderp1ank v. King, 3 Hare 1 at 17, 67 Eng. Rep. 273 at 
279-280 (1843); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §231 
(1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §494 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment m., §374, Comment k. (1944). In 
Mullreed v. Clark, llO Mich. 229 at 233, 68 N.W. 138 (1896) the 
Court quoted the cited section of Gray with approval and applied the 
rule stated to a disposition governed by the statute prohibiting sus 
pension of the absolute power of alienation. 
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John Stiles devises property to James Thorpe on trust 
to pay the income to John's children for life, then to 
their children until the youngest reaches twenty-five, 
and then to transfer the principal to John's grandchil-
dren living at that time, the disposition of the principal 
is invalid if John has children living at the time of his 
death.1 z6 If, however, John's children predecease him, 
that fact is considered in applying the rule and the limi-
tation of the principal is good. Events which occur after 
the commencement of the period of the Rule are rrot 
considered in determining the validity of a limitation.121 
In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker,tzs textatrix devised land 
to her husband until death or remarriage, then to a 
trustee to sell the land and hold the proceeds in trust 
to pay half the income to a son, Stuart, for life. The will, 
as construed by the Court, gave the remainder in half 
the corpus, after the death of Stuart, to those daughters 
of Stuart who reached twenty-five and those sons of 
Stuart who reached thirty, but if none did so to testa-
trix's son Looe and his children. Testatrix died in 1913, 
1zs Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 
(1924); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 
703 (1930); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 
270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), discussed above at Part Two, notes 88, 
102-104. 
121 Viscount Dungannon v. Smith, 12 Cl. & F. 546, 8 Eng. Rep. 
1523 (1846); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §370, Comment k. (1944). Contra: Story v. First Na-
tional Bank & Trust Co., 115 Fla. 436, 156 So. 101 (1934); PENNA. 
STAT. ANN., Tit. 20, §301.4 (1950). Merchants National Bank v. Curtis, 
98 N.H. 225, 97 A. (2d) 207 (1953); Mass. Gen. Laws, c. 184 A (1954). 
There is an exception in the case of future interests created by the exer-
cise of powers of appointment. Chapter 13, Section C, infra. The rqle 
stated in the text has been criticized. Sweet, "The Monstrous Regiment 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities," 18 JuRID. REv. 132 at 157-158 (1906); 
Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 HARv. L. REv. 721 at 728-730 
(1952); Leach, "Perpetuities Legislation, Massachusetts Style," 67 
HARV. L. REV. 1349 (1954). See: Simes, "Is the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities Doomed? The 'Wait and See' Doctrine," 52 MICH. L. REv. 
179 (1953). 
12s 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). 
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and Stuart died in 1915 without issue. The court held 
the disposition of the corpus void because, at the time of 
the testatrix's death, it was possible that Stuart might 
have children, saying: 
"The court must be able to say, to avoid the rule, that 
to a certainty the estate will vest within 21 years after 
the death of Stuart and Looe, and this vesting must be 
found to have been discernible at the date of the death 
of the testatrix. At that time Stuart and Looe were both 
living but had no children. Certainty as to time the 
estate will vest must be apparent unaided by events sub-
subsequent to the date the will became operative." 129 
The certainty of vesting required by the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is absolute certainty; a high degree of prob-
ability is not enough. If, at the commencement of the 
period, any combination of future events which would 
postpone vesting beyond the period is possible, the fu-
ture interest is void, although the actual occurrence of 
that combination of events is highly unlikely.130 If John 
Stiles devises property "to my brother Henry for life, 
remainder to my brother Henry's widow for life, re-
mainder to the oldest male descendant of my brother 
Henry living at the death of his widow" the ultimate 
remainder is void even though, when John dies, his 
brother Henry is eighty and has a wife the same age.181 
129 226 Mich. 72 at 77. Cf. Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 
N.W. 7 (1894), holding that the fact that testator's widow elected to 
take against the will could not be considered in determining the 
validity of a disposition under the statute forbidding suspension of 
the absolute power of alienation. 
180 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, 
Comment k. (1944). · 
m Hodson v. Ball, 14 Sim. 558, 60 Eng. Rep. 474 (1845); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Com-
ment k. (1944). In Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 
(1894), land was devised upon trust for two sons, their wives and 
children, for the lives of the sons and their wives, then to the children 
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Henry's present wife may die and he may marry a woman 
who was not in being at the death of John. In that event 
vesting would be postponed until the end of a life not 
in being at the commencement of the period. It is un-
likely that Henry will marry a woman more than eighty 
years younger than himself, but he may possibly do so. 
Provisions in wills postponing distribution until some 
administrative step, such as probating the will, paying 
debts, completion of administration, winding up of a 
business or sale of property, is taken are frequent causes 
of difficulty. Whenever possible, such provisions are con-
strued to postpone only enjoyment, not vesting.132 In 
Skinner v. Taft,133 a direction in a will that the executors 
transfer property to four named persons and their heirs 
and assigns, "after the payment of my just debts and 
funeral expenses" and upon the termination of a trust 
which was to terminate "five years from the date of the 
probating of my will in the County of which I may die 
and their heirs and assigns. The trust was held invalid for violation 
of the statute prohibiting suspension· of the absolute power of aliena-
tion, but the Court thought that the reference to the sons' wives was 
to wives living at the testator's death. So construed, the trust would 
not violate the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities. Conover v. 
Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900), involved a conveyance 
of land upon trust for William for life, then for his wife and children 
for her life, remainder to the children. The Court held that, under 
the language of the deed in question, "children" meant those children 
living at the death of William so that their interests vested indefeas-
ibly at his death. With this construction, the remainder would not 
have violated the common-law Rule. Another provision of the in-
strument limited interests to persons to be determined on the death 
of William's wife if he had no children. If the word "wife" included 
anyone whom William might marry after the date of the conveyance, 
these provisions would have violated the common-law Rule. 
132 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §374, Comment f. (1944). See: Fitzgerald v. City of Big 
Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900) (payment of debts and 
other legacies); McGraw v. McGraw; 176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 1910) (pay-
ment of debts). Cf. De Buck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 
(1940). 
133 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905). Cf. In re Mallory's Estate, 
127 Mich. 119, 86 N.W. 541, 89 N.W. 348 (1901). 
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a resident," was treated as valid, presumably on the 
theory that the interests vested at the death of the testa-
or and only enjoyment was postponed. If such a pro-
vision does postpone vesting until the taking of some 
administrative action, such as probating the will, which 
may not occur within twenty-one years, the interests so 
postponed are void, even though that action would 
normally be completed well within the permissible 
period.134 Thus in Battelle v. Parks/85 it was suggested 
that land could not be devised beneficially to the adminis-
trator of the testator's estate, because it is uncertain when 
an administrator will be appointed. It should be recalled, 
however, that if vesting is postponed only until the hap-
pening of that one of two alternative conditions which 
1s4 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTuRE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); Note, 87 MICH. 
L. REv. 814 (1939); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment f. (1944). 
But see: Brandenburgh v. Thorndike, 139 Mass. 102, 28 N.E. 575 
(1885); Belfield v. Booth, 63 Conn. 299, 27 Atl. 585 (1893). In re 
Wood, [1894] 3 Ch. 381 (C.A.), involved a bequest to issue of the 
testator living when his gravel pits should be exhausted. Although 
the pits would have been exhausted in four years after the testator's 
death if worked at the usual rate and they were in fact exhausted in 
six years, the bequest was held void because the pits might not have 
been exhausted within twenty-one years. In re Bewick, [1911] 1 Ch. 
116, involved a devise to trustees to pay off a £1000 mortgage from 
income and then to convey to the testator's issue living when the 
mortgage was paid. Although the normal income was sufficient to 
pay off the mortgage in five years, the interest of the issue was held 
void because the income might possibly decrease, thus preventing 
paying off the mortgage within twenty-one years. The rule that post-
ponement of vesting until probate or administration violates the Rule 
Against Perpetuities is criticized in Leach and Tudor, "The Common 
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.23 
(1952). 
1s5 2 Mich. 531 (1853). The case involved the statute prohibiting 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation, which allowed no 
period in gross, but the problem can arise under the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities. Cf. Thatcher v. Wardens &: Vestrymen of 
St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877), where the 
Court assumed that a direction to pay the expenses of the last illness 
and funeral of a life cestui could suspend the absolute power of 
alienation. The facts are not stated in the official report but are set 
out in Records &: Briefs, June Term, 1877, # 36. 
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first occurs, the fact that one of the conditions might 
not be performed within the period of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, will not invalidate the interest in question. 
In re Lamb's Estate 136 involved a will which left the 
estate to nine brothers and sisters of the testatrix and 
provided that if any legatee should die before the estate 
was ready for distribution his share should pass to his 
children. The shifting executory interests were properly 
treated as valid because they would necessarily vest, if 
at all, on the deaths of the legatees. Similarly, in Schiffer 
v. Brenton,131 a provision in a will that if any legatee con-
tested it his interest would shift to the other legatees was 
held valid. A contest by a named legatee would neces-
sarily be commenced during his lifetime. 
For the purpose of determining certainty of vesting 
under the Rule Against Perpetuities, every human being 
is treated as being capable of having children, regardless 
of age or physical condition.138 This is a conclusive pre-
sumption of law which cannot be rebutted by evidence 
that the person is incapable of having children.189 If 
1SG122 Mich. 239, 80 N.W. 1081 (1899), Part Two, note 120 supra. 
137 247 Mich. 512, 226 N.W. 253 (1929). Cf. Fitzgerald v. City 
of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900), where a gift to 
named legatees in the event the city refused to accept a bequest for 
library purposes was treated as valid. This was much more question-
able than the provisions in Schiffer v. Brenton as the life of the city 
could not be a measuring life under the Rule. In Moss v. Axford, 
246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929), a bequest of the residue to the 
executor, "with the instructions to pay the same to the person who 
has given me the best care in my declining years and who in his 
opinion is the most worthy of my said property," was held valid. 
If the discretionary power to select the legatee was confined to the 
named executor, the legacy would necessarily vest, if at all, during 
the life of the executor. 
138 Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); Gray, 
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §215 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §497 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §377 (1944); 
Annotations, 67 A.L.R. 539 (1929); 146 A.L.R. 794 (1943). Contra: 
Exham v. Beamish [1939] I.R. 336. 
ta9 Although irrebuttable for purposes of determining the validity 
of future interests under the Rule Against Perpetuities, there is 
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John Stiles devises property to "my mother for life, re-
mainder to her children for their lives, remainder to her 
youngest grandchild living at the death of the survivor 
of her children," the ultimate remainder is void even if 
John's mother is ninety-eight years old at the time of 
his death.140 An English court has even suggested that a 
child is conclusively presumed to be capable of having 
children before reaching the age of five years.141 Unless 
the word "children" as used in the limitation includes 
adopted children, 142 the conclusive presumption of law 
that all persons are capable of having children through-
out their lives sometimes requires the treatment as pos-
sible that which is factually impossible. For this reason 
the presumption has,been criticized.148 It does have the 
virtue of increasing the certainty of the law of property 
English and some American authority for permitting the presump-
tion of possibility of issue to be rebutted in suits to terminate trusts 
where the only non-consenting beneficiaries are the unborn children 
of a person who, because of age, disease, or surgery is in fact incapable 
of having children. Leng v. Hodges, Jacobs 585, 37 Eng. Rep. 971 
(1822); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., 191n (1915); TRUSTS 
RESTATEMENT, §340, Comment e. (1935); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§274 (1940). 
uo Ward v. Van der Loeff, [1924] A.C. 653. In this country, if the 
context permits, the word "children" in such a limitation [i.e., to 
the children of a person whom the testator knows to be beyond the 
age of child-bearing] tends to be construed to mean children living 
at the time of the testator's death. Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 
Atl. 188 (1925); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Marble, 316 Mass. 294, 
55 N.E. (2d) 446 (1944); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §377, Comment c. 
(1944). Such a construction would make the limitation valid. 
141 Re Gaite's Will Trusts, [1949] 1 All E.R. 459 at 460. The dis-
position in question was held valid, however, on the ground that, be-
cause English law does not permit a child under five to marry, such 
a child could not have legitimate issue. 
1 42 A limitation to the children of a named person ordinarily does 
not include adopted children except where an intent to include them 
is found from additional language or circumstances. Russell v. Mus-
son, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§287 (1940). Some modern adoption statutes may alter this rule. 
E.g., REv. STAT. Mo. (1949) §453.090. 
143 E.g., Leach, "Perpetuities in Perspective," 65 HARV. L. REv. 721 
at 731-734 (1952). 
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by making it possible to ascertain the validity of limita-
tions of future interests without awaiting the settlement 
by litigation of doubtful questions of fact. 144 At any 
rate, Michigan follows the presumption. In Gettins v. 
Grana Rapids Trust Co.,145 property was bequeathed to 
a trustee to pay the income to the testatrix's daughter 
Belle for life, and then to her children and to transfer 
a share in the corpus to each child of Belle on reaching 
twenty-five, with limitations over in the event of any 
child dying under twenty-five. Although Belle was fifty-
two and childless, the provisions as to the limitations 
over were held void because they might postpone vest-
ing until more than twenty-one years after her death, 
the Court saying that Belle must be considered as cap-
able of having issue as long as she lived. 
B. THE CONCEPT OF VESTING IN ENGLISH LAW 
As has been seen, at the time of its reception in this 
country, English law permitted the creation in persons 
other than the grantor or testator of three types of fu-
ture interests 146 in property, remainders, 147 interessia 
144 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §497 (1936). 
145 249 Mich. 238, 288 N.W. 703 (1930). The case involved a devise 
of land with a mandatory direction to convert to personalty so the 
common-law Rule applied Accord under the statute prohibiting sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation: Rozell v. Rozell, 217 
Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922) (man aged 44). See: Van Gallow v. 
Brandt, 168 Mich. 642 at 647, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912) (woman aged 
68; suggestion that it would make no difference if she were 100) . 
. 146 Professor Simes defines a future interest as "an interest in land 
or other things in which the privilege of possession or of enjoyment 
is future and not present." 1 LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §1 (1936). 
For more extended discussions of the rules of vesting in Anglo-Ameri-
can law see Simes, ld., §§64-158; Fearne, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS, 
lOth ed. (1844); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§99-ll8, 
970-974 (1915); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§157, 158 and comments 
(1936); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§275-279 (1950); Simes, 
"Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §§4.33-
4.36, 4.53-4.58 (1952). 
147 Part One, notes 351, 352, 358, 359, 363; Part Two, notes 5-21 
supra. 
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termini,148 and executory interests.149 At common law 
a remainder is a future freehold estate in land so limited 
as to become possessory immediately upon the termina-
tion of a preceding estate for life or in tail created by 
the same conveyance or will.150 A remainder is contin-
148 Part One, notes 355, 359, 363, supra. An interesse termini is a 
legal estate for years in land, limited to an ascertained living person, 
to commence on a fixed future date. If Andrew Baker on January 
1, 1954, leases land to John Stiles for a term of forty years, to com-
mence July 1, 1990, the interest of John is an interesse termini. Such 
an interest is not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. Mann, 
Crossman & Paulin, Ltd. v. Registrar of Land Registry, [1918] 
1 Ch. 202; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§117, 320n 
(1915). See: Smith v. Day, 2 M. & W. 684, 150 Eng. Rep. 931 (1837); 
Gillard v. Cheshire Lines Committee, 32 W.R. 943 (C.A. 1884); Red-
ington v. Browne, 32 L.R. (Ir.) 347 at 356 (1893); Knight v. City of 
London Brewery Co., (1912] 1 K.B. 10; Challis, LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 472-473 (1911). At common law, prior to the 
statutes of Uses and Wills, an estate for years could not be limited to 
commence on the happening of an event uncertain to occur. Green 
v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 216, 78 Eng. Rep. 472 (1591). Hence, a limi-
tation of a term of years or an interest therein to an unborn or un· 
ascertained person or contingent upon an uncertain event is not an 
interesse termini but an executory interest, to which the Rule Against 
Perpetuities does apply. Redington v. Browne, 32 L.R. (Ir.) 347 
(1893); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §320n. (1915); 2 
Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §498 (1936). 
1 49 Part One, notes 355, 359, 363; Part Two, notes 23, 25, 26, supra. 
1 5o Part Two, supra, at notes 6-21. Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 
lOth ed., 3-4 [Butler's Note (c)] (1844); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER· 
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §8 (1915); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §156 (1936); 
Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, 
§4.25 (1952). A freehold estate limited unconditionally to an ascer-
tained living person, to follow an estate for years, whenever and how-
ever the estate for years terminates, although frequently referred to as 
a remainder, is technic;tlly a present estate subject to a term. If 
Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for forty years, remainder 
to John Stiles and his heirs, John takes a present estate in fee simple 
which is vested and not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 19a, 76 Eng. Rep. 668 (1587); Smith ex 
dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135, 26 Eng. Rep. 881 (1742); 
DeGrey v. Richardson, 3 Atk. 469, 26 Eng. Rep. 1069 (1747); Smith, 
EXECUTORY INTERESTS, ed. 1844, §§253, 760; Challis, LAW OF REAL 
PRoPERTY, 3rd ed., 80, 99 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 
3rd ed., §§8, 970n (1915); 1 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §62 
(1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §156, Comment e. (1936). This is 
true even though the estate for years is subject to a special limitation. 
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for forty years if the 
Penobscot Building so long stands, remainder to John Stiles and his 
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gent (not vested) if it is subject to a condition precedent 
which may not occur at or before the expiration of the 
preceding particular estate.151 If Andrew Baker conveys 
land to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John Stiles 
if John marries Lucy Baker, the remainder is contingent 
until John marries Lucy. A remainder is vested if it is 
not subject to any condition precedent except the termi-
nation of the preceding estate.152 This being so, a re-
heirs, John takes a present estate in fee simple which is, of course, 
vested. If, however, a freehold estate is limited to cut off or follow a 
term of years only if an uncertain event occurs, it is an executory 
interest. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for forty 
years but, if the Penobscot Building falls at or before the expiration 
of the term, to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest limited to John 
is an executory future interest which is void because it may not vest 
within the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Gore v. Gore, 2 P. 
Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722); Smith, EXECUTORY INTERESTS, ed. 
1844, §§121-124; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§58, 59 
(1915); 1 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§62, 155 (1936); PROPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, §156, Comment e. (1936); Simes, "Types of Future 
Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§4.31, 4.55 (1952). See: 
Green v. Edwards, Cro. Eliz. 216, 150 Eng. Rep. 472 (1591). 
tst Beverley v. Beverley, 2 Vern. 131, 23 Eng. Rep. 692 (1690); 
Festing v. Allen, 12 Mees. & W. 279, 152 Eng. Rep. 1204 (1843); 
Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 5-9 and Butler's Note (g) 
(1844); Digby, HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 266 
(1897); Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 75, 128 (1911); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§9, 101 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw OF 
FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§68, 69 (1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 
1 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §4.36 (1952). See: Smith ex dem. 
Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135 at 139, 26 Eng. Rep. 881 at 883 (H.L. 
1742). So a remainder is contingent even though limited on a con-
dition which must occur, such as the death of a person or the coming 
of a fixed future date, if the condition is not certain to occur at or 
before the termination of the preceding estate, whenever and however 
that termination may occur. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James 
Thorpe for life, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs if Lucy Baker 
dies, the remainder is contingent. Lucy must necessarily die, but she 
may not die at or before the termination of the life estate. Colthirst 
v. Bejushin, 1 Plow. Comm. 21, 75 Eng. Rep. 33 (1550); Beverley v. 
Beverley, supra. 
1s2 Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (1616); Lux-
ford v. Cheeke, 3 Lev. 125, 83 Eng. Rep. 611 (1683); Digby, HISTORY 
OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 265 (1897); Challis, LAW OF 
REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 146 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 
3rd ed., §970 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §67 (1936). 
This is so only if the remainder, throughout its continuance, will take 
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mainder may be vested although it is not presently pos-
sessory and may never become so.153 If Andrew Baker 
conveys land to Roger White for life, remainder to Lucy 
Baker for life, remainder to James Thorpe in tail, re-
mainder to John Stilesin fee simple, all three remainders 
are vested because none is subject to any condition 
precedent except the termination of the preceding estate 
or estates. This is so as to Lucy Baker's life estate al-
though it will never become possessory unless she sur-
vives James Thorpe.154 As the Rule Against Perpetuities 
prohibits only remoteness of vesting, not remoteness of 
possession, the remainder to John Stiles is valid under 
the Rule although it will not become possessory until 
the last lineal descendant of James Thorpe dies, which 
effect on the termination of the preceding estate, whenever and how-
ever such termination occurs. If the remainder is conditional upon the 
preceding estate terminating in a particular manner, it is contingent. 
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for life, remainder to 
John Stiles and his heirs, the remainder is vested. If Andrew Baker 
conveys land to James Thorpe for life, remainder if, but only if, 
the life estate terminates by the death of James, to John Stiles and 
his heirs, the remainder is contingent because the life estate may 
terminate in some other manner than the death of James, as by for-
feature or surrender. Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 5 and 
Butler's Note (d) (1844). 
1sa Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 216 (1844); Digby, 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 265 (1897); Challis, 
LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 74, 127, 146 (1911); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §102 (1915); Simes, "Types of Future 
Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). See: Smith 
ex dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135 at 138, 26 Eng. Rep. 881 at 
883 (H.L. 1742). 
1~>4 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUmES, 3rd ed., §102 (1915); 1 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 72 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§157, Comment f., Special Note, Comment p., Ill. 11 (1936); 2 Powell, 
LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §274 (1950); Simes, "Types of Future Inter-
ests," 1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). See: Webb v. Hear-
ing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (1616); Boreton v. Nicholls, 
Cro. Car. 363, 79 Eng. Rep. 917 (1634); Badger v. Lloyd, 1 Salk. 232, 
91 Eng. Rep. 206 (1696); Croxall v. Shererd, 5 Wall. 268 at 287-288 
(1866). Lucy's life estate would be vested even if Roger's preceding 
life estate were on special limitation, e.g., "to Roger White for life 
if he shall so long remain in the Ready Reserve, remainder to Lucy 
Baker for life." 
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may occur at a time beyond the period of the Rule.155 
Similarly, if Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker, 
now unmarried and childless, for life, remainder to the 
eldest child of Lucy for life, remainder to John Stiles in 
fee simple, the estate of John Stiles is both vested and 
valid although it may not become possessory until the 
end of a life not now in being and follows in time a 
remainder which is contingent.156 
At common law a remainder limited to a person not 
in being or not presently ascertainable is contingent be-
cause it is subject to the condition precedent of the re-
mainderman coming into being or becoming ascertain-
able.157 If Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker, 
now unmarried and childless, for life, remainder to the 
eldest child of Lucy, the remainder is contingent. So, 
where the Rule in Shelley's Case has been abolished, if 
155 Webb v. Hearing, Cro. Jac. 415, 79 Eng. Rep. 355 (1616); Udal 
v. Udal, Aleyn 81, 82 Eng. Rep. 926 (1648); Fearne, CoNTINGENT 
REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 223 (1844); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 
3rd ed., §111 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 72 
(1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). See: Badger v. Lloyd, 1 Salk. 232, 91 Eng. 
Rep. 206 (1696). John's remainder in fee simple would be vested 
even if James' preceding estate tail were on special limitation, e.g., 
"to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body so long as they bear 
the name and arms of Baker, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs." 
.t5s Udal v. Udal, Aleyn 81, 82 Eng. Rep. 926 (1648); Fearne, 
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 223 (1844); 1 Simes, LAw OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 73 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157, 
Comment f. (1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests,'' 1 AMERICAN 
LAW oF PROPERTY, §4.33 (1952). See: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUI-
TIES, 3rd ed., §117a (1915). Cf. the rule stated in Part Two, note 
161 infra, that every interest subsequent to an executory interest is 
itself executory. 
mKent v. Harpool, 1 Vent. 306, 86 Eng. Rep. 197 (1678); Fearne, 
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth Ed., 9 (1844); Challis, LAw oF REAL 
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 131 (1911}; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd 
ed., §9 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§69, 82 (1936); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157, Comments u., v. (1936); §370, Com-
ment i. (1944); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §278 (1950). See: 
Smith ex dem. Dormer v. Packhurst, 3 Atk. 135 at 139, 26 Eng. Rep. 
881 at 883 (H.L. 1742). 
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Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for life, re-
mainder to the heirs of Lucy in fee simple, the re-
mainder is contingent until the death of Lucy because 
her heirs will not be ascertainable until then.158 Simi-
larly, if Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles, who 
now has ten children, for life, remainder to that child 
of John's who takes the most care of John in his last 
illness, the remainder is contingent until the death of 
John because the remainderman cannot be ascertained 
until then.159 
A remainder may be vested although it is subject to 
being defeated by the exercise of a power of appointment 
or by the operation of a condition subsequent, a special 
limitation, or an executory limitation.160 If Andrew 
Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder 
15s Challoner and Bowyer's Case, 2 Leon. 70, 74 Eng. Ree. 366 
(1587); Archer's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 66b, 76 Eng. Rep. 146 (1597); 
Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 9 (1844); Challis, LAw OF 
REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 75, 131 (1911); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER· 
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §109 (1915); 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§§69, 83 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157, Comment u., Ill. 26 
(1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §§4.2, 4.25 (1952). See: Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 
H.L.C. 1 at 81, 10 Eng. Rep. 359 at 392 (1853). However, a remainder 
to the "heirs" of a living person is vested if the word "heirs" is not 
used in its technical sense but as a designation of presently ascertain-
able existing persons, such as presently living children or the persons 
who would be heirs if the ancestor died presently. Darbison ex dem. 
Long v. Beaumont, 1 P. Wms. 229, 24 Eng. Rep. 366 (1713), aff'd., 
3 Brown 60, 1 Eng. Rep, 1177 (1714); Goodright ex dem. Brooking 
v. White, 2 Wm. Bl. 1010, 96 Eng. Rep. 593 (1775). 
159 Biggot v. Smyth, Cro. Car. 102, 79 Eng. Rep. 691 (1628); Quarm 
v. Quarm, [1892] I Q.B. 184 (C.A.); Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 
3rd ed., 131 (1911); 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §82 (1936). 
1so Cunningham v. Moody, 1 Ves. Sen. 174, 27 Eng. Rep. 965 
(1748); Doe ex dem. Willis v. Martin, 4 T.R. 39, 100 Eng. Rep. 882 
(1790); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 226-227 (1844); 
Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 75 (1911); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§102, 103, 112 (1915); 1 Simes, LAw 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§57, 69, (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §157, 
Comments p., q., r., s. (1936); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §277 
(1950). Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §4.35 (1952). 
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as Lucy may by will appoint and, in default of appoint-
ment, to John Stiles in fee subject to the condition that 
John and his heirs care for Lucy's grave forever, the re-
mainder of John Stiles is vested. If Andrew Baker con-
veys land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to John 
Stiles and his heirs so long as they care for Lucy's grave, 
the remainder is vested. If Andrew Baker conveys land 
to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to John Stiles and his 
heirs, but if Lucy's grave is neglected within twenty 
years after her death, then to James Thorpe and his 
heirs, the remainder to John Stiles is vested. 
Under the common-law system, every future interest 
limited to someone other than the grantor or testator 
which is not a remainder or an interesse termini is an ex-
ecutory interest.161 The term includes springing freehold 
interests in land,162 shifting freehold interests which cut 
161 Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 381-386 and Butler's 
Notes (a) and (b), 401 and Butler's Note (e) (1844); Challis, LAw oF 
REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 76, 168-171 (1911); 1 Simes, LAw oF FUTURE 
INTERESTs, §149 (1936); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERI· 
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §4.53 (1952). Cf. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§§156, Comment e., 158 (1936). The Restatement classifies interessia 
termini as executory interests and future interests in chattels real and 
personal, and following chattels real, which would be remainders if 
they were freehold estates in land expectant upon freehold estates in 
land, as remainders. The Restatement classification reflects fairly wide-
spread American usage. 
A limitation subsequent to an executory interest is an executory 
interest, although it is a freehold estate in land so limited as to 
become possessory upon the termination of a preceding freehold 
estate. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe and his heirs 
but, if Lucy Baker die in the lifetime of James, to Roger White for 
life, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John is 
executory. Fearne, CONTINGENT REMAINDERS, 10th ed., 503 (1844); 
Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 124 (1911). But see Part 
Two, note 168 infra. A freehold interest which follows an estate for 
years is either a present estate or an executory interest. Part Two, 
note 150 supra. 
162 Clerc's Case, 6 Co. Rep. I7b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599); Davies v. 
Speed, 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692); Fearne, CoNTINGENT RE-
MAINDERS, lOth ed., 399 (1844); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 
§279 (1950); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," I AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §4.56 (1952). See: Badger v. Lloyd, 1 Salk. 232 at 233, 91 
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off a prior estate for life163 or in tail, 164 freehold interests 
which follow or cut off a prior estate in fee simple, 165 
Eng. Rep. 206 (1696). If Andrew Baker conveys or devises land to 
John Stiles and his heirs "to commence in possession ten years after 
my death," the interest of John is a springing executory interest. 
1sa For example, if Andrew Baker conveys land to Lucy Baker for 
life but, if Lucy remarry, to John Stiles for the life of Lucy, the 
interest of John is a shifting executory interest. Brent's Case, 2 Leon. 
14, 74 Eng. Rep. 319 (1575); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth 
ed., 400 (1844). See: Egerton v. Earl Brownlow, 4 H.L.C. 1 at 186, 
10 Eng. Rep. 359 at 433 (1853). This must be distinguished from an 
interest following a life estate on special limitation, which is a re· 
mainder, not an executory interest. If Andrew Baker conveys land 
to Lucy Baker until her death or remarriage and, in the event of such 
remarriage, to John Stiles for the life of Lucy, John takes a con-
tingent remainder. Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 10 
[Butler's Note (h)], 13, (1844); 2 Powell, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 
§279 (1950); 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §154 (1936). See: 
Beverley v. Beverley, 2 Vern. 131, 23 Eng. Rep. 692 (1690); Egerton 
v. Earl Brownlow, supra. 
164 For example, if Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe 
and the heirs of his body, but if the tenant in tail fail to bear the 
name and arms of Baker, to John Stiles and the heirs of his body. 
If, however, an estate tail is on special limitation, an estate limited to 
take effect upon the operation of the special limitation is a remainder, 
not an executory interest. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James 
Thorpe and the heirs of his body so long as they bear the name and 
arms of Baker and, on their ceasing to do so, to John Stiles and the 
heirs of his body, John takes a contingent remainder. Arton v. Hare, 
Popham 97, 79 Eng. Rep. 1207 (1594); Fearne, CoNTINGENT RE-
MAINDERS, 10th ed., 5, 13 (1844); 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§154 (1936). 
1s5 Hinde and Lyons Case, 3 Leon. 64, 74 Eng. Rep. 543 (1577); 
Pells v. Brown, Cro. Jac. 590, 79 Eng. Rep. 504 (1620). As there 
cannot be a remainder on a fee simple (Part Two, note 7 supra), a 
future interest limited on a fee simple is always an executory interest 
whether or not the fee is on special limitation, that is, whether the 
future interest is limited to follow or to cut off the preceding fee. 
If Andrew Baker conveys fand to James Thorpe and his heirs so long 
as they shall bear the name and arms of Baker and then to John 
Stiles and his heirs (special limitation), or to James Thorpe and his 
heirs, but if they shall cease to bear the name and arms of Baker to 
John Stiles and his heirs (conditional limitation), the interest of 
John Stiles is, in either case, an executory interest (which, of course, 
violates the Rule Against Perpetuities and so is void). Fearne, CoN· 
TINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 12 (1844); Challis, LAw OF REAL 
PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 173 (1911); 1 Simes, LAw oF FUTuRE INTERESTS, 
§154 (1936); 2 Powell, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §279 (1950); Simes, 
"Types of Future Interests," 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§4.25, 
4.27, 4.55 (1952). See: Willion v. Berkley, 1 Plowd. Conun. 223 at 
235, 239, 248, 75 Eng. Rep. 339 at 358, 365, 379 (1562); Earl of 
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all future interests in estates for years except the interesse 
termini/66 and all future interests in chattels personal 
except, possibly, an interest limited to follow a life estate 
which modern authorities treat as, or analogous to, a re-
mainder.m In strict common-law theory, an executory 
interest, unlike a remainder, never vests until it becomes 
possessory.168 Thus if Andrew Baker conveys to John 
Stafford v. Buckley, 2 Ves. Sen. 170, 28 Eng. Rep. 111 (1750). But 
see Part Two, note 168 infra. Compare the different rule as to future 
interests limited on life estates and fees tail mentioned in the two 
preceding notes. 
.1ss Manning's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 94b, 77 Eng. Rep. 618 (1609); 
Lampet's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 46b, 77 Eng. Rep. 994 (1612); Cotton v. 
Heath, 1 Eq. Cas. Ahr. 191, pl. 2, 21 Eng. Rep. 981 (1638); Fearne, 
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 4 [Butler's Note (c) 2.] (1844); 
Smith, EXECUTORY INTERESTs, ed. 1844, §756a. Cf. Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §117b, App. F. (1915); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
§156, Comment e. (1936); 2 Powell, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, §§273, 
279 (1950). The Restatement treats some interests in estates for years 
as remainders. Part Two, note 161 supra. Professor Powell follows 
the terminology of the Restatement but recognizes that the rule 
stated in the text was that of the English law. As to the interesse 
termini, see Part Two, note 148 supra. A freehold estate which follows 
an estate for years is either a present estate or an executory interest. 
Part Two, note 150 supra. 
167 Hoare v. Parker, 2 T.R. 376, 100 Eng. Rep. 202 (1788); Re 
Tritton, 61 L.T.R. 301 (Q.B. 1889); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, 
lOth ed., 4 (Butler's Note (c) 2.) (1844); Part One, notes 409-422 
supra. Cf. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §117a, App. F 
(1915); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §156, Comment e. (1936); Powell, 
LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, §§273, 279. In Evans v. Walker, [1876] 3 
Ch. Div. 211, there was a bequest of chattels personal to Maria Evans 
for life, then to her children for their lives, then to Edwin, Sally, 
and Eliza Walker. The interest of the Walkers was treated as a 
vested remainder and held valid. If an executory interest, it would 
have violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. Most modern American 
authority follows the view of this case. 
1ss Preston, TREATISE oN EsTATES, 2d ed., 66, 75 (1820); Fearne, 
CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 1 [Butler's Note (a)] (1844); 
Smith, ExECUTORY INTERESTS, ed. 1844, §301; Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §114 (1915); Simes, "Types of Future Interests," 
1 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §4.2 (1952); Leach and Tudor, "The 
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 Id., §24.20. See: Gore v. 
Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722). Cf. PROPERTY REsTATE-
MENT, §158, Comment b. (1936), §370, Comment o. (1944); Gray, Id., 
§§117, 117a. This does not mean that an executory interest was always 
contingent. Such an interest limited to take effect on an event bound 
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Stiles an estate in fee simple in land to commence in 
possession upon the death of Andrew, the estate does 
not, in theory, vest until Andrew dies. Similarly, if An-
drew Baker conveys to John Stiles an estate in fee simple 
in land to commence in possession ten years after the 
date of the deed, the estate does not vest until the expira-
tion of the ten years.169 Logical application of this doc-
trine would mean that if Andrew Baker conveys to John 
Stiles an estate in fee simple in land to commence in 
possession twenty-two years after the date of the deed, 
the conveyance would be void under the Rule Against 
Perpetuities because the estate cannot vest within the 
period of the Rule. Such a result would be absurd, be-
cause a conveyance by Andrew Baker to James Thorpe 
for twenty-two years, remainder to John Stiles in fee, 
is unquestionably valid.170 Modem authorities take the 
to occur was not contingent. An executory interest of a non-possessory 
character, such as a beneficial interest under a trust or a profit or 
easement, would, of course, vest when it becomes presently beneficial. 
Professor Gray suggested that a future interest in chattels personal, 
to take effect upon the termination of a prior interest for years, 
whenever and however the prior interest terminates, and a future 
interest in chattels personal which would be a vested remainder on a 
life estate if the property were land, are vested. However that may 
be, it is settled tliat a future interest in land which would be a re-
mainder but for the fact that the preceding estate is an executory 
interest may vest when the preceding interest vests. If Andrew Baker 
conveys land to James Thorpe and his heirs but, if James die without 
issue living at the time of his death, to Roger White for life, remainder 
to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John, although originally 
executory, becomes a vested remainder when James dies without sur-
viving issue. Lewis Bowles's Case, 11 Co. Rep. 79b, 77 Eng. Rep. 
1252 (1615); Challis, LAw OF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 124 (1911); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §114n.4. (1915); 1 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §152 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §156, 
Comment c., (1936), §370, Comment o. (1944). 
169 Clere's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 17b, 77 Eng. Rep. 279 (1599); Davies 
v. Speed, 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692). Professor Simes thinks 
that such a conveyance can sometimes be construed to create a life 
estate followed by a remainder. I LAw oF FUTURE INTERESTS, §150 
(1936). 
110 Part Two, note 150 supra. Professor Simes thinks that such a 
conveyance can sometimes be construed to create a present estate in 
fee simple subject to a term. 1 LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §150 (1936). 
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view that an executory interest limited to an ascertained 
living person and certain to become possessory on a fixed 
future date does not violate the Rule.171 
With this exception, every executory interest which is 
not certain to become possessory, if at all, within the 
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, is void.172 Thus 
an executory interest limited to a person who may not 
be ascertainable within the period of the Rule is invalid. 
If Andrew Baker bequeaths jewels to John Stiles for life, 
then to John's widow for life, then to the eldest son of 
John living at the death of such widow, the interest of 
the eldest son is void because.he may not be ascertainable 
until the death of a person not presently in being.173 
Similarly, if Andrew Baker, owning an estate for five 
hundred years in land, bequeaths it to John Stiles for 
171 Challis, LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 472-473 (1911); 2 
Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §498 (1936); PRoPERTY REsTATE-
MENT, §370, Comment h. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common 
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§24.20 (1952). See: Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 
(1722); Fearne, CoNTINGENT REMAINDERS, lOth ed., 1 (1844). But cf. 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§114, 20ln.2 (1915). 
Compare the rule as to interessia termini, which are of the same 
essential nature as springing executory interests. Part Two, note 
148 supra. An executory interest violates the Rule even though 
limited unconditionally to an ascertained living person on a fixed 
future day, if ascertainment of the exact interest in or part of the 
property so limited is postponed for longer than the period of the 
Rule. Curtis v. Lukin, 5 Beav. 147, 49 Eng. Rep. 533 (1842). 
112 Part Two, note 134 supra. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §370, Com-
ment o., Ill. 5 (1944). An executory interest of a non-possessory 
character, such as a beneficial interest under a trust or a profit or 
easement, would, of course, vest when it becomes presently beneficial. 
11a Hodson v. Ball, 14 Sim. 558, 60 Eng. Rep. 474 (1845); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §214 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §496 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Com-
ment k. (1944); Part Two, note 131 supra. In Re Hill, [1902] 1 Ch. 
807 (C.A.), an attempt to create a perpetual succession of life inter-
ests in jewels was held invalid. Compare Part Two, note 13 supra. 
In both the example put in the text and in Re Hill, the interests 
created would have been contingent remainders if the property 
involved had been land instead of jewels. Even so, they would have 
been void because no future interest can vest until the taker is ascer-
tainable. Part Two, note 157 supra. 
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life, then to his eldest son for life, then to the eldest son 
of such eldest son, the last disposition is void if John has 
no son when Andrew dies, because the taker may not 
be ascertainable within lives in being and twenty-one 
years.174 Even though the taker of an executory interest 
is in being and ascertained, it is invalid if so limited as 
to become possessory upon the happening of an event 
which may not occur and which may occur at a time 
beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Thus if Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe 
in fee simple, "but if the descendants of James become 
extinct, then to John Stiles and his heirs," the shifting 
executory interest limited to John is void because it 
might become possessory at some time beyond the period 
of the Rule.175 Similarly, if Andrew Baker conveys land 
174 Somerville v. Lethbridge, 6 T.R. 213, 101 Eng. Rep. 517 (1795); 
Beard v. Westcott, 5 B.&Ald. 801, 106 Eng. Rep. 1383 (1822); Beard 
v. Westcott, Turn. & R. 25, 37 Eng. Rep. 1002 (1822). A freehold re-
mainder limited in the same way would also be void. 
u5 Davies v. Speed, 2 Salk. 675, 91 Eng. Rep. 574 (1692); Digby, 
HISTORY OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, 5th ed., 365-366 (1897); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PFRPETUmEs, 3rd ed., §177 (1915). See: Badger 
v. Lloyd, I Salk. 232 at 233, 91 Eng. Rep. 206 (1696). That is, an 
executory interest limited to commence on indefinite failure of issue 
is void under the Rule although, as has been seen (Part Two, note 
155 supra) a remainder on an estate tail, which is really conditional 
upon indefinite failure of issue, is vested and valid. In England, until 
the rule was changed by statute [1 Viet., c. 26, §29, (1837)] there was 
a constructional presumption that, when property was transferred "to 
James Thorpe and his heirs but, if James die without issue, to John 
Stiles and his heirs," the phrase "die without issue" meant indefinite 
failure of issue, that is "if the descendants of James ever become 
extinct." If the property involved was land, such a transfer was con-
strued to create an estate tail in James with a remainder in fee simple 
in John which was vested and valid. Soulle v. Gerrard, Cro. Eliz. 525, 
78 Eng. Rep. 773 (1595); Tuttesham v. Roberts, Cro. Jac. 22, 79 Eng. 
Rep. 18 (1603); Browne v. Jerves, Cro. Jac. 290, 79 Eng. Ree. 249 
(1610); Chadock v. Cowley, Cro. Jac. 695, 79 Eng. Rep. 604 (1624); 
Doe ex·dem. Jones v. Owens, 1 Barn. & Ad. 318, 109 Eng. Rep. 805 
(1830). See: Machell v. Weeding, 8 Sim. 4, 59 Eng. Rep. 2 (1836). 
If the property involved consisted of chattels real or personal, the 
interest of John was an executory interest which was void under the 
Rule Against Perpetuities. Green v. Rod, Fitz-G. 68, 94 Eng. Rep. 
656 (1732); Beauclerk v. Dormer, 2 Atk. 308, 26 Eng. Rep. 588 (1742). 
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to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot 
Building stands and then to John Stiles and his heirs, 
the shifting executory interest of John is invalid because 
it is not certain that the Penobscot Building will fall 
within lives in being and twenty-one years.176 
C. VESTING UNDER MICHIGAN LAW 
Chapter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 
1846,177 which was adopted, with some modifications, 
from the New York Revised Statutes of 1829,m made 
extensive changes in the terminology and some changes 
in the nature and characteristics of future interests in 
land. The statutes denominate every interest which is 
expectant as to possession, created in a person other than 
17'6 Part Two, note 49 supra. Yet, where estates tail are permitted, 
a conveyance to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body so long as 
Westminster Hall stands, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, would 
give John a valid vested remainder. Part Two, note 155 supra. 
111 Comp. Laws (1857); §2585 et seq.; Comp. Laws (1871) §4068 et 
seq.; Comp. Laws (1897) §8783 et seq.; How. Stat., §5517 et seq.; Comp. 
Laws (1915) §11519 et seq.; Comp. Laws (1929) §12921 et seq.; Mich. 
Stat. Ann., §26.1 et seq.; Comp. Laws (1948) c. 554. 
178 Part Two, Chapter I, Title 2, Art. 1. As to the drafting of the 
New York Revised Statutes and their partial adoption in Michigan, 
see Part One, supra, at notes 575, 582. The Michigan chapter has 
two sections which were not in the New York article, §45, which 
provides that the presumption created by §44, that a conveyance to 
two or more persons creates a tenancy in common, does not apply to 
mortgages or conveyances to husband and wife, and §46, re1atmg to 
nominal conditions, which is quoted in Part One, supra, at note 143. 
Section 24 of the New York article provided: "Subject to the rules 
established in the preceding sections of this Article, a freehold estate 
as well as a chattel real, may be created, to commence at a future 
day; an estate for life may be created, in a term of years, and a re-
mainder limited thereon; a remainder of a freehold or chattel real, 
either contingent or vested, may be created expectant on the determi-
nation of a term of years; and a fee may be limited on a fee, upon 
a contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen within the 
period prescribed in this Article." Section 24 of the Michigan chapter 
omitted the italicized portion of the New York section. The signifi-
cance of this omission has been suggested in Part Two, note 49 supra, 
and will be discussed more fully in Part Three, infra. 
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the grantor or testator, a future estate179 and classify 
some future estates as remainders but give no special 
name to those which are not remainders. The Statutes 
classify as remainders not only those freehold future 
interests which would have been remainders under Eng-
lish law but also future estates of freehold or for years 
so limited as to cut off a prior freehold estate, to cut 
off or follow an estate in fee simple, or to cut off or 
follow an estate for years.180 Thus those interests which 
179 "Sec. 7. Estates, as respects the time of their enjoyment, are 
divided into estates in possession, and estates in expectancy. 
"Sec. 8. An estate in possession, is where the owner has an im· 
mediate right to the possession of the land; an estate in expectancy is 
where the right to the possession is postponed to a future period. 
"Sec. 9. Estates in expectancy are divided into, 
"1. Estates commencing at a future day, denominated future 
estates: and, 
"2. Reversions. 
"Sec. 10. A future estate, is an estate limited to commence in pos-
session at a future day, either without the intervention of a precedent 
estate, or on the determination, by lapse of time or otherwise, of a 
precedent estate, created at the same time." 
The Revisers' notes make it clear that the object of these provisions 
was to abolish the technical differences between remainders and 
executory interests. 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2 ed., 570-571 (1836). 
tso "Sec. 11. When a future estate is dependent upon a precedent 
estate, it may be termed a remainder, and may be created and trans-
ferred by that name. 
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a prior 
remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that the persons to whom 
the first remainder is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one 
years, or upon any other contingency by which the estate of such 
persons may be determined before they attain their full age. 
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be created on a term 
for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon which it is limited 
be such that the remainder must vest in interest, during the con-
tinuance of not more than two lives in being at the creation of such 
remainder, or upon the termination thereof. 
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on a 
term of years, except to a person in being at the creation of such estate. 
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter contained relative to 
future estates, shall be construed to apply to limitations of chattels 
real, as well as of freehold estates, so that the absolute ownership of a 
term of years, shall not be suspended for a longer period than the 
absolute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect to a fee. 
"Sec. 27. A remainder may be limited on a contmgency, which, 
in case it should happen, will operate to abridge or determine the 
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in England would have been remainders, shifting execu-
tory interests and present freeholds subject to a term are 
remainders here. One type of estate which would have 
been a springing executory interest in England, the free-
hold estate limited to cut off or follow a term of years 
only if an uncertain event occurs, is also a remainder 
under the Michigan statutes. Interests which in Eng-
land would have been interessia ·termini or springing 
executory interests of other types are simply future 
estates, without specific name, in Michigan. 
The statutes convert all estates tail into estates in 
fee simple 181 and provide that a remainder in fee limited 
on an estate tail shall take effect if, but only if, the first 
tenant in tail dies without issue living at the time of his 
precedent estate; and every such remainder shall be construed a 
conditional limitation, and shall have the same effect as such a 
limitation would have by law." 
See also §24; quoted in Part Two, note 178 supra} and In re 
Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 214, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). §§16, 20 
and 23 were repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2), 
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52, but the repeal would not seem to alter 
the meaning of the term "remainder." For the much narrower mean-
ing of the term "remainder" at common law see Part Two, supra} at 
notes 6-21, 148, 150. 
1s1 §3, quoted in the text at Part One, note 84 supra. Under the 
Rule in Shelley's Case [Wolfe v. Shelley, 1 Co. Rep. 93b, 76 Eng. 
Rep. 206 (1579-81)], a conveyance "to John Stiles for life, remainder 
to his heirs," creates a fee simple in John and a conveyance "to John 
Stiles for life, remainder to the heirs of his body," creates a fee tail 
in John. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §28, abolishes that rule by rroviding, 
"When a remainder shall be limited to the heirs, or heirs o the body 
of a person to whom a life estate in the same premises shall be given, 
the persons who, on the termination of the life estate, shall be the 
heirs, or heirs of the body of such tenant for life, shall be entitled 
to take as purchasers, by virtue of the remainder so limited to them." 
The effect of §§3 and 28 combined is that a conveyance "to John 
Stiles for life, remainder to the heirs of his body," creates a life estate 
in T ohn with contingent remainder in fee simple to the heirs of his 
body. Thompson v. Thompson, 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 
(1951), Part One, note 89 supra. As a remainder to the heirs of a 
living person is contingent (Part Two, note 158 supra), the abolition 
of the Rule in Shelley's Case has the effect of making some dispositions 
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities which would not have done so 
at common law. 
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death. 182 Whereas in English law the rules as to vesting 
of remainders and executory interests were different in 
several respects, our statutes provide a uniform rule as 
to the vesting of all future estates in land: 
"Sec. 13. Future estates are either vested or con-
tingent: 
"They are vested when there is a person in being 
who would have an immediate right to possession of 
the lands, upon the ceasing of the intermediate or prece-
dent estate: 
"They are contingent whilst the person to whom or 
the event upon which they are limited to take effect re-
mains uncertain.'' 
Because the common-law recognition of remainders 
was restricted to freehold interests in land, it seemed, at 
the time when English law was received in this country, 
that all future interests in chattels real and personal, 
except interessia termini, were executory interests and 
so could not vest before they became possessory.188 Chap-
182 §4, quoted in the text at Part One, note 84 supra. Sec. 22 pro-
vides: "When a remainder shall be limited to take effect on the 
death of any person without heirs, or heirs of his body, or without 
issue, the word 'heirs' or 'issue', shall be construed to mean heirs 
or issue living at the death of the person named as ancestor." Com-
pare the different construction of such provisions in the older English 
decisions. Part Two, note 175 supra. By eliminating the "indefinite 
failure of issue" construction, Section 22 saves many future estates 
which would otherwise violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Re-
visers' Note, 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 568 (1836). It was applied in 
Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich. 47 (1875); Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich. 
229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896). In St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 
(1852), a will which became effective before the Revised Statutes of 
1846 came into force devised life estates to named persons and suc-
cessive estates for life to their descendants "as long as any posterity 
will exist, and in case of extinction to the next heirs." The ultimate 
remainder was held void under the common-law Rule Against Per-
petuities. 
183 Part One, notes 403-422, Part Two, notes 166, 167, supra. How-
ever, modern English and American law tends to treat future interests 
in chattels personal, limited to follow life interests, as remainders, at 
least for purposes of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Evans v. Walker, 
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ter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846 makes 
possible remainders in chattels real and applies the same 
rules of vesting to future estates in chattels real as to 
future freehold estates. The chapter did not apply to 
chattels personal, but the Michigan Supreme Court has 
shown a tendency to recognize future interests in chat-
tels personal, including remainders, which correspond to 
those permitted in land. Many of the vesting cases dis-
cussed in this section involved future interests in chat-
tels personal and some involved mixed dispositions of 
land and chattels. In all of them the Court applied the 
same rules of vesting to future interests in chattels per-
sonal as to future interests in land, and in several in-
stances it has expressly stated that the rules of vesting 
are the same as to both.184 What the statutes have done 
for future interests in chattels real, case law has done 
[1876] 3 Ch. Div. 211; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUlTIES, 3rd ed., 
§§841, 851 (1915); Part One, notes 429, 430, supra. 
m Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 556, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); 
In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 214, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). Cf. 
Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556 at 568-569, 162 N.W. 102 (1917). 
The Rule Against Perpetuities did not apply to dispositions of 
Michigan land between 1847 and 1949 (Part Two, note 50 supra), but 
decisions establishing the rules of vesting of interests in land made 
during this period, although not involving application of the Rule, 
should be considered authoritative as to the problem of vesting for 
purposes of the Rule. The Michigan vesting cases are discussed in 
detail in Brake, "The 'Vested vs. Contingent' Approach to Future 
Interests: A Critical Analysis of the Michigan Cases," 9 UNIV. OF 
DETROIT L.J. 61, 121, 179 (1946). The original title of Chapter 62 of 
the Revised Statutes of 1846 (Part Two, note 177 supra) was, "Of 
the Nature and Qualities of Estates in Real Property, and the Aliena-
tion Thereof." It was the first chapter in Title XIV, which was 
headed, "Of Real Property, and of the Nature, Qualities and Aliena-
tion of Estates Therein." Act 227, P.A. 1949, amended the title of 
Chapter 62 to read, "Of the nature and qualities of estates in real 
and personal property, and the alienation thereof." It could be argued 
that this amendment extended Section 13 and other provisions of the 
chapter to chattels personal. However, Act 227 did not amend the 
heading of Title XIV or remove the limiting word "lands" from Sec-
tions 1, 8, 13, 36, 44, and 46. The lorimary purpose of Act 227 was 
to extend Sections 37, 38, 39 and , relating to accumulations, to 
personal property. Part Two, note 501 infra. It is doubtful that it 
changed the scope of other sections of Chapter 62. 
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for chattels personal. We have one system of future 
interests in all types of property with uniform rules of 
vesting for all. 
Section 13 is a paraphrase of Sir William Blackstone's 
explanation of the distinction between vested and con-
tingent remainders.185 Although neither complete nor 
accurate for that purpose, the section was probably in-
tended to adopt the English rules governing the vesting 
of remainders and apply them to all future estates. In 
at least one situation, however, the section, when read 
with other provisions of Chapter 62, appears to change 
the rules governing the vesting of remainders. At com-
mon law a remainder failed if it was not ready to take 
effect when the preceding estate terminated.186 Hence 
a remainder limited to commence on an event which 
might not occur at or before the termination of the pre-
ceding estate was contingent even though the event was 
one certain to occur, such as the coming of a fixed date 
or the death of a living person.187 If Andrew Baker con-
veys lands to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John 
Stiles and his heirs if Lucy Baker dies either before or 
after James, the remainder is contingent at common 
law. Lucy will certainly die but not necessarily before 
James' life estate terminates. Our statutes provide that 
a remainder does not fail merely because it is not ready 
185 "For remainders are either vested or contingent. Vested re-
mainders (or remainders executed, whereby a present interest passes 
to the party, though to be enjoyed in futuro) are where the estate 
is invariably fixed, to remain in a determinate person, after the par-
ticular estate is spent. . . . Contingent or executory remainders 
(whereby no present interest passes) are where the estate in remainder 
is limited to take effect, either to a dubious and uncertain person, 
or upon a dubious and uncertain eventj so that the particular estate 
may chance to be determined, and the remainder never take effect." 
2 CoMMENTARIES *168-169 (1765), citing Boraston's Case, 3 Co. Rep. 
16a, 20a, 76 Eng. Rep. 664, 670 (1587). 
1ss Part Two, notes 11, 12, supra. 
187 Part Two, note 151 supra. 
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to take effect when the preceding estate terminates, 188 
hence the remainder of John is certain to take effect 
upon an event certain to occur. If James should die 
before Lucy, the right to possession for the life of Lucy 
would revert to Andrew. If the reversionary estate of 
Andrew is an "intermediate or precedent estate" within 
the meaning of the second clause of Section 13, John's 
interest comes within the statutory definition of a vested 
future estate. If the phrase "intermediate or precedent 
estate" in the second clause does not include reversionary 
estates, John's interest does not come within either the 
second or third clause. The first clause provides that 
future estates are either vested or contingent. John's 
interest is not contingent under either the common-law 
definition of contingency or that provided by the third 
clause of Section 13 because there is no uncertainty as 
to the person who takes or the event upon which the 
interest takes effect, so his interest is probably a vested 
future estate in Michigan.189 
1ss "Sec. 32. No expectant estate can be defeated or barred by 
any alienation or other act of the owner of the intermediate or prece-
dent estate, nor by any destruction of such precedent estate by disseizin, 
forfeiture, surrender, merger or otherwise. 
"Sec. 33. The last preceding section shall not be construed to pre· 
vent an expectant estate from being defeated in any manner, or by 
any act or means which the party creating such estate shall, in the 
creation thereof, have provided or authorized; nor shall an expectant 
estate thus liable to be defeated, be on that ground adjudged void in its 
creation. 
"Sec. 34. No remainder, valid in its creation, shall be defeated 
by the determination of the precedent estate, before the happening 
of the contingency on which the remainder is limited to take effect; 
but should such contingency afterwards happen, the remainder shall 
take effect in the same manner, and to the same extent, as if the 
precedent estate had continued to the same period." 
189 Walsh, FUTURE EsTATES IN NEW YoRK, §7 (1931). This con-
clusion seems inescapable in view of the language of Section 29: 
"When a remainder on an estate for life, or for years, shall not be 
limited on a contingency, defeating or avoiding such precedent estate, 
it shall be construed as intended to take effect only on the death of the 
first taker, or the expiration, by lapse of time, of such term of years." 
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It will be recalled that, under English law, a remainder 
may be vested although it is not presently possessory, 
even when it may never become possessory/90 but an 
executory interest does not vest until it becomes posses-
sory.191 It is clear that in Michigan a remainder may 
vest before it becomes possessory/92 even when it may 
never become possessory. Thus if Andrew Baker con-
veys land to Roger White for life, remainder to John 
Stiles for life, John's remainder is vested although it 
will not become possessory if he does not survive 
Roger.193 As Section 13 adopts one standard of vesting 
for all future estates, the standard applicable to re-
mainders in English law, it would seem that a future 
estate may be vested in Michigan before it becomes pos-
sessory even though it would have been an executory 
interest in England. The language of the second clause 
of Section 13 makes this clear as to those types of re-
mainders which would have been shifting executory 
interests under English law. As to those future interests 
which would have been springing executory interests, a 
problem like that discussed in the preceding paragraph 
arises. If the phrase "intermediate or precedent estate" 
Under the common-law rules, this section would make every remainder 
limited on an indefeasible estate for life or years contingent because 
it would not be ready to take effect whenever and however the pre-
ceding estate terminated. It is apparent that the statutes change the 
common-law rules of vesting in this respect. 
190 Part Two, notes 153-155, supra. 
1s1 Part Two, notes 168, 169, supra. But such an interest may not be 
contingent. 
m Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874); Hovey v. Nellis, 
98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Downing v. Birney, 117 Mich. 
675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 
404 (1937). See: Walton v. Torrey, Harr. Ch. 259 (Mich. circa 
1840); Chambers v. Shaw, 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883); Hull v. 
Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908); Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 
Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917); In re De Bancourt's Estate, 279 
Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937). 
193 Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889); Downing 
v. Birney, 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898). 
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in the second clause includes the retained interest of a 
grantor who has conveyed a future estate of the spring-
ing use type, then such a future estate is within the 
statutory definition of a vested interest if limited to com-
mence upon an event certain to occur. If the phrase does 
not include such retained interests, such a future estate 
does not come within either the second or third clause 
but, since it is not contingent, must be vested under the 
language of the first clause. In any event, the Michigan 
Supreme Court has held that a future estate of the 
springing executory interest type, limited to commence 
upon the death of a living person, is vested. Thus in 
Mcintyre v. Mcintyre's Estate,194 involving a conveyance 
of an estate to commence on the death of the grantors, 
the Court said, 
"Two provisions of the deed were relied on to sustain 
proponent's contention that the terms of the deed were 
not sufficient to create a vested interest in a grantee: 
(a) 'It is understood that this deed is made for the pur-
pose of creating a future estate;' (b) 'and the full title 
and enjoyment * * * shall only become operative upon 
194 156 Mich. 240 at 241-242, 120 N.W. 587 (1909). The real 
problem involved in the case was not vesting but whether the instru-
ment was a will or a present conveyance of a future estate. If, as 
the Court held, it was a present conveyance of a future estate, that 
estate would have been a springing executory interest under English 
law. Part Two, notes 6, 150, 162, 169, supra. In Engel v. Ladewig, 
153 Mich. 8, 116 N.W. 550 (1908), a husband and wife joined in a 
deed conveying land owned by the husband in fee simple to their 
son in fee simple, subject to certain charges and reserving to the 
grantors "all right, title and control so long as we or either of us 
shall live." The Court treated the interest of the son, which would 
have been a springing executory interest in England, exactly as if it 
were a vested remainder. See: Hitchcock v. Simpkins, 99 Mich. 198, 
58 N.W. 47 (1894); Taylor v. Richards, 153 Mich. 667, 117 N.W. 
208 (1908); Watkins v. Minor, 214 Mich. 308, 183 N.W. 186 (1921); 
Benton Harbor Federation of Women's Clubs v. Nelson, 301 Mich. 
465, 3 N.W. (2d) 844 (1942); Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §24, quoted in 
Part Two, note 178 supra; Revisers' note, 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 
570-571 (1836). 
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the death of the survivor of the grantors hereof, and at 
that time, and not before, the said grantee shall enjoy 
the full title and control hereof.' Our statute * * * 
defines 'a future estate' as 'an estate limited to commence 
in possession at a future day,' etc., and by [Section 13] 
they are said ·to be either vested or contingent. There 
is no contingency mentioned in this deed. The grantee's 
right to possession was inevitable on the happening of 
events which were inevitable. He had, therefore, a 
vested interest." 
If a future estate of the springing executory interest 
type, limited to commence unconditionally on the death 
of a living person, is vested, it would seem that such an 
estate limited to commence unconditionally on a fixed 
future date is likewise vested. In other words, mere post-
ponement of enjoyment to a future time does not make 
a future estate contingent and so, under Section 13, does 
not keep it from being vested, although it would have 
been an executory interest in England. If Andrew Baker 
conveys to John Stiles an estate in fee simple in land to 
commence in possession twenty-two years after the date 
of the deed, John probably takes a vested estate which 
does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities.195 
Under English law, the fact that an interest prior in 
time is on special limitation does not make a future 
interest contingent, provided it is limited to take effect 
whenever and however the prior interest terminates. If 
Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy Baker until her 
death or remarriage, remainder to John Stiles and his 
heirs, John takes a vested remainder at common law.196 
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe for 
195 In Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N.W. 361 (1895), there 
was a bequest to be paid a year after the death of the testator's widow. 
It was treated as vested. Walsh, FuTURE EsTATES IN NEw YoRK, §7 
(1931). Cf. Part Two, note 171 supra. 
196 Part Two, note 154 supra. 
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forty years if the Penobscot Building so long stands, re-
mainder to John Stiles and his heirs, John takes a present 
vested estate in fee simple at common law.197 The Michi-
gan statutes make the interest of John in the second 
example a future estate instead of a present interest, 
and Section 13 provides that future estates are contin-
gent "whilst - - - the event upon which they are limited 
to take effect remains uncertain." It is arguable that the 
section makes the interests of John in these examples 
contingent and, hence, that that in the second example 
is void because the event may remain uncertain for more 
than twenty-one years. However, the "event" in each of 
these examples is not a condition precedent to John's 
taking an interest but only one which, if it occurs, will 
terminate the preceding estate and so make his interest 
possessory sooner. At any rate, the Michigan Supreme 
Court has held that a remainder of the type described 
in the first example is vested, 198 so it would probably 
hold that one of the type described in the second ex-
ample is vested and valid. 
(1) Contingency as to Person or Event 
Under English law a future interest limited to per-
sons not in being or not presently ascertainable or upon 
a condition precedent not certain to occur is contin-
gent.199 Hence a remainder limited to the heirs of a 
living person is contingent because they cannot be ascer-
tained until the death of the ancestor.200 Dicta in New 
197 Part Two, note 150 supra. 
1 98 Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 (1874); Rood v. Hovey, 
50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883). See: Ryder v. Flanders, 30 Mich. 
336 (1874); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 
976 (1924). 
199 Part Two, notes 151, 159, 173, 175, 176, supra. 
2.;o Part Two, note 158 supra. 
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York cases decided in 1835 and 1840 suggested that the 
second clause of Section 13 may have made a radical 
change in the rules of vesting by providing that a re-
mainder is vested if there is a person in being who 
would be entitled to take if the preceding estate termi-
nated now.201 In Moore v. LittelJ202 decided in 1869, 
land had been conveyed to John Jackson "for and during 
his natural life, and after his death to his heirs and their 
assigns forever." Although unnecessary to the decision/03 
the opinion of Judge Woodruff, in which a majority of 
the Court of Appeals concurred, stated that the re-
mainder vested presently in the living children of John 
as his heirs apparent and contained the following dicta: 
"If there 'is a person in being who would have an 
immediate right to the possession of the lands upon the 
ceasing of the precedent estate, then that remainder is 
vested' within the terms of the statute. It is not 'a person 
who now has a present fixed right of future possession 
or enjoyment', but a person who would have an immed-
iate right if the precedent estate were now to cease. I 
read this language according to its ordinary and natural 
signification, and if you can point to a human being and 
201 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 at 301-302 (1835); Moore v. 
Lyons, 25 Wend. 119 at 144 (1840). In the latter case Chancellor 
Walworth qualified this startling proposition by a suggestion that it 
was true only if the preceding estate would be terminated by an event 
certain to occur. See also Lawrence v. Bayard, 7 Paige 70 at 75 (N.Y. 
1838). 
202 41 N.Y. 66 (1869). It is evident from his opinion (pp. 71-75) 
that Judge Woodruff misunderstood the common-law rules of vesting. 
He seems to have thought that such a remainder was contingent at 
common law only because of the doctrine of destructibility of con-
tingent remainders. The context indicates that Judge Woodruff did 
not consider the remainder indefeasibly vested; it would open to 
admit after-born children and be defeated, as to any child, if he 
predeceased his father. 
2oa The only question involved was whether children of John could 
alienate their interests before their father's death. Six of the seven 
judges agreed that the remainder was alienable even if contingent 
in view of Section 35 (Part One, note 371 supra.) 
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say as to him, 'that man or that woman, by virtue of a 
grant of a remainder, would have an immediate right 
to the possession of certain lands if the precedent estate 
of another therein should now cease', then the statute 
says, he or she has a vested remainder.---
"That definition [the third clause J is to be construed 
in connection with the other [the second clause]; if there 
is no person who would have an immediate right of 
possession upon the ceasing of the intermediate or prece-
dent estate, i.e.} if no person can be found of whom this 
can now be avowed, either because if that precedent 
estate should now cease, it would be uncertain who was 
entitled, or whether the event upon which it was limited 
would happen, then the remainder is contingent." 204 
If pushed to their logical conclusion these dicta would 
seem to mean that if Andrew Baker conveyed land to 
James Thorpe and his heirs "until his last descendant 
dies" or "until the Penobscot Building falls," then to 
John Stiles and his heirs, the interest of John Stiles 
would be vested. The Revisers' Notes make it clear that 
this was not intended.205 Even if confined to the facts of 
Moore v. LittelJ a remainder to the heirs of a life tenant, 
the dicta are unsound. They engraft onto the second 
clause of Section 13 the words "if the precedent estate 
should now cease." When read in the light of the com-
mon law, that clause means that a remainder is vested 
if an ascertained living person would take on the termi-
nation of the preceding estate whenever it terminates. 
Moreover, it seems evident that the second clause is 
qualified by the third rather than qualifying it. When 
the three clauses are read together, the result is a short 
statement of the common-law rules of vesting of re-
2o4 41 N.Y. 66 at 76, 79. 
2o5 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 568-569 (1836). 
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mainders.206 However that may be, the dicta in Moore 
v. Littel have caused much confusion in New York and 
other states which have adopted the New York statutes. 207 
In the New York version of Section 13, the clauses 
are separated by periods.008 In the Michigan version 
they are separated by colons.209 Judge Sanford M. Green, 
who drafted the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846, had 
been a New York lawyer 210 and must have been familiar 
with the doubt in New York as to the meaning of Sec-
tion 13. It may be that he introduced this change in 
punctuation deliberately to make it clear that the second 
clause was qualified by the third. In any event, the 
confusion in the New York cases necessitates a careful 
examination of the Michigan cases which involve the 
problem in Moore v. Littel. 
As to the specific problem involved in Moore v. Littel, 
the Michigan Supreme Court has shown a disposition 
to construe the word "heirs" in a conveyance of a re-
mainder to the heirs of a living person as meaning "chil-
dren" or "issue." 211 If the word is construed t:p mean 
oos Chaplin, SusPENSION oF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§§571-582 (1928); Walsh, FuTURE EsTATES IN NEW YoRK, §8 (1931). 
As Mr. Chaplin points out, the Revisers' Notes expressly state that a 
remainder to the issue of a life tenant living at his death is contin-
gent. 3 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 573 (1836). See Part Two, note 185 
supra. 
201 Id.; Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §107 (1915); I 
Simes, LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§83-92 (1936). 
2os1 N.Y. Rev. Stat., 2d ed., 718 (1836). 
2o9 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §13, Part Two, note 184 supra. In Comp. 
Laws (1857) §2597, Comp. Laws (1871) §4080, Comp. Laws (1897) 
§8795 and Comp. Laws (1915) §11531, there is a colon after the first 
clause and a semicolon after the second. In How. Stat., §§5529, there 
are semicolons after both. In Comp. Laws (1929) §12933, Mich. Stats. 
Ann., §26.13, and Comp. Laws (1948), §554.13, there is a colon after 
the first clause and a period after the second. The punctuation of the 
original Revised Statutes of 1846 should prevail. 
210 Part One, note 582 supra. 
211 See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885); Porter v. Osmun, 
135 Mich. 361, 97 N.W. 756 (1904); Fullager v. Stockdale, 138 Mich. 
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"children," the remainder vests in the living children 
of the named ancestor, subject to open to admit after 
born children.212 When, however, the word "heirs" in 
a conveyance of a remainder to the heirs of a living 
person is construed in its technical sense, that is, as 
meaning the persons who would inherit the lands of the 
ancestor on his death intestate, Michigan rejects the view 
of Judge Woodruff in Moore v. Littel and follows the 
common-law rule that a remainder to the heirs of a liv-
ing person is contingent until his death. In re Church-
ill's Estate 2.13 involved a devise to a trustee for the life 
of the testator's daughter, remainder, if the daughter 
should die leaving issue, to such issue, and, if she should 
die without issue, remainder, as to eight-tenths, to named 
persons. The will provided, "This leaves an undivided 
two-tenths part of the remainder of my estate, to be 
disposed of under the laws of the State of Michigan." 
The Court held that the two-tenths remained contingent 
until the death of the daughter without issue and then 
vested in the heirs of the testator, determined as of the 
death of the daughter. Thompson v. Thompson 214 in-
volved a conveyance to a son, "For and during his nat-
ural lifetime and after his decease, to the heirs of his 
body." The trial court, evidently following the dicta in 
Moore v. Littel, held that the son took a life estate with 
363, 101 N.W. 576 (1904). In all these cases the life tenant, to whose 
"heirs" the remainder was limited, had living children at the date of 
the conveyance. Cf. Goodell v. Hibbard, 32 Mich. 47 (1875). 
212 See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885). But see: 
Fullager v. Stockdale, 138 Mich. 363 (1904). This was the common-
law view. Part Two, note 158 supra. 
213 230 Mich. 148, 203 N.W. 118 (1925). See: Lewis v. Nelson, 
4 Mich. 630 (1857). 
214 330 Mich. 1, 46 N.W. (2d) 437 (1951); Part One, note 89, Part 
Two, note 181, supra. Cf. Wilson v. Terry, 130 Mich. 73, 89 N.W. 
566 (1902). In Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W. 556 
(1914), land was devised to a son for life, remainder to his heirs. 
It was held that the son's widow took a share as a statutory heir. 
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a vested remainder to the heirs of his body in being at 
the date of the deed, subject to open to admit after-born 
heirs. The Supreme Court modified the decree to hold 
that the son took a life estate with a remainder to the 
heirs of his body in being at his death. The opinion 
clearly adopts the technical common-law meaning of 
"heirs" and appears to accept the common-law view that 
a remainder limited to the heirs of a living person is 
contingent. 
The dicta in Moore v. Littel 215 go far beyond the 
specific problem involved in that case by stating that a 
remainder is vested if there is a person in being who 
would take it if the preceding estate terminated now. 
In Mcinerny v. Haase 216 the Michigan Supreme Court 
showed some inclination to adopt this view. In that 
case, land was devised to the testator's wife for life, "and 
upon her death I bequeath to my daughter Hannah and 
finally, upon Hannah's death, to my granddaughter, 
Mary Jane Mcinerny, should she survive her mother 
Hannah. And in case the said Mary Jane dies before 
her mother, Hannah, then it is my will that the afore-
said property be equally divided among the surviving 
children of my daughter Hannah." The Court said 
that the question of whether the will violated the sta-
tute prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation, 
"depends upon whether the estate in remainder was 
vested or contingent. Our statute (section 8795, 3 Comp. 
Laws) defines such estates: 
" 'Future estates are either vested or contingent: They 
are vested when there is a person in being who would 
have an immediate right to the possession of the lands, 
215 Part Two, notes 202-204, supra. 
216 163 Mich. 364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910). Accord: Ensign v. Dunn, 
181 Mich. 456, 148 N.W. 343 (1914). 
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upon the ceasing of the intermediate or precedent estate. 
They are contingent whilst the person to whom or the 
event upon which they are limited to take effect, re-
mains uncertain.' 217 
"We find in the instant case, under this definition, 
that at the creation of this estate this granddaughter was 
such person then in being who would have such im-
mediate right to possession. The conclusion is unavoid-
able that this was a vested remainder. See opinion, au-
thorities, and notes on the distinction between vested 
and contingent remainders. Kountz's Estate, 213 Pa. 390 
(62 Atl. 1103, 3 L.R.A. [N.S.J 639, 5 Am. & Eng. Ann. 
Cas. 427." 218 
The report of the cited Pennsylvania case is preceded 
by a headnote reading: 
"A vested remainder is an estate to take effect after 
another estate, for years, for life, or in tail, which is so 
limited that if the particular estate were to expire or end 
in any way at the present time, some certain person 
would become thereupon entitled to the immediate en-
joyment.'' 219 
211 The punctuation does not agree with Comp. Laws (1897) §8795, 
in which the second clause is followed by a semicolon. Part Two, 
note 209 supra. 
21s 163 Mich. 364 at 368. The question involved was whether these 
dispositions, plus a provision requiring the then holder of the land 
to pay $5 to testator's son if he returned from the Army, suspended 
the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives. It is 
difficult to see why the court thought the vested or contingent char-
acter of Mary Jane's remainder was material. It would either vest 
subject to the $5 charge or fail on the deaths of her grandmother and 
mother. In Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883) there 
was a devise to testator's wife for life or widowhood, remainder "to 
my children now living, or who may be at the time of her decease or 
marriage." It was held that the remainder vested indefeasibly in the 
children living at the testator's death. This is probably just an 
illustration of the tendency to construe ambiguous or inconsistent 
language in favor of early vesting. Cf. Lewis v. Nelson, 4 Mich. 630 
(1857), holding that a remainder to the surviving children of the 
grantors created by a deed executed before the effective date of the 
Revised Statutes of 1846 conveyed no interest to their living children, 
present or future. 
219 Emphasis supplied. 
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This headnote appears to express the view of Judge 
Woodruff in Moore v. Littel, but the Pennsylvania opin-
ion quotes from numerous English authorities and clear-
ly asserts the common-law view in the following pas-
sage: 
"But, in any event, the remainder in the grandchild-
ren could only be deemed vested in case they had the 
right to immediate possession whenever and however the 
preceding estate determined." 220 
This being so, it would seem that the opinion in Mc-
Inerny v. Haase does not really adopt the theory of the 
dicta in Moore v. Littel. It should probably be classi-
fied as an illustration of the judicial tendency to con-
strue as a condition subsequent language which on its 
face imposes a condition precedent. However that may 
be, the other Michigan cases involving the question 
clearly reject the Moore v. Littel view and adopt the 
common-law rules of vesting of remainders. Fitzhugh v. 
Townsend 221 involved a devise to a trustee for the life 
of testatrix's granddaughter, 
"and if, at her decease, she leave lawful issue surviv-
ing her, I devise and bequeath the whole of my said 
residuary estate to such issue. 
"In the event of the death of my granddaughter, 
Elizabeth Fitzhugh Birney, without lawful issue surviv-
ing her, - - - I further will and direct that all the rest, 
residue, and remainder - - - be equally divided among 
all my brothers and sisters, and the children of such of 
them as shall be no longer living, - - -." 
Elizabeth died without ever having had issue. A 
z2o 213 Pa. 390 at 396, 62 Atl. 1103 (1906). Emphasis supplied. 
The case held that an interest limited to grandchildren to be ascer-
tained ten years after the testatrix's youngest grandchild came of age 
was contingent and violated the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
zz1 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886). 
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brother of the testatrix, Samuel, predeceased the testa-
trix, survived by a son, William, who survived the testa-
trix but died in the lifetime of Elizabeth, without issue, 
devising his estate to Townsend. The interest of William 
would not be vested under the English concept of vest-
ing because it would be contingent on an event uncer-
tain to occur, the death of Elizabeth without issue. Coun-
sel for Townsend contended that a share vested in Wil-
liam at the death of the testatrix because, if the life in-
terest of Elizabeth had then terminated, William would 
have taken a share, citing Moore v. Littel and other 
New York cases following the dicta of Judge Woodruff 
in support of this contention.222 The Court affirmed a 
decree of Circuit Judge Sanford M. Green ruling that 
Townsend took nothing and held that William's re-
mainder was contingent until the death of Elizabeth. As 
the same result could have been reached by holding 
that the interest of William vested at the death of the 
testatrix, subject to being divested if he predeceased 
Elizabeth, the Court's care in holding that William's 
remainder was contingent must be interpreted as a 
categorical rejection of the dicta in Moore v. Littel and 
a deliberate adherence to the common-law rules govern-
ing the vesting of remainders. 
Hadley v. Henderson 223 involved a will which devised 
the residue to Charles C. Owen and provided, "If in 
222 Briefs and Records, January Term, 1886, Defendant Townsend's 
Brief, pp. 11-15. His counsel was Charles I. Walker, Professor of 
Law in the University of Michigan. The Briefs and Records contain 
no opinion by Judge Green and the Bay County Clerk, who searched 
his records at the author's request, could find none. 
22a 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75 (1921). Accord: Stevens v. Wildey, 
281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937). Cf. In re Churchill's Estate, 
230 Mich. 148, 203 N.W. 118 (1925); Part Two, note 213 supra; 
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 
(1930), Part Two, notes 103, 145, supra; In re Dingler's Estate, 319 
Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). 
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case Charles C. Owen dies without issue, it is my will 
that the above property be disposed of" to three named 
persons and a society. The Court, relying on Fitzhugh v. 
Townsend and stressing the third clause of Section 13, 
held the remainder contingent. In Michigan Trust Co. 
v. Baker/24 property was bequeathed to testatrix's hus-
band until death or remarriage, remainder to a trustee 
for the life of her son Stuart and "If my said son shall 
have lawful child or children of his body who shall sur-
vive him, his share of my estate shall go to such child or 
children, girls at age of 25 years and boys at 30 years and 
not before." The will limited other remainders in the 
event that Stuart died without issue. Stuart died two 
years after the testatrix, without ever having had issue. 
The Court held all the remainders subsequent to the 
trust contingent and void under the Rule Against Per-
petuities. In Lambertson v. Case/25 land was devised to 
testator's wife "as long as she lives, and when she gets 
through with it it shall go to Norma Lambertson if she 
is living, if not to J. V. Lambertson." It was held that 
the remainder of Norma was contingent. In re Coots' 
Estate 226 involved a devise of land and other property 
to a trustee for the lives of the testator's widow and son, 
then to the son's children, or their heirs by right of repre-
sentation, and in case the son should die without leaving 
issue or lineal heirs, then to six named nephews and 
nieces. The remainder to the nephews and nieces was 
held to be contingent. In Floyd v. Smith 2·21 there was a 
bequest to a trustee for the lives of four named persons, 
224226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), Part Two, notes 102, 128, 
supra. Accord: Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 
Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Two, notes 88, 104, supra. 
225 245 Mich. 208, 222 N.W. 182 (1928). 
2zs 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), cert. den., Delbridge v. 
Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931). 
221 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942), Part Two, note 98 supra. 
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then to the issue of the life beneficiaries living ·at the 
death of the survivor. It was held that the remainder 
vested on the death of the survivor of the life bene-
ficiaries. 
This review of the cases would seem to make it abun-
dantly clear that Michigan does not accept the view 
advanced by Judge Woodruff in Moore v. Littel that a 
remainder is vested if there is a person in being who 
would take if the preceding estate terminated now. In 
Michigan a remainder is not vested unless the event 
upon which it is to become possessory is certain to occur 
and there are ascertained persons in being who, through-
out the continuance of the remainder, will take when-
ever that event occurs. In the language of Section 13, 
a future estate is contingent whilst the person to whom 
or the event upon which it is limited to take effect re-
mains uncertain. 
(2) What Language Creates Contingency 
As has been seen, a future interest may be vested al-
though possession or enjoyment is postponed until a 
future time/28 although it may never become possessory 
because it may terminate before prior interests, 229 and 
although it is subject to defeasance by the exercise of 
a power of appointment or by the operation of a con-
dition subsequent, a special limitation, or an executory 
limitation.230 If Andrew Baker devises land to James 
Thorpe for life, remainder to Lucy Baker for life, but 
22s Part Two, notes 153, 155, 195, supra. Otherwise there could be 
no such thing as a vested future interest. By definition a future estate 
is one "where the right to the possession is postponed to a future 
period." Part Two, note 179 supra. 
229 Part Two, notes 154, 193, supra. 
200 Part Two, note 160 supra. Cf. Plant v. Weeks, 39 Mich. 117 
(1878). 
344 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
if Lucy remarry, to John Stiles for the life of Lucy, the 
remainder of Lucy is vested although it will not become 
possessory in any event until the termination of James's 
life estate, it will never become possessory if Lucy dies 
before James and, even after it becomes possessory, it 
will be defeated if Lucy remarries. On the other hand, 
if Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe for life, 
remainder, if Lucy is unmarried at the death of James, 
to Lucy Baker for life, Lucy's remainder is contingent. 
When a future interest is limited to an ascertained liv-
ing person it is contingent only if subject to a condition 
precedent of an uncertain event. In Michigan State 
Bank v. Hastings,231 land and other property were con-
veyed to the State, "upon and subject to the express 
condition that the State of Michigan shall indemnify and 
save harmless" the grantors against a certain mortgage. 
In holding that this was a condition subsequent, the 
Court remarked, 
"The right to annex a condition to a conveyance, re-
sults from the power of alienation; and this power of 
alienation is an incident to the right of property. If 
then, that condition be precedent, and the act upon 
which the estate depends be not performed, the estate 
does not vest; but if the condition be subsequent, the 
estate does vest, and will continue to vest until defeated 
by a failure on the part of the grantee to perform the 
condition annexed to the estate; or, in other words, until 
there is a breach of the condition." 232 
It should be noted that a future interest may be vested 
subject to defeasance although the event causing de-
231 1 Dougl. 225 (Mich. 1844). Blanchard v. Detroit, Lansing & 
Lake Michigan R.R. Co., 31 Mich. 43 (1875), is a similar case. There 
a conveyance was made "upon the express condition" that the grantee 
build a depot on the land and stop a train there daily. This was held 
to be a condition subsequent. 
2s2 1 Dougl. 225 at 252. 
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feasance may or will occur before the future interest 
becomes possessory. For example, if Andrew Baker de-
vises land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder as she may 
by will appoint, and in default of appointment to John 
Stiles and his heirs, the remainder of John Stiles is 
vested subject to defeasance.233 In McCarty v. Fish/34 
property was devised to testatrix's husband for life, with 
power to use so much of the principal as might be neces-
sary in defraying his necessary expenses, remainder to 
others. It was held that the remainder vested at the 
death of the testatrix, subject to being defeated by the 
exercise of the power. 
Whether particular language of a conveyance or will 
mentioning an uncertain event imposes a condition 
precedent or merely postpones enjoyment, limits the 
duration of the interest, or subjects it to defeasance is 
usually a problem of construction. The Michigan 
Supreme Court has frequently expressed a strong con-
structional preference for that construction which will 
make the future interest vest at the earliest possible 
time.235 An interest which is vested or will certainly vest 
during the period of the Rule does not, of course, violate 
the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
2&3 Part Two, note 160 supra. It is also possible to have a remainder 
vested subject to a charge. Smith v. Jackman, 115 Mich. 192, 73 N.W. 
228 (1897); Engel v. Ladewig, 153 Mich. 8, 116 N.W. 550 (1908). 
234 87 Mich. 48, 49 N.W. 513 (1891). 
2as Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 565, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); 
Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395 at 399-400, 15 N.W. 525 (1883); Union 
Mutual Association v. Montgomery, 70 Mich. 587 at 595, 38 N.W. 
588 (1888); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374 at 378, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); 
Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642 at 648-649, 134 N.W. 1018 
(1912); Ensign v. Dunn, 181 Mich. 456 at 462, 148 N.W. 343 (1914); 
In re Churchill's Estate, 230 Mich. 148 at 155, 157, 203 N.W. liS 
(1925); Lambertson v. Case, 245 Mich. 208 at 210, 222 N.W. 182 
(1928); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352 at 360, 38 N.W. (2d) 889 
(1949); In re Ecclestone's Estate, 339 Mich. 15 at 20, 62 N.W. (2d) 606 
(1954). This is a rule of construction generally accepted in Anglo-
American law. 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §348 (1936). 
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The uncertain events which most commonly cause 
difficulty are reaching a certain age, and death before 
another. Other uncertain events occasionally appear in 
the cases. As has been seen, provisions in wills post-
poning distribution until some administrative step, such 
as probating the will, paying debts, completion of ad-
ministration, winding up of a business, or sale of prop-
erty, is taken, are construed, whenever possible, to post-
pone only enjoyment, not vesting.236 In Skinner v. 
Taft/81 a direction in a will that the executors transfer 
property to four named persons and their heirs and as-
signs, "after the payment of my just debts and funeral 
expenses" and upon the termination of a trust which 
was to terminate "five years from the date of the probat-
ing of my will in the County of which I may die a resi-
dent," was treated as valid, presumably on the theory 
that only enjoyment, not vesting, was postponed. In 
Ostrander v. Muskegon Finance Co./38 the testator de-
vised his estate to his wife, "Provided, she remains my 
widow." It was held that the widow took a present fee 
simple, subject to defeasance upon her remarriage. 
Where it is clear that no interest was intended to pass 
unless and until an uncertain event should occur, the 
interest is contingent. Conant v. Stone 239 involved a 
will which provided, "My said son to have the use and 
income from said estate so long as Lizzie Rice, his present 
wife, remains as his legal wife, but in case of her death 
or in case of a legal separation and divorce from my said 
23s Part Two, note 132 supra. 
237 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905), Part Two, note 133 supra. 
Accord: Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 
(1900) (payment of debts and other legacies); McGraw v. McGraw, 
176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 1910) (payment of debts). Cf. De Buck v. 
Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940). 
za8 230 Mich. 310, 202 N.W. 951 (1925). 
239 176 Mich. 654, 143 N.W. 39 (1913), Part One, note 191 supra. 
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son, I then give, devise and bequeath to my said son 
and to his heirs and assigns forever, said above men-
tioned interest in my estate." The devise of the fee was 
held contingent. Similarly, in Dusbiber v. Melville/40 
a will provided, "Now, my will is, that in case she shall 
be compelled to live apart from her said husband, Fred-
erick Melville, and shall have to support herself, that I 
give, devise and bequeath to her, the said Florence A. 
Melville, the sum of two thousand dollars, to be paid to 
her by my executor, out of my estate, as soon as my 
executor shall be convinced that it is impossible for the 
said Florence A. Melville to live with her husband ... " 
This language was held to impose a condition preced-
ent. In Markham v. Hufjord/41 a bequest "to be paid 
to him at the expiration of two years from the date of 
my demise: provided that he shall be deemed a reformed 
man, in the judgment of the executors of this will," 
was correctly held to be contingent. 
A provision postponing enjoyment until a legatee or 
devisee reaches a certain age may be construed as a con-
dition precedent which suspends vesting until the legatee 
reaches that age or the bequest may be found to vest 
indefeasibly, subject only to postponement of enjoy-
ment, or to vest, subject to defeasance if the legatee dies 
before reaching the stipulated age.243 If the legatee is 
in being and ascertained and entitled to the income until 
receipt of the principal, the gift is usually found to be 
240 178. Mich. 601, 146 N.W. 208 (1914), Part One, note 191 supra. 
Cf. Conrad v. Long, 33 Mich. 78 (1875), where a remainder was 
devised, "upon this condition: if at any time subsequent she should 
conclude not to live with her present husband - - - -." This was held 
to be a condition subsequent. 
241. 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222 (1900), Part Two, note 113 supra. 
243 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §350 (1936). 
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vested.244 In Hull v. Osborn/45 the residue of an estate 
was devised and bequeathed to two named grandchil-
dren "on the terms and conditions herein contained and 
payable at the times and in the manner hereinafter set 
forth." Ten thousand dollars was to be paid to each of 
the persons "when she shall arrive at" the ages of twenty-
one, twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five and forty years "and 
the remainder of the one-half of the residue hereby de-
vised and bequeathed to the said Blanche Wyckoff Hull 
shall be paid to her when she shall arrive at the age of 
forty-five years." After like provision for the other 
legatee, the will provided that if either legatee should die 
without living issue before reaching forty-five, the un-
paid portion of her share should be paid to the survivor 
"at the time and in the manner it would have been paid 
to such deceased grandchild had she lived." If both died 
under forty-five without living issue, there was a gift 
over to brothers, sisters, nephews, and nieces then liv-
ing. It was held that the interest of the two grand-
children in the principal vested at once, subject to post-
ponement of enjoyment and to defeasance upon death 
244 !d., §§351, 355, 356; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§256-259 (1940). 
See Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556 at 569, 162 N.W. 102 (1917). 
In Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 565, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), Chief 
Justice Campbell said, "While there has been some variance among 
the authorities concerning the legal distinctions between vested and 
contingent estates, they chiefly agree first in favoring the vesting of 
interests, and second in treating future interests as vested when there 
is any present interest in the income of the property." 
245 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). See: Le Baron v. Shepherd, 
21 Mich. 263 (1870); Knorr v. Millard, 52 Mich. 542, 18 N.W. 349 
(1884); Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265, 23 N.W. 807 (1885); In re 
Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). Cf. Bennett 
v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889), Part One, note 6ll 
supra, where property was to be transferred to a daughter when she 
reached thirty-five, but if she died before that to her issue or, if none, 
to another. The daughter was entitled to part of the income pending 
the transfer. It was held that her interest was indefeasibly vested. 
This result is, of course, unsound. 
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under forty-five. In Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust 
Co./46 there was a bequest to a trustee to pay the income 
to testatrix's daughter Belle for life and upon her death 
to pay portions of the principal to children of Belle who 
were then twenty-five and the issue of children who pre-
deceased Belle, 
"And any remaining portions, my trustee shall keep 
each as a special trust fund, for one each of her children 
surviving and being less than 25 years of age, and it shall 
pay to each such child the net income arising from his 
or her special fund, and upon a child reaching the age 
of 25 years, it shall pay, deliver and convey to said child 
his or her special trust fund; and in the event of the 
death of such child before the same shall reach the age 
of 25 years, my trustee shall pay, deliver and convey his 
or her special fund to my said daughter's children sur-
viving, except this, that if any child has died with issue 
then surviving, said issue shall take the share the de-
ceased child would receive if living - - -." 
The Court held that the interests of the children of 
Belle were vested subject to defeasance on death under 
twenty-five. The provision for defeasance violated the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, but the interest of the chil-
dren did not. 
In Hunter v. Hunter/ 47 a will directed the executors 
to apply the income to the support of the testatrix's three 
2462.49 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Part Two, notes 103, 145, 
supra. Gardner v: City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 
255 N.W. 687 (1934), Part Two, note 88 supra, involved a similar 
disposition. As the trust included land, it violated the statute pro-
hibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation. Part One, 
note 593, Part Two, note 53 supra. The Court did not clearly decide 
whether the interest of children, who were to receive income until 
they reached thirty and then the principal, was contingent or vested 
subject to defeasance but used language suggesting that their interest 
would violate the Rule Against Perpetuities unless indefeasibly vested. 
267 Mich .. 270 at 291-292. This is clearly unsound. A future interest 
vested subject to defeasance does not violate the Rule, although the 
provision for defeasance may. Cf. Part Two, note 280, infra. 
247 160 Mich. 218, 125 N.W. 71 (1910). 
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children until distribution, to distribute a third of the 
principal to each child on reaching thirty or, in the dis-
cretion of the executors, at any time after reaching 
twenty-one, and, in case any child die, to distribute its 
share to its issue or, if none, to the survivor. Two chil-
dren died without issue before reaching twenty-one; 
the third died at twenty-seven, leaving issue, before dis-
tribution had been made. It was held that the estate of 
the surviving child took nothing; that his interest was 
either contingent upon surviving until distribution or 
vested subject to defeasance on death before reaching 
thirty. 
If a will manifests no intention to give any interest 
to a legatee unless he reaches a certain age, his interest· 
is, of course, contingent until he reaches that age. In 
Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker}248 there was a bequest to 
a trustee to pay the income from half to testatrix's son 
Stuart for life, then, "If my said son shall have lawful 
child or children of his body who shall survive him, his 
share of my estate shall go to such child or children, girls 
at age of 25 years and boys at 30 years and not before." 
It was held that the interests of the children would not 
vest until they reached the stated ages. 
Alleged conditions of survival give rise to three types 
of problems: (1) whether the future interest in question 
is subject to such a condition; (2) who must be survived; 
and (3) whether the condition is precedent or subse-
quent; that is, whether the interest is contingent or 
vested subject to defeasance. If the future interest is a life 
estate following a prior life estate, it will never become 
possessory unless the remainderman survives the life ten-
248 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), Part Two, notes 102, 224, 
supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760. 
(1932); Part Two, note 103 supra. 
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ant. If Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe for 
life, remainder to Lucy Baker for life, Lucy's interest, al-
though vested, will not become possessory unless she 
survives James. If, however, the future interest is a 
fee simple or an absolute interest in personalty, the fail-
ure of the remainderman to survive the preceding estates 
does not affect his interest unless it is subject to a con-
dition of survival. If Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy 
Baker for life, remainder to John Stiles in fee simple, 
John's remainder is not affected by his death before 
Lucy. It passes to his heirs, devisees, or assigns as if 
he owned a present estate in fee simple.250 
When a present interest is devised to the surviving 
members of a group of persons, "surviving" normally 
means surviving the testator, because language in a will 
is ordinarily construed to speak from the death of the 
testator.251 Hence if Andrew Baker devises land "to the 
surviving children of my deceased daughter Lucy," those 
children of Lucy who are living when Andrew dies will 
take. When, however, a future interest is devised to the 
surviving members of a group, the normal meaning 
would ordinarily seem to be "surviving the preceding 
estates." Thus if Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy 
Baker for life, remainder to her surviving children, he 
probably means those who survive Lucy. Most courts 
adopt this construction unless the context suggests a dif-
ferent meaning.252 Michigan, however, appears to fol-
250 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Curtis v. 
Fowler, 66 Mich. 696, 33 N.W. 804 (1887); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 
374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Hibler v. Hibler, 104 Mich. 274, 62 N.W. 
361 (1895); Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897); 
Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Holmes v. 
Holmes, 215 Mich. 112, 183 N.W. 784 (1921); In re Hurd's Estate, 
303 Mich. 504, 6 N.W. (2d) 758 (1942). But see: Hunter v. Hunter, 
Part Two, note 24 7 supra. 
2p Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404, 4 N.W. 172 (1880). 
2s2 2 Simes, LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §349 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §251 (1940). 
352 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
low a minority rule that, even in this situation, "surviv-
ing" presumptively means "surviving the testator." 
In Toms v. Williams/58 land and other property were 
devised to a trustee to hold for eighteen years and 
then to transfer them to four named persons "or the 
survivor of them, and to their heirs and assigns for-
ever, as tenants in common." It was held that the 
word "survivor" related to surviving the testator so that 
the interests vested indefeasibly on the death of the 
testator. Rood v. Hovey 254 involved a will by which a 
testator devised his estate to his wife for life or widow-
hood, remainder to "my children now living, or who 
may be at the time of her decease or marriage." Two 
sons who survived the testator predeceased his widow. 
It was held that their interests vested indefeasibly on 
the death of the testator. In Porter v. Porter/55 a testator 
devised his estate to his wife for life and "on the decease 
of my wife,--- I desire my property to be divided equal-
ly between my surviving children". One son survived 
the testator but predeceased his widow. It was held that 
an interest vested indefeasibly in this son upon his 
father's death and was not defeated by his failure to 
survive the life tenant. 
The rule that "surviving" means "surviving the testa-
tor" being only a rule of construction, it ought to be 
2sa 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Part Two, notes ll2, 244, 
supra. The four named persons were entitled to part of the income 
during part of the eighteen years. 
254 50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883), Part Two, notes 198, 218, supra. 
L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1077 (1891) is 
substantially contra. There land was devised to the widow for life, 
remainder to three named children with a provision that "whereas 
one or more of my said children may not survive me or my said 
wife" in such case the remainder to the survivors. The remainder 
was held vested subject to defeasance by failure to survive the willow. 
255 50 Mich. 456, 15 N.W. 550 (1883). Accord: In re Patterson's 
Estate, 227 Mich. 486, 198 N.W. 958 (1924). 
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overcome by a clear expression of contrary intention. In 
Mullreed v. Clark/56 where a remainder was devised to 
the testator's son James "and, if James should die with-
out heirs, then" to testator's daughters, the trial court 
held that "die without heirs" meant die without heirs 
before the testator, so that James took an indefeasibly 
vested estate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that 
"die without heirs" referred to the time of James's death. 
Lambertson v. Case 257 involved a devise of land to testa-
tor's wife "as long as she lives, and when she gets through 
with it it shall go to Norma Lambertson if she is living, 
if not to J. V. Lambertson." Norma survived the testa-
tor but predeceased the life tenant. The court rejected 
a contention that "if she is living" referred to the time 
of the testator's death and held that Norma's remainder 
was contingent upon her surviving the life tenant and 
never vested. In one case, however, the Michigan Su-
preme Court has applied the rule as if it were a rule of 
law, defeating intent, rather than a rule of construction 
designed to ascertain intent. In Sturgis v. Sturgis,258 
a testator devised land to his son David "for and during 
his natural life and to descend to his male children, if 
any shall survive him, if not, then to his female children, 
and should none of his children survive him" to other 
grandchildren of the testator. At the death of the testa-
tor, David had two sons, Frank and James. Frank pre-
deceased David, leaving issue. It was held that the in-
256110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138, 989 (1896), Part Two, notes 125, 
183, supra. 
257 245 Mich. 208, 222 N.W. 182 (1928), Part Two, note 225 supra. 
In re Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, 163 N.W. 907 (1917) involved 
a bequest to a wife for life, remainder to five children "or to such of 
them as shall be living at the time of my death in case I shall survive 
my wife, or at the time of my wife's death, in case she should survive 
me." It was held that the remainder was subject to a condition of 
surviving the wife. 
258 242 Mich. 52, 217 N.W. 771 (1928). Emphasis supplied. 
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terests of Frank and James vested indefeasibly at the 
death of the testator. 
When a condition of survival is found to exist, the 
Michigan Supreme Court has shown a strong prefer-
ence for a construction which would make the future 
interest affected by it vested subject to defeasance rather 
than contingent.259 
When a remainder is vested, it is clear in Michigan as 
elsewhere that it is not subject to any condition of sur-
vivorship unless such a condition is imposed expressly or 
by implication by the terms of the limitation.260 As to 
contingent remainders, however, Michigan developed a 
peculiar doctrine, markedly inconsistent with the usual 
constructional preferences for early vesting and early 
indefeasibility, that every contingent remainder was sub-
ject to a condition of surviving the life tenant unless a 
contrary intention was expressly manifested. In Fitzhugh 
v. Townsend/61 property was devised to a trustee for the 
life of a granddaughter, with remainder to the surviv-
ing issue of the granddaughter. In the event of the grand-
daughter's death without surviving issue, the property 
was to be divided among testatrix's brothers and sisters, 
"and the children of such of them as shall be no longer 
living." A brother of the testatrix who had died before 
259 L'Etourneau v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1007 (1891), 
Part Two, note 254 supra; Mcinerny v. Haase, 163 Mich. 364, 128 
N.W. 215 (1910), Part Two, note 216 supra; Van Gallow v. Brandt, 
168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912). See: Penny v. Mayer, 279 
Mich. 400, 272 N.W. 721 (1937). Accord: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
§253 (1940). But see: Hadley v. Henderson, 214. Mich. 157, 183 
N.W. 75 (1921), Part Two, note 262 infra; Lambertson v. Case, 245 
Mich. 208, 222 N.W. 182 (1928), Part Two, notes 225, 257, supra; 
In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), Part Two, 
note 263 infra; Stevens v. Wildey, 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 
(1937), Part Two, note 266 infra; Horton v. Moore, 110 F. (2d) 189 
(6th Cir. 1940), Part One, note 372 supra. 
260 Part Two, note 250 supra. 
2a1. 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886), Part Two, note 221 supra. 
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rhe will was made left a son, William, who survived the 
testatrix but predeceased the life beneficiary. It was 
held that William's interest was contingent both upon 
the death of the life beneficiary without issue and upon 
his surviving her, so that his estate took nothing. In 
Hadley v. Henderson/62 there was a bequest to testator's 
son Charles, but in case Charles should die without is-
sue, $3,000 to a daughter Mary, $2,000 to a sister Susan, 
$1,000 to a niece Alice, and the residue to a missionary 
society. Susan predeceased the testator, survived by is-
sue. Mary and Alice survived the testator ·but pre-
deceased Charles. These three had no issue. It was held 
that the contingent legacies of Mary and Alice "lapsed" 
upon their death before Charles. In re Coots' Estate 263 
is the most notorious of this strange line of cases. There, 
land was devised to a trustee for the life of the survivor 
of the testator's widow and son, remainder to the son's 
children and their heirs, but if the son should die with-
out issue, to six named nephews and nieces of the testa-
tor. Three of these nephews and nieces survived the 
testator but predeceased his son, who died without issue. 
The Court rejected the cogent argument that our sta-
tutes make contingent future estates descendible and de-
visable/64 which they cannot be if all are subject to a 
condition of survivorship until vesting, and held that 
the devises to the nephews and nieces were subject to a 
condition precedent of surviving the widow and son. 
262 214 Mich. 157, 183 N.W. 75 (1921), Part Two, note 223 supra. 
Contra: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §261 (1940). See: Casner and West-
fall, "Construction Problems," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §21.25 
(1952). 
2ss 253 Mich. 208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931), cert. den., Delbridge v. 
Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1931), Part Two, note 226 supra. Contra: 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT §261 (1940). 
264 Part One, note 371 supra. 
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After this decision the Legislature enacted a statute pro-
viding: 
"In all cases where the owner of an expectant estate, 
right or interest in real or personal property, shall die 
prior to the termination of the precedent or inter-
mediate estate, if the contingency arises by which such 
owner would have been entitled to an estate in posses-
sion if living, his heirs at law if he died intestate, or his 
devisees or grantees and assigns if he shall have devised 
or conveyed such right or interest, shall be entitled to 
the same estate in possession." us 
Stevens v. Wildey u 6 involved a will which became 
effective before the statute. By it, land was devised to 
Richard Odell for life, remainder to his children, but if 
he died without issue to Isaac Odell. Isaac survived the 
testator but predeceased Richard, who died without is-
sue. It was held that Isaac's remainder "lapsed." The 
Court said, however, that the rule in the Coots' case 
was changed by the statute as to dispositions becoming 
effective after the statute. It would seem, therefore, that 
the strange rule in In re Coots' Estate is no longer the 
law of Michigan. 
Professor Gray and many of the courts which have 
passed upon the question have taken the position that a 
limitation should be construed as if the Rule Against 
265 Act 211, P.A. 1931; Mich. Stat. Ann. §26.47; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§554.101; Part One, note 372 supra. 
266 281 Mich. 377, 275 N.W. 179 (1937); Part Two, notes 124, 223, 
supra. See: American Brass Co. v. Hauser, 284 Mich. 194 at 200, 
278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 
Mich. 575 at 606, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). In In re East's Estate, 
325 Mich. 352, 38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949), a remainder was limited 
by a will admitted to probate in 1905, to Percey C. Hunt in fee, 
"further, in case he dies without leaving direct heirs then said estate 
to be divided equally between my brothers and sisters." It was 
decided that the condition (dying without direct heirs) had not oc-
curred, but the opinion suggests that the contingent future estate of 
the brothers and sisters was subject to a condition of surviving Percey. 
325 Mich. 352 at 359, 363. 
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Perpetuities did not exist, and then the Rule should be 
applied to it, as so construed "remorselessly." American 
courts, however, are tending to adopt the view that when 
the limitation is capable of two possible constructions, 
one of which would violate the Rule and the other of 
which would not, the latter should be adopted. 267 The 
Michigan Supreme Court has not clearly accepted either 
view, but it has indicated that it will not distort the lan-
guage of a limitation in order to achieve a construction 
which would make it valid. 268 
267Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §629 (1915), but 
compare §633: "When the expression which a testator uses is really 
ambiguous, and is fairly capable of two constructions, one of which 
would produce a legal result, and the other a result that would be 
bad for remoteness, it is a fair presumption that the testator meant to 
create a legal rather than an illegal interest." Taking the two sections 
together, Professor Gray may only have meant that the language 
should not be distorted in order to achieve a construction which would 
make the limitation valid. See 2 Simes, LAW oF FUTuRE INTERESTS, 
§550 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §375 (1944); Leach and Tudor, 
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY §§22.44-22.46 (1952). The Restatement adopts and Leach and 
Tudor prefer the view that the effect of the Rule should have a bearing 
on construction. The classic statement of the view that it should not is 
that of Baron Parke in Viscount Dungannon v. Smith, 12 Cl. & F. 546 at 
599, 8 Eng. Rep .. 1523 at 1545 (1846). One of the best known state-
ments of the other view is that of Lumpkin, J., in Forman v. Troup, 
30 Ga. 496 at 499 (1860). 
268 Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). The 
limitation was to a son for life, remainder to his children for their 
lives, remainder to the children's heirs. The question was whether 
the class "children" closed at the testatrix's death or at her son's 
death. See Part Two, note 276 infra. But in Dean v. Mumford, 102 
Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894) the court held that a testamentary trust 
for testator's sons, their wives and children, included only wives whom 
they had at the testator's death, although one of the sons was then 
unmarried. The opinion indicates that this construction was adopted 
because any other would make the limitation invalid. 
CHAPTER 12 
Class Gifts 
A CLASS gift is a limitation of a property interest to a group of persons intended to take as an entity or unit rather than as specific individuals. 
When a limitation is to persons specified by their indi-
vidual names, the grantor or testator may be assumed to 
have thought of them as separate individuals rather than 
as an entity, unit, or group. Hence, in the construction 
of limitations, there is a presumption that a limitation to 
named individuals is not a class gift.269 Being only a rule 
of construction, this presumption is overcome by a con-
trary manifestation of intention. 270 When a limitation 
269 Hatt v. Green, 180 Mich. 883, 147 N.W. 598 (1914) (to her 
children, i.e., George, Ellen, Milo, Merwin, Walter, Alfred, Sarah, 
Wade, and Governor); In re Coots' Estate, 258 Mich. 208, 284 N.W. 
141 (1981), cert. den., Delbridge v. Oldfield, 284 U.S. 665 (1981) 
(residue to be divided equally among seven named nephews and 
nieces); Cattell v. Evans, 301 Mich. 708, 4 N.W. (2d) 67 (1942) 
(residue to seven named persons, each to take an equal undivided one-
seventh share). PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §280 (1940); Casner, "Class 
Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§22.5-22.8 (1952). 
210 Eyer v. Beck, 70 Mich. 179, 38 N.W. 20 (1888) (my 
heirs, to wit: John Beck, the children of Christian Beck, Jr., de-
ceased, Elizabeth Eicher, Gottsieb Beck, Peter Beck, Magdalena Eyer); 
Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 588 (1897) (remainder 
"to her said grandchildren, Joseph and Peter Lariverre, children of 
the said Joseph, her son, or to his heirs; it being expressly understood 
that, if her said son Joseph shall have more children at the time of 
his death, they shall share and share alike the said property"); In re 
Ives' Estate, 182 Mich. 699, 148 N.W. 727 (1914) (residue to sister 
Hattie and brothers Wesley and Dwight, to each an undivided one-
third); In re Hunter's Estate, 212 Mich. 880, 180 N.W. 864 (1920) 
(residue to my two sisters, viz: Catherine and Ella, share and share 
alike); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 278 N.W. 404 (1987) (to the 
following named children of my said nephew, Fred, to wit: Edmund, 
Mildred, Wilmot and Helma, share and share alike); American Brass 
Co. v. Hauser, 284 Mich. 194, 278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938) 
(to my children. This will is made by me having in mind my 
children, Frank, Otto, Albert and Charles); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§281 (1940). 
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is to persons described only by a group designation, such 
as "children," "grandchildren," "brothers," "nephews," 
"cousins," "issue," "heirs," or "next of kin," the grantor 
or testator may be assumed to have thought of them as 
an entity or unit rather than as separate individuals. 
Hence, in the construction of limitations, there is a pre-
sumption that a limitation to persons described only by 
a group designation is a class gift.271 Being only a rule of 
construction, this presumption is overcome by a contrary 
manifestation of intention.272 
211 See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885) (conveyance of 
remainder to heirs of a living person created a class gift to his 
children); Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894) (to the 
children of my said son); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 
182 (1899) (to my daughter Mary Ann, I give to each of her children 
one hundred dollars); Porter v. Osmun, 135 Mich. 361, 97 N.W. 756, 
98 N.W. 859 (1904) (conveyance of remainder to heirs of a living 
person created a class gift to his children); Sturgis v. Sturgis, 242 
Mich. 52, 217 N.W. 771 (1928) (remainder to the male children of 
a son); In re Ecclestone's Estate, 339 Mich. 15 at 24, 62 N.W. (2d) 606 
(1954). See: In re Churchill's Estate, 230 Mich. 148, 203 N.W. ll8 
(1925). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §279 (1940); Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 
AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §§22.9-22.11 (1952). Class gifts were 
involved in the following cases: 
Bailey v. Bailey, 25 Mich. 185 (1872) (my lawful heirs); Plant v. 
Weeks, 39 Mich. 117 (1878) (children of my deceased sister Mary); 
Hascall v. Cox, 49 Mich. 435, 13 N.W. 807 (1882) (my legal heirs); 
Morrison v. Estate of Sessions, 70 Mich. 297, 38 N.W. 249 (1888) (my 
lawful heirs); Clark v. Mack, 161 Mich. 545, 126 N.W. 632 (1910) 
(nearest of kin); Menard v. Campbell, 180 Mich. 583, 147 N.W. 556 
(1914) (at his decease to his heirs surviving); Morse v. Lowe, 182 
Mich. 607, 148 N.W. 970 (1914) (his next of kin, by blood relation-
ship); Brooks v. Parks, 189 Mich. 490, 155 N.W. 573 (1915) (after 
her decease to her heirs); In re Shumway's Estate, 194 Mich. 245, 160 
N.W. 595 (1916) (after her decease to my legal heirs); Russell v. 
Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927) (surviving children of 
life tenant); Hay v. Hay, 317 Mich. 370, 26 N.W. (2d) 908 (1947) 
(remainder to my legal heirs); In re East's Estate, 325 Mich. 352, 38 
N.W. (2d) 889 (1949) (remainder in case he dies without leaving 
direct heirs to my brothers and sisters). In LaMere v. Jackson, 288 
Mich. 99, 284 N.W. 659 (1939), a class gift was held void for uncer-
tainty as to the composition of the class. Other Michigan cases in-
volving class gifts are cited in Part Two, notes 270 supra, 273-276, 
279, 282, 284, 286, infra. 
212 Strong v. Smith, 84 Mich. 567, 48 N.W. 183 (1891) (to my own 
brothers and sisters and to the brothers and sisters of my said wife); 
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As in the case of limitations to individuals, when a 
future estate is limited to a class, the death of a member 
of the class before his interest becomes possessory does 
not defeat it unless it is subject to a condition of sur-
vival, express or implied. If Andrew Baker devises land 
to John Stiles for life, remainder to John's children in 
fee, and John has three children when Andrew dies, these 
children take a vested remainder. If one dies before 
John, his interest passes to his heirs, devisees, or as-
signs.273 If, however, a class gift is subject to a condition 
of survival, the effect of nonsurvival is different from that 
when the gift is to individuals, in that the share of the 
member of the class who fails to survive ordinarily 
passes to the surviving members of the class. If Andrew 
Baker devises land to John Stiles for life, remainder to 
those children of John who survive him, John has three 
Downing v. Birney, 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898) (conveyance 
of remainder to the children of her body begotten); Fullager v. Stock-
dale, 138 Mich. 363, 101 N.W. 576 (1904) (conveyance to heirs of a 
living person vested indefeasible interests in her present living 
children); Wessborg v. Merrill, 195 Mich. 556, 162 N.W. 102 (1917) 
(bequest to my wife and five children). With the last case compare 
In re Holtforth's Estate, 298 Mich. 708, 299 N.W. 776 (1941) where a 
devise "to the seven children of my brother, - - and the survivor of 
them" was assumed to create a class gift. 
21s De Visme v. Mello, 1 Bro. C.C. 537, 28 Eng. Rep. 1285 (1782) 
(personalty); Rood v. Hovey, 50 Mich. 395, 15 N.W. 525 (1883), Part 
Two, note 254 supra; Porter v. Porter, 50 Mich. 456, 15 N.W. 550 
(1883), Part Two, note 255 supra; Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 
N.W. 255 (1894), Part Two, note 250 supra; Conover v. Hewitt, 125 
Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Porter v. Osmun, 135 Mich. 361, 97 
N.W. 756, 98 N.W. 859 (1904); In re Patterson's Estate, 227 Mich. 
486, 198 N.W. 958 (1924), Part Two, note 255 supra; Sturgis v. Sturgis, 
242 Mich. 52, 217 N.W. 771 (1928), Part Two, note 258 supra; Rodey 
v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937). See Lariverre v. Rains, 
112 Mich. 276 at 281, 70 N.W. 583 (1897). 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE 
INTERESTS, §390 (1936); Casner and Westfall, "Construction Problems," 
5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §21.11 (1952). Cf. Fitzhugh v. Town-
send, 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886), Part Two, notes 221, 261, 
supra. The class designation itself, e.g., "heirs," "next of kin," may 
imply a condition of survival. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §249, Com-
ments e, f. (1940). 
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children when Andrew dies, and one of these dies before 
John, the entire remainder passes to the surviving two 
in the absence of other provisions in Andrew's will.274 
A class gift differs from a limitation to individuals in 
that a class may open to admit new members after the 
effective date of the instrument containing the limitation. 
If Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles for life, re-
mainder to John's sons Henry and William in fee, a third 
son of John, born after the death of Andrew, will not take 
under the devise. If however, Andrew Baker devises 
land to John Stiles for life, remainder to the children of 
John, not only John's children in being at the death of 
Andrew but those born thereafter will share the re-
mainder.275 A well-settled rule of construction, known 
as the "Rule of Convenience," prescribes that, in the ab-
sence of a manifestation of some other intention, a class 
closes when any member of it is entitled to possession of 
a share in the property. This means that the class will 
z14 Eberts v. Eberts, 42 Mich. 404, 4 N.W. 172 (1880); Fitzhugh v. 
Townsend, 59 Mich. 427, 27 N.W. 561 (1886), Part Two, notes 221, 
261, supra; In re Blodgett's Estate, 197 Mich. 455, 163 N.W. 907 
(1917), Part Two, note 257 supra; American Brass Co. v. Hauser, 284 
Mich. 194, 278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938). See In re Coots' 
Estate, 253 Mich. 208 at 212, 234 N.W. 141 (1931); Cattell v. Evans, 
301 Mich. 708, 4 N.W. (2d) 67 (1942). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §251, 
Ill. 1; c. 22, Introductory Note; §296, Comment c. and Ills. 1, 6 
(1940); Casner and Westfall, "Construction Problems," 5 AMERICAN 
LAW oF PROPERTY, §21.12 (1952). If a limitation to individuals is 
subject to a condition of survivorship, the survivors take the shares of 
those who fail to survive only if the limitation creates a joint tenancy 
or contains express provisions therefor, as was the case in L'Etourneau 
v. Henquenet, 89 Mich. 428, 50 N.W. 1077 (1891), Part Two, note 
254 supra. 
z1s Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 186 
(1880); See v. Derr, 57 Mich. 369, 24 N.W. 108 (1885); Hovey v. 
Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Lariverre v. Rains, 112 
Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 (1897); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 
N.W. 182 (1899); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). 
Cf. Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265, 23 N.W. 807 (1885) (bequest, 
without precedent interest, to children of a living person, to be paid 
to them on coming of age). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, C. 22, JntrodUC· 
tory Note §279, Ill 2. (1940). 
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not open to admit persons who come into being after 
this time. If Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy Baker 
for life, remainder to the children of John Stiles, chil-
dren of John who are in being when Andrew dies or 
who come into being before Lucy dies constitute the 
class; children of John who come into being after the 
death of Lucy are not entitled to shares.276 Similarly, if 
Andrew Baker bequeaths property to the children of 
John Stiles who attain the age of twenty-one, children 
of John who come into being after a child of John has 
attained that age do not take. 271 
The Rule of Convenience has an important exception. 
If there is no member of the designated class in being at 
the time when, under the terms of the limitation, the 
interest of the class or some of its members would other-
wise become possessory, the class does not close so long 
as it is possible for persons included within the class de-
scription to come into being. If Andrew Baker devises 
land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to the children 
of John Stiles, and John has no children when Lucy 
276 Baldwin v. Karver, 1 Cowp. 309, 98 Eng. Rep. 1102 (1775); 
Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 186 (1880) 
(devise to daughter for life, remainder to her children and grand-
children); McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 182 (1899) 
(bequest to widow for life, remainder to children of daughter Mary 
Ann; child of Mary Ann en ventre sa mere when the widow died en-
titled to share); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). 
PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §295 (1940); 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE IN-
TERESTS, §378 (1936); Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §§22.40-22.46 (1952). Being only a rule of construction, the 
Rule of Convenience does not apply if a contrary intent is mani-
fested. Thus in Lariverre v. Rains, 112 Mich. 276, 70 N.W. 583 
(1897), Part Two, note 270 supra, the Court recognized that the 
language used expressly included members of the class who came into 
being after the remainder limited to it became posssesory. This lan-
guage is quoted in the text, Part One, note 264 supra. 
211 Andrews v. Partington, 3 Bro. C.C. 401, 29 Eng. Rep. 610 
(1791 ); Hoste v. Pratt, 3 Ves. Jr. 730, 30 Eng. Rep. 1243 (1798); Gray, 
RULE AGAINST PFRPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §379 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §382 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §295 (1940); 
Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §22.44 (1952). 
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dies, all children of John, whenever born, will take. 
The first child of John will take the whole remainder 
subject to open, that is, to partial defeasance in favor 
of children of John born later. 278 
Chapters 9, 10, and 11 have made it evident that if the 
interest of any member of a class may possibly vest at a 
time beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, that interest is void, and, hence, if the interests of all 
members of the class may possibly vest at a time beyond 
the period of the Rule, the entire class gift is void. This 
is well settled in Michigan.279 The English cases and all 
American decisions involving the question go beyond 
this by holding that, for purposes of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, a class gift stands or falls as a unit. If the 
interest of any member of the class may possibly vest at 
any time beyond the period of the Rule, the entire class 
gift is void, even though the interests of some members 
are presently vested or will certainly vest within the 
period.280 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to James 
218 Hutcheson v. Jones, 2 Madd. 124, 56 Eng. Rep. 281 (1817). 
See: Wyndham v. Wyndham, 3 Bro. C.C. 58, 29 Eng. Rep. 407 (1790); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §295 (b), Ill. 2 and Comment o (1940); 2 
Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §378 (1936); Casner, "Class Gifts," 
5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§22.42, 22.43 (1952). 
279 St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 (1852), Part Two, notes 39, 
84, supra; Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 
976 (1924), Part Two, notes 102, 128, supra; Gettins v. Grand Rapids 
Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930), Part Two, note 145 
supra; Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 
255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Two, note 88 supra. 
2so Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox. 324, 29 Eng. Rep. 1186 (1787); Routledge 
v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794); Leake v. Robinson, 
2 Mer. 363, 35 Eng. Rep. 979 (1817); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PER· 
PETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§373-376 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§§527, 528 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§371, 383, 384 (1944); 
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, §24.26 (1952); Leach, "The Rule Against 
Perpetuities and Gifts to Classes," 51 HARV. L. REv. 1329-1353 (1938). 
In Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922), land was 
devised to testator's son for life, remainder to the children of the son 
for their lives. When the testator died the son had five children. A 
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Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles for 
life and then to transfer the principal to those children 
of John who reach the age of twenty-five, the entire class 
gift to the children of John is void, even if John has two 
children who are twenty-five and three under twenty-
five when Andrew dies.281 Considered alone, the interests 
of the two children who are already twenty-five would 
vest at once upon the death of Andrew, and those of the 
three under twenty-five would certainly vest or fail 
within their own lives, but John may have more children. 
born within four years of his death, who would reach 
twenty-five more than twenty-one years after John's 
death. The Rule of Convenience does not save such a 
gift because, under it, the class would not close against 
persons not in being until John's death. 
The unit or "all or nothing" rule, that a class gift is 
void in toto if the interest of any possible member of the 
class violates the Rule Against Perpetuities, has two ex-
ceptions. First, when a fixed sum is given to each mem-
ber of the class, the gifts to those members whose inter-
ests will certainly vest within the period of the Rule are 
valid even though the interests of other members vio-
late the Rule and so are void.282 If Andrew Baker be-
statute then in force forbade the limitation of successive estates for 
life to persons not in being (Chapter 19, infra). It was held that 
the entire limitation to the children of the son failed because the 
class would not close until the death of the son and so might include 
persons not in being at the death of the testator. And see Part Three, 
notes 78, 79, 81, infra. 
281 Vawdry v. Geddes, I Russ. & M. 203, 39 Eng. Rep. 78 (1830). 
282 Storrs v. Benbow, 3 DeG. M. & G. 390, 43 Eng. Rep. 153 (1853); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §389 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §528 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §385 
(1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpe-
tuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY, §24.28 (1952). This type of 
gift was involved in McLain v. Howald, 120 Mich. 274, 79 N.W. 
182 (1899), Part Two note 271 supra, and In re East's Estate, 325 
Mich. 352, 38 N.W. (2d) 889 (1949), but in those cases no interest 
could possibly vest beyond the period of the Rule, the gift being to 
persons to be ascertained at the death of a life tenant. 
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queaths property to James Thorpe upon trust to pay 
the income to John Stiles for life, and then to transfer 
$1,000 of the principal to each of those children of John 
who reach twenty-five, the interests of those children of 
John who are in being when Andrew dies are valid. The 
second exception is related to the first. When a class 
gift is made to a class consisting of several separated sub-
classes, the gifts to some subclasses may be valid although 
others fail. If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to James 
Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles for 
life, then to pay the income to John's children for their 
lives and upon the death of any child of John to pay the 
principal upon which that child was receiving income to 
the issue of that child, the limitations to such issue are 
valid as to the issue of any child of John who was in 
being when Andrew died, although void as to issue of 
any child of John who came into being after Andrew's 
death.283 
The interrelations between the Rule of Convenience 
and its exception and the unit or "all or nothing" rule 
and its two exceptions are perhaps best illustrated by a 
series of examples. If Andrew Baker bequeaths property 
to John Stiles for life and then to the grandchildren of 
John, the class gift is valid if John has a grandchild liv-
ing when Andrew dies.284 That grandchild takes a vested 
2ss Griffith v. Pownall, 13 Sim. 393, 60 Eng. Rep. 152 (1843); Gray, 
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §391 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §528 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §389 (1944); 
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.29 (1952). 
284 In Cheever v. Washtenaw Circuit Judge, 45 Mich. 6, 7 N.W. 
186 (1880), there was a bequest to testator's daughter Escalala for 
life, then to her children and grandchildren in equal shares. Escalala 
had children but no grandchildren when the testator died. The 
remainder to the class was correctly treated as valid. The living 
children took vested interests which would entitle them or their 
estates to possession of shares on their mother's death. This, under 
the Rule of Convenience, would close the class to afterborn grand-
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interest which will entitle him or his estate to possession 
of a share when John dies. Under the Rule of Conven-
ience, the class will close on the death of John and, there-
fore, all its members will be ascertained and their inter-
ests vested at the end of a life in being. If, on the other 
hand, John has no grandchild when Andrew dies, the 
class gift is void. 285 John's grandchildren may be born 
after his death to children of John not in being when 
Andrew died. The Rule of Convenience is not certain 
to close the class at John's death because he may have 
no grandchildren at that time. Since it is possible that 
the interests of all of the members of the class may vest 
too remotely, they would all be void even if there were 
no unit or "all or nothing" rule. 
If Andrew Baker bequeaths property "to my brothers 
and sisters for life, remainder to their children," the 
remainder is valid whether or not Andrew's parents are 
alive and whether or not there are children of his 
brothers and sisters in being at the time of his death.286 
The brothers and sisters in being at his death will be 
entitled to possession at that time; therefore the Rule 
children at the death of Escalala. As the Court held, grandchildren who 
came into being after the death of Escalala (the only ones whose inter-
ests might violate the Rule Against Perpetuities) would be excluded 
by the Rule of Convenience. 
285 Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpe-
tuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.25, Case 37 (1952). If 
there is no precedent estate, that is, if Andrew Baker bequeaths 
property "to the grandchildren of John Stiles," the result is the same 
as in the case of the postponed gifts described in the text. If John 
has grandchildren living when Andrew dies, they are entitled to im-
mediate possession. Hence the Rule of Convenience closes the class 
at once and the gift is valid. If John has no grandchildren in being 
when Andrew dies, the class gift is void. John's only grandchildren 
may be children of his as yet unborn children, born after his death. 
2s6 As to the validity of a bequest "to James Thorpe upon trust to 
pay the income semi-annually to my brothers and sisters for their lives 
and on the death of the survivor to transfer the corpus to their chil-
dren in equal shares," see Casner, "Class Gifts," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §22.46 (1952). 
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of Convenience closes the class "brothers and· sisters" 
to afterborn children of his parents. The children of the 
brothers and sisters must necessarily be born or con-
ceived within their parents' lifetimes. If, on the other 
hand, Andrew Baker bequeaths property "to my 
brothers and sisters for life, remainder to my nephews 
and nieces in equal shares," the remainder is void unless 
Andrew's parents predecease him or he has a nephew or 
niece in being at the time of his death. His only nephews 
and nieces might be the children of brothers and sisters 
born after his death and might not come into being until 
after the deaths of those brothers and sisters who were 
alive when Andrew died. Here again, the gift would be 
void even if there were no unit or "all or nothing rule.'· 
If, in the last example, Andrew's parents predeceased 
him, the remainder will be valid because no more 
brothers and sisters can be born. Hence, all of An-
drew's nieces and nephews must necessarily come into 
existence within lives in being. If there is a nephew 
or niece in being when Andrew dies, the remainder will 
also be valid. The class "brothers and sisters" will close 
under the Rule of Convenience on the death of Andrew. 
The nephew or niece in being when Andrew dies will 
take a vested right to possession of a share on the death 
of the living brothers and sisters. Hence, the class 
"nieces and nephews" will close at the end of a life in 
being. 
If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles 
for life and then to such of John's children as reach the 
age of twenty-five, and John has no children when An-
drew dies, the remainder is void because all of John's 
children who reach twenty-five may be born within four 
years of John's death and so their interests would not 
vest until more than twenty-one years after a life in be-
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ing. 287 As has been seen, such a gift is also void in toto 
under the unit or "all or nothing" rule, even though 
John has children who have reached twenty-five when 
Andrew dies.288 The class will not close until John's 
death; children born within four years of his death will 
be included in it and, because reaching twenty-
five is a condition precedent to their interests, those in-
terests may not vest until more than twenty-one years 
after the death of John and those of his children who 
are living when Andrew dies. On the other hand, if 
Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles for life 
and then to John's children "but if any child of John 
dies before reaching twenty-five, his share shall pass to 
his issue," the class gift to the children is valid whether 
or not John has children when Andrew dies. Here the 
provisions as to age is not a condition precedent but 
one for defeasance. All of John's children must neces-
sarily come into being during his lifetime, and their 
interests will vest as soon as they do, subject to defeas-
ance on death before twenty-five.289 The provisions for 
defeasance are valid as to the shares of children of John 
287 Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 
(1924), Part Two, notes 102, 128, supra; Gettins v. Grand Rapids 
Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930), Part Two, note 145 
supra; Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 
255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Two, note 88 supra. Cf. Burke v. Central 
Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932). 
2ss Part Two, note 281 supra. In this situation, if there is no prece-
dent estate, that is, if Andrew Baker bequeaths property "to such of 
the children of John Stiles as reach the age of twenty-five years," the 
gift is valid if John has children who have reached twenty-five when 
Andrew dies. These children will be entitled to immediate posses-
sion of shares. Hence the class will close at once under the Rule of 
Convenience and afterborn children of John will take no interest. 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §379 (1915). 
289 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §372 (1915); PROP· 
ERTY RESTATEMENT, §384, Jll. 2 (1944). 
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m being when Andrew dies but void as to the other 
shares.290 
If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles for 
life, remainder to the grandchildren of John, payable at 
their respective ages of twenty-five, the class gift is valid 
if John has a grandchild who has reached the age of four 
when Andrew dies. 291 The age provision is neither a 
condition precedent nor a provision for defeasance. 
Hence the grandchild who is four or his estate will cer-
tainly be entitled to possession of a share when twenty-
five years after his birth have elapsed and John has died. 
This must happen within a life in being and twenty-one 
years, and, when it does, the class will close and all mem-
bers of it, the grandchildren of John who come into be-
ing before the class closes, will have vested interests. 
2oo Part Two, note 283 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §384, Ill. 2 
(1944). 
291 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §639aa. (1915); Leach 
and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities,'' 6 AMERI· 
CAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.25, Case 40. (1952). 
CHAPTER 13 
Powers of Appointment 
I F ANDREW BAKER devises land to John Stiles for life, remainder to such children of John as John 
may appoint and, in default of appointment, to Lucy 
Baker in fee simple, Andrew is the donor of a power of 
appointment, John is the donee of the power, John's 
children are the objects of the power, and Lucy is the 
taker in default. When a power of appointment is 
created, problems as to validity under the Rule Against 
Perpetuities may arise as to (1) the power itself, (2) inter-
ests appointed under the power, and (3) the limitation 
in default of appointment. As the validity of limitations 
in default of appointment has been considered before, 
it may be best to treat this problem first. 
A. INTERESTS LIMITED IN DEFAULT OF APPOINTMENT 
A limitation in default of appointment may be vested, 
subject to defeasance by the exercise of the power.292 
The limitation to Lucy Baker in the example given in 
the preceding paragraph is of this type. A future inter-
est which is vested subject to defeasance does not offend 
the Rule Against Perpetuities. But a limitation in de-
fault of appointment may be contingent. Such a limita-
tion violates the Rule unless it is certain to vest, if at all, 
within the period of the Rule. If the power of appoint-
ment is limited as to objects or restricted to exercise by 
will, so that the donee cannot appoint to himself for his 
292 McCarty v. Fish, 87 Mich. 48, 49 N.W. 513 (1891), Part Two 
notes 160, 234 supra. 
370 
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT 371 
own exclusive benefit, the period of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is computed, so far as the validity of the 
limitation in default of appointment is concerned, from 
the time when the instrument creating the power be-
came effective. 293 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property 
to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder 
to such children of John as John may appoint and, in 
default of appointment, to those children of John who 
reach the age of twenty-five years, the period of the Rule 
is computed from the death of Andrew. At that time it 
293 Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); 
Part Two, notes 75-77 supra. Although agreeing that, in this situation, 
the period of the Rule commences upon the effective date of the in-
strument creating the power, Professor Leach thinks that facts occur-
ring between that date and the time when the power expires may be 
considered in determining the validity of the limitation in default of 
appointment. Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against 
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.36 (1952). Compare 
Part Two, notes 127, 128, supra. He cited no authority for this view 
and conceded that there was none at the time he wrote, but the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts later adopted his view. Sears 
v. Coolidge 329 Mass. 340, 108 N.E. (2d) 563 (1952), noted, 33 BosTON 
UNIV. L. REv. 119 (1953), 66 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1953). Michigan 
Trust Co. v. Baker, supra, is opposed to the Leach view. There the 
limitations were (l) to testatrix's husband for life, with power to con-
sume so much of the principal as he might desire for his support and 
comfort, (2) to a trustee to pay the income to testatrix's son Stuart 
for life, (3) to the daughters of Stuart who reach twenty-five and the 
sons who reach thirty, (4) in default of such children of Stuart, to 
other persons. Stuart predeceased the husband, leaving no issue, so if 
facts occurring before the expiration of the husband's power had been 
considered, the subsequent limitations would have been valid. They 
were held void. 
It should be recalled that when a future interest is destructible by 
someone for his own benefit, the period of the Rule does not com-
mence until the destructibility ceases. Part Two, note 70 supra. This 
doctrine applies to limitations in default of appointment and so quali-
fies the statement in the text in situations where such limitations are 
destructible by virtue of some other power than that in default of 
which they are limited. Moreover, Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §12, Part 
Two, note 304 infra, provides that when a tenant for life has an un-
limited power to dispose of the fee by will, he shall be deemed to 
possess an absolute power of disposition. The effect of the statute 
would seem to defer the commencement of the period of the Rule, as 
to interests limited in default of appointment, to the death of the 
donee. Compare Part Two, notes 297, 321, infra. 
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is not certain that any of John's children will reach the 
age of twenty-five within twenty-one years after John's 
death. Hence the limitation in default of appointment 
is void. That is, the existence of such a limited power 
of appointment has no bearing on the validity of inter-
ests limited in default of its exercise. If, on the other 
hand, the power is unlimited as to objects and purpose 
and presently exercisable by deed, so that the donee of 
the power could at any time appoint to himself for his 
own exclusive benefit, the period of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is computed from the time when the power 
ceases to be exercisable.294 If Andrew Baker bequeaths 
property to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, 
remainder to such person or persons as John may by deed 
or will appoint and, in default of appointment, to those 
children of John who reach the age of twenty-five years, 
the period of the Rule is computed from the death of 
John because John could appoint to himself for his 
own exclusive benefit. At that time all of John's chil-
dren are in being and all will reach twenty-five or die 
within their own lives. Hence the limitation in default 
of appointment is valid. That is, the existence of an 
unlimited power to destroy a future interest for the sole 
benefit of the holder of the power postpones the com-
mencement of the period of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
B. POWERS OF APPOINTMENT THEMSELVES 
A power of appointment itself, whether limited or un-
limited, violates the Rule Against Perpetuities unless it 
294 Part Two, notes 69-73 supra. Although such a gift in default of 
appointment does not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, there is a 
line of Michigan cases (certainly unsound and probably overruled) 
holding that when a life tenant is given unlimited power to dispose 
of the fee by deed, a limitation in default of appointment is void for 
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is certain to be exercisable, if at all, within the period of 
the Rule, computed from the effective date of the in-
strument creating the power.295 If Andrew Baker devises 
land to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, re-
mainder to James Thorpe in fee, subject to a power in 
the first son of John who reaches twenty-five to appoint 
the fee by deed or will to any person or persons, the 
power is void. It is not certain that a son of John will 
reach twenty-five and so be able to exercise the power 
within the period of the Rule. However, even though 
a power is limited to take effect on a contingency which 
may not occur within the period of the Rule, if the 
donee of the power is an ascertained, living human being, 
the power is valid because it will be exercisable, if at all, 
within the lifetime of the donee. 296 If Andrew Baker 
repugnancy. Part Two, notes 182, 183, supra. If the power permits 
disposition by deed or will, there should be no possible basis for the 
application of this repugnancy doctrine. 
29o Wollaston v. King, L.R. & Eq. 165 (1868); Re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. 
D. 401 (C.A. 1890); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §475 
(1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §535 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §390 (1) (1944). The Rule Against Perpetuities regu-
lates only interests in property. Strictly speaking, a power of appoint-
ment is not an interest in property. Simes, "The Devolution of Title 
to Appointed Property," 33 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 488-490 (1928); 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §390, Comment b, (1944). Accordingly, in-
stead of saying that a power violates the Rule, it might be technically 
more accurate to say that, because any exercise of it would violate 
the Rule, the power is incapable of effective exercise. Foulke, "Powers 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 16 CoL. L. REv. 537 at 539-540 
(1916); Bettner, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers 
of Appointment," 27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 151 (1940). The end result 
is the same, and the courts tend to use the language of the text. 
296 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §476 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §535 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §390, 
Comment c. (1944). See: Re Hargreaves, 43 Ch. D. 401 at 405 (C.A. 
1890). There is some doubt as to the soundness of this proposition 
in Michigan when the objects of the power are limited to persons 
other than the donee of the power because our statutes provide that 
when the disposition which a power authorizes is limited to be made 
to any particular person or class of persons, other than the donee of 
the power, the court of chancery shall exercise the power after the 
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devises land to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, 
remainder to James Thorpe in fee, subject to a power 
in John to appoint the fee by deed or will to any person 
or persons when and if John has a son who reaches 
twenty-five, the power is valid. It cannot be exercised 
unless John has a son who reaches twenty-five during 
the lifetime of John and so must be exercisable, if at all, 
within a life in being. 
A power of appointment which is limited as to objects 
or exercisable only by will, so that the donee cannot ap-
point to himself for his own exclusive benefit, violates 
the Rule Against Perpetuities if it could possibly be ex-
ercised at a time beyond the period of the Rule, com-
puted from the effective date of the instrument creating 
the power.297 If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to 
John Stiles, who has no son, for life, remainder to such 
death of the donee unless the exercise of the power is made expressly 
to depend on the will of the donee. Rev. Stat. 1846 c. 64, §§23, 24, 
28; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2680, 2681, 2685; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4163, 
4164, 4168; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8878, 8879, 8883; How. Stat., §§5612, 
5613, 5617; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11614, 11615, 11619; Comp. Laws 
(1929) §§13017, 13018, 13022; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.113, 26.114, 
26.118; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.23, 556.24, 556.28. If Andrew Baker 
devises land to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder 
to James Thorpe in fee, subject to a power in John to appoint the fee 
to such of his issue as he may select when and if John has a son who 
reaches twenty-five, it might be argued that the statute permits the 
power to become exercisable more than twenty-one years after the 
death of John and so that it violates the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Matter of Christie, 133 N.Y. 473, 31 N.E. 515 (1892); Battelle v. 
Parks, 2 Mich. 531 (1853); American Brass Co. v. Hauser, 284 Mich. 
194, 278 N.W. 816, 115 A.L.R. 1464 (1938). 
297 Webb v. Sadler, L.R. 14 Eq. 533 (1872), L.R. 8 Ch. App. 419 
(1873); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§474, 477 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §536 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §390 
(2) (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against 
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §24.32 (1952). But Rev. 
Stat. 1846, c. 64, §12, Part Two, note 304 infra, provides that when a 
tenant for life has an unlimited power to dispose of the fee by will, 
he shall be deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition. The 
effect of the statute would seem to be that such a power will be treated 
as if the donee could appoint to himself for his own exclusive benefit. 
Compare Part Two, notes 293 supra, 321 infra. 
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female issue of John as John's eldest son may appoint, the 
power will certainly be exercisable, if at all, within a life 
in being and twenty-one years and so does not offend 
the rule stated in the preceding paragraph, but, since 
it may possibly be exercised more than twenty-one years 
after the death of John, it is void under the rule just 
stated. This means, in effect, that an unborn person 
cannot be the donee of a power which is limited or testa-
mentary unless the exercise of the power is restricted 
by other terms of the instrument to a period measured 
by lives in being and twenty-one years. As a power of ap-
pointment limited to a living person cannot be exercised 
after his death, such a power does not violate the rule 
even though it is subject to a condition precedent which 
may never occur.298 A power of appointment which is un-
limited as to objects and exercisable by deed, so that the 
donee can appoint to himself for his own exclusive bene-
fit, does not offend the Rule Against Perpetuities merely 
because it could possibly be exercised at a time beyond 
the period of the Rule, so long as it will certainly be 
exercisable, if at all, within the period.299 If Andrew 
Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles, who has no son, 
for life, remainder to such persons as John's eldest son 
298 But see Part Two, note 296 supra. A power of appointment which 
is not limited in duration to the life of the donee is bad unless its 
execution is restricted to the period of the Rule. Thus if Andrew 
Baker devises land to John Stiles and his heirs, subject to a power in 
Lucy Baker and her heirs to appoint the fee to any issue of the tes-
tator, the power is void. See Gray, id., §475. It is not necessary to the 
validity of a power, however, that the donee have any other interest 
in the property. Ostrander v. Muskegon Finance Co., 230 Mich. 310, 
202 N.W. 951 (1925). 
299 Bray v. Hammersley, 3 Sim. 513, 57 Eng. Rep. 1090 (1830), 
sub nom. Bray v. Bree, 2 Cl. 8c F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1834); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §477 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §536 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §390, Com· 
ment a. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against 
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.31 (1952). 
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may appoint, the power is valid even though, by its 
terms, the son may possibly exercise it more than twenty-
one years after John's death. 
If a power of appointment does not offend the rules 
stated in the preceding two paragraphs, it is not made 
invalid by the fact that, within its terms, an appointment 
could be made which would violate the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. aoo If Andrew Baker bequeaths property to 
John Stiles for life and then to such issue of John as 
John may appoint, John might appoint to "my oldest 
male descendant living ninety years after the Penobscot 
Building falls." As will be seen, such an appointment 
would be void. But if John appoints to "my children 
in equal shares,'' the appointment is valid. 
C. INTERESTS APPOINTED UNDER POWERS 
Under general Anglo-American law, if a power of ap-
pointment is unlimited as to objects and exercisable by 
deed, so that the donee can appoint to himself for his 
own exclusive benefit, the period of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is computed, for the purpose of determining 
the validity of interests appointed under the power, from 
the effective date of the appointment rather than that of 
the instrument creating the power. 301 If Andrew Baker 
soo Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§473, 510 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §537 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §392, 
Comment c. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule 
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.32 (1952). 
See: Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929); Part Two, 
note 295 supra. 
so1 Bray v. Hammersley, 3 Sim. 513, 57 Eng. Rep. 1090 (1830), sub 
nom. Bray v. Bree, 2 CI. & F. 453, 6 Eng. Rep. 1225 (1834); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §524 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE 
INTERESTS, §537 (1936); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 374 (1919), 101 A.L.R. 
1282 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §391 (1944); Leach and Tudor, 
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF 
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bequeaths property to John Stiles, who has neither chil-
dren nor grandchildren, for life, remainder to such per-
sons as John may by deed or will appoint, and John 
appoints by will to "my children for life, remainder to 
my grandchildren," the appointment is valid although 
all of John's children were born after Andrew's death and 
all of his grandchildren are born after his own death. 
In other words, a power of appointment under which the 
donee can at any time appoint to himself is the equiva-
lent of absolute ownership for purposes of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. An appointment under such a 
power is treated as if it were a limitation by the donee 
of his own property. 
The applicability of the rule stated in the preceding 
paragraph to appointments of Michigan land is ren-
dered somewhat doubtful by two sections of our statutes: 
"Sec. 55. The period during which the absolute 
right of alienation may be suspended by any instrument 
in execution of a power, shall be computed from the time 
of the creation of the power, and not from the date of 
such instrument. 
"Sec. 56. No estate or interest can be given or 
limited to any person, by an instrument in execution of 
a power, which such person would not have been capable 
of taking, under the instrument by which the power 
was granted." 302 
PRoPERTY, §24.33 (1952). See: Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust 
Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 285, 255 N.W. 287 (1934), quoting a passage 
from Halsbury's LAws oF ENGLAND which reflects the rule stated in the 
text. 
so2 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§55, 56; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2712, 
2713; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4195, 4196; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8910, 
8911; How. Stat., §§5644, 5645; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11646, 11647; 
Comp. Laws (1929) §§13049, 13050; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.145, 26.146; 
Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.55, 556.56. These provisions do not appear 
to have been construed by the Michigan Supreme Court. Other pro-
visions of the statutes on powers were construed in Bates v. Leonard, 
99 Mich. 296, 58 N.W. 311 (1894), to reach the same result which 
would have obtained at common law. 
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These statutory provisions were taken from the New 
York Revised Statutes of 1829.303 The New York Court 
of Appeals has indicated that these two sections are 
modified by other sections of the statutes which, as in 
force in Michigan, provide: 
"Sec. 9. When an absolute power of disposition, not 
accompanied by any trust, shall be given to the owner of 
a particular estate, for life or years, such estate shall be 
changed into a fee, absolute in respect to the rights of 
creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future 
estates limited thereon, in case the power should not be 
executed, or the lands should not be sold for the satis-
faction of debts. 
"Sec. 10. When a like power of disposition shall be 
given to any person to whom no particular estate is 
limited, such person shall also take a fee, subject to any 
future estates that may be limited thereon, but absolute 
in respect to creditors and purchasers. 
"Sec. 11. In all cases where such power of disposition 
is given, and no remainder is limited on the estates of 
the grantee of the power, such grantee shall be entitled 
to an absolute fee. 
"Sec. 12 .. When a general and beneficial power to 
devise the inheritance, shall be given to a tenant for life 
or for years, such tenant shall be deemed to possess an 
absolute power of disposition, within the meaning, and 
subject to the provisions of the three last preceding sec-
tions. 
"Sec. 13. Every power of disposition shall be deemed 
absolute, by means of which the grantee is enabled, in 
3o3 Part Two, c. I, Art. Third, §§128, 129. Because of the doubt as 
to its meaning raised in Dempsey v. Tylee, S Duer (10 N.Y. Super.) 
7S (1854), Part Two, note SIO infra, Section 129 was amended by 
Laws 1909, c.52, to read: "An estate or interest can not be given or 
limited to any person, by an instrument in execution of a power, unless 
it would have been valid, if given or limited at the time of the 
creation of the power.'' The sections are now Real Property Law, 
§§178, 179. 
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his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own 
benefit." 304 
In the view of the New York Court, if the donee of 
a power has an absolute power of disposition of the 
entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13, Sections 
55 and 56 have no application, and the validity of ap-
pointments made by him is determined as if he were in 
fact an absolute owner disposing of his own property. If 
the donee does not have an absolute power of disposition 
of the entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13, 
Sections 55 and 56 do apply and the validity of appoint-
ments is judged from the time of the creation of the 
power.305 If the donee of the power has unlimited ca-
004 Rev. Stat. 1846, c 64, §§9 to 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666 to 
2670; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4149 to 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864 
to 8868; How. Stat., §§5598 to 5602; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11600-
11604; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13003 to 13007; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.99-
26.103; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.9-556.13. N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part 
II, Art. Third, §§81-85 were identical, except as to section numbers. 
N.Y. Real Property Law, §§149 to 153, as presently in force, are 
virtually identical. These sections operated to eliminate the strange 
fiction of powers appendant, under which one person might have 
both the whole fee and a power to appoint the fee which would enable 
him to defeat dower and creditors. See: Simes, "The Devolution of 
Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 493-497 (1928). 
The following section provides: "Sec. 14. When the grantor in any 
conveyance shall reserve to himself, for his own benefit an absolute 
power of revocation, such grantor shall still be deemed the absolute 
owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and 
purchasers are concerned." Such a power of revocation is not a power 
of appointment but, as it makes powers of appointment created by the 
conveyance, appointments under them, and limitations in default of 
appointment, destructible, it postpones the commencement of the 
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, as to these interests, until 
its expiration. Part Two, notes 70, 293, supra, 322 infra. Bettner, 
"The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers of Appointment," 
27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 167-171 (1940). 
Although these statutes purport to apply only to land, there is a 
tendency to extend them, by analogy, to personalty. Townsend v. 
Gordon, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944); In re Pilsbury's 
Will, 50 Misc. 367, 113 App. Div. 893, 99 N.Y. Supp. 62, affd., 186 
N.Y. 545, 79 N.E. 1114 (1906). 
sos Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 
(1908; Bettner, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers 
of Appointment,'' 27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 167-171 (1940). 
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pacity to convey the en•tire fee to anyone, including him-
self, the New York view coincides with the common-law 
rule. If, however, the donee's unlimited power of dis-
position is limited to a future estate, it does not come 
within Sections 9-13, so Sections 55 and 56 apply. If 
Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe upon trust 
to pay the rents and profits to John Stiles for life, re-
mainder as John Stiles may by deed or will appoint, John 
cannot dispose of the entire fee because, under New York 
and Michigan law, his equitable life interest as bene-
ficiary of the trust is inalienable. 806 Hence, even though 
his power to dispose of the remainder is unlimited and 
presently exercisable by deed, the validity of any ap-
pointment which he makes will be judged, under the 
New York view, from the death of Andrew.807 
The reference in Section 55 to the "period during 
which the absolute right of alienation may be suspended" 
is to the provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised Sta-
tutes of 1846 which prohibited suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation for more than two lives.308 
Those provisions were repealed in 1949,809 so Section 
55 no longer has any meaning in Michigan. It thus be-
comes important to know whether Section 56 is a mere 
adjunct or addendum to Section 55 which has ceased to 
have meaning or whether it is a provision of independent 
significance which invalidates any appointment made 
under a power unless the power is an absolute power of 
disposition of the entire fee within the meaning of Sec-
tions 9-13 or the donor of the power.could have con-
sos Part One, notes 581, 583, 621, 625, supra. 'See: Hunt v. Hunt, 
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900); In re Peck. Estates, 320 Mich. 
692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948); Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881). 
307 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 
(1908). 
ws Part Two, note 47 supra. 
309 Part Two, note 61 supra. 
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veyed or devised directly to the appointee by the in-
strument creating the power. That question was raised 
in Dempsey v. Tylee,S'-0 a New York case decided in 1854, 
where the problem involved was whether a married 
woman could create a power to appoint to her husband 
although she could not, in the then existing state of the 
law, convey directly to him. If Section 56 is read lit-
erally and is independent of Section 55, she could not do 
so. The majority of the court took this view, but Justice 
Duer, who had been one of the draftsmen of the New 
York Revised Statutes, filed an opinion in which he said: 
"From the construction, however, which my brother 
has given to § 129 [Michigan §56], in the article "Of 
Powers", it seems proper that I should now say, that I 
entirely dissent. As I construe that section, it only means 
that no person shall take an estate under a power that, 
if limited to him by the instrument creating the power, 
would have involved an undue suspense of the power of 
alienation; in other words, where its direct limitation 
would have been void, as too remote. Section 129 merely 
declares the legal consequence of the rule which § 128 
[Michigan § 55] establishes, and is to be construed, pre-
cisely as if the word 'hence' had connected the sections, 
by following the.first, and preceding the second and both 
the sections are expressed very nearly in the words in 
which the rule and its consequence will be found to be 
stated by the most approved text writers on this abstruse 
branch of the law, Fearne, Sugden, and Cruise. As I 
construe the section, therefore, it refers only to the na-
ture of the estate granted, and not at all to any personal 
incapacity of the grantee, other than that which the rule, 
declared in § 128, necessarily creates, although it cannot 
be denied that the words of the section are quite suscep-
tible of the interpretation that my brother Bosworth has 
given to them." 811 
31o 3 Duer (10 N.Y. Super.) 73 (1854). 
3
.11 3 Duer (10 N.Y. Super.) 73 at 101-102. See Part Two, note 303 
supra. 
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To return to the example given in the first paragraph 
of this section: 312 If Andrew Baker devises property to 
John Stiles, who has neither children nor grandchildren, 
for life, remainder to such persons as John may by deed 
or will appoint, it is clear that John has an absolute 
power of disposition of the entire fee under Sections 9 
and 13. Accordingly, under the New York view, which 
Michigan is likely to follow, Sections 55 and 56 
have no application, 313 from which it follows that the 
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities does not com-
mence until. John exercises the power. Hence, if he 
appoints by will to "my children for life, remainder to 
my grandchildren," the appointment is valid, as at com-
mon law. If, on the other hand, Andrew Baker devises 
property to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the in-
come to John Stiles, who has no children or grand-
children, for life, remainder to such persons as John may 
by deed or will appoint, John does not have an absolute 
power of disposition of the entire fee under Sections 9 
and 13. Under the New York view, Sections 55 and 56 
apply. 314 Section 55 no longer has meaning in Michigan, 
but, if our courts should follow the majority view in 
Dempsey v. Tylee 315 that Section 56 has independent 
and literal significance, it would seem that John could 
not appoint to "my children, remainder to my grand-
children," because Andrew Baker could not have made 
a devise directly to John's grandchildren. In this situa-
tion, then, our law would differ from the common law 
as to the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities 
to appointments made under unlimited powers to ap-
312 In the text immediately following Part Two, note 301 supra. 
313 Part Two, note 305 supra. 
314 Part Two, note 307 supra. 
315 Part Two, note 310 supra. 
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point by deed or will. If our courts should accept the 
Duer view in Dempsey v. Tylee 316 that Section 56 has 
no independent significance and relates only to the sta-
tutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation, now repealed in Michigan, then that section 
no longer has meaning here and the common law applies. 
In view of the doubt which exists, Sections 55 and 56 
should be repealed or modified so as to make clear this 
phase of the law. 
The New York and Michigan statutes governing 
powers of appointment purport to apply only to interests 
in land. The courts of both states have tended to extend 
them, by analogy, to powers of appointment of chattels 
personal. 317 If Section 56 should be deemed to have in-
dependent and literal significance, the distinction would, 
of course, become important because, if it does not apply 
to dispositions of chattels personal, they are governed 
by the common law. 
The older English cases and the great weight of Amer-
ican authority hold that, when a power of appointment 
is restricted to exercise by will, the period of the. Rule 
Against Perpetuities is computed, as to interests ap-
pointed, from the creation of the power rather than the 
time of its exercise, even though the objects of the power 
are unlimited, so that the donee could appoint to his 
own estate.318 The more recent English decisions and 
3HI Part. Two, note 311 supra. 
317 In re Pilsbury's Will, 50 Misc. 367, 113 App. Div. 893, 99 N.Y. 
Supp. 62, aff'd., 186 N.Y. 545, 79 N.E. 1114 (1906); Townsend v. Gor-
don, 308 Mich. 438, 14 N.W. (2d) 57 (1944). 
318 Wollaston v. King, L.R. 8 Eq. 165 (1868); In re Powell's Trusts, 
39 L.J. Ch. 188 (1869); Morgan v. Gronow, L.R. 16 Eq. 1 (1873); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§526-526c, 948-969 (1915); 2 
Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §538 (1936); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 
374 (1919), 101 A.L.R. 1282 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §392 
(1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpe-
tuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.34 (1952). 
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one in Wisconsin hold that, even though a power is 
restricted to exercise by will, if it is unlimited as to ob-
jects, the period of the Rule does not commence until 
the power is exercised. 3111 Section 12 of Chapter 64 of the 
Revised Statutes of 1846 320 provides that, if a tenant for 
life has unlimited power to devise the fee, he shall be 
deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition. It 
would seem that the effect of this statutory provision is 
that, in Michigan, even though the power as to the re-
mainder is limited to exercise by will, if the donee is 
enabled to dispose of the entire fee, including his own 
life estate, for his own benefit, the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities does not commence until the power 
is exercised, that is, from the death of the life tenant. 321 
If a testamentary power is unlimited as to objects but 
the donee cannot dispose of the entire fee, the same 
doubtful situation described in the preceding paragraph 
exists. 
319 Rous v. Jackson, 29 Ch. D. 521 (1885); Miller v. Douglass, 192 
Wis. 486, 213 N.W. 320 (1927). 
32'0 Part Two, note 304 supra. But there must be power to dispose of 
the entire fee. A life cestui of a trust with unlimited power to appoint 
the remainder cannot dispose of the entire fee if, because of spend-
thrift provisions as to personalty or the statutory restraint on alienation 
as to land, he cannot transfer his own life interest. Hunt v. Hunt, 
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900); In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 
692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948); Dana v. Murray, 122 N.Y. 604, 26 N.E. 
21 (1890). 
an Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 
(1908); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §391, Comment h., App. Ch. A. par. 
36 (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Per-
petuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §24.34 (1952). In re Kil-
patrick's Estate, 318 Mich. 445, 28 N.W. (2d) 286 (1947) involved a 
bequest to a trustee to pay the income to testator's wife for life and 
to transfer to her any part of the principal which she might request, 
remainder as the wife might appoint by will. No perpetuities problem 
was involved. As the wife had an immediate right to demand the 
whole principal, it would seem that the period of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities should be computed from the time she made an appoint-
ment rather than from her husband's death under both the common-
law and statutory rules. 
POWERS OF APPOINTMENT 385 
It is well settled everywhere that when a power of 
appointment is limited as to objects, so that the donee 
cannot appoint to himself or his estate, the period of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities is computed from the ef-
fective date of the instrument creating the power. 322 If 
Andrew Baker bequeaths property to John Stiles for life, 
remainder to such issue of John as John may appoint, 
the period of the Rule commences at the death of An-
drew. It will be recalled that events which occur after 
the commencement of the period ordinarily cannot be 
considered in determining whether interests are certain 
to vest within the period. 323 When the period commences 
at the creation of a power of appointment, however, facts 
which occur between the creation and exercise of the 
power may be so considered. 824 If Andrew Baker be-
queaths property to John Stiles, who has no issue, for 
life, remainder to such of John's issue as John may by 
will appoint and John appoints by will to "my son 
Henry for life, remainder to his children," the appoint-
ment to the children of Henry is invalid if Henry is 
s22 Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§473, 514 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW oF FuTURE IN'r}:RESTS, §537 (1936); Annotation, 1 A.L.R. 374 
(1919), 101 A.L.R. 1282 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §392 (1944); 
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 
6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.34 (1952). It should be borne in 
mind, however, that if the power itself and interests created by ap-
pointment under it are destructible by virtue of some other power, 
the period of the Rule does not commence until the destructibility 
ceases. Part Two note 70 supra. See: Foulke, "Powers and the Rule 
Against Perpetuities," 16 CoL. L. REv. 537 at 541 (1916). 
s2s Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); 
Part Two, notes 127-129, supra. 
a24 Routledge v. Dorril, 2 Ves. Jr. 357, 30 Eng. Rep. 671 (1794); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§515, 516 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §537; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §392 (1944); 
Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.35 (1952); Simes, "The Devolution 
of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 502 (1928). 
Cf. Part Three, note 152 infra. 
386 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
alive when John dies, because the class may include 
children born more than twenty-one years after the 
death of John, the only measuring life designated in An-
drew's will. If, however, Henry predeceased John, the 
appointment to his children is valid. The fact of Henry's 
death may be considered, and it makes it certain that 
all of Henry's children came into being during the life 
of John.825 
The repeal in 1949 of the statutes prohibiting sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation for more 
than two lives 8211 creates a difficult question as to powers 
of appointment created by instruments which became 
effective before the repeal but exercised after the repeal. 
Is the validity of an appointment made after the repeal 
under a power created before governed by the repealed 
statutes? Such authority as there is indicates that it is 
if the power is limited as to objects.827 Probably it is not 
if the power is an absolute power of disposition of the 
entire fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13!28 
325 Rev. Stat. 1846, c.64, §56, Part Two, note 302 supra, should not 
affect the result in such a situation. Andrew could have bequeathed 
directly to "the children of any son of John Stiles who may predecease 
Johu" because such children would necessarily come into being dur-
ing the life of John. 
32~ Part Two, notes 46, 61, supra. 
s21 Bartlett v. Sears, 81 Conn. 34, 70 Ad. 33 (1908); Simes, "The 
Devolution of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 515 
(1928). But see: Re Leigh's Marriage Settlement, [1952] 2 All Eng. 
L.R. 57. 
328 Part Two, note 304 supra. 
CHAPTER 14 
Interests to Which the Rule Applies 
SPEAKING generally, as Chapters 9, 11, and 12 have indicated, the requirement of certainty of 
vesting within the period of the Rule Against Per-
petuities applies to all future interests in property 
limited to persons other than the transferor, whether 
in land or in chattels, whether legal or equitable, and 
whether, under English law, they would have been re-
mainders, executory interests, powers of appointment, 
or interests created by the exercise of a power of ap-
pointment.329 There remain for consideration (1) in-
terests retained by or created in the transferor under the 
terms of the instrument of transfer, (2) interests created 
in others which are not strictly property rights but de-
rive from the law of contract, and (3) interests which 
are excepted from the operation of the Rule. 
a29 This statement should be read with the qualification that cer-
tain administrative powers which do not have the characteristics of a 
power of appointment are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
A power of appointment is dispositive in character. Its exercise cuts 
off an interest of a taker in default and creates one in the appointee. 
PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §318, Comment g. (1940). Trustees' powers 
to sell, lease, mortgage, invest, and appoint successor trustees during 
the term of the trust are not dispositive in character and are not sub-
ject to the Rule. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §382 (1944); Leach and 
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW oF PROPERTY, §24.63 (1952). The same is true as to a mort-
gagee's power of sale. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., 
§562-571 (1915). Howe':er, powers of a trustee which are dispositive 
in character, such as a discretionary power to allocate income between 
life beneficiaries or to apply principal to the use of a life beneficiary, 
are subject to the Rule. Leach and Tudor, id., §24.32. Cf. Chapter 20, 
Section B (1), infra. 
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A. INTERESTS OF A TRANSFEROR 
When an owner of property transfers an interest in 
it which is less than his whole interest and less than a 
fee simple, or the equivalent in personalty, his retained 
interest is a reversion. If Andrew Baker, owning land 
in fee simple, conveys it to John Stiles for life, in tail, 
or for forty years, Andrew retains a reversion expectant 
upon the termination of John's estate.330 When an 
owner in fee simple transfers an estate for life followed 
by a contingent remainder, he retains a reversion. Thus 
if Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles, who has 
no son, for life, remainder to the eldest son of John and 
his heirs, Andrew retains a reversion in fee simple which 
will become possessory on the death of John if John 
never has a son. 331 Although, as in the last example, a 
reversion may be subject to defeasance, all reversions 
330 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§42-49 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §154 (1936). Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §12, Comp. Laws 
(1857) §2596; Comp. Laws (1871) §4079; Comp. Laws (1897) §8794; 
How. Stat., §5528; Comp. Laws (1915) §11530; Comp. Laws (1929) 
§12932; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.12; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.12, pro-
vides: "A reversion is the residue of an estate left in the grantor or 
his heirs, or in the heirs of a testator, commencing in possession on 
the determination of a particular estate granted or devised." 
There cannot be a reversion expectant upon an estate tail in Michi-
gan because our statutes convert estates tail into estates in fee simple. 
Part One. note 84 supra. There is no such thing as a reversion expec-
tant upon a fee simple. A reversionary interest expectant upon a fee 
simple is a possibility of reverter. Part Two, note 335 infra. In strict 
common-law theory, a reversion expectant upon an estate for years 
is a present rather than a future estate, since the lessor retains seisin. 
Cf. Part Two, note 150 supra. Our statutes appear to define such a 
reversion as a future estate. Part Two note 179 supra. Nevertheless, 
Chief Justice Campbell referred to such a reversion as a "present 
estate in possession" in Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W. 
814 (1879). 
331 Egerton v. Massey, 3 C.B. n.s. 338, 140 Eng. Rep. 771 (1857); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §ll3a (1915); 1 Simes, LAW 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §45 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §154, Ill. 6 
(1936). A conveyance of the springing use type, e.g., Andrew Baker to 
John Stiles and his heirs when and if John marries Lucy Baker, leaves 
a present estate in the transferor. Simes, id., §43. 
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are deemed to be vested,332 and they are not subject to 
the Rule Against Perpetuities.333 If Andrew Baker be-
queaths land to John Stiles for a thousand years "but 
if John's descendants ever become extinct, then the 
estate bequeathed to him shall terminate," the heirs of 
Andrew have a valid reversion which will become pos-
sessory on the extinction of John's descendants or the 
expiration of a thousand years, whichever first occurs.334 
When an owner in fee simple transfers an estate in fee 
simple on special limitation, his retained interest is a 
possibility of reverter.335 If John Stiles conveys land to 
the Detroit, Lansing, and Northern Railroad Company 
"so long as used for railroad purposes," John has a pos-
sibility of reverter which will become possessory when 
use for railroad purposes ceases. There is disagreement 
among the authorities as to whether such an interest is 
vested or contingent. 336 A recent English decision holds 
3sz Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §113 (1915); 1 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §47 (1936). 
333 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §283 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§504, 508 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT 
§372 (1944). 
ss4See: Gore v. Gore, 2 P. Wms. 28, 24 Eng. Rep. 629 (1722); Wood 
v. Drew, 33 Beav. 610, 55 Eng. Rep. 505 (1864); Toms v. Williams, 
41 Mich. 552 at 572, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Negaunee Iron Co. v. Iron 
Cliffs Co., 134 Mich. 264, 96 N.W. 468 (1901), Part One, note 323 supra 
(reversion expectant upon 99-year lease on special limitation); Great 
Lakes Realty & Building Co. v. Turner, 190 Mich. 582, 157 N.W. 57 
(1916), Part One, note 331 supra (reversion expectant upon 99-year 
lease subject to condition subsequent); C.J. Netting Co. v. Sillman, 
226 Mich. 307, 197 N.W. 545 (1924), Part One, note 334 supra (re-
version expectant upon 50-year lease subject to condition subsequent); 
Smith v. Applebaum, 241 Mich. 493, 217 N.W. 401 (1928), Part One, 
note 320 supra (reversion expectant upon 99-year lease subject to con-
dition subsequent); Webb v. Knauss, 253 Mich. 197, 234 N.W. 154 
(1931), Part One, note 339 supra (same as preceding); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §209 (1915). Cf. Part Two, notes 150, 
330, supra. 
335 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §154, Comment c. (1936); 1 Simes, LAW 
oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §§177-187 (1936); Part One, note 354 supra. 
336 Gray, RuLE A~AINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §113, n.3 (1915) 
(vested); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §154 (3) and Comment e. (1936) 
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that it is contingent, subject to the Rule Against Per-
petuities and, consequently, void, if the event which will 
terminate the estate conveyed may not occur within the 
period of the Rule. 837 All American authority is to the 
effect that possibilities of reverter are not subject to the 
Rule.338 Several Michigan decisions assume the validity 
of possibilities of reverter,889 but they relate to convey-
ances which became effective between 184 7 and 1949, 
when the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities was not 
in force as to Michigan land.840 
When an owner in fee simple transfers an estate in 
fee simple on condition subsequent, his retained interest 
is a right of entry.341 If John Stiles conveys land to the 
Detroit, Lansing, and Northern Railroad Company "but 
if the said land shall cease to be used for railroad purposes 
the grantor or his heirs may enter and terminate the 
(not vested); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §507 (1936) (essen-
tially contingent). 
B37 Hopper v. Corporation of Liverpool, 88 Sol. J. 213 (1944), noted, 
62 L. QuAR. REv. 222 (1946). But see: In re Chardon, [1928] 1 Ch. 
464; Cheshire, MoDERN LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 520 (1949). 
ass Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§41, 312 (1915); 
2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §507 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATE-
MENT, §372 and Comment a. (1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Com-
mon Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, 
§24.62 (1952). . 
aa9 School District No. 5 of Delhi v. Everett, 52 Mich. 314, 17 N.W. 
926 (1883); Lemmen v. Allendale Grange No. 421, 201 Mich. 179, 
166 N.W. 1003 (1918); Fractional School District No. 9 v. Beardslee, 
248 Mich. 112, 226 N.W. 867 (1929); Thomas v. Jewell, 300 Mich. 
556, 2 N.W. (2d) 501 (1942); Part One, note 377 supra. Language 
in Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 at 211 (1870) might be thought 
to recognize the validity of a possibility of reverter under a convey-
ance executed before 1847. 
B4o Part Two, note 50 supra. 
B41 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §12 (1915); 1 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §159 (1936). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §24, 
Comment b. (1936) denominates such an interest a "power of termi-
nation." This term is not a happy one because the old law made a 
sharp distinction between a condition subsequent, which was per-
missible in a common-law conveyance, and a power of revocation, 
which could be used only in a conveyance operating under the Statute 
of Uses. 1 Coke, INSTITUTES, 237a (1628). 
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estate hereby granted," John has a right of entry which 
will entitle him or his heirs to take possession when use 
for railroad purposes ceases. Such rights of entry are 
contingent, 342 and recent English cases indicate that they 
are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities and so void 
if the event which will entitle the transferor to enter is 
not certain to occur within the period of the Rule.343 
The American decisions are to the effect that rights of 
entry on breach of condition subsequent are not subject 
to the Rule.544 No Michigan reported decision discusses 
the applicability of the Rule Against Perpetuities to 
rights of entry. Their validity has been assumed in cases 
involving conveyances executed both before 345 and 
after 346 184 7, and they have been enforced in a few in-
342 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §304 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTs, §506 (1936). 
343 In re Trustees of Hollis' Hospital, [1899] 2 Ch. 540; In re Da 
Costa, [1912] 1 Ch. 337; Re Peel's Release, [1921] 2 Ch. 218. See: 
In re Macleay, L.R. 20 Eq. 186 at 190 (1875); Dunn v. Flood, 25 Ch. 
D. 629 at 633 (1882), aff'd., 2~ Ch. D. 586 at 592 (1885). Stat. 15 Geo. 
V, c. 20 §4 (3) (1925) expressly subjects rights of entry to the Rule. 
344 Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §304 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §506 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §372 
(1944); Leach and Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Per-
petuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.62 (1952). 
345 Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, 1 Dougl. 225 (Mich. 1844); 
Michigan State Bank v. Hammond, 1 Doug!. 527 (Mich. 1845); People 
v. Beaubien, 2 Doug!. 256 (Mich. 1846); Campau v. Chene, 1 Mich. 
400 (1850); City of Detroit v. Detroit & Milwaukee R.R. Co., 23 Mich. 
173 (1871); Hatch v. Village of St. Joseph, 68 Mich. 220, 36 N.W. 
36 (1888); County of Oakland v. Mack, 243 Mich. 279, 220 N.W. 
801 (1928). The rights of entry, involved in these cases and those 
cited in the two following notes were on breach of conditions subse-
quent, which might not occur within the period of the Rule annexed 
to conveyances in fee simple. A right of entry on breach of a condition 
subsequent in a conveyance of a term of years (lease) is an incident 
of the reversion, which is vested. Part One, notes 360, 375, Part Two, 
notes 330, 334, supra. 
346 Blanchard v. Detroit, Lansing & Lake Michigan R.R. Co., 31 
Mich. 42 (1875); Barrie v. Smith, 47 Mich. 130, 10 N.W. 168 (1881), 
Part One, note 142 supra; Chippewa Lumber Co. v. Tremper, 75 Mich. 
36, 42 N.W. 532 (1889); Jenks v. Pawlowski, 98 Mich. llO, 56 N.W. 
1105 (1893); Leggett v. City of Detroit, 137 Mich. 247, 100 N.W. 566 
(1904); Adams v. First Baptist Church of St. Charles, 148 Mich. 140, 
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stances where the conveyances were executed after 
1847.347 
The American exemption of possibilities of reverter 
and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent 
from the operation of the Rule Against Perpetuities is 
a strange anomaly. If Andrew Baker conveys land to 
James Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot 
Building shall stand and then to John Stiles and his 
heirs, the interest of John is void under the Rule. But 
if Andrew Baker conveys to John Stiles and his heirs and 
John conveys to James Thorpe and his heirs so long as 
the Penobscot Building shall stand, John retains a pos-
sibility of reverter which the American decisions treat 
as valid and which may become possessory after cen-
turies. Why the law should forbid one and permit the 
other is difficult to see. Indeed, the possibility of re-
111 N.W. 757 (1907); Puffer v. Clark, 202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 
(1918); Halpin v. Rural Agricultural School District No. 9, 224 Mich. 
308, 194 N.W. 1005 (1923); Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 
N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267 (1925), Part One, note 158 supra; Epworth 
Assembly v. Ludington & Northern Ry., 236 Mich. 565, 211 N.W. 99 
(1926); Trustees of the M.J. Clark Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240 
Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927); Weber v. Ford Motor Co., 245 Mich. 
213, 222 N.W. 198 (1928); Village of Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 
254 Mich. 58, 235 N.W. 829 (1931); Bruce v. Henry Ford Hospital, 
254 Mich. 394, 236 N.W. 813 (1931); Quinn v. Pere Marquette Ry. 
Co., 256 Mich. 143, 239 N.W. 376 (1931); Rhines v. Consumers' Power 
Co., 259 Mich. 236, 242 N.W. 898 (1932); Briggs v. City of Grand 
Rapids, 261 Mich. 11, 245 N.W. 555 (1932); Avery v. Consumers' 
Power Co., 265 Mich. 696, 253 N.W. 189 (1934); Ford v. City of 
Detroit, 273 Mich. 449, 263 N.W. 425 (1935); Dolby v. State Highway 
Commissioner, 283 Mich. 609, 278 N.W. 694 (1938); Juif v. State 
Highway Commissioner, 287 Mich. 35, 282 N.W. 892 (1938); Central 
Land Co. v. City of Grand Rapids, 302 Mich. 105, 4 N.W. (2d) 485 
(1942); Livonia Township School District v. Wilson, 339 Mich. 454, 
sub nom. Wayne County v. Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 (1954). 
347 Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314, 22 N.W. 816 (1885); Watrous v. 
Allen, 57 Mich. 362, 24 N.W. 104 (1885); Hickox v. Chicago & Canada 
Southern Ry. Co., 78 Mich. 615, 44 N.W. 143 (1889); Reilly v. Otto, 
108 Mich. 330, 66 N.W. 228 (1896); Estes v. Muskegon County Agri-
cultural & Driving Park Association, 181 Mich. 71, 147 N.W. 553 
(1914); Hawkins v. Dillman, 268 Mich. 483, 256 N.W. 492 (1934). 
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verter is the more serious indirect restraint on alienation 
of the two where, as in Michigan, it is probably inalien-
able 348 and so must descend to the heirs of the trans-
feror. Under our system of descent, the heirs of a 
grantor are likely to be very numerous and very scat-
tered a hundred years after his death. Unless all of them 
can be found and persuaded to release, the owner of the 
fee subject to defeasance cannot afford to erect expensive 
improvements on the land and cannot sell it for an ade-
quate price because the title he has may be cut off at 
any moment by an event beyond his control. The only 
possible explanation of this anomalous rule is the his-
torical one that the Rule Against Perpetuities was de-
veloped to restrict interests created by virtue of the Sta-
tutes of Uses and Wills and that possibilities of reverter 
and rights of entry were interests known to the common 
law before the enactment of these statutes.849 This argu-
ment has not deterred our courts from applying the Rule 
to contingent remainders, which were also known to the 
common law.350 The Michigan Supreme Court has never 
enforced a possibility of reverter or a right of entry de-
feating a fee arising from a conveyance which became 
348 Part One, note 377 supra. Rights of entry on breach of con-
ditions subsequent in conveyances of estates in fee executed before 
1931 are also inalienable. Part One, note 374 supra. 
349 Part Two, notes 338, 344, supra. Professor Leach is wont to cite 
as a horrible example of the tendency ot remote possibilities of re-
verter and rights of entry to prevent the development and use of land, 
a tract in Boston which was conveyed long ago on condition that no 
building over thirteen feet high ever be erected on it. The probable 
motive of the grantor was a desire to preserve a view of his cattle 
grazing in the vicinity. The tract is now in a closely built-up section 
of the city but the owners dare not erect an appropriate building 
on it. They cannot secure releases from the heirs of the grantor be-
cause these cannot be found. Hence no one can use the land effectively, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed.) 50, note 25 
(1940); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.62 (1952). 
35o Part Two, notes 37, 39, 42, supra. 
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effective at a time when the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities applied to Michgan land. It is, therefore, 
free to follow the English decisions holding that these 
interests are subject to the Rule,351 and it ought to do so. 
A fee simple subject to an easement, a profit a prendre, 
or a use restriction is a present estate which is vested and 
not subj.:!ct to the Rule Against Perpetuities. If John 
Stiles, owning land in fee simple, grants to James Thorpe 
and his heirs a right to take oil and gas from his land 
so long as they can be extracted, John retains a present 
possessory fee simple which does not violate the Rule 
although it will become more enjoyable at some remote 
future time when the oil and gas operations cease.352 In 
England it is not possible to create a legal easement 
which entitles the holder to exclusive possession of the 
servient land, a right to exclusive possession being 
deemed a possessory estate.353 Several Michigan cases, 
351 Part Two, notes 337, 343, supra. 
352 This was assumed in McClanahan Oil Co. v. Perkins, 303 Mich. 
448, 6 N.W. (2d) 742 (1942), which involved such a grant. 
353 Anonymous, Y.B. 4 Edw. IV, Pasch., pl. 9 (1464); Rex. v. Bell, 
7 T.R. 598, 101 Eng. Rep. 1152 (1798) (exclusive use of way); Rex 
v. Bath, 14 East 609, 104 Eng. Rep. 736 (1811); Rex v. Roch-
dale Waterworks, 1 M.&S. 634, 105 Eng. Rep. 237 (1813); Rex 
v. Birmingham Gas-Light & Coke Co., l B.&C. 506, 107 Eng. Rep. 
187 (1823); Rex v. Brighton Gas Light & Coke Co., 5 B.&C. 466, 108 
Eng. Rep. 173 (1826); Rex v. Chelsea Water Works, 5 B.&Ad. 156, 
110 Eng. Rep. 750 (1833); Regina v. East London Waterworks, 18 
Q.B. 705, 118 Eng. Rep. 266 (1852); Electric Telegraph Co. v. Over-
seers of Salford, 11 Ex. 181, 156 Eng. Rep. 795 (1855); Taylor v. 
Corporation of St. Helens, 6 Ch. D. 264 (C.A. 1877) (exclusive use 
of an artificial watercourse); Lancashire & Cheshire Telephone Ex-
change Co. v. Manchester, 14 Q.B.D. 267 (C.A. 1884); Reilly v. Booth, 
44 Ch. D. 12 (C.A. 1889) (exclusive use of a passage); Bevan v. Lon-
don Portland Cement Co., Ltd., 67 L.T. 615 (1892); Metropolitan 
Ry. Co. v. Fowler, (1893] A.C. 416 (exclusive use of tunnel); Assess-
ment Committee of Holywell Union v. Halkyn District Mines Drain-
age Co., (1895] A.C. 117 (H.L. 1894) (this and the other cases not 
specially noted involved public utility pipe or pole lines); Sweet, 
"The 'Easement' of Tunnelling," 32 L.Q.R. 74 at 79 (1916). Accord: 
Dyce v. Hay, 1 Macqueen 305 (H.L., Scotland, 1852). See: Potter v. 
North, 1 Lev. 268, 83 Eng. Rep. 400 (1669). 
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however, have treated conveyances of rights of exclusive 
possession and control, particularly to railroad com-
panies, as grants of easements.354 If John Stiles grants to 
the Detroit, Lansing, and Northern Railroad Company 
"an easement of right of way, with the right to exclusive 
possession, control and enjoyment, so long as used for 
railroad purposes," the railroad takes, under English 
law, a possessory fee simple on special limitation, and 
John's retained interest is a possibility of reverter. 
Under Michigan law it would seem that the railroad 
takes only an easement and John retains the present fee 
simple subject to the easement, not a mere possibility of 
reverter.355 Yet his right to possession is contingent upon 
a remote future event. 
ss4 Jones v. Van Bochove, 103 Mich. 98, 61 N.W. 342 (1894); Mat-
thews v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. Co., 110 Mich. 170, 
67 N.W. 1111 (1896): Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal R. Co., 174 
Mich. 138, 140 N.W. 535 (1913); Engleman v. City of Kalamazoo, 
229 Mich. 603, 201 N.W. 880 (1925) (exclusive right to use a stairway); 
McClintic-Marshall Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 254 Mich. 305, 236 N.W. 
792 (1931) (exclusive right to construct and use a tunnel); Michigan 
Central R.R. Co. v. Garfield Petroleum Corp., 292 Mich. 373, 290 
N.W. 833 (1940): Gardens of Rest, Inc. v. Upper Michigan Power 
& Light Co., 322 Mich. 153, 33 N.W. (2d) 741 (1948) (exclusive right 
to maintain a power line; the other cases involve railroad rights of 
way). See: Annotation, "Deed to Railroad Company as Conveying 
Fee or Easement," 132 A.L.R. 142 (1941). But in Croucher v. Wooster, 
271 Mich. 337, 260 N.W. 739 (1935), a grant of the use of land for 
residence purposes forever was held to convey a possessory estate in 
fee simple. 
a5s Mahar v. Grand Rapids Terminal R. Co., 174 Mich. 138, 140 
N.W. 535 (1913). See: Wanzer v. Blanchard, 3 Mich. 11 (1853); 
Thayer v. McGee, 20 Mich. 195 (1870). In reality our Supreme Court 
has created a new fiction, analogous to the English fiction that an 
owner in fee simple subject to an outstanding long-term lease has a 
present possessory estate. Part Two, note 330 supra. Such a develop-
ment is remarkable in view of the evident intention of our statutes 
to abolish the English fiction and to make every estate "where the 
right to the possession is postponed to a future period" an estate in 
expectancy. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §8, Comp. Laws (1857) §2592, 
Comp. Laws (1871) §4075; Comp. Laws (1897) §8790; How. Stat., 
§5524; Comp. Laws (1915) §11526; Comp. Laws (1929) §12928; Mich. 
Stat. Ann., §26.8; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.8. See Part Two, notes 
179, 330, supra. 
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The American exemption of possibilities of reverter 
and rights of entry on breach of condition subsequent 
from the Rule Against Perpetuities does not appear to 
extend to any other type of contingent future interest 
in property retained by or created in a transferor under 
the terms of the instrument of transfer. Thus it would 
seem that a reserved power of revocation 356 or power of 
appointment 357 and the possibility of being an appointee 
under a power of appointment 358 created by the instru-
ment are subject to the Rule to the same extent that 
interests limited to persons other than the transferor are 
so subject. So is a reserved option to repurchase which 
would be specifically enforcible if valid. 859 
356 Foulke, "Powers and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 16 CoL. L. 
REv. 627 at 644 (1916). A power of revocation exercisable only by 
the transferor personally would not violate the Rule because it could 
not be exercised beyond a life in being. See Part Two, note 296 supra. 
But a power of revocation reserved to the transferor and his heirs, 
exercisable only upon a remote condition precedent would, it is be-
lieved, offend the Rule. It is noteworthy that the only future interests 
retained by or created in a transferor which the American decisions 
exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities are those which were recog-
nized at common law before the enactment of the Statutes of Uses and 
Wills. Powers were a creation of equity and acquired recognition at 
common law only by virtue of these statutes. An option is an interest 
in property only by virtue of the equitable doctrine of specific per-
formance of contracts. 
357 A power of appointment exercisable only by the transferor per-
sonally would not offend the Rule because it could not be exercised 
beyond a life in being. Part Two, notes 296, 298, supra. But a power 
of appointment reserved to the transferor and his heirs, exercisable 
only upon a remote condition precedent, would seem to violate the 
Rule. For example, if Andrew Baker conveys land to John Stiles and 
his heirs "but if the descendants of John ever become extinct, to such 
person as the grantor or his heirs may appoint." 
358 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §372, Comment a. (1944). For ex-
ample, if John Stiles conveys land "to such persons as Andrew Baker 
may appoint and until and in default of appointment to James 
Thorpe and his heirs" and Andrew Baker appoints "to John Stiles 
and his heirs if the descendants of James Thorpe ever become extinct." 
359 London & South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 
(1882); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §394 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The 
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROP· 
ERTY, §24.56 (1952). 
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B. CONTRACTS) OPTIONS) AND MORTGAGES 
The Rule Against Perpetuities is a part of the law of 
property. It has no application to contracts which do 
not create interests in property.36{) If the Iosco Life In-
An option to repurchase stock in a closed corporation, probably 
limited in duration to the life of the transferor-optionee, was enforced 
in Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210 N.W. 209, 48 A.L.R. 622 
(1926). The validity of an option to repurchase land, given in 1838 
for a term of fifteen years, was assumed in Swetland v. Swetland, 3 
Mich. 482 (1855). As the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities did 
not apply to limitations of interests in land made between March 1, 
1847, and September 22, 1949 [Part Two, note 50 supra], decisions 
relative to the validity of options to repurchase given during that 
period are not precedents as to the application of the Rule. In a 
number of cases options to repurchase land given during that period, 
limited in duration to twenty-one years or less, were enforced or as-
sumed to be valid. Cornell v. Hall, 22 Mich. 377 (1871); Daniels v. 
Johnson, 24 Mich. 430 (1872); Stahl v. Dehn, 72 Mich. 645, 40 N.W. 
922 (1888); Reed v. Bond, 96 Mich. 134, 55 N.W. 619 (1893); Ab-
bott v. Gruner, 121 Mich .. 140, 79 N.W. 1065 (1899); Blumberg v. 
Beekman, 121 Mich. 647, 80 N.W. 710 (1899); City Lumber Co. v. 
Hollands, 181 Mich. 531, 148 N.W. 361 (1914); Gogarn v. Connors, 
188 Mich. 161, 153 N.W. 1068 (1915); McFadden v. Huron Valley 
Building and Savings Association, 255 Mich. 659, 239 N.W. 322 (1931); 
Beecher v. Morse, 286 Mich. 513, 282 N.W. 226 (1938). As such 
options could not have been exercised beyond the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, they would not have violated the Rule if it had 
been in force. In Livonia Township School District v. Wilson, 339 
Mich. 454, sub nom. Wayne County v. Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 (1954), 
a reserved option in a 1944 deed to repurchase for $80 if, within 25 
years, the land should not be used for school purposes, was treated as 
valid. The validity of a perpetual pre-emptive option to re-
purchase land was assumed in Stony Pointe Peninsula Association v. 
Broderick, 321 Mich. 124, 32 N.W. (2d) 363 (1948), Part One, note 
233 supra, and there is dictum to the effect that an option of this 
type would be valid in Smith v. Barrie, 56 Mich. 314 at 317, 22 N.W. 
816 (1885), Part One, note 230 supra. Such an option reserved in a 
conveyance executed since September 23, 1949, should be deemed void 
both as . a direct restraint on alienation and as violating the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. 
sso Walsh v. Secretary of State for India, 10 H.L.C. 367, 11 Eng. 
Rep. 1068 (1863); Witham v. Vane, (H.L. 1883), reported in Challis, 
LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 3rd ed., 440 (1911). Gray, RuLE AGAINST 
PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §329 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§513 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §401 (1944); Leach & Tudor, 
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF 
PROPERTY, §24.58 (1952). Professors Gray and Simes suggest that the 
Rul~does apply to a transfer of rights created by contract, such as a 
beq~st by the obligee on a remote contingency. 
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surance Company, in consideration of being designated 
beneficiary under a $100,000 insurance policy on the life 
of John Stiles, contracts with John that it will pay $3,000 
per annum to the eldest son of John for life, to the eld-
est son of such eldest son for life, and to the eldest son in 
each successive generation forever, in like manner, it 
would seem that the contract is valid 361 although such 
a perpetual succession of life interests, if limited as inter-
ests in property, whether legal or under a trust, would 
be void. 
An option to purchase property is a contract right 
to purchase which is always subject to at least two con-
ditions precedent, notification of election to purchase 
and payment of the purchase price. Irrevocable options 
to purchase land and unique chattels are specifically en-
forcible in equity. Consequently such an option, to the 
extent that it is valid for that purpose, is a limitation of 
a contingent equitable future interest in the property 
involved. The decisions in England and this country 
are uniform in holding that options, insofar as they are 
limitations of contingent future interests in property, 
are subject to the Rule Against Perpetuities.862 In Eng-
land an option, in its purely contract aspects, is not sub-
ject to the Rule, and therefore, even though it may under 
its terms be exercised at some time beyond the period of 
the Rule, it may be enforced against the original op-
tionor either by an action for damages for breach or, if 
the original optionor still owns the property, by a suit 
361 See: Holmes v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 288 
N.Y. 106, 41 N.E. (2d) 909 (1942); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §401, 
Ill. 2. (1944). 
ss2 London&: South Western Ry. Co. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. D. 562 (1882); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §330 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §512 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§393, 
394 (1944); Leach &: Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Per-
petuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56 (1952). 
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for specific performance.'~63 In this country an option 
which would otherwise be specifically enforcible and 
which, under its terms, might be exercised at a time 
beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities, is 
wholly void and cannot be enforced in any way either 
against the original optionor or against a subsequent 
purchaser.864 If Andrew Baker, owning land in fee 
simple, contracts with John Stiles to convey it to John, 
his heirs or assigns, upon notice and payment of $10,000 
at any time within forty years, the contract is void. 
An option given to someone who has no other interest 
in the land is a very severe indirect restraint on aliena-
tion and development. Neither the optionor nor any-
one who acquires the land can afford to expend money 
on improvements while his title remains subject to de-
feasance by the exercise of the option. An option given 
to a lessee under a long-term lease does not have the 
same restraining effect. It increases the value and im-
proves the salability of the lessee's estate and encourages 
him to make valuable improvements, since by exercise 
of the option he may extend the duration of his posses-
sion. In England options in leases, entitling the lessee 
to renew, are not subject to the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties even though they permit perpetual renewal, &65 but 
an option to purchase the fee is subject to the Rule, even 
363 Worthing Corporation v. Heather, [1906] 2 Ch. 532 (damages); 
Hutton v. Watling, [1948] Ch. 26 (specific performance); Cheshire, 
MoDERN LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 505 (1949). 
364 Eastman Marble Co. v. Vermont Marble Co., 236 Mass. 138, 128 
N.E. 177 (1919); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §512 (1936); 
PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §393, Comment h, §394, Comment e. (1944); 
Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.56 (1952); Annotation: 162 A.L.R. 
581 (1946). See: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §330c 
(1915); Cf. §330a. 
365 Rider v. Ford, [1923] 1 Ch. 541; Cheshire, MoDERN LAW OF REAL 
PROPERTY, 6th ed., 505 (1949). 
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though given to a lessee under a long-term lease" 866 In 
this country options given to a lessee, exercisable only 
during the term of the lease, whether to renew 3~7 or to 
purchase the fee, 1168 are exempt from the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. If Andrew Baker, owning land in fee 
simple, leases it to John Stiles, his executors, administra-
tors, and assigns for 99 years, with options in the lessee 
to renew forever on the same terms and to purchase at 
any time at a price to be determined by arbitrators at 
the time of exercise, both options are valid. 
Windiate v. Lorman ss9 was a suit to remove a cloud 
from title. In 1910 the plaintiff, John Windiate, exe-
cuted an instrument providing, 
"If I ever desire to sell, or if my heirs or devisees shall 
ever desire to sell [certain lands], I will give to Janette 
Lorman, her heirs, devisees and assigns the first oppor-
tunity to buy the said land at the best price, not to exceed 
$1,000, which I can get for it from anyone else - - - and 
366 Woodall v. Clifton, [1905] 2 Ch. 257; Cheshire, MoDERN LAw oF 
REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 504 (1949). 
367 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §230 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §511 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §395 
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpe-
tuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PRoPERTY, §24.57 (1952); Annotations, 
3 A.L.R. 498 (1919), 162 A.L.R. 1147 (1946). 
368 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §512 (1936); PROPERTY RE· 
STATEMENT, §395 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule 
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.67 (1952); 
Annotation: 162 A.L.R. 581 at 599 (1946). But see: Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §230b (1915). 
3~9 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). In Livonia Township 
School District v. Wilson, 339 Mich. 454, sub nom. Wayne County v. 
Wilson, 64 N.W. (2d) 563 (1954), a provision in a 1944 deed giving the 
grantor an option to repurchase for $80 if, within 25 years, the land 
should not be used for school purposes, was treated as valid. In Braun v. 
Klug, 335 Mich. 691, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), land was conveyed in fee 
simple subject to a covenant against sale to anyone but the grantors or 
their heirs. A decree holding the provision void as a direct restraint on 
alienation but giving the grantors a pre-emptive option to repurchase, 
to which the grantees did not object, was affirmed. As to whether a 
pre-emptive option is a direct restraint on alienation see Part One, 
at notes 226-231, supra. 
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upon payment or tender of such price by her, her heirs 
or assigns, to me, my heirs and devisees, that the land 
shall be conveyed to her, her heirs or assigns, in fee 
. I " s1mp e---. 
The plaintiff, at a time when the land was worth some 
$8,000, sought a declaration that this option was void 
under the Rule Against Perpetuities. An assignee of 
the optionee intervened as party defendant and filed a 
cross-bill for specific performance of the option. The 
Court affirmed a decree for the intervenor, granting 
specific performance of the option, saying that the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities was not in force in 
Michigan so far as land was concerned and that the op-
tion did not suspend the absolute power of alienation in 
violation of the statutes then in force. 370 Subsequently 
37o Accord as to the latter point: Matter of City of New York, 246 
N.Y. 1, 549, 157 N.E. 911, 159 N.E. 646 (1927), cert. den., 276 U.S. 
603 (1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!12, Ch. B, 1!53 
(1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.9 (1952). Both the New York and 
Michigan courts were influenced in reaching this conclusion by the 
fact that the suspension of the absolute power of alienation statutes 
[Part Two, note 47 supra], unlike the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, allowed no period in gross. Hence, if any option con-
travened the statutes, an option exercisable for any period, even a 
single day, not based on human lives, would be void. There are 
numerous decisions enforcing or assuming the validity of options to 
purchase land given between March 1, 1847, and September 22, 1949, 
when these statutes applied to disposition of land and the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities did not [Part Two, note 50 supra], exercis-
able for periods in gross of less than twenty-one years. Curran v. 
Rogers, 35 Mich. 221 (1876); Wilcox v. Cline, 70 Mich. 517, 38 N.W. 
555 (1888); Mier v. Hadden, 148 Mich. 488, Ill N.W. 1040 (1907); 
Cameron v. Shumway, 149 Mich. 634, 113 N.W. 287 (1907); Van 
Deusen v. Brown, 167 Mich. 49, 132 N.W. 472 (1911); Weadock v. 
Champe, 193 Mich. 553, 160 N.W. 564 (1916); George v. Schuman, 
202 Mich. 241, 168 N.W. 486 (1918); Wayne Woods Land Co. v. 
Beeman, 211 Mich. 360, 178 N.W. 696 (1920); Cooper v. Pierson, 
212 Mich. 657, 180 N.W. 351 (1920); Jacob v. Cummings, 213 Mich. 
373, 182 N.W. 115 (1921); Olson v. Sash, 217 Mich. 604, 187 N.W. 
346 (1922); Jefferson Land Co. v. Kamowski, 233 Mich. 210, 206 
N.W. 351 (1925); Ludwig v. Hall, 234 Mich. 478, 208 N.W. 436 
(1926); Su1zberger v. Steinhauer, 235 Mich. 253, 209 N.W. 68 (1926); 
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John Windiate's widow sued for admeasurement of her 
dower in the optioned land, joining as a defendant Frank 
Tyack, who claimed to have an interest as a vendee under 
a land contract executed by John Windiate in 1920. 
Tyack, who was not a party to the earlier case, urged 
the invalidity of the 1910 option. The Court reaffirmed 
its previous decision that the option was valid, saying, 
"Inasmuch as we do not follow the common law on 
the subject it will not be necessary for us to take up the 
many English and American cases cited to us by counsel 
dealing with the common-law rule. - - -
"In Gray on the Rule Against Perpetuities (3d Ed.), 
§329, it is said: 
"'The rule against perpetuities concerns rights of 
property only, and does not affect the making of contracts 
which do not create rights of property.'" 371 
Tromley v. Lange, 236 Mich. 240, 210 N.W. 202 (1926); Rashken v. 
Smith, 236 Mich. 440, 210 N.W. 485 (1927); Beardslee v. Grindley, 
236 Mich. 453, 210 N.W. 486 (1926); Clark v. Muirhead, 245 Mich. 49, 
222 N.W. 79 (1928); O'Toole & Nedeau Co. v. Boelkins, 254 Mich. 
44, 235 N.W. 820 (1931); Danto v. Kunze, 255 Mich. 135, 237 N.W. 
390 (1931); Stevens v. Stott, 270 Mich. 637, 259 N.W. 157 (1935); 
Thomas v. Ledger, 274 Mich. 16, 263 N.W. 783 (1936); State v. 
Owen, 312 Mich. 73, 19 N.W. (2d) 491 (1945); Bergman v. Dykhouse, 
316 Mich. 315, 25 N.W. (2d) 210 (1946); Le Baron Homes, Inc. v. 
Pontiac Housing Fund, Inc., 319 Mich. 310, 29 N.W. (2d) 704 (1947); 
Deane v. Rex Oil & Gas Co., 325 Mich. 625, 39 N.W. (2d) 204 (1949). 
See also cases cited in Part Two, notes 359 supra, 372, 373, infra. In 
Digby v. Thorson, 319 Mich. 524, 30 N.W. (2d) 266 (1948) an option 
to purchase land, exercisable for two lives in being, was enforced. As 
such options could not have been exercised beyond the period of the 
common-law Rule Against· Perpetuities, they would not have violated 
the Rule if it had been in force. In Caughey v. Ames, 315 Mich. 643, 
24 N.W. (2d) 521 (1946) an option to purchase land without a 
stated time limitation was construed to be exercisable only for a 
reasonable time. As a reasonable time would be less than twenty-one 
years, such an option would not have violated the Rule if it had been 
in force as to land. In Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 167, 
290 N.W. 367 (1940), an option to purchase stock in a closed corpo-
ration, exercisable during the lives of named persons, was enforced. 
This option, as it related to unique chattels personal, was subject to 
the Rule Against Perpetuities but did not violate it. 
an Windiate v. Leland, 246 Mich. 659 at 663 and 665, 225 N.W. 620 
(1929). 
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If this language quoted from Professor Gray's treatise 
is to be considered dictum that options are not subject 
to the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, it should 
be read in the light of the following section of that 
treatise, which asserts positively that specifically enforc-
ible options are subject to the Rule. Options to pur-
chase land given since September 23, 1949, when the 
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities came into force 
as to land, should be deemed subject to the Rule here 
as elsewhere. 
The Michigan Supreme Court has frequently en-
forced or assumed the validity of options to purchase 872 
and to renew a single time 878 in leases for terms of less 
872 Gustin v. Union School District of Bay City, 94 Mich. 502, 54 
N.W. 156 (1893); Wright v. Kaynor, 150 Mich. 7, 113 N.W. 779 
(1907); Mentlikowski v. Wisniewski, 173 Mich. 642, 139 N.W. 874 
(1913); Agar v. Streeter, 183 Mich. 600, 150 N.W. 160 (1914); Bushman 
v. Faltis, 184 Mich. 172, 150 N.W. 848 (1915) (granting specific per-
formance of a contract to give a 99-year lease containing an option 
to purchase exercisable for ten years); Nowicki v. Kopelczak, 195 Mich. 
678, 162 N.W. 266 (1917); Polczynski v. Nowicki, 227 Mich. 415, 198 
N.W. 976 (1924); Meadow Heights Country Club v. Hinckley, 229 
Mich. 291, 201 N.W. 190 (1924); Hake v. Groff, 232 Mich. 233, 205 
N.W. 145 (1925); Hafeli Bros. Corp. v. Bon, 273 Mich. 525, 263 N.W. 
733 (1935); Nu-Way Service Stations, Inc. v. Vandenberg Oil Co., 
283 Mich. 551, 278 N.W. 683 (1938); Berrien County Fruit Exchange, 
Inc. v. Pallas, 314 Mich. 66, 22 N.W. (2d) 74 (1946); Brenner v. 
Duncan, 318 Mich. 1, 27 N.W. (2d) 320 (1947); Starr v. Holck, 318 
Mich. 452, 28 N.W. (2d) 289 (1947); Mathieu v. Wubbe, 330 Mich. 
408, 47 N.W. (2d) 670 (1951); Dyksterhouse v. Ohl, 330 Mich. 599, 
48 N.W. (2d) 122 (1951); Rosenthal v. Shapiro, 333 Mich. 302, 52 
N.W. (2d) 859 (1952); Holt v. Stoffiet, 334 Mich. 272, 54 N.W. (2d) 
593 (1952), 338 Mich. 115, 61 N.W. (2d) 28 (1953). 
373 Brown v. Parsons, 22 Mich. 24 (1870); Brand v. Frumveller, 32 
Mich. 215 (1875); Pickard v. Kleis, 56 Mich. 604, 23 N.W. 329 (1885); 
Starkey v. Horton, 65 Mich. 96, 31 N.W. 626 (1887); Wright v. Kaynor, 
150 Mich. 7, 113 N.W. 779 (1907); Chittenden v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., 154 Mich. 1, 117 N.W. 548 (1908); Meadow Heights 
Country Club v. Hinckley, 229 Mich. 291, 201 N.W. 190 (1924); 
Stern Co. v. Friedman, 229 Mich. 623, 201 N.W. 961 (1925); King-Blair 
Co. v. Schloss, 253 Mich. 243, 234 N.W. 481 (1931); Maas Bros., Inc. 
v. Weitzman, 288 Mich. 625, 286 N.W. 104 (1939); Berrien County 
Fruit Exchange, Inc. v. Pallas, 314 Mich. 66, 22 N.W. (2d) 74 (1946); 
Mansour v. Hyman Winegarden Realty Corp., 314 Mich. 262, 22 N.W. 
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than twenty-one years given between 1847 and 1949, 
when the Rule Against Perpetuities was not in force as 
to limitations of land. Such options would not, of course, 
have violated the Rule even if it had been in force and 
if it extended to options in leases.m Stender v. Ker-
reos 375 was a summary proceeding for possession of land. 
Mrs. Cady leased the land to the defendants for three 
years from August 1, 1904, by a lease providing, 
"And the said parties of the second part at the end of 
the said three years may have the privilege of renewing 
this lease at the same rental for so long a term as said 
parties of the second part may see fit, upon the same 
terms and conditions as in this lease contained, with this 
exception: That on and after three years from said 
August 1, 1904, the said party of the first part shall have 
the privilege of entering and occupying said premises 
and terminating said lease, in case she wishes to rebuild 
upon said premises, upon giving said parties of the 
second part sixty (60) days' notice in writing of such 
intention; - - -." 
The plaintiff purchased the reversion from Mrs. Cady, 
and on May 29, 1907, served the defendants with a notice 
(2d) 366 (1946); Laevin v. St. Vincent de Paul Society of Grand 
Rapids, 323 Mich. 607, 36 N.W. (2d) 163 (1949); Mathieu v. Wubbe, 
330 Mich. 408, 47 N.W. (2d) 670 (1951); Gurunian v. Grossman, 331 
Mich. 412, 49 N.W. (2d) 354 (1951); Rosenthal v. Shapiro, 333 Mich. 
302, 52 N.W. (2d) 859 (1952). 
374 But they would have violated the statutes prohibiting suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation for more than two lives if options 
were deemed to suspend the absolute power of alienation because the 
statutes permitted no period in gross. Part Two, note 370 supra. 
Moreover, in Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), it 
was assumed that a provision in a forty-year lease that the lessor would 
either pay for the tenant's improvements or grant a renewal lease for 
forty years at the end of the term was valid. 
375 156 Mich. 499, 121 N.W. 258 (1909). Grenier v. Cota, 92 Mich. 
23, 52 N.W. 77 (1892), involved a lease for seven months with "first 
privilege to keep said building for a longer term." The Court, having 
determined that the lessees had estopped themselves to exercise the 
option for renewal, found it unnecessary to consider the validity or 
effect of the quoted language. 
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to quit on August 1, 1907, which did not state that the 
plaintiff intended to rebuild. On July 27, 1907, the de-
fendants notified the plaintiff that they elected to renew 
the lease for fifty years from August I, 1907. A judg-
ment for the plaintiff was affirmed. All members of the 
Court agreed that the option to renew the lease for an 
indefinite term was valid and that it could not be cut off 
unless the reversioner actually intended to rebuild. The 
majority deemed the notice to quit a sufficient manifes-
tation of such an intention. Three justices dissented on 
the ground that it was not. The dissenting opinion, in 
the course of an argument that the option to renew was 
valid, stated, 
"If they had nominated a term, the length of which, 
if originally agreed upon, would have violated the rule 
against perpetuities, a different question would be pre-
sented. They did no such thing. It will not be presumed 
that it was the intention of either party that a perpetuity 
was to be created, nor should the contract receive the 
construction that under its terms one might be 
created." 376 
The meaning of this passage escapes the present writer. 
Gould v. Harley 377 was a suit to construe a lease. On 
376 156 Mich. 499 at 508. 
377 215 Mich. 234, 183 N.W. 705 (1921). Brush v. Beecher, llO 
Mich. 597, 68 N.W. 420 (1896), involved leases for terms of five 
years providing that, at the expiration of the term, the lessor might 
elect to purchase buildings erected by the lessee and that, if he did 
not so elect, the lease would be extended for five years, with like pro-
vision for election and extension at the expiration of each extension. 
After the lessee's death the lessor attempted to treat the leases as 
being perpetually renewable. It was held that as they only pur-
ported to bind the parties, their executors, administrators and assigns, 
not their heirs, the renewal provisions were limited to the joint lives 
of the parties. The opinion suggested that if the provisions called for 
perpetual renewal at the option of the lessor, they would probably 
be void as against public policy because of their tendency to restrict 
alienation and development. This public policy must be something 
other than the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute power 
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January 12, 1898, land was leased to the defendants for 
a term of ten years, "with the privilege of renewing said 
lease at the pleasure of said second parties." The defen-
dants elected to renew for ten years in 1908 and notified 
the lessor in 1918 of their intention to renew for an 
additional ten years, which renewal the reversioner re-
sisted. The trial court entered a decree for the defen-
dants, holding that they had a perpetual option to renew 
the lease every ten years forever. The Supreme Court 
reversed, holding that, as a matter of construction, the 
option was limited to a single ten-year renewal. The 
opinion states that provisions for perpetual renewal are 
not favored and will not be found unless the language 
is clear and a provision that the renewal lease shall con-
tain the same terms as the original does not include the 
renewal provision. These decisions are not authority as 
to the validity of options for perpetual renewal under 
the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, but there is 
no reason to believe that the Court will deviate from 
its constructional preference against such options in 
cases governed by the Rule. That this is so is indicated 
by the recent case of Rex Oil & Gas Companry v. Busk,818 
where an option to purchase oil extracted from desig-
nated land, created by a contract of December 9, 1949, 
which expressed no time limit, was construed to be op-
erative only for a reasonable time, not perpetually. The 
Court did not discuss the validity under the Rule 
of alienation and the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, because 
all that could be renewed against the lessee's objection would be his 
obligation to pay rent, and a contingent obligation to pay money is 
not subject to either the statutes or the common-law Rule. 
a1s 335 Mich. 368, 56 N.W. (2d) 221 (1953). As this option was not 
contained in a lease it should have been deemed, if perpetual, to 
violate the Rule Against Perpetuities. Part Two, note 364 supra. 
Accord, as to the proposition that options without time limits will 
be construed to be limited to a reasonable time: Caughey v. Ames, 
315 Mich. 643, 24 N.W. (2d) 521 (1946), Part Two, note 370 supra. 
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Against Perpetuities of an option which is perpetual. 
The common-law mortgage took the form of a convey-
ance by the mortgagor to the mortgagee, in fee or of some 
lesser estate, upon condition that if the mortgagor should 
repay the mortgage debt by the due date, he or his heirs 
might re-enter and terminate the estate of the mort-
gagee.879 As has been seen, by the seventeenth century, 
the mortgagor, in addition to a right of entry, also had 
an equity of redemption entitling him to revest title in 
himself by payment of the debt after the due date.380 Al-
though these are really contingent future interests, they 
have never been deemed subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.381 Under Michigan law the mortgagor re-
tains a present possessory estate and the mortgagee 
acquires a lien, 882 which is really a beneficial power of 
appointment exercisable on a future contingency. For 
the purpose at hand, the relations between the vendor 
and the vendee under an executory contract for the sale 
of land are essentially the same. The vendee has a pres-
ent equitable fee simple and the vendor a nominal legal 
title which is really only a power of revocation exercis-
able on a future contingency.383 So, under our law, the 
interests of the mortgagee and the land contract vendor 
are really contingent future estates. Nevertheless, it 
would seem that they are not subject to the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.884 That is to say, mortgages and executory 
379 Littleton, TENURES, Sec. 332 (1481 ); Part One, note 667 supra. 
s8o Part One, notes 678-688, supra. 
as1 Knightsbridge Estates Trust, Ltd. v. Byrne, [1940] A.C. 613; 
Cheshire, MoDERN LAW oF REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed., 505 (1949). See: 
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, §§562-571 (1915). 
382 Part One, note 704 supra. 
38a Part One, notes 693-696, 705, supra. 
384 See: Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§562-571; Leach 
& Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.63 (1952). A mortgagee's rights may be barred 
by the statute of limitations, which begins to run at the time of default. 
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land contracts may be made to run longer than twenty-
one years. 
The Restatement of Property takes the position that 
a limitation made by a corporation of its own unissued 
stock or securities is exempt from the Rule Against Per-
petuities. sss 
Albright v. Cobb, 34 Mich. 316 (1876). Although mortgages and land 
contracts themselves are exempt from the Rule, transfers of interests 
thereunder are not. Thus a mortgagee could not devise his interest to 
"my oldest descendant living when the Penobscot Building falls.'' 
ss5 S. 400 (1944). See: 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §513 
(1936). This would include long term options given as security and 
options to repurchase stock designed to keep the organization "closed". 
The Michigan Supreme Court has shown some favor to the latter type 
of arrangement, although it has not been confronted with one which 
might violate the Rule. Halsey v. Boomer, 236 Mich. 328, 210 N.W. 
209, 48 A.L.R. 622 (1926); Bohnsack v. Detroit Trust Co., 292 Mich. 
167, 290 N.W. 367 (1940); Barnes Co., Inc. v. Folsinski, 337 Mich. 
370, 60 N.W. (2d) 302 (1953), Part One, note 522 supra. 
Limitations to charities are partially exempt from the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities. Chapter 15 infra. 
CHAPTER 15 
Trusts and Charities 
A. REMOTENESS OF VESTING 
I T WILL be recalled that the indestructibility of equitable contingent remainders was one of the rea-
sons for the development of the Rule Against Per-
petuities.386 The interests of private beneficiaries of 
trusts and the interests of private persons following trusts 
are subject to the Rule to the same extent as any other 
future interests. 887 One aspect of this is the familiar rule 
of the law of trusts that a trust beneficiary must be cer-
tain to be ascertainable within the period of the Rule.388 
There are two principal methods of devoting property 
to charity. One is by transferring it to a charitable cor-
poration for all or some of the purposes permitted by 
the corporate charter. A transfer of property to a per-
petual charitable corporation, as mediaeval lawyers well 
ass Part Two, notes 27, 28, 37, supra. 
as1 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. 
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 
226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust 
Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930); Gardner v. City National 
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); Floyd v. Smith, 
303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942); In re Dingler's Estate, 319 
Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 
3rd ed., §§323-326 (1915); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §§62, Comment k, 
65, Comment b. (1925); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §62.10 (1939); PROP-
ERTY RESTATEMENT, §370, Comment p. (1944). Act. 193, P.A. 1947, §1, 
amended, Act 61, P.A. 1951, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.82 (1), Comp. 
Laws (1948) §555.301, provides that trusts created by an employer for 
his employees as part of a stock bonus plan, pension plan, disability 
or death benefit plan, or profit-sharing plan, "shall not be deemed to 
be invalid as violating the so-called rule against perpetuities, any other 
existing law against perpetuities or any law restricting or limiting the 
duration of trusts." 
ass TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §112 (1935). 
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knew, creates a perpetuity. Hence such transfers have 
been restricted in England and some American states by 
what are known as mortmain statutes, and the permis-
sible transferees have been limited by statutes restricting 
the creation, powers, and purposes of charitable corpo-
rations. 889 In the absence of applicable statutory restric-
tions, the only perpetuity problem involved in a transfer 
of property to a charitable corporation is whether the 
interest of the corporation is certain to vest within the 
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. If the prior 
interests are non-charitable, a limitation of property to 
a charitable corporation is subject to the Rule to the 
same extent as a like limitation to a private person. 390 If 
Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles in fee simple 
"but if John's descendants ever become extinct, to the 
Baker Home for the Aged Poor, Inc.," the shifting execu-
tory interest limited to the Home is void under the Rule. 
Under the English and most American decisions, how-
ever, if the prior interests are charitable, such a shifting 
interest to a charity is excepted from the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. 891 If Andrew Baker devises land to the So-
389 3 Scott, LAw oF TRusTs, §§362.1-362.4 (1939). 
39o Attorney-General v. Gill, 2 P. Wms. 369, 24 Eng. Rep. 770 (1726); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §594 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §543 (1936); TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §401, 
Comment i. (1935); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §396 (1944); Leach & 
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAw oF PROPERTY, §24.38 (1952). The same is true if there is no pre-
ceding interest, i.e., if a springing executory interest is limited by a 
private person to a charitable corporation. 
391 Christ's Hospital v. Grainger, 16 Sim. 83, 30 Eng. Rep. 804 
(1847); affd., 1 Mac. & G. 460, 41 Eng. Rep. 1343 (1848); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§597-603d (1915); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §542 (1936); TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §401, Comment 
f. (1935); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §397 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The 
Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoP-
ERTY, §24.40 (1952). The same is true if there is no preceding interest 
and the transferor is itself a charity, i.e., if a springing executory 
interest is limited by a charitable corporation to another charitable 
corporation. 
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ciety for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., "so 
long as it maintains at least forty free drinking fountains 
for horses in the City of Boston and when and if it shall 
cease to do so to the Baker Home for the Aged Poor, 
Inc.," the shifting executory interest limited to the Home 
is, under these decisions, valid, although it is not cer-
tain to vest within the period of the Rule Against Per-
petuities. 
The other principal method of devoting property to 
charity is by the creation of a trust. This, too, has been 
restricted by statutes of various types.392 In the absence 
of applicable statutory restrictions, several perpetuities 
problems arise incident to the creation of a charitable 
trust because determination of the validity of a trust 
under the Rule Against Perpetuities involves not only 
the vesting of the legal estate of the trustee but also that 
of the equitable interests of the beneficiaries. The prob-
lem of the legal estate of the trustee is and is treated the 
same as that of a limitation to a charitable corporation. 
If the prior interests are non-charitable, a limitation to a 
trustee for charitable purposes must be certain to vest, 
if at all, within the period of the Rule. 393 If Andrew 
Baker devises land to John Stiles in fee simple "but if 
John's descendants ever become extinct to James Thorpe 
and his heirs upon trust to erect and maintain forever a 
free home for the aged poor," the shifting executory 
interest limited to James is void under the Rule. Under 
the English and most American decisions, however, if 
the prior interests are charitable, such a shifting interest 
to a charitable trust is excepted from the Rule Against 
Perpetuities.894 If Andrew Baker devises land to the 
~92 Part Two, note 389 supra. 
ags Part Two, note 390 supra. 
394 Part Two, note 391 supra. The problem here involved can arise 
in several situations. (1) Limitation to one charitable corporation, 
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Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Inc., 
"so long as it maintains at least forty free drinking foun-
tains for horses in the City of Boston and when and if 
it shall cease to do so to James Thorpe and his heirs 
upon trust to erect and maintain forever a free home for 
the aged poor," the shifting executory interest limited 
to James is, under these decisions, valid, although it is 
not certain to vest within the period of the Rule Against 
Perpetuities. The interests of the beneficiaries of a 
charitable trust are, under the English and most Ameri-
can decisions, excepted from the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities.395 Thus a trust to erect and maintain forever a 
free home for the aged poor is valid, although many of 
the aged poor who will become beneficiaries will not be 
ascertainable, and their interests will not vest, for cen-
turies. 
Michigan has always recognized the validity of limita-
tions of vested interests in property to charitable corpora-
tions. Thus a bequest to an incorporated missionary so-
ciety,396 church,897 college,898 school board,399 or city 400 
then to another; (2) limitation to a trustee for charity, then to a 
charitable corporation; (3) limitation to a charitable corporation, then 
to a trustee for charity; (4) limitation to a trustee for one charity, then 
to another trustee for another charity; (5) limitation to a trustee to 
hold forever, first for one charity, then for another; (6) limitation 
by a charitable corporation to another charitable corporation without 
a preceding interest; (7) limitation by a charitable corporation to a 
trustee for charity without a preceding interest. In all these situations 
it would seem that the interest of the second charity is exempt from 
the Rule. That is, a particular charitable purpose is treated as an 
entity for the purpose at hand. 
395 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §§112, Comment h., 364, 365 (1935). 
It is sometimes said that the beneficiaries of a charitable trust have 
no property interest at all and hence there is no equitable interest 
which could vest at a time beyond the period of the Rule. Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §590 (1915); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, 
§364 (1939). 
396 American Baptist Missionary Union v. Peck, lO Mich. 341 (1862); 
Cook v. Universalist General Convention, 138 Mich. 157, 101 N.W. 
217 (1904); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908). 
TRUSTS AND CHARITIES 413 
for all or some of its corporate purposes has always been 
good. As an unincorporated society cannot hold title to 
land, a devise to an unincorporated charitable organiza-
tion is bad, but a direct bequest of personalty to such an 
organization is good. m As the reported cases involved 
limitations which were not contingent, we lack authority 
Cf. Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 
(1896); Sprague v. Trustees of Protestant Episcopal Church, 186 Mich. 
554, 152 N.W. 996 (1915). 
397 Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 162 N.W. 498 (1917); Puffer v. Clark, 
202 Mich. 169, 168 N.W. 471 (1918); Trustees of the M.J. Clark 
Memorial Home v. Jewell, 240 Mich. 250, 215 N.W. 378 (1927). See: 
Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44 (1864). 
398 Allison v. Smith, 16 Mich. 405 (1868). 
399 Maynard v. Woodard, 36 Mich. 423 (1877). (Bequest of residue 
to district school board to hold forever in trust, to use the annual 
interest for a school library with books "suitable for people of all ages 
and classes within the said district.") Such a bequest does not create 
a true trust. Part One, note 221 supra. 
4oo Hatheway v. Sackett, 32 Mich. 97 (1875); Hathaway v. Village 
of New Baltimore, 48 Mich. 251, 12 N.W. 186 (1882) (bequest to 
village to erect a high school); Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 
Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900) (devise of land and bequest of money 
to a city for library); Hosmer v. City of Detroit, 175 Mich. 267, 141 
N. W. 657 (1913) (devise of land worth $357,000 and personalty 
worth $44,000 to a city to erect a fountain in a public park); Green-
man v. Phillips, 241 Mich. 464, 217 N.W. 1 (1928) (devise of residue 
to city to provide park; the Court, unnecessarily, relied on charity 
statutes cited in Part Two, note 421 infra). Cf. Penny v. Croul, 76 
Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889) (bequest to trustee to 
devote the income to maintenance of the library and grounds of the 
Detroit Water Works). Act 380, P.A. 1913, Comp. Laws (1915) §3301; 
Comp. Laws (1929) §2746; Mich. Stat. Ann., §5.3421; Comp. Laws 
(1948) §123.871, provides that grants, devises, and bequests to mu-
nicipal corporations for public parks, grounds, cemeteries, buildings, 
or other public purposes, whether made directly or in trust and 
whether made before or after the enactment of the statute, shall not 
be invalid for violation of any statute or rule against perpetuities. 
401 Estate of Ticknor, 13 Mich. 44 (1864) (bequest to unincorporated 
charitable society good). Although an unincorporated association can-
not hold legal title to land, it can be the beneficiary of a trust of land, 
and there is a strong tendency in modern cases to construe a direct 
devise of land to an unincorporated charitable organization as creating 
a trust for the organization. In re Schoales, [1930] 2 Ch. 75, noted, 
29 MICH. L. REv. 651 (1931); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §397.2 (1939); 
TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §397, Comment g. (1935). 
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as to the application of the Rule Against Perpetuities to 
limitations to charitable corporations and societies. 
In Smith v. Bonhoof/(}2 it was held that a conveyance 
of land made in 1842 to the Roman Catholic bishop of 
Detroit, upon trust for an unincorporated congregation, 
created a valid perpetual trust. The opinion does not 
mention the Rule Against Perpetuities which, of course, 
was in force as to limitations of land in 1842. 
It will be recalled that Chapter 63 of the Revised Sta-
tutes of 1846, which is still in force, limits the purposes 
for which trusts of land can be created,403 and that pro-
visions of Chapter 62, which were in force from 1847 
to 1949, prohibited suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation of land for more than two lives.404 As neither 
chapter made provision for charitable trusts, these chap-
ters greatly complicated the problem of the validity of 
charitable trusts involving land. Although neither 
chapter regulated trusts of chattels personal, the subse-
quent developments make it desirable to consider the 
decisions chronologically rather than according to the 
subject matter involved. 
In Attorney General v. Soule~405 a provision in a will 
directing the executors to set aside $10,000 "for the 
establishment of a school at Montrose aforesaid, for the 
education of children," was held void as too indefinite to 
bind the executors to use for a public charity. In Meth-
odist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark/06 a convey-
402 2 Mich. 116 (1851). 
4oa Part One, notes 583, 586, supra. 
404 Part Two, note 4 7 supra. These provisions were held to limit 
the duration of trusts of land. Part One, notes 592, 593, supra. 
4os 28 Mich. 153 (1873). 
406 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 (1897). It was assumed in Thatcher 
v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37 
Mich. 264 (1877), that a remainder to an incorporated church fol-
lowing a trust which offended by its duration the suspension statutes, 
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ance to trustees upon trust for use as the site of a church 
forever was held void. The Court said that, as Chapters 
62 and 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 made no pro-
vision for charitable trusts of land, they must conform 
to the rules for private trusts and were void if they sus-
pended the absolute power of alienation for more than 
two lives. In Penny v. Croul,407 a testator devised land 
to his wife ·for life, remainder to trustees with directions 
to convert it into personalty and devote the income for-
ever to maintaining the library and grounds of the De-
troit Water Works. It was held that the direction to con-
vert the land into personalty took the disposition out of 
the suspension of the absolute power of alienation sta-
tutes and that, as a trust of personalty for the benefit of 
a public charitable corporation, it was valid. The Court's 
opinion, written by Justice Campbell, cited as authority 
cases involving direct bequests to public corporations 408 
and stated: 
"The rule which prevents personal property from be-
ing tied up for more than lives in being, and 21 years 
thereafter, is not a universal rule of common law, but 
would be void, and held in State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 
548 (1898) that a remainder to the State which might vest five years 
after a life in being was void. In White v. Rice, 112 Mich. 403, 70 
N.W. 1024 (1897), a conveyance of land to an incorporated church, 
partially upon a potentially perpetual trust for unincorporated re-
ligious societies, was held to create a valid trust under a statute en-
acted after the conveyance involved in Methodist Episcopal Church of 
Newark v. Clark was executed. Act 145, P.A. 1855, §21, Comp. Laws 
(1857) §2029, Comp. Laws (1871) §3074, How. Stat., §4637, repealed, 
Act 209, P.A. 1897. This statute expressly authorized conveyances to 
trustees to hold in perpetuity for religious societies. 
4o7 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889). In Home 
Missionary Society v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129 N.W. 686 (1911), 
the validity of a bequest to trustees to pay the income in perpetuity 
to the society was assumed. 
408 Hatheway v. Sackett, Hathaway v. Village of New Baltimore, 
Part Two, note 400 supra; Maynard v. Woodward, Part Two, note 
399 supra. 
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one worked out by courts of equity, and it never had 
any application to charitable or public benefactions. 
There has never been any incapacity to keep a fund in 
permanence when there is a public corporation to re-
ceive and expend the income." 409 
The testatrix in Wheelock v. American Tract So-
ciety 410 devised her lands to her executors in trust "to 
pay the same" to the society and three other charitable 
corporations, 
"And should my executors think it best to appropriate 
a portion of the moneys which may come into their 
hands, which shall not be expended and paid as herein-
before set forth, - - and as to the amount to be paid, or 
sums to be distributed, to each, I leave entirely to the 
judgment and discretion of my executors to act in this 
respect as they shall think right, - - it is my wish and 
desire, and they are hereby directed, to pay to such 
worthy poor girls, to aid in their education, such sums 
as shall not be expended or paid as hereinbefore pro-
vided; - - -" 
The Court held that the provision for worthy poor 
girls was invalid because it was not fully expressed and 
clearly defined upon the face of the instrument creating 
it, as required by subsection 5, Section 11, Chapter 63, 
Revised Statutes of 1846.411 It ruled that the direct 
devises to the four charitable corporations also failed 
because they were inseparably connected with the void 
provision for worthy poor girls. So by the turn of the 
century it was clear, from Methodist Episcopal Church 
of Newark v. Clark,412 that charitable trusts of land were 
subject to the suspension of the absolute power of aliena-
409 76 Mich. 471 at 480. 
41o 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 (1896). Testatrix was domiciled in 
Pennsylvania, but the lands were in Michigan. 
411 Part One, notes 583, 586, supra. 
412 Part Two, note 406 supra. 
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tion provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes, 
and, from Wheelock v. American Tract Society,418 that 
they were subject to the provisions of Chapter 63 gov-
erning trusts. As to charitable trusts of chattels personal, 
Penny v. Croul 414 had indicated their validity when the 
beneficiary was a charitable corporation, and Smith v. 
Bon hoof 415 might indicate that they were valid when the 
beneficiary was an unincorporated charitable society. 
Attorney General v. Soule 41jj had left doubtful the va-
lidity of any other type of charitable trust. 
In Hopkins v. Crossley,411 the Detroit Volunteer Fire 
Department, a corporation, dissolved in 1886 and turned 
over its personalty to three trustees for the relief of poor 
and needy or disabled members of the old Volunteer De-
partment and their families, of poor, needy, or disabled 
members of the new paid Fire Department, and of any 
other needy and worthy persons, and also for the up-
keep of firemen's monuments in cemeteries. The Court, 
after saying that, because no land was involved, Chap-
ters 62 and 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 had no 
application, and that the Rule Against Perpetuities does 
not apply to a gift to charity, held the trust void. The 
grounds of this decision are not clear, but it does not 
seem that the objection to charitable trusts rested on 
their being perpetuities. Under the law of trusts, the 
beneficiaries of a trust must be definitely ascertainable 
persons.418 Charitable trusts are an exception to this 
418 Part Two, note 410 supra. 
414 Part Two, note 407 supra. 
415 Part Two, note 402 supra. 
416 Part Two, note 405 supra. 
417 132 Mich. 612, 96 N.W. 499 (1903). In Hopkins v. Crossley, 138 
Mich. 561, 101 N.W. 822 (1904), it was decided that the fund belonged 
to the persons who were members of the corporation at its dissolution. 
418 TlWSTS RESTATEMENT, §112 (1935). 
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rule.419 Hopkins v. Crossley probably amounts to a re-
fusal to accept this exception to the general rule. In 
any event, several attempts to create charitable trusts 
were held ineffective under its authority.420 
Act 122 of the Public Acts of 1907 provided, 
"Section 1. No gift, grant, bequest or devise to re-
ligious, educational, charitable or benevolent uses which 
shall in other respects be valid under the laws of this 
State, shall be invalid by reason of the indefiniteness or 
uncertainty of the persons designated as the beneficiaries 
thereunder in the instrument creating the same, nor by 
reason of the same contravening any statute or rule 
against perpetuities. - - -" 421 
419 !d., §112, Comment h., §364 (1935). 
4 2o McPherson v. Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, 118 N.W. 985 (1909) (inter 
vivos trust of personalty for charity, "just as you wish."); Stoepe1 v. 
Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 547, 127 N.W. 673 (1910) (bequest to 
physician "to be used as he sees best for carrying on the work of 
relieving suffering," void where testatrix died before the effective date 
of Act 122, P.A. 1907). In Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 
N.W. 938 (1908), a husband who died in 1896 devised the residue of 
his estate, real and personal, to his wife for life, remainder as to two-
thirds to such charities in the City of Alpena as she should by will 
appoint. The wife, who died in 1905, attempted to exercise the power 
and also made bequests of her own property to "women.'s work in 
foreign fields," "women's work in home lands (not Tank Home)," 
and "Protestant Missionary work among poor colored people of the 
South." The Court held that the power created by the husband's 
will failed because the beneficiaries were not definitely ascertainable, 
but, on the basis of extrinsic evidence that the church to which she 
belonged had three organizations devoted to the three objects stated, 
held that the wife's bequests of her own property were to these 
organizations and were valid. 
421 Amended by Act 125, P.A. 1911, to include trusts for the mainte-
nance of parts of cemeteries. Repealed and superseded by Act 280, 
P.A. 1915, Comp. Laws (1915) §§11099-11101; Comp. Laws (1929) 
§§13512-13514; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.1191-26.1193; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§§554.351-554.353. Section I of the present statute provides, "No gift, 
grant, bequest or devise, whether in trust or otherwise to religious, 
educational, charitable or benevolent uses, or for the purpose of pro-
viding for the care or maintenance of any part of any cemetery, public 
or private, or anything therein contained which shall in other respects 
be valid under the laws of this state, shall be invalid by reason of 
the indefiniteness or uncertainty of the object of such trust or of the 
persons designated as the beneficiaries thereunder in the instrument 
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Since the enactment of this legislation there is no 
doubt that any charitable trust which would be valid 
under general Anglo-American law is also valid under 
Michigan laW.422 It has been held to exempt charitable 
creating the same, nor by reason of the same contravening any statute 
or rule against perpetuties." Act 373, P.A. 1925, Comp. Laws (1929) 
§§13516-13517; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.1201-26.1202; Comp. Laws (1948) 
§§554.381, 554.382, provides: "Sec. 1. No statutory or common law 
rule of this state against perpetuities or restraint of alienation shall 
hereafter invalidate any gift, grant, devise or bequest in trust or 
otherwise, for public welfare purposes. Sec. 2. Public welfare purposes 
are defined to be all lawful purposes beneficial to the public as a 
whole." See also Act 380, P.A. 1913, Part Two, note 400 supra. 
Trusts created by an employer as part of a stock bonus plan, pension 
plan, disability or death benefit plan, or profit sharing plan, are 
exempted from the Rule Against Perpetuities by Act 193, P.A. 1947, 
as amended by Act 61, P.A. 1951, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.82 (1), Comp. 
Laws (1948), §555.301. 
422 Loomis v. Mack, 183 Mich. 674, 150 N.W. 370 (1915) (Devise of 
land and personalty on trust for dependent children of Oakland 
County; decree holding valid affirmed by four to four vote in Supreme 
Court. The justices voting for reversal thought Act 122 of 1907 was 
unconstitutional because of a defective title. This doubt was elimi-
nated by Act 125 of 1911); In re Brown's Estate, 198 Mich. 544, 165 
N.W. 929 (1917), discussed at Part Two, note 428 infra; Peters v. 
Fowler, 202 Mich. 695, 168 N.W. 966 (1918), discussed at Part Two, 
note 427 infra; Scudder v. Security Trust Co., 238 Mich. 318, 213 
N.W. 131 (1927) (devise of residue to trustee to provide for the wel-
fare of elderly persons without means of support by paying income 
or principal to organized charities); Wanstead v. Fisher, 278 Mich. 68, 
270 N.W. 218 (1936) (devise of land to trustee to provide college 
scholarships to needy graduates of Iron River High School); John 
Robinson Hospital v. Cross, 279 Mich. 407, 272 N.W. 724 (1937) 
(bequest to trustee to maintain room in hospital); Gifford v. First 
National Bank of Menominee, 285 Mich. 58, 280 N.W. 108 (1938) 
(devise of residue to trustee to pay income to named persons for life, 
then to devote to charitable purposes connected with medicine and 
public health); Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942) 
(bequest to trustee to construct a hospital in Lapeer); Chicago Bank 
of Commerce v. McPherson, 62 Fed. (2d) 393 (6th Cir. 1932) (devise 
to trustees for "such charitable, benevolent, educational and public 
welfare uses as such trustees shall elect"). In Moore v. O'Leary, 180 
Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914), a devise of the residue to "Mary E. 
Clary, to be disposed of by her as I have heretofore instructed her for 
charitable purposes" was held void in spite of the statute. Because 
of the Statute of Wills, such a devise does not create an express 
charitable trust. There is a conflict of authority in other jurisdictions 
as to whether a constructive trust for charity will be imposed in this 
situation. 3 Scott, LAw oF TRusTs, §359 (1939). In Scarney v. Clarke, 
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trusts of land from the suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1846 423 and from the "fully expressed and 
clearly defined" provision of Chapter 63.424 It will be 
recalled that, under general Anglo-American law, chari-
ties are not wholly exempt from the Rule Against Per-
petuities in that a contingent limitation to a charity not 
preceded by an interest in a charity is subject to the 
Rule, 425 although one which follows another charity is 
exempt.426 In Peters v. Fowler,421 a testator directed his 
executors to invest $500 and pay the income to the local 
Methodist Episcopal church as long as it conducted at 
least twelve services a year, and when it ceased to do so 
to pay over the principal to the Board of Foreign Mis-
sions of the Methodist Episcopal Church. This was held 
valid, as it would be in most jurisdictions. In re Brown's 
Estate 428 involved a devise of land and personalty to 
corporations to be organized within two years after pro-
bate of the will to operate charitable hospitals. This 
282 Mich. 56, 275 N.W. 765 (1937), a trust for a clinic operated for 
profit was properly held to be non-charitable. Cf. Auditor General 
v. R. B. Smith Memorial Hospital Association, 293 Mich. 36, 291 N.W. 
213 (1940), where a non-profit hospital was held charitable although 
it charged fees. 
423 Scudder v. Security Trust Co., Wanstead v. Fisher, cited in pre-
ceding note. See Part One, notes 583, 586, Part Two at notes 410, 
411, supra. 
424 In re Brown's Estate, Part Two, note 422 supra. See Part One, 
notes 592, 593, Part Two, at notes 47, 406, supra. 
425 Part Two, note 390 supra. 
426 Part Two, note 391 supra. 
427 202 Mich. 695, 168 N.W. 966 (1918). 
428 198 Mich. 544, 165 N.W. 929 (1917). In re DeBancourt's Estate, 
279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891, 110 A.L.R. 1346 (1937), involved a be-
quest to a trustee to pay $10,000 to the Salvation Army in Jackson 
"when he is satisfied that the building will be completed and that the 
said Salvation Army will be able to finance the same." This was 
treated as valid, but it was held that the Salvation Army would forfeit 
the bequest if it failed to comply with the condition precedent within 
ten years, the period of the statute of limitations on claims against 
decedent's estates. 
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was held valid although it suspended the absolute power 
of alienation for a period which might exceed two lives, 
the maximum period permitted by the statute then in 
force, and postponed vesting for a period which might 
exceed lives in being and twenty-one years, the period 
of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities.429 This 
decision appears to mean that in Michigan charities are 
exempt from the Rule Against Perpetuities in all cases, 
even when the charitable limitation is contingent and 
does not follow another charity. 
B. DURATION; RESTRAINTS ON TERMINATION 
Generally speaking, the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities prohibits only remoteness of vesting, it does 
not restrict the duration of interests in property, legal 
or equitable, whether or not they are vested. If Andrew 
Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs, John 
takes a legal estate in fee simple which may last forever. 
If Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe and his 
heirs upon trust for John Stiles and his heirs, James takes 
a legal estate in fee simple and John an equitable estate 
in fee simple. Both of these and the trust itself may 
last forever, but no violation of the Rule is involved 
because there is no postponement of vesting.430 A trust 
does not tie up property or impede alienation undesir-
ably if the interests of the beneficiaries are alienable and 
they are entitled to terminate the trust by compelling 
the trustee to convey the legal title to them. Hence, in 
the absence of statutory restrictions, there is no legal 
429 Part Two, note 134 supra. 
4So Williams v. Teale, 6 Hare 239, 67 Eng. Rep. 1155 (1847); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§232-246 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §557 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §378 
(1944). 
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limit to the duration of such trusts.431 As has been seen, 
the Michigan statutes prohibiting suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation, which were in force from 184 7 
to 1949, were construed to limit the permissible dura-
tion of trusts for receipt of the rents and profits of land, 
charitable and private, to two lives in being.432 A trust 
does tie up property and impede alienation undesirably 
if the beneficiaries are unable to compel termination of 
the trust, particularly if their interests are inalienable. 
Hence rules, collateral to the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
have been developed to restrict limitations which tend 
to make trusts indestructible for undesirably long 
periods. The application of these rules is not identical 
as to all types of indestructible trusts, so separate consid-
eration of the types of trusts which may be indestructible 
is desirable. 
( 1) Charitable Trusts 
Under general Anglo-American law, a charitable trust 
may be made perpetually indestructible; that is, it may 
be so limited that it may last forever and that no one will 
be entitled to terminate it.433 Michigan recognized this 
lack of limitation on the duration of indestructible 
charitable trusts in Smith v. Bonhoof/34 involving a trust 
of land created before the enactment of the suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation statutes, and in 
431 In re Cassel, [1926] Ch. 358; 1 Scott, LAw OF TRusTs, §62.10 
(1939). 
432 Part One, note 593, Part Two, note 406 supra. But these statutes 
were made inapplicable to charitable trusts by Act 122, P.A. 1907, 
Part Two, note 421 supra. 
433 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §365; 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §365 (1939); 
2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §554 (1936). PROPERTY REsTATE· 
MENT, §§378, 381, 398 (1944); Wolfe, "Rules Against Perpetuities and 
Gifts to Charity," 17 IND. L.J. 205 (1942). 
434 2 Mich. 116 (1851), Part Two, note 402 supra. 
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Penny v. CroulJ 435 involving a trust of personalty created 
before the charities statute of 1907.436 Although charit-
able trusts of land were limited in duration to two lives 
by the suspension of the absolute power of alienation 
statutes,437 it is clear that there has been no restriction 
on the duration of charitable trusts, whether of land or 
of personalty and whether or not they are indestructible, 
since the legislation of 1907.488 
(2) Honorary Trusts 
A trust which has no ascertainable human beneficiaries 
but which does have a definite non-charitable purpose is 
known as an honorary trust.439 The commonly recog-
nized honorary trusts are those for care of graves, 440 for 
support of particular animals,441 and for the promotion 
of non-charitable causes such as sports 442 and political 
parties.443 An honorary trust is not a true trust because 
the trustee cannot be compelled to carry it out. If he 
refuses to do so, however, he holds upon resulting trust 
4ss 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889), Part Two, note 
407 supra. 
436 Act 122, P.A. 1907, Part Two, note 421 supra. 
437 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 
3 N.W. 207 (1879), Part Two, note 406 supra. 
438 Part Two, notes 422-424, 426-428, supra. 
489 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §124, Comment c. (1935); 1 Scott, LAW oF 
TRUSTS, §124 (1939). 
440 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 21 L.J. Ch. (N.S.) 596 (1852); Mussett v. Bingle, 
[1876) W.N. 170; 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §124.2 (1939). 
441 Pettingall v. Pettingall, 11 L.J. Ch. 176 (1842) (favorite black 
mare); In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889) (testator's horses and hounds); 
In re Kelly, [1932] I.R. 255 (testator's dogs); 1 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS, 
§ 124.3 (1939). A trust for the benefit of animals in general, as for 
the prevention of cruelty to them, is charitable. In re Marchant, 54 
Sol. J. 425 (1910); TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §374, Comment c. (1935); 
3 Scott, id., §374.2. 
442 In re Thompson, [1934] 1 Ch. 342 (fox hunting); 1 Scott, LAW 
OF TRUSTS, §124.6 (1939). 
443 Bonar Law Memorial Trust v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, 
49 T.L.R. 220 (1933); 3 Scott, LAw OF TRUSTS, §374.6 (1939). 
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for the settlor or the persons who would have been en-
titled to the property if there were no trust, usually the 
heirs or residuary devisees of the settlor. In the absence 
of provision for its termination in the trust instrument, 
such a trust is indestructible. The beneficiaries cannot 
terminate it because there are no ascertainable human 
beneficiaries, the settlor or his heirs, etc., cannot compel 
termination, and the trustee cannot terminate the trust 
for his own benefit. This being so, a rule collateral to 
the Rule Against Perpetuities has been developed to the 
effect that an indestructible honorary trust is void unless 
its duration is certain not to exceed the period of the 
Rule.444 If Andrew Baker bequeaths $10,000 to John 
Stiles upon trust to devote the income to the support of 
Andrew's horses and dogs so long as they live, the be-
quest is void, because the trust is not certain to termi-
nate within human lives and twenty-one years.445 
In Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial As-
sociation/46 a testator bequeathed $100 to the trustees "as 
a perpetual fund to be kept at interest by said trustees 
444 Dawson v. Small, L.R. 18 Eq. Il4 (1874); Mussett v. Bingle, 
[1876] W.N. 170; Kennedy v. Kennedy, [1914] A.C. 215; In re Kelly, 
[1932) I.R. 255; TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §124 (1935); 2 Simes, LAW OF 
FUTURE INTERESTS, §555 (1936); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §124.1 (1939); 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §379 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common 
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY, §24.67 
(1952); Smith, "Honorary Trusts and the Rule Against Perpetuities," 
30 CoL. L. REv. 60 (1930). 
445 It is the generally accepted view that animal lives may not be 
used to measure the period. In re Estate of Kelly, [1932] I.R. 255; 
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§228a, 906 (1915); 2 
Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §491 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§374, Comment h. (1944). See Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 
N.Y. Supp. 598 (1932). But in In re Dean, 41 Ch. D. 552 (1889), an 
honorary trust to last for fifty years if the horses who were its bene-
ficiaries so long lived was held valid. Moreover, in In re Estate of 
Kelly, supra, where the trust was to apply £4 annually to the support 
of certain dogs, it was held that the annual payments were severable 
and the trust good for twenty-one years. 
446 170 Mich. 645, 129 N.W. 36 (1912). 
TRUSTS AND CHARITIES 425 
and the interest used to take care of the graves on my lot 
in said cemetery," and the residue of his estate to his 
wife for life, remainder to the trustees to erect a fence 
around the cemetery and a vault in it. The disposition 
of the residue was held valid, but the provision for a per-
petual trust fund was held void as a perpetuity. Since 
1911 the Michigan statutes have expressly permitted per-
petual trusts for the care of graves/47 but the Lounsbury 
case is still authority for the proposition that Michigan 
recognizes honorary trusts and holds those not authorized 
by statute invalid if their duration may exceed the 
period of the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
(3) Trusts For Unincorporated Societies 
An unincorporated association has capacity to be the 
beneficiary of a trust.448 If the purposes of such an as-
sociation are charitable, there is no limit to the duration 
of trusts for it.449 If the purposes of an unincorporated 
association are not charitable, a trust for it is void if, by 
its terms, it may continue for a period longer than that 
of the Rule Against Perpetuities and will be indestruc-
447 Act 125, P.A. 1911, Act 280, P.A. 1915, Part Two, note 421, 
Act 380, P.A. 1913, Par,t Two, note 400 supra. See: In re More's 
Estate, 179 Mich. 237, 146 N.W. 319 (1914), where such a trust was 
held valid by virtue of the provisions of a special act incorporating 
the cemetery involved. 
448 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §119 (1935); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §119 
(1939). Such a trust must be distinguished from a trust for the present 
or future members of a society as individuals, which is a form of class 
gift. 
449 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §380 (1944); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, 
§119 (1939); Part Two, note 433 supra; Smith v. Bonhoof, 2 Mich. 
116 (1851); Home Missionary Society v. Corning, 164 Mich. 395, 129 
N.W. 686 (1911); Peters v. Fowler, 202 Mich. 695, 168 N.W. 966 
(1918), Part Two, note 427 supra. Of course this was not true as to 
trusts of Michigan land created between 1847 and 1907. Methodist 
Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 3 N.W. 207 
(1879), Part Two, note 406 supra. 
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tible during that period.450 It would seem, however, that 
a trust for a non-charitable unincorporated association is 
valid, even though it may continue for a period longer 
than that of the Rule Against Perpetuities, if some per-
son may destroy it for his own benefit or if the current 
members of the association may expend the entire prin-
cipal at any time for the purposes of the association.451 
(4) Indestructible Trusts For Private Persons 
In England, if all the beneficiaries of a trust for priv-
ate persons are in being and ascertained, they are en-
titled to terminate the trust by compelling the trustee 
to convey to them even though such termination will 
defeat a material purpose of the trust. 452 The rule that 
trusts for private persons were always destructible by the 
beneficiaries had, until 1935, a single exception. The 
interest of the beneficiary of a trust for the separate use 
of a married woman could be made inalienable and she 
could be effectively prohibited from terminating the 
trust prematurely.453 Such a restraint on alienation and 
4 50 Thomson v. Shakespear, 1 De G.F.&J. 399, 45 Eng. Rep. 413 
(1860); Carne v. Long, 2 De. G.F.&.J. 75, 45 Eng. Rep. 550 (1860); 1 
Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §119 (1939); 2 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§485 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §380 (1944); Leach 8c Tudor, 
"The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, §24.67 (1952). 
451 In re Drummond, [1914] 2 Ch. 90; 1 Scott, LAW oF TRusTs, §119 
(1939); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §380 (1944). The Restatement deems 
it sufficient if the trustee or some other person has such power to ex-
pend the principal, but this has been questioned. Morray, "The Rule 
Against Prolonged Indestructibility of Private Trusts," 44 ILL. L. REv. 
467 at 484 (1949). 
452 Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. 8c Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841); 
Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §236 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW 
OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §557 (1936); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §337 
(1939). 
453 Jackson v. Hobhouse, 2 Mer. 483, 35 Eng. Rep. 1025 (1817); 
Tullett v. Armstrong, 4 My. 8c Cr. 377, 41 Eng. Rep. 147 (1840); Bag-
gett v. Meux, 1 Ph. 627, 41 Eng. Rep. 771 (1846). The restraints on 
alienation and termination were effective, however, only while the 
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termination would endure, of course, only for the life 
of the married woman concerned. In re Ridley 454 in-
volved a bequest to trustees to pay the income to Mary 
Cooper for life and then to hold upon trust for the chil-
dren of Mary who survived her. The will prohibited 
alienation or anticipation of their interests by female 
beneficiaries. Mary survived the testator and later died, 
survived by two married daughters. The daughters sued 
to compel the trustees to terminate the trust by trans-
ferring the principal to them. Such transfer was decreed 
on the ground that provisions against termination of a 
trust which might last longer than the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities are void. 
Since 1935 England has not permitted indestructible 
trusts for private persons whether or not they are mar-
ried women; that is, if all the beneficiaries of such a 
trust are in being, ascertained and of full age, they may 
compel the trustee to terminate the trust by transferring 
the principal to them. In this country, however, it is 
generally held that the beneficiaries of a trust are not 
entitled to compel its termination if such termination 
would defeat a material purpose of the trust. 455 This 
doctrine is commonly applied in two situations, where 
woman was married, ceasing upon her husband's death. Jones v. 
Salter, 2 Russ. & M. 208, 39 Eng. Rep. 374 (1815); Barton v. Briscoe, 
Jac. 603, 37 Eng. Rep. 978 (1822). The Law Reform (Married 
Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 and 26 Geo. V, c. 30, §2, in-
validated such restraints in deeds and wills becoming . effective after 
the statute. The Married Women (Restraint Upon Anticipation) 
Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. VI, C. 78, §1 (1), made such invalidation 
retroactive, so that restraints on alienation and termination in trusts 
for married women are void, regardless of when the trust instrument 
became effective. 
4iH 11 Ch. D. 645 (1879). Accord: Whitby v. Mitchell, 42 Ch. D. 
494 (1889), aff'd., 44 Ch. D. 85 (C.A. 1890). 
4 55 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §121c (1915); TRUSTS 
RESTATEMENT, §337 (2) (1935); 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§557 (1936); 3 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTs §337 (1939); Part One, note 
615 supra. 
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the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable by rea-
son of spendthrift provisions which, as has been seen, 
are usually valid in the United States/56 and where, even 
though the cestui's interest is alienable, one of the pur-
poses of the trust is to postpone the cestui's enjoyment 
of the principal until he reaches a stipulated age. Such 
provisions for postponement of enjoyment are ordinarily 
valid in this country under what is known as the rule in 
Claflin v. Clafiin.451 There is general agreement that pro-
visions which would make trusts for private persons per-
petually indestructible are void 458 and some authority 
for the view adopted in In re Ridley, 459 that provisions 
against termination of trusts which might last longer 
than the period of the Rule Aganist Perpetuities. are 
void.460 The rules on this question are as yet somewhat 
unsettled. 461 
The problem of indestructibility of trusts for private 
persons is complicated in Michigan by statutory pro-
visions that a conveyance by a trustee of land in contra-
vention of the trust is absolutely void and that the bene-
ficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of 
lands cannot assign or dispose of his interest.462 In New 
456 Part One, notes 569-572, supra. 
457 149 Mass. 19, 20 N.E. 454 (1889). 
458 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §62, Comment k. (1935); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §381 (1944). The Restatement takes no position as to 
the validity of provisions for indestructibility which are not perpetual 
but which may last longer than the Rule Against Perpetuities. 
459 Part Two, note 454 supra. 
4so 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§553, 557 (1936); I Scott, 
LAW OF TRUSTS, §62.10 (1939). Cf. Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 
3rd ed., §I2li (1915). 
461 Brownell, "Duration of Indestructible and Spendthrift Trusts," 
23 CoRN. L.Q. 629 (1938); Morray, "The Rule Against Prolonged In-
destructibility of Private Trusts," 44 ILL. L. REv. 467 (1949). 
462 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§19, 21, Comp. Laws (1857) §§2649, 2651; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4132, 4134; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8847, 8849; 
How. Stat., §§5581, 5583; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11583, 11585; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §§12985, 12987; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.69, 26.71; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§555.19, 555.20; Part One, notes 580, 583, 602, 621, supra. 
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York these provisions are held to prevent premature 
termination of trusts even though the beneficiaries are 
in being, ascertained, of full age and wish to terminate.463 
As a trust suspends the absolute power of alienation, a 
trust of land which might last for more than two lives 
in being is void if created between 1847 and 1949, when 
the statutes prohibiting such suspensions were in force.m 
The repeal of the statutes prohibiting suspension of the 
absolute power of alienation 465 leaves us without any 
statutory restriction on the duration of trusts. If Michi-
gan should follow the New York view, that the statutory 
inalienability of the interests of the trustee and cestui 
que trust makes trusts for receipt of the rents and profits 
of land indestructible, it would have either to permit 
perpetually indestructible trusts or to hold perpetual 
trusts of land void; it could not then follow the general 
Anglo-American view, that the trusts themselves are 
valid but the provisions preventing termination are void, 
because the provisions preventing termination would be 
statutory. 
In Bennett v. Chapin/66 land and other property were 
devised to trustees to pay the income to a daughter of 
the testatrix until she reached thirty-five and then to 
transfer the principal to her. Before she reached that 
age the daughter sued to compel termination of the 
463 Part One, note 614 supra. 
464 Part One, note 593 supra. 
465 Part Two, note 61 supra. 
466 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). The facts are stated more 
fully in Part One, at note 611 supra. See: Fredericks v. Near, 260 
Mich. 627 at 631, 245 N.W. 537 (1932), Part One, notes 616, 617, 
supra. In Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900), 
land was conveyed to a trustee to apply the rents and profits to the 
use of William Fitzhugh during his life and after his death to apply 
them to the use of his wife and children during the life of the wife, 
remainder at her death to the children. After the death of William 
his widow released her interest to the other beneficiaries. They sued 
to compel termination of the trust and were granted the relief sought. 
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trust. It was held that she was entitled to such termina-
tion. This decision appears to be a rejection of both 
the New York view that the statutory inalienability of 
the interests of the trustee and cestui que trust makes 
trusts for receipt of the rents and profits of land inde-
structible and of the doctrine of Claflin v. Claflin 467 that 
the beneficiaries of a trust are not entitled to terminate 
it if termination would defeat a material purpose of the 
trust. Subsequent Michigan decisions indicate, however, 
that a beneficiary of a trust of either land or personalty 
is not entitled to compel its termination if the trust in-
strument contains express spendthrift provisions restrain-
ing the alienation of the cestui's interest.468 It would 
seem that such spendthrift provisions are invalid in 
Michigan if the beneficiary whose alienation is restrained 
has more than a life interest in income.469 Reading these 
decisions together, it appears that provisions against 
termination of a trust are wholly ineffective in Michigan, 
whether the subject matter is land or chattels, if the 
beneficiary has an equitable fee simple or equivalent 
interest. If Andrew Baker devises property to James 
Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to pay the income to 
John Stiles and his heirs by a will providing, "it is a 
material purpose of this trust that no beneficiary thereof 
shall have access to the principal or be entitled to termi-
nate the trust," the trust is probably valid but the pro-
vision against termination void. If, however, a bene-
ficiary has only a life interest, he cannot compel termi-
nation in contravention of express provisions of the trust 
467 Part Two, notes 455, 457, supra. 
468 Rose v. Southern Michigan National Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 
N.W. 284 (1931); Hay v. Le Bus, 317 Mich. 698, 27 N.W. (2d) 309 
(1947), Part One, note 647 supra. 
469 In re Ford's Estate, 331 Mich. 220, 49 N.W. (2d) 154 (1951), 
Part One, note 650 supra. 
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instrument, even with the cooperation of the bene-
ficiaries in remainder. If Andrew Baker devises property 
to James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to pay the 
income to John Stiles for life and then to transfer the 
principal to Roger White, his heirs, and assigns by a will 
providing "John Stiles shall not alienate or anticipate his 
right to income under this trust," John and Roger prob-
ably cannot compel the trustee to transfer the property 
to them during John's lifetime. 
This raises the problem in In re Ridley.470 If Andrew 
Baker devises property to James Thorpe and his heirs 
upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles, who has no 
son, for life, then to pay the income to the eldest son of 
John for life, then to transfer the principal to Roger 
White, his heirs and assigns, by a will providing, "no 
life beneficiary under this trust shall alienate or antici-
pate his interest," is the restraint on termination valid? 
If so, it may make the trust indestructible for longer than 
lives in being and twenty-one years. In re Ridley and the 
best American authorities would hold the restraint m-
valid.471 Michigan should do so. 
470 Part Two, note 454 supra. 
471 Part Two, note 459 supra. But see: Blossom v. Anketell, 275 Fed. 
947 (E.D. Mich. 1921). 
CHAPTER 16 
Accumulations 
A. THE COMMON-LAW RULE AGAINST ACCUMULATIONS 
A DIRECTION to accumulate is a provision in an instrument limiting interests in property, usually by way of trust, that income shall be added to 
principal so as to increase the corpus.472 If Andrew Baker 
bequeaths property to James Thorpe upon trust to add 
the income received during the life of John Stiles to 
the principal and, upon the death of John, to pay the 
accumulated fund to the children of John who survive 
him, an accumulation is directed. A direction to use 
income to preserve, as distinguished from increase, the 
principal is not a provision for an accumulation. Thus 
a provision in a trust instrument that income shall be 
used to pay taxes, rent, or repair costs, or to replace such 
a wasting asset as a valuable lease or a mine, is not a 
direction to accumulate. 473 But a provision for use of in-
come in a manner which will increase the original prin-
cipal, as by payment of an existing mortgage on the 
trust property, paying premiums on an insurance policy 
on the life of the settlor which is an asset of the trust, 
or treating stock dividends as principal, is a direction to 
accumulate,474 as is a provision that part of the income 
472 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §439 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory 
Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY 
§25.109 (1952). 
473 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §439, Comments a., d., j., (1944). 
474 Simes, "Statutory Restrictions on the Accumulation of Income," 
7 UNIV. OF CHICAGO L. REV. 409 at 417 (1940); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
§439, Comments f., g., h. (1944). 
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shall be paid to the beneficiaries and part added to the 
principal. 
If the completion of an accumulation is a condition 
precedent to the interests of its beneficiaries and it may 
not be accomplished within the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, those interests are void by virtue 
of the normal operation of the Rule as a rule against 
remoteness of vesting.m If Andrew Baker bequeaths 
$100,000 to James Thorpe upon trust to add income to 
principal until the fund reaches $1,000,000 and to pay 
the accumulated fund to the issue of John Stiles then 
in being, the limitation to the issue of John is void be-
cause they may not be ascertainable within lives in being 
and twenty-one years. The same would be true if An-
drew Baker bequeaths property to James Thorpe upon 
trust to add income to principal for fifty years and to 
pay the accumulated fund to the issue of John Stiles 
then in being. 
In England at common law, if the interests of the 
beneficiaries were certain to vest within the period of 
the Rule Against Perpetuities and the accumulation was 
certain to cease at or before the time that such interests 
vested, a provision for accumulation was valid.416 If 
John Stiles bequeaths property to James Thorpe upon 
trust to add income to principal "during the lives of all 
my issue living at the time of my death and for twenty-
one years thereafter and to pay the accumulated fund 
to my issue then living," the provision for accumulation 
is valid at common law. Because the English law of 
475 Lord Southampton v. Marquis of Hertford, 2 V.&:B. 54, 35 Eng. 
Rep. 239 (1813); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§671, 
677 (1915); 2 Simes, LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §587 (1936); Leach & 
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.42, 24.65 (1952). 
476 Thellusson v. Woodford, 11 Ves. Jr. 112, 32 Eng. Rep. 1030 
(1805); 1 Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §62.11. 
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accumulations became statutory in 1800, there are few 
precedents as to the common-law rules, but it would 
seem that, so long as the interests of the beneficiaries 
were certain to vest within the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities, the fact that a provision for ac-
cumulation might operate for longer than that period 
did not invalidate it.477 If Andrew Baker bequeathed 
property to James Thorpe upon trust "for the children 
of John Stiles, income to be added to principal for thirty 
years and the accumulated fund then to be paid to such 
children, their executors, administrators and assigns," 
it would seem that the provision for accumulation was 
valid. Such a provision did not tie up property for 
longer than the period of the Rule because, under Eng-
lish law, the beneficiaries could compel termination of 
the trust as soon as they were ascertained and of age, 
even though the accumulation was incomplete.478 
As has been seen, in this country the beneficiaries of 
a trust cannot always compel its termination even though 
they are all in being, ascertained, and of full age.479 
Consequently, a provision for accumulation ties up prop-
erty here although the interests of the beneficiaries are 
vested. That being so, the American courts have de-
veloped a rule corollary to the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties known as the Common-Law Rule Against Accumu-
lations. Under this rule, whether or not the interests of 
the beneficiaries are vested, a provision for accumulation 
is wholly void if the accumulation may possibly continue 
for longer than the period of the Rule Against Perpe-
4<77 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §672 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §588 (1936). See: Tregonwell v. Sydenham, 
S Dow 194, 3 Eng. Rep. 1035 (H.L. 1815); Wharton v. Masterman, 
[1895] A.C. 186. 
478 Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. & Ph. 240, 41 Eng. Rep. 482 (1841); 
Part Two, note 452 supra. 
479 Part Two, notes 455, 456, 457, supra. 
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tuities.480 The Common-Law Rule Agai~stAccumula­
tions has a partial exception in the case/of charities. If 
the interest of a charitable beneficiar:t is vested, a pro-
vision for an accumulation in its fayor which may con-
tinue longer than the period of tl;ie Rule Against Per-
petuities is not void, but a court b£ competent jurisdic-
tion may shorten the period of accumulation.481 
B. THE MICHIGAN STATUTES 
rJ~-~---
Chapter 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846 
provided: 
"Sec. 37. An accumulation of rents and profits of 
real estate, for the benefit of one or more persons, may 
be directed by any will or deed suffu:ient to pass real 
estate, as follows: "· 
"1. If such accumulation be directed"~ commence 
on the creation of the estate out of which the remLaJlJi 
profits are to arise, it must be made for the benefit of one 
or more minors then in being, and terminate at the 
expiration of their minority: 
"2. If such accumulation be directed to commence 
at any time subsequent to the creation of the estate out 
of which the rents and profits are to arise, it shall com· 
4so 2 Simes, LAW oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §589 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §441, (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule 
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY, §24.65 (1952). 
Professor Simes thinks that this is the same rule as that which restricts 
provisions making trusts indestructible. "Statutory Restrictions on the 
Accumulation of Income," 7 UNIV. OF CHICAGO L. REv. 409 at 410 
(1940). 
4S1 St. Paul's Church v. Attorney-General, 164 Mass. 188, 41 N.E. 
231 (1895); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §678 (1915); 3 
Scott, LAW OF TRUSTS, §401.9 (1939); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §442 
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.42 (1952). This seems to 
have been the rule in England at one time. Harbin v. Masterman, 
L.R. 12 Eq. 559 (1871). Now, however, where a vested interest is 
given to a charity, subject to a provision for accumulation, the pro-
vision for accumulation is void and the charity takes the principal at 
once. Wharton v. Masterman, [1895] A.C. 186. 
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mence within the time in this chapter permitted for the 
vesting of future estates, and during the minority of the 
persons for whose benefit it is directed, and shall termi-
nate at the expiration of such minority. 
"Sec. 38. If in either of the cases mentioned in the 
last preceding section, the direction for such accumula-
tion shall be for a longer time than during the minority 
of the persons intended to be benefited thereby, it shall 
be void as to the time beyond such minority; and all 
directions for the accumulation of the rents and profits 
of real estate, except such as are herein allowed, shall 
be void. 
"Sec. 39. When such rents and profits are directed 
to be accumulated for the benefit of infants entitled to 
the expectant estate, and such infants shall be destitute 
of other sufficient means of support and education, the 
chancellor, upon the application of their guardian, may 
direct a suitable sum out of such rents and profits to be 
applied to their maintenance and education. 
"Sec. 40. When in consequence of a valid limitation 
of an expectant estate, there shall be a suspense of the 
power of alienation, or of the ownership, during the 
continuance of which the rents and profits shall be un-
disposed of and no valid direction for their accumula-
tion is given, such rents and profits shall belong to the 
person presumptively entitled to the next eventual 
estate." 482 
Chapter 63 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846 
provides: 
482 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§37 to 40; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2621 
to 2624; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4104 to 4107; Comp. Laws (1897) 
§§8819-8822; How. Stat., §§5553 to 5556; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11555 
to 11558; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12957 to 12960; Mich. Stat. Ann., 
§§26.37 to 26.40; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.37 to 554.40. These pro-
visions were taken from N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit II, art. 
First, §§37-40. Sections 37 and 38 were amended in important respects 
by Act 227, P.A. 1949, and all four sections were repealed by Acts 6, 
7 P.A. 1952. See Part Two, note 501 infra. 
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"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or 
either of the following purposes: ---
"4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to 
accumulate the same for the benefit of any married 
woman, or for either of the purposes and within the 
limits prescribed in the preceding chapter." 483 
In St. Amour v. Rivard,484 a case involving the will of 
a testator who died in 1841, the Court stated that,y 
common law, a provision for accumulation for ~ortger 
than the period of the common-law R_!!Ie/Agafnst Per-
petuities would be wholly voic:l~ · 
Toms v. Willi~as ~~inVolved the will of a testatrix 
who died in 1876 ing land which was subject to a 
·forty-year lease, g" en in 1854, which required the lessor 
to pay for buildJngs erected by the lessee at the expira-
tion of the term) in 1894 or to grant a renewal lease for 
an additional f~rty years. The will devised this and 
other land and ~l .. lso personal property to trustees ( 1) to 
set aside annually until 1894 $5,000 of the income as a 
sinking fund to p~y for the buildings, (2) to accumulate 
the rest of the inCQme until the expiratiori of the mi-
nority of the younge~f John R., ~~(}ni M. and Mary 
J. Williams, (3) to pay Qver-·suefi accumulation and 
subsequently accruing income to these three persons 
after the youngest was of age, (4) to pay for the build-
ings in 1894, and then to transfer the entire corpus of 
the trust to the three persons. John R. Williams came 
483 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §11, Comp. Laws (1857) §2641; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4124; Comp. Laws (1897) §8839; How. Stat., §5573; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11575; Comp. Laws (1929) §12977; Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §26.61; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.11. This subsection was taken 
from N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. Second, §55, but 
the words "for the benefit of any married woman" were not in the 
New York section. 
484 2 Mich. 294 at 299-300 (1852), Part Two, note 39 supra. The 
case did not involve an accumulation, so the language is dictum. 
485 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). 
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of age before the death of the testatrix, Gershom M. 
Williams did so in 1878, and Mary J. Williams would 
do so in 1881. The Court held that the interests of John 
R., Gershom M., and Mary J. Williams vested immed-
iately upon the death of the testatrix and that both pro-
visions for accumulation were valid. The opinion states 
that the Michigan accumulation statutes had no applica-
tion to accumulations of income of personal property, 
and that directions for such accumulations limited to 
lives in being and twenty-one years are valid.486 Reject-
ing New York decisions to the contrary, the Court held 
that our statutes permitted an accumulation of the 
rents and profits of land for the benefit of any number 
of minors until the youngest came of age.487 Likewise, 
rejecting New York decisions to the contrary, the Court 
held that our statutes did not invalidate provisions for 
accumulations to pay off what amounted to an encum-
brance on the trust property.488 
In Wilson v. Odell/89 a will devised land and person-
alty to trustees (I) to pay an annuity of $1500 to the 
testator's wife for her life, (2) to pay annuities of $600 
for or to each of his children while under fourteen and 
$1,000 thereafter for life, (3) to continue the children's 
annuities to their children until the youngest was of 
age, (4) to transfer the corpus to the children's children 
after all the children were dead and the youngest of 
their children was of age. The Court held that the 
limitation of the principal violated the statutes prohibit-
ing suspension of the absolute power of alienation and 
486 41 Mich. 552 at 562. Accord: Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 
255 Mich. 436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931), Part Two, note 495 infra. 
487 41 Mich. 552 at 568-569. See: Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Per-
petuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.110, 
25.114 (1952). 
488 41 Mich. 552 at 575. See: Whiteside, id., §§25.109, 25.114 (1952). 
489 58 Mich. 533, 25 N_W, 506 (1885). 
,, 
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that, as the annuities given to the testator's children 
would not consume the en~ire income, the direction as 
to them was for an accumulation which, under our 
accumulation statutes, could not last beyond the time 
, when the youngest of the testator's children came of *·~T~is decision illustrate!s the fact that, whereas an 
accumulation which violates the Common-Law Rule 
Against Accumulations is wholly void, an accumulation 
for a minor which violates the statutes because it is to 
extend beyond minority is void only as to the excess. 
Palms v. Palms 490 in;lolved a will which devised land 
and othe~ prope:rey-mtrustees to pay the income to the 
testator's two children for life and then to transfer the 
principal to their children as each came of age. A codicil 
directed the trustees to treat royalties under mineral 
leases as principal during the minority of testator's 
grandchildren "now living." The Court observed that if 
this codicil directed an accumulation of the rents and 
profits of land, it would be void under the statutes be-
cause it was to commence at once but might be for the 
benefit of persons not yet in being. It held, however, 
that the mineral royalties were not rents and profits but 
the proceeds of sales of iron ore. 
In Eldred v. Shaw/~1 land and sheep were devised to 
a trustee for a grandson with directions to apply only 
so much of the income as was necessary to the support, 
education, and maintenance of the beneficiary during 
minority, "and, in the case of the death of my said 
grandson without heirs by his body begotten, the lands 
490 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). Cf. Poole v. Union Trust Co., 
191 Mich. 162, 157 N.W. 430 (1916), where the Court, without over-
ruling Palms v. Palms on the accumulation question, allowed the life 
income beneficiary under a trust the entire royalties paid during her 
lifetime under mineral leases given by the settlor. 
491 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897), Part One, note 98 supra. 
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with all its increases and accretions I give, devise and 
bequeath" to adult children of the testator. It was held 
that the grandson took an estate tail, subject to trust 
during minority, which, by operation of the fee tail 
statute,492 became a fee simple subject to a contingent 
limitation (shifting executory interest) on death without 
issue. The Court decided that the provision for accumu-
lation of surplus income was valid under the accumula-
tion statutes and that the accumulated fund should be 
held on trust for the life of the grandson, he to receive 
the income and the principal to go with the land. In 
reaching the latter conclusion, the Court seems to have 
overlooked the fact that the statutes permitted accumu-
lations of the rents and profits of the land only for the 
benefit of minors. An accumulation during the minority 
of a child for the benefit of an adult is not permitted by 
the statutes. The New York decisions make it clear that 
accumulations are invalid unless for the exclusive bene-
fit of the persons during whose minority they are made, 
that the minor is entitled to the whole accumulation on 
coming of age, and that a limitation giving it to an-
other on a contingency is void.m 
In Hull v. Osborn/94 the residue of an estate was de-
vised to testator's two granddaughters, $10,000 to be paid 
to each on reaching twenty-five, $10,000 on reaching 
thirty, $10,000 on reaching thirty-five, $10,000 on reach-
ing forty, and the balance of half the residue on reach-
492 Part One, note 84 supra. 
493 Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.110 (1952); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
§445 (1944). The Restatement and a 1945 amendment to the New 
York statute [Laws 1945, c. 558, Real Prop. Law, §6la] provide that 
a gift to others of the accumulated fund on death of the minor before 
reaching twenty-one is valid. 
494 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). Cf. Hunter v. Hunter, 160 
Mich. 218, 125 N.W. 71 (1910). 
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ing forty-five. The will provided that if either died be-
~?re reaching forty-five, wit:Pout issue, the unpaid por-
t~n of her share should pa~s to the other and that if 
bot~~o died, all unpaid should pass to persons to be 
ascertaii:ied-~at-that time. It was held that the entire 
interests of the granddaughters vested on the death of the 
testator, subject to being divested by death without issue 
before reaching forty-five, and that the provisions for 
postponement of payment did not violate "the rule as 
to perpetuities or accumulations." The Court thought 
that these provisions postponed: only payment of prin-
cipal and that the granddaughters were entitled to the 
entire income as it accrued. 
In Post v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.,495 half the residue 
ot an estate, consisting who}Iy of personalty, was be-
queathed to trustees to pay from the income not to 
exceed $300 per monthto testatrix's daughter Fannie for 
life and then to her issue until her youngest child living 
at the testatrix's death reached twenty-five, then to trans-
fer the principal and accumulated surplus income to the 
issue of Fannie. When one of her two children was a 
minor and the other was of age, Fannie and her chil-
dren petitioned for payment of more than $300 a month 
(the total income being some $450 per month) to pay 
for the education of the children. A decree ordering 
such payment was reversed insofar as it related to the 
child who was of age. The Court ruled that, as the 
accumulation statutes related only to the rents and 
495 255 Mich. 436, 238 N.W. 206 (1931). In Hay v. Hay, 317 Mich. 
370, 26 N.W. (2d) 908 (1947), personalty was bequeathed to a trustee 
to pay certain life annuities and accumulate the surplus income until 
twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor of the grandchil-
dren of the testator who were living when he died, then to pay the 
accumulated fund to his heirs, to be determined at that time. There 
were seven grandchildren living when the testator died. The provisions 
were treated as valid. 
442 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
profits of land they had no application and, hence, that 
the direction to accumulate for a period measured by 
lives in being was valid. It held, nevertheless, that a 
court may direct advancements from an accumulation 
for the education and support of minor beneficiaries.496 
The testator in Loomis v. Laramie 491 devised the 
residue of his estate, consisting of land and personalty, 
to trustees to accumulate the income for twenty years 
and then to transfer the principal and accumulated in-
come to five named persons "and the heirs of their body 
forever." The Court, without mentioning the accumu-
lation statutes, held that the trust was void because it 
suspended the absolute power of alienation for a period 
not based on lives in violation of the statutes then in 
force and that the five persons were entitled to the resi-
due immediately and absolutely. The same result should 
have been reached if the accumulation statutes had been 
considered and applied. 
In re Dingler's Estate 498 involved a devise of an estate 
to trustees to pay the income to testatrix's twin grand-
daughters in quarterly instalments until they reached 
thirty and then to transfer the principal to them "or 
to the survivor unless one of said granddaughters shall 
die leaving issue surviving." It was held that the pro-
vision for payment of the income in quarterly instal-
ments was not a direction to accumulate because it did 
not involve adding income to principal. 
496 Citing Knorr v. Millard, 52 Mich. 542, 18 N.W. 349 (1884), 
which reached the same result on the ground that, as Rev. Stat. 1846, 
c. 62, §39 [Part Two, note 482 supra] expressly authorizes such ad-
vancements from accumulations of the rents and profits of land, a 
court of equity should have power to direct them from accumulations 
of the income from personalty. Accord: Knorr v. Millard, 57 Mich. 265, 
23 N.W. 807 (1885). 
497 286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938). 
498 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). 
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In re Mac Donell's Estate 499 concerned a devise of 
land and a small amount of personalty to trustees to pay 
the testator's son Donald $200 a month until he reached 
thirty-five and then to transfer the corpus of the trust 
to him. Before reaching thirty-five, Donald sued to 
compel the trustees to pay him the entire income. The 
trustees contended that the accumulation statutes were 
inapplicable because the will did not expressly direct 
accumulation and because it conferred upon the trustees 
discretionary power to pay Donald more than $200 a 
month in the event of emergency. J\ decree for the 
trustees was reversed, the Court holding that the accumu-
lation statutes applied to a mixed disposition of land 
and personalty and that an implied direction to accumu-
late was governed by them. J\s there was no other bene-
ficiary, it would seem that Donald would have been en-
titled to compel termination of this trust under the rule 
in Bennett v. Chapin.500 He did not seek to do so. 
Sections 37 and 38 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Sta-
tutes of 1846 were amended by Act 227, Public J\cts 
of 1949, to read as follows: 
"Sec. 37. J\n accumulation of rents and profits of 
real estate, or of the profits or income of personal estate, 
or both, for the benefit of 1 or more persons, may be 
directed by any will or deed sufficient to pass real or 
personal estate, as follows: 
"First. If such accumulation be directed to commence 
499 325 Mich. 449, 39 N.W. (2d) 32 (1949). But see In re Peck's 
Estate, 323 Mich. 11 at 20-21, 34 N.W. (2d) 533 (1948). An accumu-
lation of the income from a mixed mass of property consisting of land 
worth $40,000 and personalty worth $40,000,000, to last until certain 
children reached twenty-five, was involved in Dodge v. Detroit Trust 
Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). Its validity was not 
determined. 
5oo 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889), Part One, note 611, Part Two, 
note 466, supra. See: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §441, Comment c. 
(1944). 
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on the creation of the estate out of which the rents and 
profits or income are to arise, it must be made for the 
benefit of l or more minors then in being, and termi-
nate at the expiration of their minority. 
"Second. If such accumulation be directed to com-
mence at any time subsequent to the creation of the 
estate out of which the rents and profits or income of 
real estate or the income of personal estate~ or both~ 
are to arise, it shall commence within the time in this 
chapter permitted for the vesting of future estates, and 
during the minority of the persons in being at the crea-
tion thereof~ for whose benefit it is directed, and shall 
terminate at the expiration of such minority. 
"Sec. 38. If in either of the cases mentioned in the 
last preceding section, the direction, in any will or deed 
heretofore or hereafter attested~ executed or delivered~ 
for such accumulation shall be for a longer time than 
during the minority of the persons intended to be bene-
fited thereby, or for a longer time than 33 years from 
the death of the maker of any will~ it shall be void as 
to the time beyond said minority or said 3 3 years~· and 
all directions for the accumulation of the rents and 
profits of real estate, or of the profits or income of per-
sonal estate~ except such as are herein allowed, shall be 
void." 501 
These amendments extended the restrictions imposed 
by the sections, which had theretofore applied only to 
accumulations of income from land and mixed property, 
to accumulations of income of personalty. Moreover, 
they increased the stringency of the restrictions by re-
quiring that accumulations be for the benefit of minors 
in being at the creation of the estate~ which means at 
the effective date of the deed or will directing the ac-
5o1 Act 227, P.A. 1949, §1, Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.37, 26.38; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§554.37, 554.38. Language added by amendment shown 
by italics. 
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cumulation.602 If Andrew Baker devised land to James 
Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to John Stiles for 
life, then to accumulate the rents and profits during the 
minority of John's eldest son, and to transfer the land 
and accumulation to such son at his majority, the direc-
tion to accumulate would have been valid under the 
statutes in their original form whether or not John's 
eldest son was in being when the testator died.503 The 
amendments to Section 37 would make it invalid unless 
the eldest son was in being when the testator died. This 
being so, the thirty-three year provision in the amend-
ment to Section 38 could have no application. Section 
37, as amended, restricted accumulations directed by 
will to the minority of a person in being when the testa-
tor died. Such a minority could not last for more than 
twenty-one years and nine months after the testator's 
death.60' 
Sections 37, 38, 39, and 40 of Chapter 62, Revised 
wz Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §41, Comp. Laws (1857) §2625; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4108; Comp. Laws (1897) §8823; How. Stat., §5557; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11559; Comp. Laws (1929) §12961; Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §26.41; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.41, provides: "The delivery of 
the grant, where an expectant estate is created by grant; and where 
it is created by devise, the death of the testator shall be deemed the 
time of the creation of the estate." Mr. Thomas G. Long of the De-
troit Bar thinks that what must have been meant was in being "at 
the commencement of the accumulation" rather than "at the creation 
of the estate" in the technical statutory sense of that term. "Perpetui-
ties and Accumulations: Recent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DE-
TROIT LAWYER 193 (1949). Mr. Long's suggestion tends to explain 
the otherwise meaningless 33-year provision in Section 38. 
5os Manice v. Manice, 43 N.Y. 303 (1871), Part Three, note 367 
infra. See Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912), 
Part Three, note 366 infra. 
504 Professor Whiteside thought that this provision was intended to 
validate a direction in a will to accumulate for a period in gross of 
thirty-three years, unconnected with minorities. "Statutory Rules: 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, 
§25.112. If so, it certainly was not well drafted to accomplish this 
purpose. See note 502 supra. 
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Statutes of 1846, as amended, 505 were repealed, as to wills 
of persons dying after the effective date of the repealing 
acts and deeds delivered thereafter, by Acts 6 and 7, Pub-
lic Acts of 1952, which became effective on September 
18, 1952. As a result of these repeals, there are now no 
restrictions on accumulations in Michigan except the 
Common-Law Rule Against Accumulations.506 It should 
be noted, however, that the repealing acts apply only to 
accumulations directed by wills or deeds becoming ef-
fective after September 18, 1952. The 1949 amendments, 
which extended the prior statutory restrictions on ac-
cumulations to personal property and increased their 
stringency, are still in force as to accumulations directed 
by wills or deeds which became effective before that date. 
Moreover, the 1949 amendments expressly purported to 
govern accumulations directed by deeds or wills which 
became effective at any time before the amendments 
were enacted. If this provision for retroactive applica-
tion is constitutionally valid, the 1949 amendments make 
void many directions for accumulation which were valid 
when the deed or will containing them became effective, 
such as that involved in Post v. Grand Rapids Trust 
Co.5o1 
505 Part Two, notes 482, 501, supra. 
506 Part Two, note 480 supra. The existence of this rule was recog· 
nized in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 Mich. 294 at 299-300 (1852), Part 
Two, notes 39, 484, supra; Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 
814 (1879), Part Two, note 485 supra. . · 
soT Part Two, note 495 supra. Mr. Thomas G. Long of the Detroit 
Bar thinks that, if the 1949 amendments were really intended to be 
retroactive, they were unconstitutional to that extent because they 
would disturb vested interests. "Perpetuities and Accumulations: Re-
cent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DETROIT LAWYER 193 (1949). It 
is to be hoped that Mr. Long is correct, but the question is far from 
being free of doubt. If Andrew Baker died in 1948 bequeathing 
$100,000 to James Thorpe upon trust to pay $100 a month to Lucy 
Baker for life and to accumulate the surplus income until her death, 
then to pay over the accumulated fund to John Stiles, his executors, 
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Trusts created by employers as part of a stock bonus 
plan, pension plan, disability or death benefit plan, or 
profit-sharing plan, for the benefit of employees 508 and 
trusts or funds established by cemetery corporations for 
perpetual care of graves 509 are expressly excepted by 
statute from legal restrictions on the duration of accumu-
lations. It will be recalled that charitable trusts are ex-
cepted by statute from the Rule Against Perpetuities. 510 
As the statute does not expressly except them from the 
Common-Law Rule Against Accumulations, it would 
seem that that rule should be applied to charities here 
as it is applied in other jurisdictions. That is, a pro-
vision for accumulation in a limitation in favor of charity 
which may operate for longer than the period of the Rule 
Against Perpetuities is valid, but a court of competent 
jurisdiction may shorten the period of accumulation.511 
administrators or assigns, the amendments would not divest any in-
terest; they would merely entitle John Stiles to demand the surplus 
income during the life of Lucy Baker. 
5os Act 193, P.A. 1947, §2 amended, Act. 61, P.A. 1951, Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §26.82 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §555.302. 
509 Act 308, P.A. 1917, Comp. Laws (1929) §10435; Mich. Stat. Ann., 
§21.855; Comp. Laws (1948) §456.35. 
510 Part Two, note 421 supra. 
flu Part Two, note 481 supra. 
CHAPTER 17 
Consequences of Violation of the Rule 
A. EXCISION OF THE LIMITATION WHICH VIOLATES THE RULE 
W HEN an interest in property is limited subject to an illegal provision for defeasance by way 
of condition subsequent or executory limita-
tion, the provision for defeasance is void but the interest 
itself is usually valid and indefeasible.012 If Andrew 
Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs, "but 
if the grantee or his heirs shall attempt to alienate, the 
grantor or his heirs may re-enter and terminate the estate 
hereby conveyed," the condition subsequent is void as 
an illegal direct restraint on alienation of an estate in 
fee simple, and John takes an indefeasible fee.513 When, 
on the other hand, an interest in property is limited 
subject to a condition precedent which is illegal because 
it may be fulfilled at a time beyond the period of the 
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, the interest it~ 
self as well as the condition is void. 514 In some cases it 
would be possible for the courts to treat the condition as 
void but the interest as valid. Thus if Andrew Baker 
conveys land to John Stiles, who has no children, for 
life, remainder to the children of John who reach 
512 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §228, Comment d., §229 (1936); 
Browder, "Illegal Conditions and Limitations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF 
PROPERTY, §27.22 (1952). 
513 Part One, note 108 supra; Mand1ebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 
78 (1874), Part One, note 138 supra; Braun v. K1ug, 335 Mich. 691, 
57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), Part One, note 162 supra; PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §406, Jll. 1 (1944). 
514 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §201 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §520 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§370, 
371 (1944). 
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twenty-five, it would be possible to delete the words 
"who reach twenty-five" and give the children an inter-
est which would vest on the death of John. Although 
conditions precedent which are illegal for some other 
reason than the Rule Against Perpetuities are sometimes 
handled in this manner,515 conditions which violate the 
Rule are not. If a condition precedent is void under the 
Rule, the interest subject to it is also void. 
English law recognized an exception to the rule of 
complete nullity of interests limited in violation of the 
Rule Against Perpetuities in two related situations. 
When land was devised to an unborn person for life with 
remainder in tail to his children or to an unborn person 
for life with successive remainders for life to each gen-
eration of his descendants forever, the first unborn per-
son took an estate tail under what was known as the cy 
pres doctrine.516 St. Amour v. Rivard 517 involved a will 
devising land to a son for life, remainder to his children 
for life, with successive remainders for life to each gen-
eration of his descendants. There were similar devises 
to others, with cross-remainders on extinction of issue of 
any initial devisee. The Court discussed the cy pres 
doctrine at some length and refused to apply it. Of 
course the cy pres doctrine cannot be applied in its 
515 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §424, Comment d. (1944); Browder, 
"Illegal Conditions and Limitations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, 
§27.22 (1952). 
5HI Nicholl v. Nicholl, 2 Black. W. 1159, 96 Eng. Rep. 683 (1777); 
Humberston v. Humberston, 1 P. Wms. 332, 24 Eng. Rep. 412 (1716); 
Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §§643, 652 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §552 (1936). This is not the same as the 
doctrine of the same name which is applied when the specific purpose 
of a charitable trust fails or does not require the whole trust property. 
517 2 Mich. 294 (1852). The testator died in 1841, so the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities applied to the devises of land. 
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original form to wills of testators who died after March 
2, 1821, when estates tail were abolished. 518 
Generally speaking, when a limitation is void under 
the Rule Against Perpetuities, it is stricken out of the 
instrument and, unless they are inseparably connected 
with it, the other limitations of the instrument take ef-
fect as if it had not contained the void limitation.519 
If the void limitation is the only one made by the instru-
ment or is a limitation of an ultimate remainder, the 
interest invalidly limited never passes out of the trans-
feror by virtue of the limitation. In such a case, if the 
void limitation is contained in a deed, the interest in-
effectively limited simply remains in the grantor.520 If 
it is contained in the residuary clause of a will, the inter-
est passes to the heirs or next of kin of the testator as 
intestate property.521 If it is contained in a prior clause 
518 Part One, note 82 supra. 
519 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §247 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §529 (1936); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §402 
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47 (1952). 
5 20 Methodist Episcopal Church of Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730, 
3 N.W. 207 (1879) (deed of land violating suspension statutes); Hop-
kins v. Crossley, 138 Mich. 561, 101 N.W. 822 (1904); (inter vivos 
trust of personalty); Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 
510 (1903) (deed of land violating suspension statutes); McPherson v. 
Byrne, 155 Mich. 338, ll8 N.W. 985 (1909) (inter vivos trust of per-
sonalty); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §403 (1944). Cf. Bateson v. Bate-
son, 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940). 
521 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885) (ultimate 
remainder in land violating suspension statutes); Farrand v. Petit, 84 
Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891) (ultimate remainder in land violating 
suspension statutes); Trufant v. Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 
469 (1895) (ultimate remainder in land violating suspension statutes); 
Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 66 N.W. 955 
(1896) (residue consisting of land and personalty); Petit v. Flint & Pere 
Marquette R.R. Co., ll4 Mich. 362, 72 N.W. 238 (1897) (ultimate 
remainder in land violating suspension statutes); State v. Holmes, 115 
Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898) (ultimate remainder in land and per-
sonalty violating suspension statutes); Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 
85 N.W. 1100 (1901) (residue consisting of land and personalty; dis-
position violating the suspension statutes); Gilchrist v. Corliss, 155 
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of a will, the interest falls into the residue and passes 
under the residuary clause.522 If Andrew Baker conveys 
land to John Stiles "if and when the Penobscot Building 
falls," the deed conveys nothing, and Andrew retains a 
fee simple absolute. If Andrew Baker devises the residue 
of his estate to John Stiles, who has no children, for life, 
remainder to those children of John who reach twenty-
five, John takes a life estate and the heirs of Andrew 
inherit the reversion. If Andrew Baker devises land to 
John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder to 
those children of John who reach twenty-five, and de-
vises the residue of his estate to James Thorpe and his 
heirs, John takes a life estate and James the remainder 
in fee. 
Mich. 126, ll8 N.W. 938 (1908) (ultimate remainder in land and 
personalty); Moore v. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914) 
(residue consisting of land and personalty); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 
196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (disposition of residue, consisting of land 
and personalty, violating the suspension statutes); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 
Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922) (ultimate remainder in land violat-
ing the suspension statutes); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 
Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922) (disposition of entire estate violating 
suspension statutes); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 
N.W. 976 (1924) (ultimate remainder violating common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 
N.W. 760 (1932) (disposition of entire estate violating suspension 
statute); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 
255 N.W. 587 (1934) (disposition of residue, consisting of land and 
personalty, violating both the suspension statutes and the common-law 
Rule); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938) 
(disposition of residue, consisting of land and personalty, violating 
the suspension statutes); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §403, Comments h., i. 
(1944). See: James E. Scripps Corporation v. Parkinson, 186 Mich. 
663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915) (ultimate remainder violating suspension 
statutes). 
522 Van Driele v. Kotvis, 135 Mich. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903) (an-
nuity violating suspension statutes); Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 162 Mich. 
457, 127 N.W. 673 (1910) (bequest of personalty on void trust); 
Lounsbury v. Trustees of Square Lake Burial Association, 170 Mich. 
645, 129 N.W. 36 (1912) (bequest of personalty on perpetual honor-
ary trust); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §403, Comment c. (1944). See: 
Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950) (ultimate 
remainder, not in residuary clause, violating the suspension statutes). 
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Where an interest which violates the Rule Against 
Perpetuities is limited to follow a prior interest, its 
invalidity does not enlarge the prior interest. If Andrew 
Baker conveys land to John Stiles and his heirs so long 
as the Penobscot Building stands and then to James 
Thorpe and his heirs, the shifting executory limitation 
to James is void, but its invalidity does not make John's 
estate endure after the Penobscot Building falls. An-
drew Baker retains a possibility of reverter which will 
become possessory in that event.523 On the other hand, 
if the void interest is limited to cut off a prior interest, 
the prior interest is indefeasible. If Andrew Baker con-
veys land to John Stiles and his heirs, "but if the Penob-
scot Building should fall, then to James Thorpe and 
his heirs," the interest of James is void, and John takes 
an indefeasible estate in fee simple absolute.524 
If an appointment under a power of appointment 
which is limited as to objects violates the Rule, the prop-
erty passes to the persons to whom it is limited in de-
fault of appointment.525 If an appointment under a 
power of appointment which is not limited as to objects 
violates the Rule, the effect is the same under some cir-
523 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 (1858); First Universalist Society 
v. Boland, 155 Mass. 171, 29 N.E. 524 (1892); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE 
INTERESTS, §530 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §403, Comment e. 
and Ill. 2 (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against 
Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§24.47, 24.62 (1952). 
524 Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 
703 (1930), Part Two, note 535 infra; Proprietors of the Church in 
Brattle Square v. Grant, 3 Gray (69 Mass.) 142 (1855); Gray, RuLE 
AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §247 (1915); 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE 
INTERESTS, §530 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §229 (1936), §402, 
Comment d., §403 Comment e. (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common 
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.47 
(1952). 
525 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §365 (1940), §403 (b) (1944); Leach & 
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47 (1952). 
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cumstances as if the donee of the power had made an 
effective appointment to himself or his estate. 526 
The problems which involve the most difficulty in the 
field covered by this chapter are those involving the 
validity of limitations which, if considered by themselves, 
do not violate the Rule Against Perpetuities, but which 
are contained in instruments limiting other interests 
that do violate the Rule. The otherwise valid limitations 
do not fail unless they are inseparably connected with 
the void limitations. The following sections of the chap-
ter are devoted largely to consideration of various situa-
tions where such connection may exist. The statutes 
prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of aliena-
tion of land for more than two lives, which were in 
force in Michigan from 1847 to 1949,521 were a statutory 
substitute for the common-law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, and the problems relating to the consequences of 
violation of the statutes were, for most purposes, the 
same as those which relate to the consequences of viola-
tion of the common-law Rule. Hence it will be con-
venient to consider, in the sections which follow, Michi-
gan cases determining the consequences of violation of 
the statutes as well as those determining the consequences 
of violation of the common-law Rule. Such precedents 
must be used with caution, however, because the theory 
and operation of the statutes differed from those of the 
common-law Rule. The common-law Rule Against Per-
526 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §365 (1940), §403 (c) (1944); Leach & 
Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.47 (1952). The property passes to the donee's 
estate rather than to the taker in default of appointment if it is found 
that the donee intended to exclude the donor from further control 
of it. Such a finding is usually made when the appointment is to a 
trustee on a trust which fails and when the appointment is made 
in a residuary clause which disposes of owned and appointive assets 
by the same words. 
527 Part Two, note 47 supra; Part Three, note I infra. 
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petuities invalidates only future interests which may 
vest at a time beyond the period of the Rule; it does not 
limit the duration of trusts as such, only the vesting of 
future interests under or following them. The statutes, 
on the other hand, invalidated provisions, whether for 
present or future interests, which might suspend the 
absolute power of alienation for longer than two lives in 
being; hence they invalidated present trusts for receipt 
of the rents and profits of land which might last longer 
than two lives although the interests under and follow-
ing the trusts were vested and, apart from the trusts, 
did not violate either the statutes or the common-law 
Rule.528 
B. EFFECT ON PRIOR LIMITATIONS 
When a limitation of a future interest violates the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, limitations of interests prior 
thereto, whether present or future, which do not them-
selves violate the Rule, take effect in accordance with 
their terms, unless the void limitation is so essential to 
the dispositive scheme of the transferor that it is infer-
able that he would not wish the prior limitations to stand 
alone.529 If Andrew Baker devises land to John Stiles, 
who has no children, for life, remainder to those children 
of John who reach twenty-five, the limitation of the life 
estate to John will ordinarily be effective even though 
the remainder violates the Rule. 
s2s Part One, note 593 supra; Chapter 20, Section C, infra. 
529 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §247 (1915); 2 Simes, 
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §530 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §402 
(1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.48 (1952); Annotation, 28 
A.L.R. 375 (1924), 75 A.L.R. 124 (1931). That is, the prior limitations 
are presumptively valid. Illinois and Missouri appear to hold that 
they are presumptively invalid. 
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In Wilson v. Odell/30 land was devised to trustees to 
pay annuities to the testator's wife and children for their 
lives and to the children's children until the youngest 
grandchild came of age, and to distribute the principal 
to the children's children after the death of all the chil-
dren and on the maJority of the youngest grandchild. 
It was held that the limitations subsequent to the inter-
ests of the testator's children violated the statutes pro-
hibiting suspension of the absolute power of alienation 
for more than two lives in being and so were void, but 
that the provisions for the annuities to the children were 
effective. In Trufant v. Nunnelly,581 land was devised to 
three children for their lives, remainder to their "body 
heirs." It was held that the limitation of the remainder 
violated the suspension statutes, but that the life estates 
could take effect. In State v. Holmes,532 land was devised 
to the testator's wife for life with alternative contingent 
remainders conditioned on events which might not occur 
for five years after her death to the State of Michigan 
and a grandson. It was held that the limitations in re-
mainder violated the suspension statutes but that the life 
estate was valid. In Rozell v. Rozell/33 one farm was 
devised to testatrix's son Cass for life, remainder to his 
children for their lives, remainder to the heirs of such 
children in fee. Another farm was devised to testatrix's 
daughter Sarah for life, remainder to Cass for life, re-
mainder to his children for life, remainder to the heirs 
of such children in fee. It was held that the remainders 
530 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885). The widow renounced her 
interest under the will. In Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 
419 (1888), Part Two, note 561 infra, prior life interests were held 
valid although a subsequent trust violated the suspension statutes. 
531 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895). 
532 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898). See: Gilchrist v. Corliss, 
155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908). 
533 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). 
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to the children of Cass were void because they violated 
a statute then in force prohibiting the limitation of life 
estates to unborn persons 534 and that the remainders to 
their heirs violated the suspension statutes, but that the 
life estates of Cass and Sarah could take effect. 
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co.ll35 is an excellent 
illustration of the effect on prior limitations of a subse-
quent limitation which is void under the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities. There, half the residue of an 
estate was devised to a trustee, with direction to convert 
land to personalty, to pay the income to testatrix's daugh-
ter Belle for life, and on her death to divide the corpus 
into as many shares as Belle should have children then 
surviving or with issue her surviving. The trustee was 
to pay one share to each child of Belle who had reached 
twenty-five and to the issue of each child who had pre-
deceased Belle. The other shares were to be held on 
trust for each child until it reached twenty-five and then 
paid to it, but if any child died under twenty-five, its 
share was to go to its issue, or if none, the other chil-
dren or their issue, and if all the issue of Belle were then 
dead, to a sister of Belle. The provisions for defeasance 
of the interests of children of Belle who survived their 
mother but died under twenty-five violated the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. It was held that the life interest of 
534 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, Comp. Laws (1857) §2601; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4084; Comp. Laws (1897) §8799; How. Stat. §5533; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11535; Comp. Laws (1929) §12937; Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §26.17; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.17. Repealed by Act 38, P.A. 
1949, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2), Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52; Chap-
ter 19 infra. The section read: "Successive estates for life shall not 
be limited unless to persons in being at the creation thereof; and 
when a remainder shall be limited on more than two successive estates 
for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of the two persons first 
entitled thereto, shall be void, . . . " The disposition of the second 
farm violated both clauses of this section. 
oao 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930). 
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Belle was valid and that her surviving issue would take 
shares which would be indefeasible from the time of 
her death. 
If a limitation of a future interest violates the Rule 
Against Perpetuities and the void interest is so essential 
to the dispositive scheme of the transferor that it is infer-
able that he would not wish prior limitations to stand 
alone, such prior limitations are also invalid. St. Amour 
v. Rivard 5311 involved a will which devised life estates in 
land to nine persons, with remainders for life to the 
children of the first tenants, remainders for life to the 
children's children, and so on forever, with cross re-
mainders in the event of extinction of the descendants 
of any original taker. The will prohibited alienation for-
ever of interests devised by it. Although the initial life 
estates and the remainders for life to the children of the 
first life tenants did not themselves violate the Rule, the 
Court decided that the testator's scheme was to create 
an indestructible perpetuity, and that since most of it 
must fail he probably would not wish any part to stand. 
Hence it held the whole will void, so that the land passed 
to the heirs of the testator as intestate property. 
Dean v. Mumford 537 involved a will which, as con-
strued by the Court, devised land to trustees to pay 
income to the testator's wife for life, then to divide into 
five shares, transfer two to the testator's two daughters 
or their children, and hold the other three on separate 
trusts for testator's three sons and their wives, and on 
the death of each son and his wife, to transfer the princi-
pal of that son's trust to his children. The Court held 
that the trust provision for each son suspended the abso-
5<>6 2 Mich. 294 (1852), Part Two, note 39 supra. The testator died 
in 1841, before the enactment of the suspension statutes. 
537 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). Cf. Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 
671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891). 
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lute power of alienation for the lives of (1) testator's 
wife, (2) the son's life, (3) the son's wife's life, and so 
the trusts were void under the statutes. The widow hav-
ing renounced her interest under the will, the property 
was ordered distributed at once to the five children free 
of trust. The Court declined to decide whether the chil-
dren took as devisees or as heirs at law of the testator. 
In Niles v. Mason/38 land was devised to trustees to pay 
an annuity to testator's sister Sarah for life and to pay the 
balance of the income to testator's children Charles and 
Lottie for their lives. On the death of either Charles or 
Lottie, half the principal was to be transferred to the 
children of the deceased child, or if none, held in trust 
for the other child and transferred on its death to its 
children. If both Charles and Lottie died without issue, 
the principal was to be transferred to testator's brother. 
It was held that these provisions suspended the absolute 
power of alienation for three lives, those of Sarah, 
Charles, and Lottie, and that they were all void except 
the annuity of Sarah, which the Court deemed sufficiently 
disconnected to be enforcible apart from the other pro-
visions. 
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst 539 involved a will 
which, after a $1000 bequest to a business associate, de-
vised an estate consisting of land and personalty on trust 
to pay life annuities to two nephews and a niece, and to 
pay the balance of the income to testator's son, a brother, 
and two sisters until the son reached twenty-five or died. 
When the son reached twenty-five or died, half the 
estate was charged with the annuities and payment of 
the balance of the income to the brother and sisters for 
sss 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901). 
ss9 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922). Accord, on similar facts: 
Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258, Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932). 
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life. Subject thereto, the son was to take the entire estate 
on reaching twenty-five; if he died under twenty-five, it 
was to be held on trust for his issue and transferred to 
them on reaching twenty-one. If the son died without 
issue or his issue died under twenty-one, the estate was 
to pass to four charities, subject to the provisions for the 
annuities and the brother and sisters. It was held that 
the bequest to the business associate was valid but that 
the other dispositions were so interconnected that the 
violation of the suspension statute by some of them 
caused all to fail. 
In Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co.J54.<! the 
residue of an estate, consisting of land and personalty, 
was devised to trustees upon two trusts. Each trust was 
to pay the income to a daughter of the testator for life, 
then to her children. Each child was to receive half a 
share in principal at twenty-five and the other half at 
thirty. If any child died under thirty, its issue was to 
receive the income from its share until twenty-one and 
then the principal. If a child died under tP,irty without 
issue, its interest passed to the other children of the 
daughter or their issue on the same trusts, and if the 
daughter and all her issue died before the termination 
of the trusts, the principal of her trust was to be added 
to the principal of the similar trust for the other daugh-
ter and her issue. If both daughters and their issue died 
before termination, the property was to pass to testatrix's 
brother. The Court held that the trusts violated both 
the suspension statutes and the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities and that no part of them could be 
given effect without making a wholly new scheme for 
the testator, which the court declined to do. 
s4o 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). 
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The Michigan cases just discussed indicate that, under 
both the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and the 
suspension statutes, the invalidity of a future interest 
does not ordinarily affect the validity of prior interests. 
The last four cases considered appear to hold, on the 
other hand, that when a trust for receipt of the rents and 
profits of land was set up to last for longer than two lives 
in being, the entire trust was void; it would not be split 
and held valid for two lives but void as to the balance.541 
Professor Whiteside has remarked that under the 
Michigan decisions it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
point out any definite test for determining when invalid 
provisions will be eliminated from a testamentary dis-
position and the valid provisions sustained.542 Most of 
the confusion has arisen, however, because the suspen-
sion statutes prohibit not only certain contingent future 
interests but also present trusts which might last longer 
than two lives in being. The repeal of the suspension 
statutes leaves only the common-law Rule Against Per-
petuities, which is violated only by a future interest 
which may vest more remotely than the period of the 
Rule. Moreover, the period of the common-law Rule 
includes any number of lives in being plus twenty-one 
years in gross. Under the common-law Rule, there 
should seldom be occasion for striking down innocent 
prior interests merely because some subsequent interest 
is too remote. 
541 Dean v. Mumford, Part Two, note 537 supra; Niles v. Mason, 
Part Two, note 538 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, Part 
Two, note 539 supra; Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 
Part Two, note 540 supra; Part Three, notes 221, 222, infra. Cf. 
Wilson v. Odell, Part Two, note 530 supra. 
542 "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.45 (1952). New York appears to have developed 
more definite rules. Id §25.28; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 
1'[1'[39-45 (1944). 
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C. EFFECT ON ALTERNATIVE AND CONCURRENT LIMITATIONS 
When a limitation of a future interest violates the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, limitations of alternative and 
concurrent interests, which do not themselves violate the 
Rule, generally take effect in accordance with their terms 
unless the void limitation is inseparably connected with 
them, as it is when it is so essential to the dispositive 
scheme of the transferor that it is inferable he would 
not wish the otherwise valid limitations to stand alone.543 
Completely disconnected limitations are almost always 
valid. Thus if a testator directs payment of his debts and 
of small legacies to servants and friends and devises the 
residue of his estate to a trustee to accumulate the in-
come for a thousand years and pay the accumulated 
fund to his descendants then in being, the invalidity 
of the residuary clause does not prevent the provisions 
for payment of debts and legacies taking effect. More-
over, concurrent limitations may be separable although 
related to some extent to the void provision. Bateson• v. 
Bateson 544 was a suit by a settlor to set aside a deed of 
543 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§529, 531 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §402, (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule 
Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, §§24.49, 24.50 
(1952). It should be recalled, however, that if the interest of any 
member of the class may vest at a time beyond the period of the Rule, 
a class gift is wholly void, although the interests of some members are 
presently vested or will certainly vest within the period. Part Two, 
note 280 supra. 
544 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940). Three justices dissented on 
the ground the absolute power of alienation of the two tenths was 
not suspended beyond the life of James. Cf. Lewis v. Nelson, 4 Mich. 
630 (1857). In Wheelock v. American Tract Society, 109 Mich. 141, 
66 N.W. 955 (1896), the residue of an estate was devised to the 
executors to pay to four named charitable societies, with discretion to 
pay some to worthy poor girls to aid in their education. It was held 
that the provision for worthy poor girls was void for indefiniteness and 
that the provisions for the charitable societies were inseparable 
and so failed also. This was unsound; if the discretionary power to 
benefit poor girls was invalid, the four societies should have been held 
to take indefeasible interests. TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, §398 (2). There 
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trust. The plaintiff conveyed his land to his son George 
upon trust to pay the income to the settlor for life and 
at his death (1) to convey four tenths to George, if then 
alive, or to his named wife and son, (2) to hold four 
tenths upon trust to pay the income to the settlor's son 
Samuel for life and on his death to convey to his named 
wife and daughters, (3) to hold two tenths upon trust 
to pay the income to the settlor's grandson James for 
fifteen years and then to convey to James, but if James 
should die within the fifteen years, to convey to the 
wife and children of James, if any, otherwise one tenth 
to George and one tenth to the trust for Samuel. It 
was held that the disposition was void under the suspen-
sion statutes as to the two tenths, but that the other 
eight tenths were separable and valid. 
If alternative limitations are made on verbally separate 
contingencies, the fact that one is invalid does not ordi-
narily prevent the other from taking effect.645 If Andrew 
Baker devises property to James Thorpe, who has no 
children, for life, remainder to his children, but if all 
his children die under twenty-five without surviving is-
are numerous cases holding wholly unrelated legacies valid although 
the principal dispositive provisions of the will were void. E.g. Far-
rand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891) (devises of land to 
sons and daughter good although trust of residue wholly void under 
suspension statutes); State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 
(1898) ($2000 legacy to grandson valid although contingent remainders 
in residue violated the suspension statutes); Otis v. Arntz, 198 Mich. 
196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (bequest to church valid although trust of 
residue violated suspension statutes); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 
Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924) (bequest of tea set good although 
devise of land bad). There are numerous cases of this type in which 
the validity of the separate gifts was not questioned. See: PRoPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §376, Comment c., §402, Comment e. (1944). 
545 Longhead ex dem. Hopkins v. Phelps, 2 Black W. 703, 96 Eng. 
Rep. 414 (1770); Gray, RuLE AGAINST PFRPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §331 
(1915); 2 Simes, LAW oF FUTURE INTERESTS, §§521, 531 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §376, Comment e. (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Com-
mon Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PRoPERTY, 
§§24.49, 24.54 (1952). 
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sue or if James dies without surviving issue, to John 
Stiles and his heirs, the contingency of James's children 
dying under twenty-five is too remote so John cannot 
take if James has surviving children, but the contingency 
of James's dying without surviving issue is not too re-
mote so John will take if James dies without surviving 
issue. A verbally single contingency will not be split, 
however.046 If Andrew Baker devises property to James 
Thorpe, who has no children, for life, remainder to his 
children who reach twenty-five, but if there are no such 
children, to John Stiles and his heirs, John cannot take 
even though James dies without having had a child. 
In Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker/47 testatrix devised 
land to her husband for life, remainder to a trustee to 
convert into money and hold for the benefit of her son 
Stuart for life. The will provided: 
"If my said son shall have lawful child or children 
of his body who shall survive him, his share of my estate 
shall go to such child or children, girls at age of twenty-
five years and boys at thirty years and not before. 
"If my son Stuart shall die without lawful issue, his 
share of my estate shall go five thousand dollars ($5,000) 
to my son Looe Baker in fee, and the remainder for his 
life and at his death to his lawful children,---." 
Stuart died after the testatrix, without having had 
issue. It was held that the first quoted paragraph sus-
pended the vesting of the interests of the children of 
Stuart for longer than lives in being and twenty-one 
546 Proctor v. Bishop of Bath and Wells, 2 H. Bl. 538, 126 Eng. 
Rep. 594 (1794); Gray, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §332 
(1915); 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE INTERESTS, §521 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §376, Comment f. (1944); Leach & Tudor, "The Com-
mon Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§24.54 (1952). In a few narrow situations the English courts developed 
exceptions to the rule that a single contingency cannot be split. Simes, 
id., §§522-524. 
547 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). 
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years and so violated the common-law Rule Against Per-
petuities. The Court also held that the remainder 
limited to Looe and his children in the event of Stuart's 
death without issue failed because of the invalidity of 
the interest of the children of Stuart. The latter holding 
was clearly wrong. The contingencies were separately 
stated and that of Stuart's death without issue did not 
violate the Rule. As Stuart did die without issue, the 
remainder to Looe and his children should have been 
given effect. 
In Gettim v. Grand Rapids Trust Co./48 half of the 
residue of an estate was devised to a· trustee to pay the 
income to testatrix's daughter Belle for life, and if Belle 
had issue then surviving, to divide into as many shares 
as Belle should have children then surviving or with 
issue her surviving. The trustee was to pay one share 
to each child of Belle who had reached twenty-five and 
to the issue of each child who had predeceased Belle. 
The other shares were to be held on trust for each child 
until it reached twenty-five and then paid to it. The 
will provided: 
"- - - and in the event of the death of such child before 
the same shall reach the age of 25 years, my trustee shall 
pay, deliver and convey his or her special fund to my 
said daughter's children surviving, except this, that if 
any child has died with issue then surviving, said issue 
shall take the share the deceased child would receive if 
living and if at the death of any child my daughter has 
no issue then surviving, it shall pay, deliver and convey 
the special fund to my daughter, Shirley S. Thurston, if 
surviving, and to her issue, if she is deceased. 
"If [upon the death of Belle] she has no issue then 
surviving I direct my trustee to pay, deliver and convey 
548 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 (1930). 
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this trust fund to my said daughter, Shirley S. Thurston, 
if then surviving, and to her issue, if she is deceased." 
It was held that the provisions of the first quoted para-
graph for gifts over on the contingency of Belle's chil-
dren dying under twenty-five were void under the Rule 
Against Perpetuities. The Court held, however, that the 
remainder to Shirley or her issue on the contingency of 
Belle's death without surviving issue. could take effect 
in that event. As the contingencies were separately stated, 
this result was correct. When the problem arises again 
it is to be hoped that the Court will follow the sound 
rule of the Gettins case rather than the unsound one of 
the Baker case. 
It will be recalled that under English law a remainder 
on an estate tail, which, of course, could not take effect 
unless the descendants of the first tenant in tail became 
extinct, was valid.549 As chattels real and personal could 
not be entailed, however, a limitation over on extinction 
of issue of a legatee of such interests violated the Rule 
Against Perpetuities.5w When freehold land and other 
property were devised by the same limitation, the dis-
positions of the freehold land and those of the other 
property were treated as separable.5n If Andrew Baker, 
owning Blackacre in fee simple and an estate for a 
thousand years in Whiteacre, devised all his interests in 
land to James Thorpe and the heirs of his body and upon 
extinction of such heirs to John Stiles and his heirs, the 
limitation to John was valid as to Blackacre although 
void as to Whiteacre. A very similar problem arose in 
549 Gray, RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §ll1 (1915); Part Two, 
note 155 supra. 
sso Burges v. Burges, 1 Ch. Cas. 229, 22 Eng. Rep. 775 (1674); Gray, 
RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIEs, 3rd ed., §212 (1915); Part Two, note 175 
supra. 
551 Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Wms. 663, 24 Eng. Rep. 559 (1720). 
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Michigan because the stringent provisions of the statutes 
prohibiting suspension of the absolute power of aliena-
tion, which were in force from 1847 to 1949, applied 
only to land, whereas limitations of personalty were re-
stricted only by the more liberal provisions of the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities. If Andrew Baker 
devised his entire estate, consisting of land and person-
alty, to James Thorpe upon trust to pay the income to 
Lucy Baker for life, then to John Stiles for life, then 
to the issue of John Stiles for twenty years and to transfer 
the principal to the descendants of John in being at the 
end of the twenty years, the dispositions did not offend 
the common-law Rule but did violate the suspension 
statutes. Should the fact that the limitation was void as 
to land make it void as to personalty also? The early 
Michigan decisions indicated that it should not, 552 but 
later cases laid down an arbitrary rule that such limita-
tions were not separable; if they failed as to land, they 
failed as to personalty also.5~'8 The most extreme case of 
this type was In re Richards' Estate/54 where the fact 
that land worth $800 was included in a limitation with 
M2 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 562, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); 
Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. Palms, 
68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). But see concurring opinion of 
Champlin, J., in the latter case, 68 Mich. 355 at 380. 
55 3 State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898); Grand 
Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); 
Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 
587 (1934); DeBuck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940); 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ~52 (1944); Whiteside, "Statu-
tory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §25.37 (1952); Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule 
Against Perpetuities," id., §24.50; Part Two, note 53 supra. 
554 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). The desirability of this 
harsh and arbitrary rule was questioned by Butzel, J. in Dodge v. 
Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575 at 598, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942), 
where the land involved was worth some $40,000 and the personalty 
about $38,000,000. 
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personalty worth $56,000 caused the entire limitation to 
fail. 
The donee of a power of appointment sometimes ex-
ercises the power and disposes of his own property by the 
same limitation. If the limitation is invalid under the 
Rule Against Perpetuities insofar as it is an appointment, 
it would seem that it is nevertheless valid insofar as it dis-
poses of the donee's own property.555 Suppose Andrew 
Baker devises Blackacre to John Stiles, who has no. chil-
dren, for life, remainder to such issue of John as John 
may by will appoint. John Stiles, owning Whiteacre; de-
vises "all land over which I have power of disposition to 
my children for life, remainder to my grandchildren." As 
the period of the Rule Against Perpetuities is computed, 
in determining the validity of an appointment under 
such a limited testamentary power, from the death of 
Andrew,556 the limitation to the grandchildren of John 
violates the Rule so far as Blackacre is concerned. 
It would seem that it is valid as to Whiteacre. 
If a limitation of a future interest violates the Rule 
Against Perpetuities and the void interest is so essential 
to the dispositive scheme of the transferor that it is infer-
able that he would not wish otherwise valid alternative 
or concurrent limitations to stand alone, such alternative 
or· concurrent limitations also fail. This proposition is 
well, illustrated by In re Richards' Estate. 557 There a 
testator bequeathed $1,000 to Willard G. Stone and de-
vised one third of his estate to his daughter and two 
thirds to trustees to pay the income to his two sons for 
twenty years and then to transfer the principal to issue 
555 Leach & Tudor, "The Common Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §24.50 (1952). See: Gilchrist v. Cor-
liss, 155 Mich. 126, 118 N.W. 938 (1908), Part Two, note 420 supra. 
556 Part Two, note 322 supra. 
557 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1988). 
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of the sons to be ascertained at that time. As the suspen-
sion statutes permitted no period in gross, the disposi-
tion of the two thirds was void. It was held that the 
legacy of Willard G. Stone could stand, but that the 
devise to the daughter of one third of the estate failed. 
As the Court observed, the testator probably intended 
to treat his children with approximate equality. If the 
disposition of the two thirds alone failed, it would pass 
as intestate property, so the daughter would receive one 
third plus two-ninths, or five-ninths of the estate, and 
each son would receive only two ninths. By eliminating 
the devise of one third to the daughter, the Court caused 
the entire estate, less the $1,000 legacy, to pass as on 
intestacy to the three children equally. 
D. EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT LIMITATIONS 
If a future interest is so limited that it may vest at 
a time beyond the period of the Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, a subsequent interest limited to follow it or cut 
it off is usually such that it, too, may vest too remotely. 
In such a case both fail by reason of the direct operation 
of the Rule. In a few situations, however, it is possible 
to have a future interest which violates the Rule followed 
by an interest which is vested or will certainly vest with-
in the period of the Rule. If Andrew Baker devises 
property to James Thorpe, who has no children, for life, 
remainder to the children of James who reach twenty-
five for their lives, remainder to John Stiles and his 
heirs, the life estate of the children of James violates the 
Rule Against Perpetuities, but the remainder in fee of 
John Stiles is indefeasibly vested. If Andrew Baker be-
queaths property to John Stiles, who has no children, 
for life, remainder to such issue of John as John may 
by will appoint, and John appoints by will "to my 
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daughters for their lives, remainder to their children for 
their lives, remainder to my son Henry and his heirs," 
the appointment to the children of the daughters vio-
lates the Rule, but the appointment to Henry vests upon 
the death of John, who was a life in being when Andrew 
died. Should such subsequent interests, themselves 
vested or certain to vest within the period of the Rule, 
fail merely because prior interests violate the Rule? The 
English cases suggest that they do/58 and Professor Gray 
accepted this view.559 The Restatement of Property and 
Professors Simes and Leach do not agree. They think 
that subsequent interests should be treated in the same 
way as prior, alternative and concurrent interests, that 
is, as valid unless the void intermediate limitation is so 
essential to the dispositive scheme of the transferor that 
it is inferable that he would not wish the subsequent 
limitations to stand if the intermediate interest fails. 560 
There are no American decisions on this problem. 
Michigan has, however, a number of decisions as to the 
closely related problem of the validity of interests which 
did not themselves violate the statutes prohibiting sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation for more 
than two lives but were limited to follow trusts which 
did violate the statutes. 
51>8 Monypenny v. Dering, 2 De G.M.&G. 145, 42 Eng. Rep. 826 
(1852); Burley v. Evelyn, 16 Sim. 290, 60 Eng. Rep. 885 (1848); In re 
Mortimer, [1905] 2 Ch. 502 (C.A.); Re Backhouse, [1921] 2 Ch. 51. 
. 
559 RuLE AGAINST PERPETUITIES, 3rd ed., §251 (1915). He had ex-
pressed a contrary view in previous editions. Moreover he thought 
that the rule of nullity extended only to subsequent interests in fee, 
that, despite the English cases to the contrary, a life estate limited to a 
living person should be valid although preceded by a void interest. 
Id., §§252-257. 
56o PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, §402, Comment d. (1944); 2 Simes, LAw 
OF FUTURE INTERESTs, §532 (1936); Leach & Tudor, "The Common 
Law Rule Against Perpetuities," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §24.51 
(1952). Morris, "Ulterior Limitations and the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties," 10 CAMB. L.J. 392 (1950), adopts this view. 
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In Palms v. Palms/61 land and personalty were de-
vised to trustees to pay the income to the testator's two 
children for their lives and then to transfer the principal 
to their children. The will provided that if any child 
was a minor at its parent's death, its share should be held 
on trust during minority. It was held that this pro-
vision for trusts to last beyond lives in being probably 
violated the suspension statutes but that both the prior 
and subsequent interests were valid, that is, the grand-
children would take on the deaths of their parents, free 
of the void trusts. 
In Dean v. M umford/62 land was to be held on trust 
during the lives of the testator's widow, three sons, and 
the sons' wive:,, remainder to the children of the sons. 
The Court held that the trust for each son, his wife, and 
children, was separate from the others but that the whole 
disposition failed and the property involved passed as 
on intestacy. As the interest of the children of each son 
would vest in interest on the death of their father, a 
life in being at the death of the testator, it would seem 
that their interests were valid, apart from the trusts. It 
would have been possible to delete the trusts and hold 
the limitations to the children valid. 
In Niles v. Mason,S63 an estate was devised to trustees 
to pay a life annuity to the testator's sister Sarah and to 
divide the remaining income between the testator's two 
children, Charles and Lottie, for their lives. On the 
death of either child, half the principal was to be trans-
ferred to his children, if any, and if none, held on trust 
for the other child and transferred to his children at his 
death. If both died without issue, the principal was to 
561 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). 
562 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). 
56a 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901). 
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be transferred to testator's brother. It was held that the 
disposition created a trust for three lives and so violated 
the suspension statutes and that the estate passed to the 
heirs subject to the annuity to Sarah. It might have been 
possible to hold that the trusts for Charles and Lottie 
were separate, that each could last for the life of Sarah 
and the life beneficiary, with remainder to the children 
of the life beneficiary, and that nothing failed except 
the cross remainder to the other trust on the death of 
Charles or Lottie without issue. The decision rendered 
indicates unwillingness to find separate trusts when there 
are cross-remainders.564 
In Casgrain v. Hammond/'65 Ellen Hammond con-
veyed land to her son Charles, who executed an instru-
ment of trust declaring that he would pay the net in-
come to Ellen for life, and if she died before the expira-
tion of fourteen years, he would pay it to five of her 
children, including himself. The instrument provided 
that the trust should last for fourteen years and until the 
death of Ellen if she lived longer. Upon its expiration 
Charles was to convey the land to the five children or 
the survivor or survivors of them. The trust was void 
because it suspended the absolute power of alienation for 
a period not based on lives. It was held that the land 
passed to the heirs of Ellen, who had died before the 
suit was commenced. The Court said that it did not 
pass to the five children who were cestuis of and re-
maindermen after the void trust because there was no 
·intention to convey to them. This seems unsound. The 
trust instrument gave the five children an unconditional 
estate which vested in them immediately, subject only 
564 See: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 111!39, 40 (1944) Cf. 
Part Two, note 541 supra. 
565 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903). 
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to the void trust and to defeasance upon failure to sur-
vive. It would seem that the provision for the trust last-
ing beyond the life of Ellen could have been deleted and 
the balance of the disposition allowed to stand, so that 
the five children would take a remainder, indefeasible 
after the death of Ellen.66~ 
In Van Driele v. Kotvis/67 a testator bequeathed $500 
to a church, to be paid out of the rents, issues, and profits 
of his estate at the rate of $25 a year for twenty years 
and devised the residue to his wife for life, remainder to 
his daughter for life, remainder to the heirs of his wife 
and himself. It was held that the provision for the 
church was void but that this did not invalidate the dis-
position of the residue which was, of course, partly con-
current with and partly subsequent to the void inte;rest. 
]ames E. Scripps Corporation v. Parkinson•$8 in-
volved the will of a testator who died in 1851, devising 
land to his wife upon trust until 1864, then one-third 
to the wife for life, and the balance, being a present 
estate as to two-thirds and a remainder after the widow's 
life estate as to the other third, in equal shares, one to 
each of testator's sons in fee and one to his daughter 
Jane for life, remainder to her heirs. It was held that 
because the trust, not being limited in duration by lives, 
was invalid, the whole will was void and the land passed 
566 See: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[64 (1944). But see 
Part Two, note 541 supra. 
567 135 Mich. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903). 
568 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915). There was earlier litigation 
over this will. Parkinson v. Parkinson, 139 Mich. 530, 102 N.W. 1002 
(1905). It was held in the later case that the heirs of Jane did acquire 
an interest by purchase, not under the will but by virtue of her consent 
to a probate decree of partition in accordance with the terms of the 
void will. Thus the Court reached by indirect means the same result 
it should have reached by simply deleting the void trust and enforcing 
the subsequent provisions.. A similar result was reached by the same 
indirect means in Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 
922 (1950). 
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to the testator's heirs at his death, so that the heirs of 
Jane took nothing by purchase. This holding seems 
unsound. If the void trust, which suspended the absolute 
power of alienation for thirteen years in gross in viola-
tion of the statutes, were deleted, the other provisions 
of the will would be valid, since the limitation to the 
heirs of Jane would vest at her death, and these pro-
visions should have been enforcible. 
In Otis v. Arntz/69 a will directed that the income 
from the residue of an estate, consisting of a farm and 
personalty, be paid to the two children of the testator, 
Grace and Clark, "and in case of their decease to their 
heirs" for twenty-five years. The next paragraph devised 
the residue, subject to the preceding provision as to in-
come, to the children's children in equal shares, "The 
share of any deceased grandchild shall go to his children 
if living, otherwise to revert to the surviving grandchil-
dren." The following paragraph directed that the farm 
be kept intact, unsold and unmortgaged, until the ex-
piration of twenty-five years, when it should be parti-
tioned among the grandchildren or sold and the proceeds 
divided as directed in the preceding paragraph. A co-
dicil provided that if Grace died within twenty-five 
years, her interest in the income should go to the chil-
dren of Clark. It was held that these dispositions of 
the residue were wholly void under the suspension sta-
tutes and that the residue passed to the heirs at law of 
the testator. If, as the Court thought, a trust to last 
twenty-five years was intended, this result was probably 
sound, either on the ground that the will suspended the 
vesting of the grandchildren's interests for twenty-five 
years or on the ground that the testator would not want 
569198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917). 
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their interests to stand alone and be accelerated as to 
possession, because this would deprive his children of 
all benefit under the will. It would have been possible, 
however, to construe the will as devising a legal estate 
for twenty-five years to the children with a remainder 
to the grandchildren which would vest completely on the 
death of their parents. Such a twenty-five year term 
would be valid because the provision of the Michigan 
Constitution making void leases of agricultural land for 
agricultural purposes for terms of more than twelve 
years only applies to leases which reserve rent or serv-
ices.570 
Scheibner v. Scheibner 511 involved a will which, after 
provision for several legacies, devised the residue to 
trustees to pay the income to the testator's wife for life 
and after her death to pay $75 a month to each of his 
two sons, Charles and William, until the expiration of 
twenty years after the testator's death, then to convert the 
estate into cash and pay it to the sons. Charles, during 
570 Const. 1908, Art. XVI, §10, Part One, notes 306, 350, supra. 
However, even on this construction, the interest of the grandchildren 
would be void if its vesting was suspended for twenty-five years, because 
the statutes then provided, "A contingent remainder shall not be 
created on a term for years, unless the nature of the contingency upon 
which it is limited be such that the remainder must vest in interest, 
during the continuance of not more than two lives in being at the 
creation of such remainder, or upon the termination thereof." Rev. 
Stat. 1846, c. 62, §20, Comp. Laws (1857) §2604; Comp. Laws (1871) 
§4087; Comp. Laws (1897) §8802; How. Stat., §5536; Comp. Laws 
(1915) §11538; Comp. Laws (1929) §12940; Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.20; 
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.20; repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. 
Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. 
m 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917). See Part Two, note 541 
supra. Subsequently the widow conveyed her interest, which had been 
enlarged as to a third from a life estate to a fee as a result of Charles's 
suit, to William. After her death, Charles sued unsuccessfully to set 
aside the conveyances on the ground of undue influence. Scheibner v. 
Scheibner, 220 Mich. 115, 189 N.W. 913 (1922). If he had never 
brought the first suit, Charles would have taken half the estate instead 
of only a third. 
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the widow's life, sought a decree that the provisions for 
a trust were invalid and that the residue should pass at 
once, free of trust, to the widow and sons as heirs at 
law. A motion to dismiss the bill on the ground there 
was an adequate remedy at law was overruled, and the 
order overruling it was affirmed in an opinion which 
intimated that the disposition of the residue was wholly 
void and that the residue passed to the widow and sons 
as heirs at law. This result seems unsound. The trust 
could have been sustained for the life of the widow, with 
immediate remainder to the sons, or the trust could 
have been deleted entirely and the widow given a legal 
life estate, with remainder to the sons. 
Loomis v. Laramie 672 illustrates the type of result 
which could have been reached in Scheibner v. Scheib-
ner and several other cases discussed above. There the 
residue of an estate was devised to trustees to accumulate 
the income for twenty years and transfer the accumulated 
fund to five named persons, "and the heirs of their body 
forever." The trust for accumulation violated both the 
suspension statutes and the accumulation statutes then 
in force. It was held, however, that the interests of the 
five named persons were vested and took effect at once. 
As these persons were not the heirs of the testator, they 
would have taken nothing if the void trust had been 
held to invalidate the limitations subsequent to it, as 
was the case in Scheibner v. Scheibner. 
s12 286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938). In DuBuck v. Bousson, 
295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940), a will disposed of an estate to 
the testator's wife and children in fourteen paragraphs. The fifteenth 
provided that these devises and bequests should not be effective for a 
year after the testator's death. It was held that the fifteenth paragraph 
was void under the suspension statutes but that this did not affect the 
validity of the other provisions because its deletion would not ma-
terially alter the testator's plan. Cf. Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 
43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950). 
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It is thus apparent that our Supreme Court was will-
ing, in some cases, to enforce limitations subsequent to 
trusts which were void under the suspension statutes if 
the deletion of the void trust did not unduly distort the 
transferor's dispositive scheme. It would seem that it 
should also be willing to enforce limitations subsequent 
to interests which violate the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, under similar conditions. The purpose of 
the Rule is to prevent property being tied up for un-
desirably long periods, not to punish innocent transferees 
of interests which do not so fetter it. 
PART THREE 
THE TWO LIVES STATUTES 
CHAPTER 18 
The Statutory Scheme 
A. THE STATUTES 
CHAPTER 62 of the Michigan Revised Statutes of 1846, which became effective March 1, 1847, pro-
vided: 
"Sec. 14. Every future estate shall be void in its 
creation, which shall suspend the absolute power of 
alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this 
chapter: Such power of alienation is suspended, when 
there are no persons in being, by whom an absolute fee 
in possession can be conveyed. 
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall 
not be suspended by any limitation or condition what-
ever, for a longer period than during the continuance 
of two lives in being at the creation of the estate, except 
in the single case mentioned in the next section. 
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be 
created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the 
event that the persons to whom the first remainder is 
limited shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or 
upon any other contingency by which the estate of such 
persons may be determined before they attain their full 
age. 
"Sec. 17. Successive estates for life shall not be 
limited, unless to persons in being at the creation 
thereof; and when a remainder shall be limited on more 
than two successive estates for life, all the life estates 
subsequent to those of the two persons first entitled 
thereto, shall be void, and upon the death of those per-
477 
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sons, the remainder shall take effect, in the same manner 
as if no other life estate had been created. 
"Sec. 18. No remainder shall be created upon an 
estate for the life of any other person or persons than 
the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such re-
mainder be in fee; nor shall any remainder be created 
upon such an estate in a term for years, unless it be for 
the whole residue of the term. 
"Sec. 19. When a remainder shall be created upon 
any such life estate, and more than two persons shall be 
named as the persons during whose lives the estate shall 
continue, the remainder shall take effect upon the death 
of the two persons first named, in the same manner as 
if no other lives had been introduced. 
"Sec. 20. A contingent remainder shall not be 
created on a term for years, unless the nature of the con-
tingency upon which it is limited be such that the re-
mainder must vest in interest, during the continuance 
of not more than two lives in being at the creation of 
such remainder, or upon the termination thereof. 
"Sec. 21. No estate for life shall be limited as a re-
mainder on a term of years, except to a person in being 
at the creation of such estate. 
"Sec. 23. All the provisions in this chapter con-
tained relative to future estates, shall be construed to 
apply to limitations of chattels real, as well as of freehold 
estates, so that the absolute ownership of a term of years, 
shall not be suspended for a longer period than the abso-
lute power of alienation can be suspended, in respect 
to a fee. 
"Sec. 41. The delivery of the grant, where an ex-
pectant estate is created by grant; and where it is created 
by devise, the death of the testator, shall be deemed the 
time of the creation of the estate." 1 
1 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§14 to 21, 23, 41; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2598 
to 2605, 2607, 2625; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4081 to 4088, 4090, 4108; 
Comp. Laws (1897) §§8796 to 8803, 8805, 8823; How. Stat., §§5530 
to 5537, 5539, 5557; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11532 to 11539, 11541, 
11559; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12934 to 12941, 12943, 12961; Mich. Stat. 
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These statutory provisions were frequently criticized.2 
Sections 14 through 20 and 23 were repealed by Act 38, 
Public Acts of 1949, which provided that the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities should thereafter be ap-
plicable to interests in Michigan land and that, 
"Sec. 3. This act applies only to wills with respect 
to which the testator dies after the effective date of this 
act and to deeds and other instruments executed after 
the effective date of this act." 3 
The repealing act became effective September 23, 
1949. The form of the repeal being such that it does 
not extend to limitations in instruments which became 
effective before that date, Michigan lawyers will be 
obliged to contend with the restrictive provisions of 
Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 for many 
years to come. 
The quoted provisions of Chapter 62 of the Revised 
Statutes of 1846 were taken from the New York Revised 
Ann., §§26.14 to 26.21, 26.23, 26.41; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.14 to 
554.21, 554.23, 554.41. As to the drafting of the Michigan statutes, see 
Part One, at note 582 supra. The judicial interpretation of these 
statutes is discussed in some detail in PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. B, 1!1!50-58, 85 (1944), and Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetui-
ties and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §§25.36-25.47, 
25.98 (1952), and in more summary fashion in 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTURE 
INTERESTS, §576 (1936) and Brake, "Satisfying Michigan's Perpetuity 
Rules," 5 UNiv. oF DETROIT L.J. 160 at 174-179 (1942). 
2 E.g. Chief Justice Campbell in Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552 at 
570, 572, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Goddard, "Perpetuity Statutes: Some 
Reform Statutes in Need of Reformation," 22 MICH. L. REv. 95 (1923); 
Report of Committee on Revision of the Michigan Perpetuity Statutes, 
1930, 10 MicH. ST. BAR J. 20 (1930); Report of the Committee on 
Legislation and Law Reform, 17 MicH. ST. BAR J. 393 at 403-405 
(1938); Tripp, "The Michigan 'Two Lives' Rule," 28 MicH. ST. BAR 
J. 17 (Mar. 1949). 
3 Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.49 (1) to 26.49 (3); Comp. Laws (1948) 
§§554.51 to 554.53. See: Long, "Perpetuities and Accumulations: Re-
cent Legislative Acts Explained," 17 DETROIT LAWYER 193 (1949); 
Sherrard, "Perpetuities in Michigan Today," 29 MICH. ST. BAR J. 5 
(Mar. 1950); Waterbury, "Some Recent Statutory Changes in the 
Law of Perpetuities," 48 MICH. L.R. 158 at 1159-1164 (1950). 
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Statutes of 1829.4 The New York revisers explained their 
purpose as follows: 
"Notwithstanding the abolition of estates tail, our law 
allows certain executory dispositions of land and the 
profits of land, by which the former may be rendered 
inalienable, and the latter may be made to accumulate 
for a life or lives in being, and twenty-one years there-
after. This limit is derived from the English law, and was 
originally adopted by the English judges from analogy to 
settlements by entail. A settlement on a parent for life, 
with remainder to his eldest son in tail, and any number 
of remainders over for life and in tail, could be barred 
by the son's suffering a recovery as soon as he came of 
age. Not to give a greater perpetuity to a disposition by 
executory devise, than the possible (and from the 
exigencies of society, even in that country, the general) 
limits of an entail, the courts held that· no executory 
devise could be good, unless it must necessarily take 
effect within a life or lives in being, or twenty one years 
thereafter. 
"When our legislature abolished entails, they left the 
4Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §§14-21, 23, 41. As to the drafting 
of the New York statutes, see Part One at note 575 supra. The judicial 
interpretation of these statutes is discussed in detail in Chaplin, Sus-
PENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, AND POSTPONEMENT OF VESTING, 
UNDER THE LAws oF NEw YoRK (3rd. ed., 1928); Powell and White-
side, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEW YoRK CONCERNING PERPE-
TUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS [New York Legislative Document (1936) 
No. 65 (H)]; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A (1944); Whiteside, 
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN ,LAw 
oF PROPERTY, §§25.1-25.35, 25.92-25.96 (1952). In addition to Michigan, 
eleven other states (Arizona, California, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and 
Wisconsin) and the District of Columbia adopted parts of the New 
York statutory scheme. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, Appendix on the 
Statutory Rules Against Perpetuities, Introductory Note (1944). Be-
cause of wide variation in the extent to which the scheme was adopted, 
no attempt has been made in this book to cite decisions from these 
jurisdictions interpreting the statutes. They are discussed in PROPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B (1944) and Whiteside, "Statutory Rules, 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§§25.1-25.5, 25.36-25.98 (1952). 
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common law in regard to executory limitations, unal-
tered; so that all we have gained by abolishing entails, 
is, that we have avoided the necessity of levying a fine 
or suffering a recovery to bar the estate tail. Indeed 
land may be rendered inalienable for a longer period 
by springing use, or executory devise, than by an entail. 
In the settlement of an estate tail, like that above men-
tioned, the life estate depends upon a single life; but in 
these executory dispositions, as the lives are not neces-
sarily required to take any interest in the estate, or to be 
in any way connected with it, any number may be intro-
duced, at the pleasure of the party, and for the mere 
purpose of protracting the period of alienation. In Eng-
land this has often been done. In one case, twenty-eight 
persons (all of whom except seven, were strangers, tak-
ing no interest in the land,) were inserted for the purpose 
of securing the longest possible term. It is obvious that 
the chance of finding, out of so great a number a very 
long life, is much greater than in the case of the entail. 
Again: The term of twenty-one years in the case of the 
settlement by entail, only occurs during the actual in-
fancy of the party entitled in remainder. In the case of 
the executory devise, &c. it is added to the life or lives in 
being, as an absolute term, and there may be cases, where, 
after the expiration of the twenty-one years, the real 
infancy of the party may be added to the former term 
thus rendering the land inalienable, except in special 
cases, for twenty-one years longer. 
"In the case of the will of Peter Thelusson, the testa-
tor availed himself of the executory devise, to secure 
the accumulation of his personal estate, and the rents 
and profits of his realty, to such an extent, that the Brit-
ish parliament passed an act, (40 Geo. III. c. 98,) 'to 
restrain all trusts and directions in deeds or wills, where-
by the profits or produce of real or personal estates shall 
be accumulated, and the beneficial enjoyment thereof 
postponed beyond the time therein limited.' 
"This act has not been re-enacted in this state; but in 
the preceding sections, the Revisers have proposed some 
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new regulations on this subject, which will considerably 
abridge the present power of rendering real estate in-
alienable; and in a subsequent section, they have re-
strained the accumulation of profits within still nar-
rower limits than are now allowed in England.5 The 
difference between the preceding sections and the exist-
ing law, consists in the following particulars: 
"1. Alienation cannot be protracted by means of 
mere nominees unconnected with the estate, beyond the 
period of two lives. 
"2. No more than two successive estates for life can 
be created. 
"3. The period of twenty-one years, after a life or 
lives in being, is no longer allowed as an absolute term; 
but the rule is restored to its original object, by being 
confined to the case of actual infancy~ which is directly 
provided for by rendering the disposition d,efeasible, and 
allowing another to be substituted during that period. 
"It is presumed that no argument need be advanced 
in favor of restricting, at least to the extent here pro-
posed, the power of creating perpetuities. It is perhaps 
a more doubtful question, whether the genius of our 
government, and the state of our society, do not require 
that the right of suspending alienation should be still 
further reduced. 
"It is proper to observe that these sections agree in 
some respects with the propositions contained in the re-
cent work of Mr. Humphreys on the law of real property 
in England. 
"It may be useful to illustrate by examples, the effect 
of § 16, as its meaning may not be immediately obvious. 
Suppose an estate devised to A for life, and upon his 
death, to his issue then living; but in case such issue 
shall die under the age of twenty-one years, or in case 
such issue shall die under the age of twenty-one years 
and without lawful issue, then to B in fee. Here, in both 
cases, the remainder to B would be valid as embraced by 
5 The statutes restricting accumulations, here referred to, are dis-
cussed in Chapter 16, supra. 
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the terms of the section; but if the devise were to A for 
life) and after his death to B for the term of twenty-one 
years; and upon the expiration of such term) to the eld-
est male descendant of A then living) an<d if there be no 
such male descendant then living) to C in fee. Here the 
period of twenty-one years being an absolute term, 
wholly unconnected with the infancy of any person en-
titled, both the term and all the remainders dependent 
on it would be void; and on the determination of the life 
estate, the fee would descend to the heirs of the testator. 
To prevent a possible difficulty in the minds of those to 
whom the subject is not familiar, we may also add, that 
an estate is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent 
remainder, and the contingency has not yet occurred. 
Where the remainder is vested as where the lands are 
given to A for life, remainder to B (a person then in 
being) in fee, there is no suspense of the power of aliena-
tion; for the remainderman and the owner of the prior 
estate, by uniting, may always convey the whole estate. 
This is the meaning of the rule of law prohibiting per-
petuities, and is the effect of the definition in 1f 14." 6 
The Michigan statutes differed from those of New 
York in two important respects. First, the New York 
statutes contained complementary provisions forbidding 
suspension of the "absolute ownership" of personal 
property, 7 so the statutory scheme there covered limita-
tions of all types of property, real, personal, and mixed. 
The Michigan statutes contained no such complementary 
6 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, IS N.Y. Rev. 
Stat. (2d ed.) 571-573 (1836). 
1 "§I. The absolute ownership of personal property shall not be 
suspended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer period 
than during the continuance and until the termination of not more 
than two lives in being at the date of the instrument containing such 
limitation or condition; or if such instrument be a will, for not more 
than two lives in being at the death of the testator. 
"§2. In all other respects, limitations of future or contingent inter-
ests in personal property, shall be subject to the rules prescribed in 
the first Chapter of this Act, in relation to future estates in lands." 
N.Y. Rev. Stat., 1829, Part Two, Ch. IV, Tit. IV, §§1, 2. 
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provisions, so the statutory scheme here covered only 
limitations of land, including freehold estates and estates 
for years.8 Moreover, the Michigan Supreme Court held 
that if a will contained a mandatory direction to convert 
land into other property, the direction worked an equit-
able conversion and the statutory scheme did not apply.9 
As has been seen, however, the Court extended the statu-
tory scheme to mixed dispositions of land and personalty 
by refusing to treat them as separable.10 Second, Section 
24 in the New York version of the statutes provided that 
"a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a contingency, 
which, if it should occur, must happen within the period 
prescribed in this Article."11 This provision was not 
adopted in Michigan. As the New York courts made it 
the basis for deciding that the statutory scheme pro-
hibited remoteness of vesting as well as suspension of 
the absolute power of alienation,12 its omission here is 
significant. The effect of this omission will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 20. 
To the extent that the Michigan statutes were identi-
cal with those of New York, judicial interpretations of 
the statutes made in New York before 1846, when they 
were adopted in Michigan, were treated by our Supreme 
Court as virtually binding on it.13 Later New York ju-
s Part Two, note 52 supra. As to the possibility that the scope of 
those sections of the statutory scheme which were not repealed by 
Act 38, P.A. 1949, was extended to include limitations of chattels per-
sonal by Act 227, P.A. 1949, see Part Two, note 184 supra. 
9 Part Two, note 59 supra. 
10 Part Two, notes 53, 553, 554, supra. 
n N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §24. 
12 Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Walker v. 
Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919). 
1a State v. Holmes, II5 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898), the theory 
being that, in adopting the New York statutes, the Michigan Legis-
lature was presumed to have adopted the prior interpretation of them 
in New York. Controlling force was not accorded the decisions of 
inferior New York courts. Foster v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131 at 141, 
109 N.W. 265 (1906). 
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dicial decisions were accorded weight but not treated as 
binding.14 
B. SUSPENSION OF THE ABSOLUTE POWER OF ALIENATION 
The notes of the New York revisers quoted in the pre-
ceding section indicate that they thought the only effect 
of the statutes prohibiting suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation (Sections 14, 15 and 16) was to 
shorten the period of the common-law Rule Against Per-
petuities by changing "any number of lives in being" to 
"two lives in being" and by eliminating the period of 
twenty-one years in gross. They did not think that they 
had changed the theory or nature of the Rule. That this 
was their understanding of the statutes which they had 
drafted is made evident by their statement, "an estate 
is never inalienable, unless there is a contingent re-
mainder, and the contingency has not yet occurred." 
That statement was roughly true under English law be-
cause contingent future interests were inalienable at 
common law 15 and the English courts would not enforce 
prohibitions on alienation of any other interest in 
property, legal or equitable.16 But the revisers evidently 
failed to realize fully that other provisions of their own 
revision changed the law on both these points by making 
contingent future interests alienable 17 and the inter-
14 Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903); Foster 
v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Moore v. O'Leary, 
180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914); In re Coots' Estate, 253 Mich. 
208, 234 N.W. 141 (1931). 
15 Part One, note 359 supra. 
:ts Part One, note 556 supra. There was an exception in the case of 
the separate equitable estate of a married woman. Part One, note 557 
supra. 
17 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §35; 
Part One, note 371 supra. 
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ests of beneficiaries of trusts for receipt of the rents and 
profits of land inalienable.18 
If contingent future interests are alienable, such an 
interest limited to an ascertained living person does not 
suspend the absolute power of alienation, as such sus-
pension is defined by Section 14/9 because there are per-
sons in being by whom an absolute fee in possession can 
be conveyed. If Andrew Baker devises land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot Building 
shall stand, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, the 
remainder of John is contingent, but James and John 
are persons in being "by whom an absolute fee in pos-
session can be conveyed." Hence, although the interest 
of John violates the common-law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, because it may vest too remotely, it does not suspend 
the absolute power of alienation. 20 
On the other hand, as the New York courts soon held, 
a present trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land 
does suspend the absolute power of alienation because 
1s N. Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part Two, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. Second, §63; 
Part One, notes 580, 621, supra. It is virtually certain that the revisers 
did not realize that this would make present trusts suspend the abso-
lute power of alienation. Powell and Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK CoNCERNING PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS, 
56 [New York Legislative Document (1936) No. 65 (H)]; PROPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!17 (1944); Rundell, "The Suspension of 
the Absolute Power of Alienation," 19 MicH. L. REv. 235 at 249-251 
(1921). Dean Rundell's article is an interesting and valuable com-
mentary on all the topics treated in this section. 
19 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
20 Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 347, 123 
N.E. 736 (1919). But see Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 at 107 (1858). 
Although the interest of John in the example given does not suspend 
the absolute power of alienation, as such suspension is defined in 
Section 14, it would violate the portion of Section 24 which was not 
adopted in Michigan (Part Three, note 11 supra), because that por-
tion of Section 24, like the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, 
forbade remoteness of vesting. Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 
N.E. 497 (1909). Dean Rundell thinks that §§14 and 15 should have 
been construed to restrict remoteness of vesting. "The Suspension of 
the Absolute Power of Alienation," 19 MicH. L. REV. 235 at 259 (1921). 
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the interest of the cestui que trust is inalienable, al-
though all interests in the land are vested.21 If Andrew 
Baker devises land to Roger White upon trust to receive 
the rents and profits and apply them to the use of James 
Thorpe and his heirs for ten years and then to convey 
the land to John Stiles, "there are no persons in being, 
by whom an absolute fee in possession can be conveyed," 
so the present trust suspends the absolute power of 
alienation for a period not limited to two lives in being, 
in violation of Section 15,22 although there are no un-
vested interests and hence no violation of the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities. 
The decisions of the New York courts interpreting and 
applying the suspension statutes, rendered before 1846, 
when the statutes were adopted in Michigan, made it 
clear that, contrary to the view of the New York revisers, 
Sections 14, 15, and 16 did not merely shorten the period 
of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities; they im-
posed restrictions on the creation of interests in property 
which, while they had the same general purpose as the 
common-law Rule, were of a quite different nature from 
that Rule and operated upon a different theory.23 Where-
as the common-law Rule prohibited all future interests 
21 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16 
Wend. 61 (1836), Chapter 20, Section C, infra; Dean Rundell thinks 
that this rule is unsound. "The Suspension of the Absolute Power of 
Alienation," 19 MicH. L. REv. 235 at 251 (1921). 
22 Matter of Hitchcock, 222 N.Y. 57, 118 N.E. 220 (1917). Section 
15 is quoted above at Part Three, note 1. 
23 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd. ed., §14 
(1928); Walsh, FuTURE EsTATES IN NEw YoRK, §23 (1931). Because 
the New York statutes were construed to prohibit remoteness of vest-
ing as well as suspension of the absolute power of alienation (Part 
Three, note 12 supra), their theory and operation did not differ so 
radically from those of the common-law Rule as did the narrower 
Michigan statutes. The only prohibition on remoteness of vesting 
in the Michigan statutes is that in Section 20 (Part Three, note 1 
supra) as to a contingent remainder on a term of years. 
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which might vest too remotely and had no application 
whatever to present and other vested interests, Sections 
14 and 15 24 applied equally to vested and contingent 
interests, whether present or future, prohibiting all and 
only those which so affected the title to land that no per-
sons in being could convey an absolute fee in possession. 
Because the statutes were phrased in terms of suspen-
sion of the absolute power of alienation, they have 
tended to be confused, by both courts and lawyers, with 
the common-law rules against direct restraints on aliena-
tion which are the subject of Part One of this study. 
Those rules are distinct from and were not superseded 
or modified by the suspension statutes; the statutes did 
not permit any direct restraint on alienation which was 
void at common law.25 At common law a prohibition 
or condition which would prevent or penalize the aliena-
tion of an estate in fee simple is void although the re-
straint will last for only a single day. 2~ This rule was 
not abrogated by the suspension statutes.27 A prohibition 
on alienation, if effective, would suspend the absolute 
power of alienation within the meaning of Section 14,28 
but, except in the case of spendthrift trusts, 29 all prohibi-
24 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
25 2 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §576 (1936); Brake, "Satisfy-
ing Michigan's Perpetuity Rules," 5 UNIV. oF DETROIT L.J. 160 at 166 
(1942). 
2s Mandlebaum v. McDonell, 29 Mich. 78 at 107, 18 Am. Rep. 61 
(1874), Part One, notes 138, 140, supra. The will involved in this case 
became effective before the suspension statutes. 
21 In re Estate of Schilling, 102 Mich. 612, sub nom. Moore v. 
Schindehette, 61 N.W. 62 (1894), Part One, note 154 supra; Porter 
v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532, 42 A.L.R. 1267 (1925), Part 
One, note 158 supra; Smith v. Smith, 290 Mich. 143, 287 N.W. 411, 
124 A.L.R. 215 (1939), Part One, note 167 supra; Braun v. K1ug, 
335 Mich. 692, 57 N.W. (2d) 299 (1953), Part One, note 162 supra. 
2s Part Three, note 1 supra. 
29 Part One, notes 569, 570, supra; Rose v. Southern Michigan Na-
tional Bank, 255 Mich. 275, 238 N.W. 284 (1931), Part One, note 
647 supra; Roberts v. Michigan Trust Co., 273 Mich. 91, 262 N.W. 
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tions on alienation of otherwise alienable interests in 
property are void under the common-law rules.80 A con-
dition subsequent restraining alienation would not sus-
pend the absolute power of alienation within the mean-
ing of Section 14. If Andrew Baker conveys land to 
John Stiles and his heirs "but if the grantee or his heirs 
shall attempt to alienate the estate hereby conveyed, the 
grantor or his heirs may enter and terminate the estate," 
Andrew and John are persons in being "by whom an 
absolute fee in possession can be conveyed," even if the 
condition were valid. But such a condition is void at 
common law and was not validated by the suspension 
statuteS.81 
The common-law rules against direct restraints on 
alienation, the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, 
and the suspension statutes share a common purpose of 
keeping property alienable, but their scope is different. 
The common-law rules against direct restraints on aliena-
tion relate to provisions which would prevent an ascer-
tained, living owner from alienating his own interest in 
property. The common-law Rule Against Perpetuities 
relates to future interests which indirectly restrain aliena-
tion of the full title to property because they are limited 
to persons unborn, who cannot convey, or on contin-
gencies which are so uncertain as to make the interests 
commercially unmarketable. The suspension stautes re-
lated primarily to future interests which were inalien-
able because limited to unborn or unascertained persons 
and to interests under trusts which were made inalien-
able by statute. The suspension statutes, like the com-
744 (1935), Part One, note 651 supra; Hay v. Le Bus, 317 Mich. 698, 
27 N.W. (2d) 309 (1947). 
3o Part One, notes 107, 244, 245, 297, 298, Part Three, notes 26, 
27, supra. 
31 Part Three, notes 26, 27, supra. 
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mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities, were aimed primar-
ily at indirect restraints on alienation, limitations which 
do not in terms prohibit or penalize alienation but which 
have the indirect effect of making it difficult or impos-
sible. They were designed to complement, not to super-
sede, the common-law rules against direct restraints on 
alienation. 
C. SCOPE AND ARRANGEMENT OF PART THREE 
The restrictions on the creation of life estates and re-
mainders thereon imposed by Sections 17, 18, 19, and 
21 32 were peculiar to the statutory scheme and will be 
discussed in Chapter 19. Because, as has been seen, the 
class of interests which suspended the absolute power of 
alienation in violation of Sections 14 and 15 33 did not 
coincide in all respects with the class of interests which 
suspend vesting in violation of the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities, 34 Chapter 20 will be devoted to 
discussion of the types of limitations which could suspend 
the absolute power of alienation. As the period of sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation permitted by 
Sections 15 and 16 differs from the period of suspension 
of vesting permitted by the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, the computation of the statutory period will 
be discussed in Chapter 21. 
Although the statutory scheme differed from the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities as to the types o! 
interests within its scope and as to the permissible period 
of suspension, it was a substitute for the common-law 
Rule, and many of the problems which arise under the 
common-law Rule arose and were solved in the same way 
s2 Part Three, note I supra. 
33Jd. 
34 Part Three, notes 20, 21, 23, supra. 
THE STATUTORY SCHEME 491 
under the statutes. The effect of destructibility of an 
interest, discussed in Chapter I 0/5 was similar under the 
statutory scheme to what it is under the common-law 
Rule.36 Under the common-law Rule it has to be abso-
lutely certain that an interest cannot vest at a time be-
yond the period of Rule, 37 and under the statutes it had 
to be absolutely certain that a suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation would not last longer than the statu-
tory period. 38 When vesting was significant under the 
statutory scheme, the rules of vesting were the same as 
under the common-law Rule. Hence all of Chapter II 
has relevance to Part Three. The rules as to what con-
stitutes a class gift, the composition of classes, and their 
closing were the same under the statutory scheme as at 
common law, so Chapter I2 is relevant to Part Three 
in these respects. The statutory definitions of absolute 
powers of revocation and disposition, discussed in Chap-
ter I3,39 applied under the statutory scheme. The ap-
plication of the statutory scheme to charities has already 
35 Part Two at notes 69-81, supra. 
36 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§55-
84 (1928); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1]"14 (1944); White-
side, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). But the doctrine of destructibility 
under the statutes differs from that under the common-law Rule in 
several important respects. Chapter 20, Subsection B (3), infra. 
37 Part Two, notes 122-124, 130, 131, supra. 
38 Chaplin, SusPENSION oF THE PowER oF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§51, 
131, 132 (1928); Walsh, FUTURE EsTATES IN NEW YoRK, §§26, 30 (1931); 
PRoPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1]"1]"30-32, (1944); Chapter 21, 
Section B, infra. Thus the conclusive presumption that every person 
is capable of having issue as long as he lives applied under the statutes 
as at common law. Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 
(1922), Part Two, note 145 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. 
A, 1]"31, Ch. B, 1]"56 (1944). Similarly, the general rule that events 
occurring before the time when certainty is required can be con-
sidered in determining certainty but events occurring after that time 
cannot (Part Two, notes 125-129, supra) applied under the statutes; 
Chaplin, id., §§89-92; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1T1T29, 30, 
Ch. B, 1]"56 (1944), Chapter 21, Section B, infra. 
39 Part Two, notes 304-307, supra. 
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been discussed in Chapter 15.40 The statutes regulating 
accumulations, which the New York revisers treated as 
an integral part of the statutory scheme, have been cov-
ered in Chapter 16. The consequences of violation of 
Sections 14 and 15 41 have been discussed in Chapter 
17. These and other problems arising under the 
Statutory scheme which have been adequately covered in 
Part Two will not be treated in Part Three other than 
by cross-references to the relevant discussions. 
4 0 Part Two, notes 404, 406, 407, 412, 423, 437, 438, supra. 
n Part Three, note I supra. 
CHAPTER 19 
The Restrictions on Life Estates 
SECTIONS 17, 18, 19, and 21 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 42 imposed several restric-tions, unknown to the common law/3 upon the crea-
tion of estates for life 44 in land and the limitation of re-
mainders thereon. Section 16 of Chapter 63 provides, 
"Every express trust, valid as such in its creation, ex-
cept as herein otherwise provided, shall vest the whole 
estate in the trustees, in law and in equity, subject only 
to the execution of the trust; and the person for whose 
benefit the trust was created, shall take no estate or in-
terest in the lands, but may enforce the performance of 
the trust in equity." 45 
In consequence, the interest of a life beneficiary under 
a trust is not an "estate for life" within the meaning of 
Sections 17, 18, 19, and 21 of Chapter 62, and those sec-
tions imposed no restrictions on the creation of beneficial 
interests under trusts; they related only to legal life 
estates.46 It should be borne in mind, however, that the 
42 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
43 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[22 (1944). See: Chene 
v. Bank of Michigan, Walk. Ch. 511 (Mich. 1844). 
44 As to the meaning of the term "estate for life" and the various 
types of life estates, see Part One, supra, at note 234. 
45 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §16, Comp. Laws (1857) §2646; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4129; Comp. Laws (1897) §8844; How. Stat., §5578; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11580; Comp. Laws (1929) §12982; Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §26.66; Comp. Laws (1948) §555.16. As the Revised Statutes of 
1846 constituted a single act, all of their provisions must be construed 
together. Brayton v. Merithew, 56 Mich. 166, 22 N.W. 259 (1885). 
46 Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Sprague 
v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Ward v. Ward, 163 
Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910); Re Wager's Estate, 295 Mich. 463, 
295 N.W. 227 (1940); McGraw v. McGraw, 176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 
1910) (affirming decree of U.S. Circuit Court, E. Dist., Mich., Harlan, 
Circuit Justice); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[26, Ch. B. 
1[56 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumu-
lations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.96 (1952). 
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interest of a trustee is a legal estate. If the trustee's in-
terest was an estate for life or a remainder following legal 
estates for life, it was subject to the restrictions of Sec-
tions 17, 18, 19, and 21, and its invalidity could affect 
other interests.47 
Section 17 prohibited the limitation of successive 
estates for life, "unless to persons in being at the creation 
thereof," and Section 21, which is still in force, 48 provides 
that "No estate for life shall be limited as a remainder on 
a term of years, except to a person in being at the creation 
of such estate." Downing v. Birney 49 involved a deed 
which, as construed by the Court, limited land to Lo-
ramie Spicer for life, remainder to her children for life, 
remainder to Lorainie in fee. At the date of the convey-
ance Lorainie had two children, Mary and Diana, and 
two more were born later. Diana predeceased her 
mother. It was held that, as the interests limited to the 
children followed that of their mother, there were "suc-
cessive life estates" involved within the meaning of Sec-
tion 17 and that, under that section, the children born 
after the date of the conveyance could not take. The 
47 PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[26 (1944); Whiteside, id. 
Thus, if land was conveyed to James Thol'{le for the life of Lucy 
Baker, upon trust for Lucy, with legal remamder to John Stiles for 
life, remainder to his children in fee, the remainder to John Stiles 
was void under Section 18, which provided, "No remainder shall be 
created upon an estate for the life of any other person or persons than 
the grantee or devisee of such estate, unless such remainder be in 
fee; ... " As Professor Whiteside and the Restatement have observed, 
the New York courts have sometimes failed to note this effect of the 
section. 
48 Section 21 was not included in the general repeal of the statutory 
scheme effected by Act 38, P.A. 1949, §2, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2), 
Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. As to the possibility that the scope of 
Section 21 was extended to include limitations of chattels personal by 
Act 227, P.A. 1949, see Part Two, note 184 supra. 
49 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898). The language of the convey-
ance was partially construed on an earlier appeal, Downing v. Birney, 
112 Mich. 474, 70 N.W. 1006 (1897), Part One, note 90 supra. 
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Court ruled that Mary and Diana took separate life 
estates, each in an undivided half of the land, and that 
Lorainie's life estate merged with her remainder in fee, 
as to half, on the death of Diana. It is to be noted that 
this decision seems to have treated the statute as altering 
the normal rules governing the closing of classes, under 
which the class "children of Lorainie" would not close 
until some member of it was entitled to possession, which 
was at the death of Lorainie. 50 This construction of the 
statute made it possible to treat the limitation to the 
children as valid. 
In Rozell v. Rozell,"1 a testatrix devised a 160-acre tract 
of land to her son Cass for life, remainder to the children 
of Cass for life, remainder to the heirs of such children in 
fee. At the time when the litigation arose, Cass had five 
children, four of whom were born before the death of 
the testatrix and one of whom was born four months 
thereafter. The Court said that a child en ventre sa mere 
is "in being" within the meaning of Section 17 but that 
the limitation of life estates to the children of Cass was 
void because the class would not close until the death of 
Cass and so children of Cass not in being at the death of 
the testatrix might take. This decision would seem to 
overrule Downing v. Birney on the question of whether 
Section 17 alters the normal rules as to the closing of 
classes. 
As Section 21 is still in force, it must be considered in 
legal drafting. If Andrew Baker conveys land to John 
Stiles for life, remainder to the children of John for life, 
the remainder would violate Section 17, as construed in 
Rozell v. Rozell. But Section 17 has been repealed, so 
such a remaiD;der may now be limited. If, however, the 
5o Part Two, notes 275, 276, supra. 
s1217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). 
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conveyance is to John Stiles for ten years if he shall so 
long live, remainder to the children of John for life, the 
remainder is void under Section 21 because the interest 
of the children is a "remainder on a term of years;" the 
class "children of John" will not close until the expira-
tion of ten years or the earlier death of John and so may 
include children not in being at the testator's death. It 
should be noted that in neither example given in this 
paragraph would the remainder for life suspend either 
vesting or the absolute power of alienation for longer 
than a life in being. 
The statutes under consideration did not prevent the 
limitation of estates for life to persons not in being ex-
cept in the two situations mentioned in Sections 17 and 
21, successive estates for life and remainders on estates 
for years. If Andrew Baker conveyed land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs, "but if James dies without issue 
alive at the time of his death, remainder to the children 
of John Stiles for life," the remainder was valid under 
the statutes.52 The interest of James was an estate in fee 
simple subject to defeasance, so the remainder to the 
children of John was neither a "successive estate for life" 
within the meaning of Section 17 nor a "remainder on a 
term of years" within the meaning of Section 21. 
In addition to prohibiting the limitation of successive 
estates for life to persons not in being, Section 17 pro-
vided, "when a remainder shall be limited on more than 
two successive estates for life, all the life estates subse-
quent to those of the two persons first entitled thereto, 
shall be void, and upon the death of those persons, the 
remainder shall take effect, in the same manner as if no 
other life estate had been created." 53 The most difficult 
52 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!23, Ill. 10 (1944). 
53 Part Three, note I supra. 
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problem of construction of this section which arose was 
that of what constituted "successive estates for life." As 
has been seen, the interests of beneficiaries under trusts, 
whether concurrent or successive, were not "estates for 
life" within the meaning of the section. 54 If a trust could 
not last longer than two lives in being, it did not violate 
Section 15, and Section 17 did not limit the number of 
successive beneficiaries. If John Stiles devised land to 
James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust "to pay the entire 
net income to my wife for her life, then to pay the net 
income to my children in equal shares and upon the 
death of each child, to pay his share in the income to his 
children in equal shares, but upon the death of my two 
youngest grandchildren living at the time of my death 
the trust shall terminate and the trustee shall convey the 
land to my issue then in being," all of the provisions of 
the devise were valid under both the suspension sections 
( 14 and 15) and Section 17, even if John had ten children 
and each of them had children. 
It is clear that if Andrew Baker devised land to Lucy 
Baker for life, remainder to James Thorpe for life, re-
mainder to John Stiles for life, remainder to the children 
of John in fee, successive estates for life were involved 
and that of John was void under Section 17. Thus in 
Hovey v. Nellis/5 a testator devised land to his widow 
for life, remainder to his son for life, remainder to the 
son's wife for life, remainder to the son's children in fee. 
The remainder to the son's wife was a third successive 
estate for life and so void under the statute. Similarly, in 
Rozell v. Rozell/6 a testatrix devised a 143-acre tract of 
54 Part Three, note 46 supra. 
5s 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894). 
se 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). The remainder to the chil-
dren of Cass also violated the provision against successive life estates 
to unborn persons. Part Three, note 51 supra. See also Downing v. 
Birney, Part Three, note 49 supra. 
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land to her daughter Sarah for life, remainder to her son 
Cass for life, remainder to the children of Cass for life, 
remainder to the heirs of such children in fee. The re-
mainder to the children of Cass for life followed two 
prior life estates and so was void under the statute. 
It is equally clear that concurrent life estates in sepa-
rate shares of the same land, without cross-remainders 
to the survivors, are not "successive life estates." In 
Woolfitt v. Preston/7 a testatrix devised land to her 
daughter Claudia for life, remainder to Martha and 
Florence for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee. It 
was held that this was a valid disposition of an undivided 
half to Claudia for life, remainder to Martha for life, 
remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee, and of the other 
undivided half to Claudia for life, remainder to Flor-
ence for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee. 
The situation which has caused real difficulty is that 
of concurrent life estates in the same land with cross-
remainders to the survivors and survivor of a group. This 
situation arises if Andrew Baker devises land to Lucy 
Baker, Roger White, and John Stiles, in equal shares, 
remainder on the death of any of these three to the 
survivors and survivor for life, remainder on the death 
of the survivor of the three to James Thorpe and his 
heirs. In this situation the New York decisions are 
to the effect that successive life estates are involved. 
If Lucy Baker dies first and Roger White next, the 
remainder in Lucy's third to Roger and John is good, 
but the remainder to John on the death of Roger fails 
as to the half of Lucy's third which passed to Roger 
s1 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918). Accord: Felt v. Methodist 
Educational Advance, 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929), Part Three, 
note 62 infra. Cf. Le Baron v. Shepherd, 21 Mich. 263 (1870). 
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on her death.58 Michigan took a different approach. In 
Case v. Green/9 land was conveyed to Hiram Case and 
Rebecca, his wife, for their lives, remainder after their 
deaths to Adelbert Case for life. The life estate of Adel-
bert was treated as valid, apparently on the theory that 
the interest of Hiram and Rebecca was a single estate for 
the life of the survivor. Similarly, in Truitt v. City of 
Battle CreekJ60 land was leased to Oliver Beauregard and 
his wife for life. On the same day the lessor conveyed 
the reversion to Truitt. Later Truitt conveyed the re-
version to his mother, who reconveyed to Truitt for life, 
remainder to his heirs in fee. It was held that Truitt's 
life estate was not invalid as a third successive estate for 
life because the interest of Beauregard and wife was a 
single estate by the entirety for the life of the survivor. 
In Kemp v. Sutton/1 a testator devised land to his wife 
and four sons "for and during their said natural lives," 
the wife to have a third of the income during her life, 
the sons to share the balance equally, and the survivors 
and survivor to take the whole, remainder on the death 
of the survivor to the City of Sault Ste. Marie. It was 
held that the whole disposition was valid; that the wife 
arid sons took a single joint life estate for the life of the 
survivor rather than separate life estates with cross-
remainders to the survivors and survivor. In Felt v. 
ss Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446 (1883); In re Soley's Estate, 150 
Misc. 839, 271 N.Y. Supp. 595 (1934); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. A, ~24, (1944). 
59 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889). See also Russell v. Musson, 
240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927). 
6o 205 Mich. 180, 171 N.W. 338 (1919), reversed on other grounds, 
208 Mich. 618, 175 N.W. 578 (1920). 
61 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). Accord: Jones v. Snyder, 
218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922). Cf. Root v. Snyder, 161 Mich. 
200, 126 N.W. 206 (1910). 
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Methodist Educational Advance/2 a testator devised a 
farm to his wife for life, then, 
"I give, devise and bequeath to my children, Joseph 
Elwell, George W. Elwell, and Rhody Conant, the use, 
improvement and income of my--- farm ---from and 
after the decease of my wife - - -, to have and to hold the 
same to the said Joseph Elwell, George W. Elwell and 
Rhody Conant for and during the term of their natural 
lives, - - - the same to be equally divided among them if 
requested by all or either of them; and from and im-
mediately after the decease of the said Joseph Elwell, 
George W. Elwell and Rhody Conant, or either of them, 
the share set off to such deceased heir, I give, devise and 
bequeath to the heirs of said deceased heir, for him, her 
or them and their heirs and assigns forever." 
The ultimate remainders were held valid in an opin-
ion stating, "Our later cases hold that the devise of a life 
estate to a class collectively creates an estate for one life 
only, that of the 'longest liver' of the class, - - -." This 
language was unnecessary to the decision. In this case as 
in Woolfitt v. Preston/3 there were no cross-remainders 
to the survivors and survivor. As to each third there was 
a life estate in the widow, a second successive life estate 
in a child, and a remainder in fee to the heirs of the 
child. The result was correct but the reasoning unsound. 
Section 18 prohibited a remainder for life on an 
estate pur autre vie.64 If Andrew Baker devised land 
to Lucy Baker for the life of Roger White, remainder 
to John Stiles for life, John's remainder was void al-
though it was only the second successive estate for life.65 
s2 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929). 
63 Part Three, note 57 supra. 
64 Part Three, note 1 supra. As to estates pur autre vie see Part 
One, supra, at notes 234, 235, 238-241, 243. 
65 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1T25 (1944); Whiteside, 
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations,'' 6 AMERICAN LAw 
OF PROPERTY, §25.95 (1952). 
THE RESTRICTIONS ON LIFE ESTATES 501 
Section 19 provided that if a remainder was limited on 
an estate pur autre vie measured by more than two lives, 
the remainder should become possessory upon the expi-
ration of the second life named. 66 If Andrew Baker de-
vised land to Lucy Baker and her heirs for the lives of 
James Thorpe, Roger White, and Thomas Kempe, re-
mainder to John Stiles and his heirs, John's remainder 
would become possessory upon the deaths of James and 
Roger. It should be noted, however, that Section 19 did 
not abbreviate an estate pur autre vie measured by more 
than two lives unless there was a remainder limited on 
it. If Andrew Baker conveyed land to Lucy Baker and 
her heirs for the lives of James Thorpe, Roger White, 
Thomas Kempe, and Edward Willis, the limitation was 
fully effective, and Andrew's reversion did not become 
possessory until James, Roger, Thomas, and Edward 
had died.67 
Estates pur autre vie unconnected with trusts have 
been uncommon here, but the duration of a trustee's 
estate is sometimes measured by the lives of the trust 
66 Part Three, notes 1, 65, supra. As Professor Whiteside observed, 
it is inferable that the measuring lives had to be those of persons in 
being. 
67 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!25 (1944). Cf. In re 
McBride's Estate, 253 Mich. 305, 235 N.W. 166 (1931). All of the restric-
tions on the creation of life estates were relatively narrow in scope and 
could be avoided quite easily by a skillful draftsman. For example, in 
Young v. Young, 255 Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931), Part One, note 
608 supra, land was devised to a trustee to pay the income to the 
testator's two children for ten years if they should so long live, re-
mainder to the children or the survivor of them for life, remainder 
on the death of the survivor to their issue. This was treated as wholly 
valid. Suspension of the absolute power of alienation would certainly 
cease on the death of the surviving child, so Sections 14 and 15 (Part 
Three, note 1 supra) were not violated. The trustee's estate was a 
term of years, so there were neither more than two successive estates 
for life within the meaning of Section 17, nor a remainder for life 
on an estate pur autre vie within the meaning of Section 18. All 
interests would vest on the death of the survivor of the two children, 
so Section 20 was not violated. The children were persons in being 
so their estates did not offend Section 21. 
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beneficiaries. Sections 18 and 19 could cause trouble in 
such situations. If Andrew Baker devised land to James 
Thorpe for the life of Lucy Baker, upon trust for Lucy, 
with legal remainder to John Stiles for life, remainder 
to his children in fee, it would seem that the remainder 
to John was void under Section 18.68 Similarly, if An-
drew Baker devised land to James Thorpe for the lives 
of Lucy Baker, Roger White, and John Stiles, upon trust 
to pay the income to Lucy, Roger, and John, and the 
survivor and survivors of them, legal remainder on the 
death of the survivor to the children of John Stiles in 
fee, it would seem that although the interests of Lucy, 
Roger, and John were not "successive estates for life" 
within the meaning of Section 17,69 the remainder would 
have to take effect, if at all, under Section 19, on the 
deaths of Lucy and Roger although John was still alive. 
On the other hand, if the estate of the trustee was a fee 
simple, Sections 18 and 19 would not affect these dis-
positions at all. If Andrew Baker devised land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to pay the income to 
Lucy Baker, Roger White, and John Stiles, and the sur-
vivors and survivor of them until the death of the sur-
vivor, and then to convey the land to the children of 
John Stiles in fee, Section 19 would have no application 
if the estate of James was a fee simple.70 Under the de-
cision in Kemp v. Sutton 71 and the dictum in Felt v. 
Methodist Educational Advance/2 the trust would not 
suspend the absolute power of alienation for more than 
a single life, so the disposition would be wholly effective. 
Sections 17 and 19 73 expressly provided that a re-
ss Part Three, note 47 supra. 
69 Part Three, note 46 supra. 
70 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[26 (1944). 
n Part Three, note 61 supra. 
12 Part Three, note 62 supra. But see Chapter 21, Section C (3), 
infra. 
73 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
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mainder in fee subsequent to a life estate which was 
void or abbreviated under these sections should not fail 
but should be accelerated as to the time at which it 
became possessory. If the remaindermen in fee were 
ascertainable at the time when they became entitled to 
possession under these sections, the remainder did take 
effect at that time.74 If Andrew. Baker devised land to 
Lucy Baker for life, remainder to Roger White for life, 
remainder to James Thorpe for life, remainder to John 
Stiles and his heirs, the remainder of John was effective 
and became possessory on the deaths of Lucy and Roger. 
If, however, the remaindermen were not ascertainable 
at the time when the statutes entitled them to posses-
sion, the remainder failed. 75 If Andrew Baker devised 
land to Lucy Baker for life, remainder to Roger White 
for life, remainder to John Stiles for life, remainder in 
fee to the issue of John Stiles in being at the death of 
John, John's life estate was void and the remainder to 
his issue failed if he survived Lucy and Roger. 
Even if one approves of the statutes prohibiting sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation, the addi-
tional restrictions on the creation of life estates imposed 
by the statutory scheme appear unnecessary and a trap 
for the unwary conveyancer. Now that the suspension 
statutes and the other restrictions on life estates have 
been repealed, the retention of Section 21 would seem 
to have no possible justification. It, too, should be re-
pealed. 
74 Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894), Part Three, 
note 55 supra; Downing v. Birney, 117 Mich. 675, 76 N.W. 125 (1898), 
Part Three, note 49 supra; PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[24 
(1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.94 (1952) 
1s Purdy v. Hayt, 92 N.Y. 446, (1883); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. A, 1[24 (1944); Whiteside, id. See: Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 
324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922). 
CHAPTER 20 
What Suspends the 
Absolute Power of Alienation? 
SECTION 14 of Chapter 62, Revised Statutes of 1846, provided, "the absolute power of alienation 
. . . is suspended when there are no persons in be-
ing, by whom an absolute fee in possession can be con-
veyed." 76 Such suspension can be caused by (1) an in-
destructible future interest, (2) an indestructible power, 
and (3) an indestructible trust. These three forms of 
suspension will be considered in the following sections 
of this chapter. 
A. INDESTRUCTIBLE FUTURE INTERESTS 
A limitation of an indestructible future interest to a 
person or corporation not in being suspends the abso-
lute power of alienation. 77 Such a person or corporation 
cannot convey his or its interest, so "there are no per-
sons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession 
can be conveyed." If Andrew Baker devises land to 
76 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Comp. Laws (1857) §2598; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §4081; Comp. Laws (1897) §8796; How. Stat., §5530; 
Comp. Laws (1915) §11532; Comp. Laws (1929) §12934; Mich. Stat. 
Ann., §26.14; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.14. Repealed, Act 38, P.A. 
1949, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 {2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. 
77 2 Simes, LAw oF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §576 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ff10 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rulea: 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PRoPERTY, 
§§25.8, 25.39 (1952). Cf. Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 575, 
2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942) (Corporation not in being). Future interests 
of persons not in being are subject to sale under court order on a 
showing that the rights of interested parties would otherwise be jeop-
ardized [Part One, note 283 supra; Garrison v. Hecker, 128 Mich. 539, 
89 N.W. 642 (1901)] but this does not prevent their suspending the 
absolute power of alienation. 
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John Stiles, who has no children, for life, remainder to 
the first son of John, the absolute power of alienation 
is suspended until John has a son. Similarly, a limita-
tion of an indestructible future interest to a class, the 
membership of which may possibly include a person or 
corporation not presently in being, suspends the ab-
solute power of alienation.78 If Andrew Baker devises 
land to John Stiles for life, remainder to the children 
of John, the absolute power of alienation is suspended 
until the death of John because children who were not 
in being when the conveyance took effect may become 
members of the class. In Trufant v. Nunneley/9 a testa-
tor devised three tracts of land, each to a named child 
for the life of that child. A later clause of the will de-
vised the three tracts to "the body heirs of my said son 
and daughters, share and share alike." It was held that 
the latter limitation suspended the absolute power of 
alienation for three lives. The "body heirs" of the three 
children might include persons who came into being 
after the deaths of the first two. 
A limitation of an indestructible future interest to a 
78 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §210 
(1928); Powell & Whiteside, THE STATUTES oF THE STATE OF NEw 
YoRK CONCERNING PERPETUmEs AND RELATED MATTERS, 61 (New 
York Legislative Document (1936) No. 65 (H)]; PROPERTY REsTATE· 
MENT, App., Ch. A, 1'[10 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpe-
tuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.8, 
25.39 (1952). 
79 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895). See also: Paton v. Langley, 
50 Mich. 428, 15 N.W. 537 (1883); Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 
N.W. 156 (1891); Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 415, 67 N.W. 505 
(1896); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906); Otis v. 
Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Cary v. Toles, 210 Mich. 
30, 177 N.W. 279 (1920); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 
489 (1922); Russell v. Musson, 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927); 
Felt v. Methodist Educational Advance, 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 
(1929); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 
703 (1930); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 
760 (1932); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938). 
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person or persons so described that neither the takers 
nor the group from among whom the takers are to be 
selected are presently ascertainable suspends the abso-
lute power of alienation.80 No person or group of per-
sons (except the whole populace) can convey the future 
interest, so "there are no persons in being, by whom an 
absolute fee in possession can be conveyed." If Andrew 
Baker devises land to John Stiles for life, remainder to 
the person who is Governor of Michigan when John 
dies, the absolute power of alienation is suspended until 
the death of John. 
Vested future interests are, by their nature, owned by 
persons who are in being and ascertained. There has 
never been any doubt that a vested future interest, not 
subject to a trust, does not suspend the absolute power 
of alienation.81 
The notes of the New York revisers give the impres-
sion that they thought that a contingent future interest 
suspends the absolute power of alienation, although 
limited to a presently ascertainable living person.82 This 
would mean that the suspension statutes, like the com-
80 Leonard v. Burr, 18 N.Y. 96 at 107 (1858); PROPERTY REsTATE-
MENT, App., Ch. A, 1T10 & Ill. 3 (1944). Cf. Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 
288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929), Part Three, note 96 infra. 
&1 Toms v. Williams, 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879); Chambers v. 
Shaw, 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883) (vested interest in child en 
ventre sa mere); Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889); 
Hovey v. Nellis, 98 Mich. 374, 57 N.W. 255 (1894); Hull v. Osborn, 
151 Mich. 8, ll3 N.W. 784 (1908); Mcinerny v. Haase, 163 Mich. 
364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Kemp v. Sutton, 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 
366 (1925); Rodey v. Stotz, 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937); In re 
Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. (2d) 108 (1947). The state-
ment in the text should be read with the qualification that a limitation 
to a class which may open to admit persons not presently in being or 
not presently ascertainable suspends the absolute power of alienation 
although the interests of those members of the class who are in 
being and ascertained are vested. Part Three, notes 78, 79, supra. 
It is not the vested interests which cause the suspension, however, so 
the statement in the text is literally accurate. 
82 Part Three, note 6 supra. 
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mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities, prohibited remote-
ness of vesting as such. Because contingent future inter-
ests were inalienable at common law,83 their existence 
did suspend the absolute power of alienation. But con-
tingent future interests are alienable under the New 
York and Michigan statutes,S4 so the existence of such 
an interest does not prevent conveyance of an "absolute 
fee in possession" if all possible takers are ascertained 
living persons. If Andrew Baker conveys land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot Building 
stands, remainder to John Stiles and his heirs, the inter-
est of John is contingent, but James and John are "per-
sons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession can 
be conveyed." Similarly, if Andrew Baker devises land 
to John Stiles, who has four sons, for life, remainder to 
that son of John now living who makes the best grades 
in college, the remainder is contingent until all of John's 
living sons finish college, but John and his four sons are 
"persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in posses-
sion can be conveyed." 
The New York Revised Statutes of 1829 contained 
two provisions which expressly prohibited remoteness 
of vesting. Sections 20 and 24 provided, 
"§20. A contingent remainder shall not be created 
on a term of years, unless the nature of the contingency 
on which it is limited, be such that the remainder must 
vest in interest, during the continuance of not more than 
two lives in being at the creation of such remainder, or 
upon the termination thereof. 
"§24. - - - a fee may be limited on a fee, upon a 
sa Part One, note 359 supra. 
84 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part II, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §85; Part 
One, note 371 supra. 
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contingency, which, if it should occur, must happen 
within the period prescribed in this Article." 85 
Accordingly, it has been held in New York that a 
future interest in fee limited on a fee is void unless cer-
tain to vest within the statutory period, even though 
it is limited to an ascertained living person who could 
convey it.86 This is not because such a future interest 
suspends the absolute power of alienation, but because 
Section 24 of the New York statute so provided. The 
quoted portion of Section 24 was not adopted in Michi-
gan; the only provision against remoteness of vesting, 
as such, in the Michigan statutory scheme being that of 
Section 20. 
In several of the earlier cases, the Michigan Supreme 
Court fell into the same error as the New York revisers 
by deeming suspension of the absolute power of aliena-
tion synonymous with suspension of vesting. Thus in 
Toms v. Williams/7 Chief Justice Campbell said, 
85 N.Y. Rev. Stat. 1829, Part II, Ch. I, Tit. II, Art. First, §§20, 24; 
Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §20, Comp. Laws (1857) §2604; Comp. Laws 
(1871) §4087; Comp. Laws (1897) §8802; How. Stat., §5536; Comp. 
Laws (1915) §11538; Comp. Laws (1929) §12940; Mich. Stat. Ann., 
§26.20; Comp. Laws (1948) §554.20. Repealed, Act. 38, P.A. 1949, 
Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. The 
quoted portion of Section 24 was not adopted in Michigan. It is 
arguable that the provision of Section 23 (Part Three, note I supra) 
that "the absolute ownership of a term of years, shall not be suspended 
for a longer period than the absolute power of alienation can be 
suspended, in respect to a fee," prohibited remote vesting of future 
interests in chattels real. See: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 
ff53 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumu-
lations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.40 (1952). 
86 Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288, 87 N.W. 497 (1909) (shifting 
interest); Walker v. Marcellus and Otisco Lake Ry. Co., 226 N.Y. 
347, 123 N.E. 736 (1919) (springing interest); 2 Simes, LAW OF FuTURE 
INTERESTS, §567 (1936). 
87 41 Mich. 552, at 562, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). Quoted with approval 
in Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8 at 13, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). There is 
similar confusion of suspension of the absolute power of alienation 
with suspension of vesting in the opinion in Mcinerny v. Haase, 
163 Mich. 364 at 368, 128 N.W. 215 (1910). See also opinion of 
Champlin, J., in Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355 at 385-386, 36 N.W. 
419 (1888). 
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"The statutes restricting perpetuities are confined to 
avoiding future estates that are made more remote in 
their vesting than two lives in being, and such arrange-
ments as serve to postpone them. In all cases where the 
application of the rules against perpetuities is invoked, 
the character of the interest as vested or otherwise is the 
turning consideration. Revisor's note to Part 2, Ch. 1, 
New York Revised Statutes." 
In one case, State v. Holmes188 the erroneous notion 
that a limitation of a contingent future interest to an 
ascertained person suspends the absolute power of aliena-
tion controlled the decision. There the residue of an 
estate was devised to the testator's wife for life, re-
mainder, if the State of Michigan should accept and by 
due enactment within five years after the death of the 
wife erect a public educational or charitable institution 
on the devised land, to the State, otherwise to the testa-
tor's grandson. The Court held both limitations in re-
mainder void, saying that a condition precedent sus-
pends the absolute power of alienation and that all of 
the parties together could not convey an absolute fee in 
possession until the performance of the condition or 
the expiration of five years after the widow's death, a 
period in gross not permitted by Section 15.89 This de-
cision was unsound. The limitations in remainder did 
suspend vesting for a period which might extend five 
years beyond a life in being, but the alternative con-
tingent remainders of the State and the grandson were 
88 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898). The decision might be de-
fended under the ancient rule that when property was conveyed to a 
public or charitable corporation with a restriction, express or implied, 
to use for a public or charitable purpose, the corporation was incap-
able of alienating the property. Part One, note 219 supra. The 
difficulty with this theory is that it would have made all limitations of 
present vested interests to public and charitable corporations illegally 
suspend the absolute power of alienation, which they did not. Part 
Two, notes 396-400, supra. 
89 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
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alienable, so they could unite to convey an absolute fee 
in possession from the moment of the widow's death. 
Indeed, the absolute power of alienation was not even 
suspended during the widow's lifetime, since she could 
join the State and the grandson in a conveyance of the 
fee. 
The later Michigan decisions make it clear that a con-
tingent future interest does not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation if there are persons in being who 
can unite to convey an absolute fee in possession; that 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation is not 
synonymous with suspension of vesting.00 This was first 
clearly recognized in Torpy v. Betts/1 where land was 
devised to the testator's widow for life, remainder to her 
son Frank in fee, on condition that he or his representa-
tives pay $500 to her daughter Grace or her legal rep-
resentatives. As the Court observed, even if the pro-
vision for payment of $500 was a condition precedent to 
the vesting of the remainder which might be performed 
at a time beyond two lives in being, Frank and Grace 
or their issue could convey an absolute fee in possession 
after the death of their mother. The opinion stated, "if 
an estate must go to persons irl! esse, the power of aliena-
tion would never be suspended, as, by joining, the own-
ers of the various estates could always convey the fee." 92 
In Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids,93 a testatrix devised 
9o 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §576 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1f53 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
§25.40 (1952). See: Brake, "Satisfying Michigan's Perpetuity Rules,'' 
5 UNIV. OF DETROIT L.J. 160 at 176 (1942). 
91 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900). There were alternative 
contingent limitations of the remainder in the event of Frank's prede-
ceasing his mother without surviving issue (I) to Grace, (2) if Grace 
predeceased her mother without surviving issue, as .the mother should 
appoint. 
92 123 Mich. 239 at 243. 
93 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900). 
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her homestead to her executor to convey to the city, if 
it would agree to maintain a free public library thereon 
forever, such conveyance to be subject to a provision that 
if the premises were used for other purposes or not used 
for library purposes for three years, the land should ''re-
vert" to named legatees. If the city should not agree to 
those terms, the executor was directed to sell the land 
and pay the proceeds to the named legatees. These pro-
visions were held valid, the Court saying, "If there are 
in existence persons who, by joining in a conveyance or 
by successive releases, are able to pass the whole estate, 
the requirements of the statute are met." 94 This decision 
would seem to overrule that in State v. H olmes/5 where 
the limitations were virtually identical. 
In Russell v. Mussont,96 land was devised to Guy and 
Clara, his wife, jointly, for their lives, remainder to the 
children of Guy surviving him. After the deaths of Guy 
and Clara, if Guy died without children, the land was 
devised to Josiah and Hannah in equal shares in fee, 
charged with support of their mother. If Josiah or Han-
nah should die without issue, his share was to pass to 
the survivor, and if both should die without issue, the 
94123 Mich. 281 at 283. In Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, at 
534, 211 N.W. 62 (1926) it was held that a perpetual option to pur-
chase did not suspend the absolute power of alienation, "because at 
all times there were persons in being by whom an absolute fee in 
possession could have been conveyed." 
9s Part Three, note 88 supra. 
96 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927). In Moss v. Axford, 246 
Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 425 (1929), testatrix devised the residue of her 
estate to her executor "with the instructions to pay the same to the 
person who has given me the best care in my declining years and who 
in his opinion is the most worthy of my said property." This prob-
ably suspended vesting until the executor designated the residuary 
legatee and no measuring lives were specified, but it was held valid, the 
Court saying, "The will provided no restriction on alienation. The 
beneficiary, whoever it might be, was in being, and she and the trustee 
could have conveyed an absolute fee at any time." This was correct 
if it be assumed that the class of persons from which the executor 
could select was ascertainable. 
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land was to pass to their mother, Sarah, in fee. This dis-
position of the ultimate remainder suspended vesting for 
three lives, those of Guy, Josiah, and Hannah, but it was 
held valid because it did not suspend the absolute power 
of alienation beyond the life of Guy. On his death Clara 
and his children could convey a fee or, if there were no 
children, Clara, Josiah, Hannah, and Sarah could to-
gether convey an absolute fee in possession. 
Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker 97 involved the validity 
of a will which devised land to the testatrix's husband 
until his death or remarriage, remainder to a trustee to 
convert the land into money and hold the money on trust 
for various persons. In holding that the direction to con-
vert prevented suspension of the absolute power of alien-
ation for more than one life, the Qourt said, 
"It must be kept in mind that, while the rule against 
perpetuities applies to future interests in both real and 
personal property, it has nothing to do with the statutory 
prohibition against suspension of power of alienation. 
The rule requires vesting of estates within a period, 
while the statute prohibits inalienability beyond a 
period; the rule is a restraint only upon future interests 
and has no concern with present interests; the statute 
reaches vested estates in real property but shorn of alien-
ability." 98 
In Rodey v. Stotz/9. a will provided that the testator's 
nephew Adolph should have the use, income benefit, 
and control of property devised to Adolph's children 
until the youngest of the children attained the age of 
twenty-one, and that the testator's nephew Fred should 
have like enjoyment of property devised to Fred's chil-
97 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924). 
98 226 Mich. 72 at 76-77. Quoted with approval in Gardner v. City 
National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270 at 287, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). 
99 280 Mich. 90, 273 N.W. 404 (1937). 
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dren until the youngest of these attained the age of 
twenty-one. Subject to these provisions, all the property 
was devised to four named children of Adolph and four 
named children of Fred, share and share alike. The 
Court, in holding that the remainders vested in the eight 
children of the nephews on the death of the testator and 
that the dispositions were fully valid, said, 
"There is no suspension of the power of alienation 
when there are ascertainable persons in being, who to-
gether can convey an absolute fee or interest in possession 
and this whether their interests are vested or contin-
gent---. 
"---The question, however, is raised whether 3 Comp. 
Laws 1929, §§12934, 12935, 100 lay down a rule as to 
remoteness of vesting in addition to a rule regarding the 
suspension of the power of alienation. This question is 
raised and answered in 2 Simes, Future Interests, p.48l, 
in which it is stated: 
" 'Is the power of alienation illegally suspended if 
there is a contingent future interest which may not vest 
within lives in being, even though there is a group of 
ascertained persons who may alienate in fee simple ab-
solute? In other words, do these statutes lay down, not 
merely a rule as to the legal power of alienation, but also 
a rule as to remoteness of vesting? While the matter is 
not free from doubt, it would seem that the statutes are 
not regarded as announcing any rule as to remoteness of 
vesting.' " 101 
As has been seen, because courts of equity will compel 
specific performance of irrevocable options concerning 
land, an option to purchase land or to renew a lease is, 
in reality, an equitable future interest which is contin-
gent upon notice and payment of the price or rent.102 As 
the optionor and optionee can unite to convey an ab-
1oo Rev. Stat. 1846. c. 62, §§14, 15, Part Three, note 1 supra. 
101 280 Mich. 90 at 95, 99-100. 
102 Part Two, notes 362, 364, supra. 
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solute fee in possession, an option does not suspend the 
absolute power of alienation within the meaning of Sec-
tion 14.108 Section 20, however, prohibited a contingent 
remainder on a term of years unless the nature of the 
contingency was such that the remainder must vest in 
interest within two lives in being.1(}4 Moreover, Section 
24 of the New York statute prohibited a contingent lim-
itation on a fee upon a contingency which might not 
occur within the statutory period.105 It is arguable that 
an option to renew a lease is a contingent remainder 
on a term of years within the meaning of Section 20 and 
that an option to purchase the fee is a contingent limita-
tion of a fee on a fee. Nevertheless, in both New York 
and Michigan, options to purchase and to renew leases, 
not limited in duration to two lives in being, were held 
valid.106 
Reversions are vested future interests.107 Possibilities 
of reverter and rights of entry on breach of condition 
subsequent are, in some sense, contingent future inter-
ests.108 These interests do not suspend the absolute power 
of alienation because they are always held by living per-
sons who can unite with the owner of the fee subject to 
1 oa Part Three, notes I, 76, supra. Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PowER 
OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §179 (1928). 
1o4 Part Three, note 85 supra. 
1o5 Idem. 
1os Option to purchase fee: Matter of City of New York, 246 N.Y. l, 
549, 157 N.E. 911, 159 N.E. 646 (1927), cert. den., 276 U.S. 603 (1928), 
Part Two, note 370 supra; Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 
N.W. 62 (1926), Part Two, note 369 supra; Michigan cases cited in 
Part Two, notes 370, 372, supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 
1[12 (1944). Option to renew lease: Burns v. City of New York, 213 
N.Y. 516, 108 N.E. 77 (1915); Stender v. Kerreos, 156 Mich. 499, 121 
N.W. 258 (1909), Part Two, note 375 supra; Gould v. Harley, 215 
Mich. 234, 183 N.W. 705 (1921), Part Two, note 377 supra; Michigan 
cases cited in Part Two, note 373 supra; Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE 
PowER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §396 (1928). 
101 Part Two, note 332 supra. 
1os Part Two, notes 336, 342, supra. 
POWER OF ALIENATION 515 
them to convey an absolute fee in possession.109 Mort-
gages and land contracts do not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation so long as the parties thereto can join 
to convey an absolute fee in possession.110 
It would seem that the absolute power of alienation 
is not suspended, within the meaning of Section 14, by a 
limitation of a present or future interest, otherwise alien-
able, to a person who, by reason of some personal in-
capacity, such as infancy or insanity, does not have nor-
mal power to convey land.m At common law, when 
property was conveyed to a public or charitable corpora-
tion with a restriction, express or implied, to use for the 
corporate purposes or some of them, the corporation was 
incapable of alienating the property.112 A literal applica-
tion of Sections 14 and 15 113 might make void all such 
conveyances in mortmain. Yet direct conveyances and 
devises of land to public and charitable corporations for 
corporate purposes have always been valid in both New 
York and Michigan/14 probably because the power to 
receive and hold land for their corporate purposes con-
ferred upon such corporations by statute was looked 
1oD Part Two, notes 339, 346, 347, supra; Chaplin, SusPENSION OF 
THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§182, 212, 213, 392-394 (1928); 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.9. 
110 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§214, 
215 (1928). 
111 Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 987 (1912) 
(minor); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§§47, 49, 50 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and 
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.7, 25.39 (1952). 
112 Part One, note 219 supra. 
113 Part Three, notes 1, 76, supra. 
114 Bird v. Merklee, 144 N.Y. 544, 39 N.E. 645 (1895); Michigan 
cases cited in Part Two, notes 396-400, supra; Chaplin, SusPENSION OF 
THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §510 (1928); PROPERTY REsTATE-
MENT, App., Ch. B, ~55 (1944). A direct conveyance or devise to a 
charitable corporation must be distinguished from a charitable trust, 
which received very different treatment under the statutes. Part Two, 
note 406 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ~55 (1944). 
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upon as exempting interests limited to them from the 
operation of the suspension statutes. Michigan legisla-
tion of 1907 and later made it clear that such disposi-
tions were not invalidated by the suspension statutes.115 
Section 14 provided, "Every future estate shall be void 
in its creation, which shall suspend the absolute power 
of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in 
this chapter; - - -." 116 This made it clear that a future 
interest which violated the suspension statutes, like a 
future interest which violated the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities, was wholly void, not merely invalid 
as to the excess.117 The effect of such invalidity on the 
title to the property in which the void interest was 
limited and upon other limitations in the same convey-
ance or will was the same as the effect of an interest being 
invalid under the common-law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties.118 This being so, the consequences of violation of 
the suspension statutes and those of violation of the com-
mon-law Rule have been treated together in Chapter 
17. 
B. POWERS 
(1) Powers Which Cause Suspension 
The Michigan law of powers over land was codified 
by Chapter 64 of the Revised Statutes of 1846,119 which 
us Part Two, notes 400, 421, 423, 427, 428, supra. 
116 Part Three, notes I, 76, supra. 
117 2 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §566 (1936). 
118 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!1!40, 70 (1944). 
119 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2658 to 2719; Comp. 
Laws (1871) §§4141 to 4202; Comp Laws (1897) §§8856 to 8917; How. 
Stat., §§5590 to 5651; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11592 to 11653; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §§12995 to 13056; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.91 to 26.152; 
Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.1 to 556.62. The following sections are 
pertinent to the present discussion. 
"§2. A power is an authority to do some act in relation to lands, 
or the creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon, which the 
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owner granting or reserving such power, might himself lawfully 
perform. 
§4. Powers, as authorized in this chapter, are general or special, 
and beneficial or in trust. 
§5. A power is general, when it authorizes the alienation in fee, 
by means of a conveyance, will or charge of the land embraced 
in the power, to any alienee whatever. 
§6. A power is special, 
1. When the person or class of persons, to whom the disposition 
of the lands under the power is to be made, are designated: 
2. When the power authorizes the alienation, by means of a 
conveyance, will or charge, of a particular estate or interest less 
than a fee. 
§7. A general or special power is beneficial when no person 
other than the grantee has, by the terms of its creation, any inter-
est in its execution. 
§22. A general power is in trust when any person or class of 
persons, other than the grantee of such power, is designated as 
entitled to the proceeds, or any portion of the proceeds or other 
benefits to arise from the alienation of the lands, according to 
the power. 
§23. A special power is in trust, 
1. When the disposition which it authorizes, is limited to be 
made to any particular person or class of persons, other than the 
grantee of such power: 
2. When any person or class of persons, other than the grantee, 
is entitled to any benefit from the disposition or charge authorized 
by the power. 
§24. Every trust power, unless its execution or non-execution 
is made expressly to depend on the will of the grantee, is impera-
tive, and imposes a duty on the grantee, the performance of which 
may be compelled in equity for the benefit of the parties in-
terested. 
§25. A trust power does not cease to be imperative when the 
grantee has the right to select any, and exclude others of the 
persons designated as the objects of the trust. 
§26. When a disposition under a power is directed to be made 
to, or among, or between several persons, without any specification 
of the share or sum to be allotted to each, all the persons desig-
nated shall be entitled to an equal proportion. 
§27. But when the terms of the power import that the estate or 
fund is to be distributed between the persons so designated, in 
such manner or proportions as the trustee of the power may think 
proper, the trustee may allot the whole to any one or more of 
such persons, in exclusion of the others. 
§28. If the trustee of a power, with the right of selection, shall 
die leaving the power unexecuted, its execution shall be decreed 
in the court of chancery for the benefit equally of all the persons 
designated as objects of the trust. 
§29. When a power in trust is created by will, and the testator 
has omitted to designate by whom the power is to be executed, 
its execution shall devolve on the court of chancery. 
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was adopted from the New York Revised Statutes of 
1829 120 and is still in force. This codification differs 
from the common-law rules 121 as to terminology m and, 
to a lesser extent, as to substance. Whereas at common 
law the term "power in trust" is equivalent to "impera-
tive power," the statutes extend the term "power in 
trust" to include all powers which are not beneficial sole-
ly to the donee and all powers under which the donee 
cannot appoint to himself or his estate. The most im-
§33. The grantor in any conveyance may reserve to himself 
any power, beneficial or in trust, which he might lawfully grant 
to another; and every power so reserved, shall be subject to the 
provisions of this chapter, in the same manner as if granted to 
another. 
§36. Every power, beneficial or in trust, is irrevocable, unless an 
authority to revoke it is reserved or granted in the instrument 
creating the power. 
§47. When the conditions annexed to a power are merely 
nominal, and evince no intention of actual benefit to the party 
to whom, or in whose favor they are to be performed, they may 
be wholly disregarded in the execution of the power. 
§48. With the exceptions contained in the preceding sections, 
the intentions of the grantor of a power, as to the mode, time 
and conditions of its execution shall be observed, subject to the 
power of a court of chancery to supply a defective execution, in 
the cases hereinafter provided." 
120 Part II, c. I, Tit. II, Art. Third. 
121 That is, non-statutory law. Most of the law of powers is of 
equitable origin. I Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §245 (1936). 
122 1 Simes, LAw OF FuTURE INTERESTS, §292 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §320, Comment e., special Note (1948 Supp.); 3 Walsh, 
LAw OF REAL PRoPERTY, §321 (1947), quoting the notes of the New 
York revisers, which make it clear that the changes in terminology were 
deliberate. Whereas at common law the term "general power'' in-
cludes any power unlimited as to objects (possible appointees), the 
statutes (Sec. 5) restrict that term to powers to alienate the entire fee. 
Whereas at common law the term "special power" is restricted to 
powers limited as to objects, the statutes (§6) extend that term to all 
powers to alienate less than a fee. Whereas at common law the term 
"power in trust" is equivalent to "imperative power," the statutes 
(§§22, 23) include some powers which are not imperative in their 
definition of powers in trust. The statutes refer to the holder of a 
power as the "grantee" (§62), whereas at common law the holder of a 
power of appointment is usually referred to as the "donee." For the 
common-law terminology, see 1 Simes, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§§246, 247 (1936); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §§319, 320 (1940). 
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portant difference in substance is that every power which 
the statutes denominate a "power in trust" 123 is impera-
tive unless its execution is made expressly to depend on 
the will of the donee. 124 An imperative power is one 
which the donee has a duty, enforcible in equity, to ex-
ecute. At common law the rule is less rigid; although a 
power limited as to objects is presumptively imperative 
if there is no gift in default of appointment, express lan-
guage is not required to rebut the presumption.125 
There is very little Michigan case authority as to the 
application of the suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation statutes to powers. The New York cases can-
not be relied upon because of two important differences 
between the New York and Michigan statutes. First, the 
New York suspension statutes apply to both land and 
personalty, whereas the Michigan suspension statutes 
were restricted to land.126 Second, the New York suspen-
sion statutes were interpreted to restrict suspension of 
vesting as well as suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation, whereas the Michigan statutes were inter-
preted as restricting only the latter.127 Because the New 
York statutes, like the common-law Rule Against Per-
petuities, restrict suspension of vesting, they prohibit 
powers which operate in such manner as to suspend vest-
ing for longer than the statutory permissible period. 
Hence all powers which would violate the common-law 
12s §§22, 23, note 119 supra. 
124 §24, note 119 supra. In Waterman v. New York Life Insurance 
& Trust Co., 237 N.Y. 293, 142 N.E. 668 (1923), it was held that a 
power to appoint "to such one of my nephews of my own blood as 
she may by her will direct" was not imperative. 
125 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §367 (1940); Simes, "Powers in Trust 
and the Termination of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 63 (1927); 
Callahan and Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §23.63 (1952). 
126 Part Three, notes 7, 8, supra. 
121 Part Three, notes 12, 86, 90-94, 96-99, supra. 
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Rule also violate the New York statutes.128 But all such 
powers did not violate the Michigan statutes. In Mich-
igan the sole guide is Section 14 of Chapter 62 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1846, which provided that the absolute 
power of alienation is suspended, "when there are no 
persons in being, by whom an absolute fee in possession 
can be conveyed." 129 If a power operated to suspend the 
absolute power of alienation, as so defined, for longer 
than the statutory permissible period, it was void. It 
would seem that a power itself, as distinguished from in-
terests appointed under the power and interests limited 
in default of its exercise, suspends the absolute power of 
alienation in the following situations: 
Class (a) Donee not in being or not ascertainable. If 
the power is limited to a person or corporation not in 
being, to a class the membership of which may possibly 
include a person or corporation not presently in being, 
or to a donee or donees so described that neither the 
donees nor the group from among whom the donees are 
to be selected are presently ascertainable, and the power 
cannot be revoked, released, or overridden by ascertain-
able persons in being, the power suspends the absolute 
power of alienation.130 If Andrew Baker devised land to 
12s The application of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities to 
powers of appointment is covered in Chapter 13, Sec. B, supra. The 
application of the New York suspension statutes to powers is dis-
cussed in detail in Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 
3rd ed., §§306-363 (1928), and more briefly in PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. A (1944); 3 Walsh, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §349 (1947), 
and Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.13 (1952). 
129 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
1ao Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich. 531 (1853), involved a will which em-
powered the "executors or administrators" to sell land for the bene-
fit of named legatees, but named no executors. It was held that the 
power was valid and exercisable by administrators cum testamento 
annexo, but the opinion suggests that such a power given to adminis-
trators for their own benefit would violate the suspension statutes 
because it would not be certain that the administrators would be ascer-
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James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to a power in the 
first son of John Stiles (who had no son) to appoint the 
fee by deed or will to any person or persons, the power 
would suspend the absolute power of alienation until 
John had a son or died. Similarly, if Andrew Baker de-
vised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to a 
power in the children of John Stiles (who had five chil-
dren) who survive him to appoint the fee by deed or will 
to any person or persons, the power would suspend the 
absolute power of alienation until the class of donees 
was closed by the death of John. Likewise, if Andrew 
Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, sub-
ject to a power in the person who should be Governor 
of Michigan in the year 1984 to appoint the fee by deed 
or will to any person or persons, the power would sus-
pend the absolute power of alienation until 1984. The 
examples given involve powers beneficial solely to the 
donee. Class (a) also includes what the statutes term 
powers in trust, but the beneficiaries of a power in trust 
would be able to override it unless it also falls into Class 
(b) or (c) below. 
Class (b) Beneficiaries not in being or not ascertain-
able. If the power is in trust, as that term is defined by 
the statutes, is not presently exercisable for the sole bene-
fit of ascertainable persons in being, and the beneficiaries 
are a person or corporation not in being, a class the mem-
bership of which may possibly include a person or cor-
poration not presently in being, or persons so described 
that neither they nor the group from among whom they 
tainable within two lives. Both the decision and the dictum are 
consistent with the rule stated in the text. The actual power involved 
in the case could be overridden by the named legatees, who were ascer-
tainable persons in being, so it did not fall into Class (a). If, however, 
the administrators had been the beneficiaries of the power as well as 
its donees, the power would have fallen into Classes (a) and (b). 
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are to be selected are presently ascertainable, and the 
power cannot be revoked, released or overriden by as-
certainable persons in being, the power suspends the 
absolute power of alienation.131 If Andrew Baker de-
vised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to an 
imperative power in John Stiles (who had no son) to 
appoint the fee to his first son, the power would suspend 
the absolute power of alienation until John had a son. 
Similarly, if Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe 
and his heirs, subject to an imperative power in John 
Stiles (who has five children) to appoint the fee by will 
to those of his children who survive him, the power 
would suspend the absolute power of alienation until the 
class of objects was closed by the death of John. Like-
wise, if Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe 
and his heirs, subject to an imperative power in John 
Stiles to appoint the fee to some member of the Michigan 
Legislature of 1983, the power would suspend the ab-
solute power of alienation until 1983. 
The three examples just given, as falling in Class (b), 
are of imperative powers of appointment limited as to 
object. Class (b) also includes imperative powers to sell, 
lease, charge, or encumber land when any person or class 
of persons other than the donee "is designated as entitled 
to the proceeds, or any portion of the proceeds or other 
1a1 Trufant v. Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895) (im-
perative power to purchase land and convey a remainder therein to 
a class of persons which could not be ascertained for three lives and 
might include persons who came into being after two lives). In Moss 
v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224, N.W. 425 (1929), the residue of an 
estate was devised to the executor, "with the instructions to pay the 
same to the person who has given me the best care in my declining 
years and who in his opinion is the most worthy of my said property." 
It was held that the power did not suspend the absolute power of 
alienation. It did suspend vesting but the group from among whom 
the beneficiary was to be selected consisted of ascertainable persons 
in being who could join with the executor to convey an absolute fee 
in possession. See also the preceding note. 
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benefits to arise from the alienation of the lands" or 
"from the disposition or charge authorized by the 
power." 132 If Andrew Baker devised land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs, subject to an imperative power in 
John Stiles (who had no son) to mortgage for $5,000 to 
pay for the education of his first son, the power would 
suspend the absolute power of alienation. Similarly, if 
Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his 
heirs, subject to an imperative power in John Stiles (who 
had no son) to sell the fee when his first son reached the 
age of eighteen and use the proceeds of such sale to pay 
for the education of such son, the power would suspend 
the absolute power of alienation. Because the Michigan 
suspension statutes were limited to land, Class (b) has 
an exception: an imperative power to sell the entire fee 
for money or exchange it for personalty, presently exer-
cisable, would not suspend the absolute power of aliena-
tion even though the beneficiaries of the proceeds were 
not in being or not ascertainable. Such a power would 
work an immediate equitable conversion of the land into 
personalty, so the suspension statutes would not apply.133 
If Andrew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his 
heirs, subject to an imperative power in John Stiles (who 
had no son) to sell the fee at once and hold the proceeds 
in trust for James and his heirs until John's first son 
reached the age of eighteen, then to use the proceeds to 
pay for the education of such son, the power would not 
suspend the absolute power of alienation for a moment, 
even though John, with the consent of James, chose to 
delay effectuating the sale. 
132 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§22, 23, Part Three, note 119 supra. 
That is, if it is an imperative "power in trust" as this term is defined 
by the statutes. 
133 Part Three, notes 9 supra, 197 infra. 
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Class (c) Power to create a trust. If the power is in 
trust, as that term is defined by the statutes, and calls 
for the creation or prolongation of a trust which would 
itself suspend the absolute power of alienation, and the 
power cannot be revoked, released, or overridden by 
ascertainable persons in being, the power suspends the 
absolute power of alienation.134 As will be made clear 
in Section C below, a trust for receipt of the rents and 
profits of land suspends the absolute power of alienation 
because, by statute, the interests of the trustee and the 
cestui que trust are inalienable. Hence an imperative 
power to create such a trust also suspends the absolute 
power of alienation. If Andrew Baker devised land to 
James Thorpe and his heirs, subject to an imperative 
power in John Stiles to create a trust of the land for 
application of the rents and profits to the support of 
Lucy Stiles, present wife of John, for the life of Lucy, 
the power would suspend the absolute power of aliena-
tion for the life of Lucy. 
It would seem that powers not included in one or 
more of these three classes did not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation under Michigan law. A power was 
not within any of these classes if it could be revoked, 
released, or overridden by ascertainable persons in be-
ing because, in those cases, there were "persons in being, 
by whom an absolute fee in possession" could be con-
veyed, despite the power, within the meaning of Sec-
tion 14 of Chapter 62.135 The statutes expressly pro-
vided that "Every power, beneficial or in trust, is irrevoc-
able, unless an authority to revoke it is reserved or 
134 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§342 (1928). See: Garvey v. McDevitt, 72 N.Y. 556 (1878). 
135 Part Three, note 1 supra. 
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granted in the instrument creating the power." 136 The 
beneficiaries of a power may override it, that is, convey 
free of it, if they are all in being and ascertained and 
their interests are not inalienable because subject to a 
trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land.131 If 
Andrew Baker devised Blackacre to James Thorpe and 
his heirs, subject to an imperative power in John Stiles 
to appoint the fee to any one of his brothers, Thomas, 
Richard, and Henry, when and if James Thorpe or his 
heirs should inherit Whiteacre, James, John, Thomas, 
Richard, and Henry are persons in being who could 
presently convey an absolute fee in possession. Express 
provisions of the instrument creating the power could 
enable less than all the beneficiaries to override it. Thus, 
in the second example given in Class (b) above, if An-
1as Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §36, Part Three, note 119 supra. Accord, 
at common law: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §337 (I) (1940); Callahan 
and Leach, "Powers of Appointment," 5 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§23.31 (1952). 
1a1 Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich. 531 (1853), Part Three, note 130 supra; 
Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900); 
Part Three, note 93 supra; Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 
425 (1929), Part Three, note 131 supra; Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N.Y. I 
(1877); Trask v. Sturges, 170 N.Y. 482, 63 N.E. 534 (1902); PROPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, §338 (1940); Callahan and Leach, "Powers of Appoint-
ment," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §23.32 (1952); Whiteside, "Sta-
tutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF 
PROPERTY, §25.13n (1952). See: Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526 at 
538, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). Cf. State v. Holmes, II5 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 
548 (1898), Part Three, note 88 supra. In Matter of Butterfield, 133 
N.Y. 473, sub nom. In re Christie, 31 N.E. 515 (1892), where a testator 
devised land to his children in fee, subject to an imperative power in 
the executrix, not to be exercised until all of his children, five of 
whom were minors, should reach their majority, to sell the land for 
payment of debts and legacies. It was held that, because of the New 
York equivalent of Rev. stat. 1846, c. 64, §48, Part Three, note II9 
supra, the power could not be overridden by the beneficiaries (i.e., 
the creditors and legatees, who were ascertained persons in being) 
because it was on the express condition that it should not be exercised 
until a future time. Consequently, the power suspended the absolute 
power of alienation for longer than the permissible period. It would 
seem that Sec. 48 does not really relate to the problem of overriding 
and that the decision is unsound. 
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drew Baker devised land to James Thorpe and his heirs, 
subject to an imperative power in John Stiles (who has 
five children) to appoint the fee by will to those of his 
children who survive him, the power would not suspend 
the absolute power of alienation if the will further pro-
vided, "but such power may be overridden during the 
life of John by his children in being at the time of such 
over-riding." 
Class (a) comprises powers limited to a donee who is 
not in being or not ascertainable. Such a power cannot 
be released by the donee. Classes (b) and (c) comprise 
powers in trust, which term under the statutes includes 
all powers which are not beneficial solely to the donee 
and all powers under which the donee cannot appoint to 
himself or his estate. As has been seen, under the 
statutes, a power in trust is imperative unless its execu-
tion is made expressly to depend on the will of the donee. 
At common law an imperative power cannot be released 
by the donee/'38 and there is no doubt that this was also 
the rule under Chapter 64 of the Revised Statutes of 
1846. There is a conflict of authority at common law 
as to whether and under what circumstances a power 
limited as to objects which is not imperative may be 
released by the donee/39 and there is grave doubt on 
138 1 Simes, LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, §281 (1936); PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, §335 (1940) and 1948 Supp.; Simes, "Powers in Trust and 
the Termination of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 211 at 216 
(1927). 
1s9 1 Simes, LAW OF FuTuRE INTERESTS, §§283, 284 (1936); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, §335 (1940), as changed by 1948 Supp.; 3 Walsh, LAW 
OF REAL PROPERTY, §334 (1947); Callahan and Leach, "Powers of Ap-
pointment," 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§23.27, 23.28 (1952); 
Annotation, 76 A.L.R. 1430 (1932); Simes, "Powers in Trust and the 
Release of Powers by the Donee," 37 YALE L.J. 211 (1927); Ball, "Re-
lease of Powers of Appointment for Federal Estate Tax Purposes," 4 
ARK. L. REv. 66 (1949-50). Prior to 1881 the English rule seems to 
have been that such powers were releasable if the donee had a pos-
sessory estate in the land in addition to the power but not otherwise. 
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the question of whether the donee of a power which is 
in trust, within the statutory meaning of that term, but 
not imperative, could release the power under the New 
York and Michigan statutes.140 Act 296 of the Public 
Acts of 1945 141 provides that the donee of a power, 
including a power in trust, may release the power. It 
follows that powers in trust created between May 25, 
1945, the effective date of Act 296, and September 23, 
1949, the effective date of the repeal of the suspension 
statutes, were releasable if the donee was in being and 
ascertainable. This means that no power created after 
May 24, 1945, fell into Classes (b) or (c). Act 296 pur-
Stat. 44 & 45 Viet., c. 41, §52, (1881), re-enacted, 15 Geo. V, c. 20, §155 
(1925) permits release in either case. Professor Simes thinks that all 
non-imperative powers are releasable. The Restatement originally took 
the position that powers limited as to objects were releasable only if 
the donor manifested an intention to that effect or if the power is 
presently exercisable (i.e. not testamentary or subject to a condition 
precedent) and the takers in default are persons to whom an effective 
appointment could be made. It now takes the view that such powers 
can be released unless the donor has manifested a contrary intent. 
It takes no position as to the effect of such a manifestation where the 
power is not imperative. 
Ho Chase National Bank v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 155 Misc. 
61, 279 N.Y. Supp. 327 (1935), aff'd., 246 App. Div. 201, 284 N.Y. 
Supp. 472 (1935), aff'd., 271 N.Y. 602, 659, 3 N.E. (2d) 205, 475 (1936). 
The Appellate Division held that such a power could not be released. 
The Court of Appeals refused to pass on the question because the 
donee of the power subsequently died without attempting to exercise 
it. In Merrill v. Lynch, 13 N.Y. Supp. (2d) 514 at 532-533 (Sup. Ct. 
Spec. Term, 1939) it was suggested that the view of the Appellate 
Division was unsound. The fact that Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §17, Part 
Three, note 119 supra, expressly authorizes a tenant for life with power 
to make leases for years to release the power to any person entitled to 
an expectant estate in the land, indxcates by virtue of the maxim 
expressio unius exclusio alterius, that other powers in trust are not 
releasable. Sec .. 15 classes such a power in a tenant for life as bene-
ficial, but it is difficult to see why it does not fall under the defini-
tion of a power in trust made by Sec. 23, Part Three, note 119 supra. 
141 Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.154 (1) to 26.154 (6); Comp. Laws (1948) 
§§556.101 to 556.106. Similar statutes were enacted in a number of 
other states at about the same time. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 1948 
Supp., §335, Comment e; Simes, HANDBOOK OF FUTURE INTERESTS, 
§74 (1951). 
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ports to validate releases of powers executed before its 
effective date,142 but it would seem that retroactive ap· 
plication of the act would be unconstitutional insofar as 
it disturbed vested rights of property. 
(2) Interests Created By Execution of Powers 
An interest in land created by the donee of a power 
by execution of the power suspends the absolute power 
of alienation, within the meaning of Section 14 of Chap-
ter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846,143 in the following 
situations: 
(a) If the interest so created is an indestructible fu-
ture interest of a type which, under the rules discussed 
in Section A, above, suspends the absolute power of 
alienation. 
(b) If the interest so created is a power of a type 
which, under the rules discussed in Subsection B (1), 
above, suspends the absolute power of alienation. 
(c) If the interest so created is a trust of a type which, 
under the rules discussed in Section C, below, suspends 
the absolute power of alienation. 
In other words, the types of interests created by execu-
tion of a power which suspend the absolute power of 
alienation are exactly the same as the types of interests 
created by direct conveyance or devise which suspend 
the absolute power of alienation. The only difference 
is in the time from which the permissible period of 
suspension is computed. Whereas, in the case of an in-
terest directly conveyed or devised, the suspension ordi-
narily commences when the deed or will creating it 
142 §4, Mich. Stat. Ann., §26.154 (4); Comp. Laws (1948) §556.104. 
us Part Three, note 1 supra. 
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takes effect, 144 in the case of an interest created by execu-
tion of a power the statutes provide, 
"Sec. 55. The period during which the absolute 
right of alienation may be suspended by any instrument 
in execution of a power, shall be computed from the time 
of the creation of the power, and not from the date of 
such instrument. 
"Sec. 56. No estate or interest can be given or 
limited to any person, by an instrument in execution 
of a power, which such person would not have been 
capable of taking, under the instrument by which the 
power was granted." 145 
These statutory provisions were taken from the New 
York Revised Statutes of 1829.146 The New York Court 
of Appeals has indicated that these two sections are modi-
fied by other sections of the statutes which, as in force 
in Michigan, provide: 
"Sec. 9. When an absolute power of disposition, not 
accompanied by any trust, shall be given to the owner 
of a particular estate, for life or years, such estate shall 
be changed into a fee, absolute in respect to the rights 
144 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 41, Part Three, note 1 supra, pro-
vided, "Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation shall not be sus-
pended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a longer J.>eriod 
than during the continuance of two lives in being at the creatzon of 
the estate, ... Sec. 41. The delivery of the grant, where an expec-
tant estate is created by grant; and where it is created by devise, the 
death of the testator, shall be deemed the time of the creation of 
the estate." [Emphasis supplied.] It should be borne in mind, how-
ever, that an interest does not suspend the absolute power of alienation 
while it is destructible by virtue of the fact that there are ascertain-
able persons in being "by whom an absolute fee in possession can be 
conveyed." Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, note 1 supra. See 
Subsection (3), infra. Cf. Chapter 10, Section A, supra. 
145 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§55, 56; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2712, 2713; 
Comp. Laws (1871) §§4195, 4196; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8910, 8911; 
How. Stat., §§5644, 5645; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11646, 11647; Comp. 
Laws (1929) §§13049, 13050; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.145, 26.146; Comp. 
Laws (1948) §§556.55, 556.56. These sections are still in force. As 
to their effectiveness, since the repeal of the suspension statutes, see 
Chapter 13, Section C, supra. 
H6 Part II, c. 1, Art. Third, §§128, 129. See Part Two, note 303 
supra. 
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of creditors and purchasers, but subject to any future 
estates limited thereon, in case the power should not be 
executed, or the lands should not be sold for the satis-
faction of debts. 
"Sec. 10. When a like power of disposition shall be 
given to any person to whom no particular estate is 
limited, such person shall also take a fee, subject to 
any future estates that may be limited thereon, but 
absolute in respect to creditors and purchasers. 
"Sec. 11. In all cases where such power of disposi-
tion is given, and no remainder is limited on the estate 
of the grantee of the power, such grantee shall be en-
titled to an absolute fee. 
"Sec. 12. When a general and beneficial power to 
devise the inheritance, shall be given to a tenant for 
life or for years, such tenant shall be deemed to possess 
an absolute power of disposition, within the meaning, 
and subject to the provisions of the three last preceding 
sections. 
"Sec. 13. Every power of disposition shall be deemed 
absolute, by means of which the grantee is enabled, in 
his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own 
benefit." 147 
1.47 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 64, §§9 to 13; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2666 to 
2670; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4149 to 4153; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8864 
to 8868; How. Stat., §§5598 to 5602; Comp. Laws (1915) §§11600-
11604; Comp. Laws (1929) §§13003 to 13007; Mich. Stat. Ann., 
§§26.99-26.103; Comp. Laws (1948) §§556.9-556.13. N.Y. Rev. Stat. 
1829, Part II, Art. Third, §§81-85 were identical, except as to section 
numbers. N.Y. Real Property Law, §§149 to 153, as presently in 
force, are virtually identical. These sections operated to eliminate 
the strange fiction of powers appendant, under which one person might 
have both the whole fee and a power to appoint the fee which would 
enable him to defeat dower and creditors. See: Simes, "The Devolution 
of Title to Appointed Property," 22 ILL. L. REv. 480 at 493-497 (1928). 
The following section provides: "Sec. 14. When the grantor in any 
conveyance shall reserve to himself, for his own benefit an absolute 
power of revocation, such grantor shall still be deemed the absolute 
owner of the estate conveyed, so far as the rights of creditors and 
purchasers are concerned." 
As will be pointed out in the following subsection, the commence-
ment of the period of the suspension statutes may be deferred, as to 
interests created by the exercise of a power as well as other interests, 
by the existence of such an absolute power of revocation or by other 
POWER OF ALIENATION 531 
In the view of the New York Court, if the donee of a 
power has an absolute power of disposition of the entire 
fee within the meaning of Sections 9-13, Sections 55 and 
56 have no application, and the validity of interests 
created by him in execution of the power is determined 
as if he were in fact an absolute owner disposing of his 
own property. If the donee does not have an absolute 
power of disposition of the entire fee within the mean-
ing of Sections 9-13, Sections 55 and 56 do apply, and 
the validity of interests created by him in execution of 
the power is judged from the time of the creation of 
the power.148 Thus if the donee's power of disposition 
is limited to a future estate, it does not come within 
Sections 9-13, so Sections 55 and 56 apply. If Andrew 
Baker devises land to James Thorpe upon trust to pay 
the rents and profits to John Stiles for life, remainder 
as John Stiles may by deed or will appoint, John cannot 
dispose of the entire fee because, under New York and 
Michigan law, his equitable life interest as beneficiary 
of the trust is inalienable.149 Hence, even though his 
power to dispose of the remainder is unlimited and 
presently exercisable by deed, the validity of any ap-
pointment which he makes will be judged, under the 
New York view, from the death of Andrew.150 
provisions which make the interest destructible because there are ascer-
tained persons in being "by whom an absolute fee in possession can 
be conveyed." Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, notes 1, 144, 
supra . 
. 148 Farmers' Loau &: Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 
(1908); Bettner, "The Rule Against Perpetuities as Applied to Powers 
of Appointment,'' 27 VA. L. REv. 149 at 167-171 (1940). Professor 
Walsh thought, however, that even an absolute power of disposition 
was governed by §§55 and 56; that the dictum to the contrary in the 
Kip case was unsound. 3 LAw oF REAL PROPERTY, §349 (1947). 
149 Part One, notes 580, 583, 621, 625, supra. See: Hunt v. Hunt, 
124 Mich. 502, 83 N.W. 371 (1900); In re Peck Estates, 320 Mich. 
692, 32 N.W. (2d) 14 (1948); Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881). 
15° Farmers' Loan &: Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 N.Y. 266, 85 N.E. 59 
(1908). 
532 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
As has been seen, when a power of appointment is 
restricted as to objects or exercisable only by will, the 
period of the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities is 
computed, as to interests created by exercise of the 
power, from the time of the creation of the power, rather 
than from that of its exercise; but facts which occur be-
tween the creation and exercise of the power may be 
considered in determining whether such interests are 
certain not to vest beyond the permissible period.161 
Under the New York and Michigan statutes, when a 
power of appointment is not an absolute power of dis-
position, the period of permissible suspension of the 
absolute power of alienation is computed, as to interests 
created by exercise of the power, under Section 55, from 
the time of the creation of the power, rather than from 
that of its exercise, but it has not been settled in either 
state whether facts which occur between the creation and 
exercise of the power may be considered in determining 
whether such interests are certain not to suspend the 
absolute power of alienation beyond the permissible 
period.152 
(3) Powers Which Prevent Suspension: Destructibility 
As has been seen, under the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, if a future interest will be destructible at 
all times until it vests, it is not subject to the Rule, and 
if a future interest is so limited as to be destructible for 
a time and then indestructible for a time before it vests, 
151 Part Two, notes 318, 322, 324, supra. 
152 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1'[30 (1944) (taking the 
position that such facts may be considered); Whiteside, "Perpetuities 
and Accumulations: Statutory Rules," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§25.13 (1952) (expressing the view that they may not be considered). 
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§360-362 
(1928), appears to favor the latter view. 
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the Rule applies, but the period of the Rule does not 
commence until the interest becomes indestructible.153 
A future interest is destructible for purposes of the com-
mon-law Rule Against Perpetuities only while some 
ascertained living person has unlimited and uncondi-
tional power to destroy it for his own exclusive benefit.15" 
Where estates tail have been abolished, such destruct-
ibility under the common-law Rule ordinarily exists 
only because of a presently exercisable power of appoint-
ment or of revocation, by the exercise of which the donee 
could immediately vest the future interest in himself. 
Under the statutes restricting suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation there is an analogous doctrine 
of destructibility. A future interest, power, or trust does 
not suspend the absolute power of alienation while there 
are ascertained persons in being who have unlimited and 
unconditional power to convey an absolute fee in posses-
sion.155 As in the case of the common-law Rule, such 
destructibility ordinarily exists because of a power of 
appointment or of revocation, but the doctrine of de-
structibility under the statutes differs from the doctrine 
under the common-law Rule in seven important respects: 
(a) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, the power 
of destruction must reside in the holder or holders of a 
153 Part Two, notes 69, 70, supra. 
154 Part Two, note 74 supra. As pointed out in the text at Part 
Two, notes 75-81, supra, a future interest is not destructible for pur-
poses of the common-law Rule merely because its owner is ascertained, 
in being, and capable of uniting with the owners of other interests to 
convey an absolute fee; a power of appointment limited as to objects, 
exercisable only by will, or subject to a condition precedent, is not 
sufficient to make an interest subject to the power destructible; and 
a power of sale is not sufficient if the proceeds of the sale would be 
subject to the future interest. 
155 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §56 
(1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 111114, 20 (1944); White-
side, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
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single estate, interest, or power, 156 under the statutes it 
is sufficient if the holders of various estates, interests, 
and powers can combine to convey an absolute fee in 
possession. 157 If Andrew Baker conveys land to John 
Stiles (who has no son) and his heirs until some son of 
John reaches the age of thirty years and then to such son 
and his heirs, subject to a power in John and his heirs 
to appoint an absolute fee to any person or persons with 
the consent of the grantor, his heirs or assigns, the limi-
tation to the son of John is not destructible under the 
common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and is void under 
that Rule. The interest of the son of John would, how-
ever, be destructible and valid under the Michigan sus-
pension statutes, because there would at all times be 
persons capable of conveying an absolute fee in posses-
sion. 
(b) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, the power 
of destruction must enable its holder to destroy the fu-
ture interest for his own exclusive benefit,158 under the 
statutes it is sufficient that the power be exercisable for 
the benefit of others/59 so long as its exercise does not 
subject the holder to any condition or penalty.160 If 
156 Part Two, note 74 supra. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, §373, Com-
ment d. (1944), takes the position that destructibility does not exist 
if the power must be jointly exercised by two or more persons or is 
exercisable by the donee only with the concurrence of one or more 
other persons. 
157 Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519, 43 N.E. 57 (1896); Chap-
lin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §81 (1928); 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
us Part Two, note 74 supra. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, Com-
ment d. (1944). 
1sa See Matter of Wilcox, 194 N.Y. 288 at 305, 306, 87 N.E. 497 
(1909); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§65 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[20 (1944); White-
side, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
160 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §71 
(1928). In Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N.Y. 523, 28 N.E. 585 (1891), a 
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Andrew Baker conveys land to James Thorpe and his 
heirs upon trust to apply the rents and profits to the 
support of John Stiles, his sons, and grandsons, during 
their lives, and upon the death of the last grandson of 
John to convey the land to the great-grandsons of John, 
subject to an absolute and unconditional power in the 
trustee and his successors to terminate the trust at any 
time by reconveying the land to the settlor, his heirs 
or assigns, the remote future interests are not destruct-
ible under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities 
and are void under that Rule. They would, however, 
be destructible and valid under the Michigan suspension 
statutes, because there would at all times be persons 
capable of conveying an absolute fee in possession.m 
(c) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, a power to 
destroy a future interest exercisable only by will is not 
sufficient,m under Section 12 of Chapter 64 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1846 163 a tenant for life or years with 
a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance 
has an absolute power of disposition, which is sufficient.164 
(d) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, the mere 
fact that the holder of the future interest in question is 
in being, ascertained, and able to convey his interest, 
does not make it destructible, even though he can unite 
will created a trust which suspended the absolute power of alienation 
for longer than the permissible term, subject to an unrestricted power 
in the cestuis que trustent to sell the land and distribute the proceeds 
to others. It was held that the penalty of loss of the property imposed 
upon the donees in the event of exercise of the power prevented the 
power from making the trust destructible. 
161 Schreyer v. Schreyer, 101 App. Div. 456, 91 N.Y. Supp. 1065 (1905), 
aff'd., 182 N.Y. 555, 75 N.E. 1134 (1905); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE 
POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §75 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory 
Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROP 
ERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
162 Part Two, note 75 supra. 
163 Part Three, note 147 supra. 
164 See Part Two, note 321 supra. 
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with others to convey an absolute fee in possession, 165 
under the Michigan statutes no interest suspended the 
absolute power of alienation if its owner was in being, 
ascertained, and able to unite with the holders of other 
estates, interests, and powers to convey an absolute fee 
in possession.166 If Andrew Baker devises land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs so long as the Penobscot Building 
stands and then to John Stiles and his heirs, the interest 
of John Stiles, although alienable, is not destructible 
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities and is 
void. As James and John have unconditional power to 
convey an absolute fee in possession at any time, the 
interest of John would not offend the Michigan suspen-
sion statutes. 
(e) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, it is suf-
ficient if the offending future interest itself is destruct-
ible,167 under the statutes destructibility does not exist 
unless ascertained persons in being have power to convey 
the entire fee.168 If Andrew Baker devises land to James 
Thorpe and his heirs for the life of John Stiles, (who 
has no son) , upon trust to apply the rents and profits 
to the use of John, remainder to the first son of John 
who reaches the age of thirty, subject to a power in John 
to appoint the remainder by deed or will to any person 
or persons, the limitation to the son of John is destruct-
ible during the life of John under the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities and so is valid because it 
must vest within lives in being at the death of John. 
Under the statutes, however, because the life interest 
of John is inalienable, there are no persons in being 
165 Part Two, note 78 supra. 
100 Part Three, notes 90-94, 96-99, supra. PROPERlY RESTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. B, 1[53 (1944); But see Part Three note 160 supra. 
167 Part Two, note 67 supra. 
168 See: Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N.Y. 522 (1881). 
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during the life of John who can convey an absolute fee 
in possession.169 
(f) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, if a future 
interest is so limited as to be destructible for a time and 
then indestructible for a time before it vests, the period 
of the Rule does not commence until the interest be-
comes indestructible and lives in being at that time may 
be used as measuring lives although they were not in be-
ing when the instrument creating the interest became 
effective,170 this is not the case under the statutes. An 
interest does not suspend the absolute power of alien-
ation while ascertained persons in being have unlimited 
power to convey an absolute fee in possession, but if an 
interest is so limited as to be destructible in this sense 
for a time and then indestructible for a time, during 
which it will suspend the absolute power of alienation, 
the two lives which measure the permissible period of 
suspension must be those of persons who were in being 
when the instrument creating the interest became effec-
tive.171 If John Stiles (who has no son) conveys land to 
James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to apply the 
rents and profits to the use of John for life, then to 
apply them to the use of the first son of John for life 
and, at his death, to convey the land to the eldest son 
of such first son, subject to an unconditional power in 
John to revoke by deed or will, the interests of the son 
and grandson are destructible under both the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities and the statutes during 
the life of John. The first son of John must necessarily 
be in being at John's death, and the grandson must neces-
169 See Part Three, note 149 supra. 
110 Part Two, note 70 supra. 
171 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§63, 
95 (1928). Contra: PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1T14, Ill. 8 
(1944). ' 
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sarily come into being during the son's life, so their 
interests do not violate the common-law Rule. But both 
interests would violate the suspension statutes because 
they would suspend the absolute power of alienation dur-
ing the life of John's first son, a life not in being at the 
time of the conveyance. On the other hand, if John 
Stiles, having a son Henry and a grandson Peter, con-
veys land to James Thorpe and his heirs upon trust to 
apply the rents and profits to the use of John for life, 
then to the use of Henry for life, then to the use of 
Peter for life and, on the death of Peter, to convey the 
land to the first son of Peter, subject to an unconditional 
power in John to revoke by deed or will, the fact that 
the interests were destructible during the life of John 
would mean that the absolute power of alienation was 
suspended for only two, instead of three, lives, those of 
Henry and Peter, which were in being at the time of the 
conveyance. Hence none of the limitations would vio-
late the statuteS.172 
(g) Whereas, under the common-law Rule, a power 
to sell land or exchange it for other property is not suf-
ficient if the proceeds of the sale or property received in 
exchange are subject to the future interest, 173 under the 
Michigan statutes, a power to convert land into other 
property could, in some situations, prevent a future in-
terest, power, or trust from suspending the absolute 
power of alienation.174 This is because the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities applies to all forms of prop-
erty, whereas the Michigan statutes applied only to land. 
112 Equitable Trust Co. v. Pratt, 117 Misc. 708, 193 N.Y. Supp. 152 
(1922), affd., 206 App. Div. 689, 199 N.Y. Supp. 921 (1923). 
11a Part Two, notes 79, 81, supra. 
174 Part One, note 639, Part Three, note 9 supra; PROPERTY RE-
STATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1[51 (1944); This point is covered in detail 
in the paragraphs which follow. 
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Because the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities 
applies only to unvested future interests and has no ap-
plication to present and other vested interests, whether 
or not they are subject to a trust, the examples of de-
structibility given in the preceding paragraphs (a) 
through (g) have been designed to illustrate, by con-
trasting the common law and statutory rules, the exist-
ence and effect of destructibility in the case of future 
interests which, in the absence of destructibility, would 
violate both the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities 
and the suspension statutes. Because, under the New 
York and Michigan statutes, the interests of the trustee 
and cestuis que trustent of a trust for receipt of the rents 
and profits of land are inalienable,175 such a trust sus-
pends the absolute power of alienation even though all 
interests involved are present or vested.m1 Most of the 
decisions as to the existence and effect of destructibility 
under the statutes relate to suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation by trusts, and hence the details of 
the doctrine of destructibility under the statutes must 
be developed by consideration of those decisions. It 
should be borne in mind, however, that the principles 
developed by the cases apply equally to suspension of 
the absolute power of alienation occasioned by future 
interests limited to unborn or unascertained persons and 
by powers. 
Under the New York decisions and what Michigan 
cases there are, for destructibility to exist, not only must 
ascertained persons in being have power to convey an 
absolute fee in possession, but the power itself must be 
absolute in the sense that its exercise is not subject to 
any condition precedent and does not entail any penalty 
175 Part One, notes 580, 583, 602, 621, supra. 
17<6 Part On~, note 593 supra; Section C, infra. 
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or loss to the persons who exercise it.177 Thus a trustee's 
power to terminate the trust by selling the land and dis-
tributing the proceeds to ascertained persons in being is 
not sufficient if sale is not permitted until a certain price 
can be obtained 178 or until the cestuis que trustent dem-
onstrate capacity to handle the proceeds wisely.179 
Neither is it sufficient if its exercise is conditional upon 
the consent of the cestuis que trustent and the proceeds 
177 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§64 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumula-
tions," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
11s Stewart v. Woolley, 121 App. Div. 531, 106 N.Y. Supp. 99 
(1907); Chaplin, id., §69; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities 
and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
See: Spitzer v. Spitzer, 38 App. Div. 436, 56 N.Y. Supp. 470 (1899); 
Bennett v. Chapin, 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889). In Farrand v. 
Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891), a power to plat and sell 
enough to pay taxes and expenses of platting when "the public good 
and the best interests of the estate" required platting and to sell the 
rest and distribute after twenty years was held insufficient. 
179 Matter of Perkins, 245 N.Y. 478, 157 N.E. 750 (1927); Chaplin, 
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §70 (1928); PROP· 
ERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!20 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory 
Rules: Perpetuites and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY, §25.15 (1952). In Taylor v. Richards, 153 Mich. 667, ll7 N.W. 
208 (1908), land was devised to executors upon trust to apply the 
income to the support of testator's grandson, William, with discre-
tionary power of sale for reinvestment, "title thereto to remain in 
my executors until he arrives at twenty-five years of age, when, if he 
shall show himself worthy and of steady habits, my said executors 
shall, if they deem it safe and for his best interest, transfer and convey 
said farm [to William], or in case they shall have previously sold 
said farm then they shall transfer to said William the proceeds . . . 
if they shall so deem it safe and for his best interest." No doubt these 
powers were not sufficient to prevent suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation, but, as such suspension could not last beyond a life in 
being, there was no violation of the statutes. In Michigan Trust Co. 
v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), testatrix devised land 
to her husband until death or remarriage, with power to invade prin-
cipal for his support and comfort and to convey to that end, re-
mainder to a trustee with mandatory direction to convert to money, 
and hold on trust for, inter alia, unborn persons. The opinion sug-
gests that the power of the husband, which was subject to a condition 
precedent which might not occur, and that of the trustee, which was 
not exercisable until the husband's death, did not prevent suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation during the life of the husband. 
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are payable to others, so that the giving of such consent 
would entail loss to the cestuis.J.So A requirement of 
consent of the cestuis que trustent or some other person 
before exercise of the power does not prevent destruct-
ibility, however, if the persons whose consent is required 
are ascertained and in being and the exercise of the 
power will not entail any penalty or loss to them.181 
Moreover, if the power is immediately exercisable, a 
mere permission to the trustee to delay its exercise for a 
time or until conditions are favorable does not prevent 
destructibility.182 Thus in Floyd v. Smith/83 an impera-
tive power to be exercised "at the earliest time practi-
cable after my death, without undue sacrifice of the true 
value thereof," was held sufficient to make destructible a 
trust which, in its absence, would have suspended the 
absolute power of alienation for four lives. 
As has been seen, under the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, the existence of a power to sell land or 
chattels free of future interests or to exchange for other 
property is not sufficient to make future interests therein 
destructible if the proceeds of the sale or property re-
ceived in exchange are subject to the future interests.18• 
That is to say, the common-law Rule inhibits not only 
the tying up of specific land or chattels for unduly long 
18o Underwood v. Curtis, 127 N.Y. 523, 28 N.E. 585 (1891); Chaplin, 
id., §71. 
181 Chaplin, id., §81. See: Williams v. Montgomery, 148 N.Y. 519 
at 526, 43 N.E. 57 (1896). 
182 Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 at 239 (1882); Chaplin, id., §66; 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.7 (1952). Accord: Fitzgerald v. City 
of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900), (donee empowered 
to act at once but authorized to delay for three years.); In re De 
Bancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937) (direction to 
trustee to convert into money at or before the expiration of fifteen 
years). 
183 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). 
1s4 Part Two, notes 79, 81, supra. 
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periods, but also the tying up of aggregations of eco-
nomic power even when the specific property involved 
can itself be alienated free of contingencies. It would 
have been possible to construe the New York statutes 
as restricting only suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation of specific land or chattels. The New York 
courts, however, accepted the common-law view by hold-
ing that, although a trustee's unconditional power to 
terminate the trust by sale of the corpus and distribution 
of the proceeds to ascertained persons in being is suf-
ficient to make the trust destructible/85 an unconditional 
power to sell or exchange for reinvestment, that is, one 
after the exercise of which the trust would continue to 
bind the proceeds, is not sufficient to make the trust de-
structible.186 Because the Michigan suspension statutes, 
unlike those of New York, applied only to land,187 the 
situation here was different. If a trustee had uncondi-
tional power, whether imperative or discretionary, to sell 
the land or exchange it for other property, it was argu-
able that the absolute power of alienation was not sus-
pended, even though the proceeds would be subject to 
the trust. The trustee was a person in being who could 
convey an absolute fee in possession, and the fact that 
the absolute power of alienation of the proceeds would 
185 Robert v. Corning, 89 N.Y. 225 (1882); Matter of Wilcox, 194 
N.Y. 288 at 305, 87 N.E. 497 (1909); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER 
OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§36, 65 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. A, 1120 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
1ss Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 at 163 (N.Y. 1836); Chaplin, 
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §36 (1928); PROP-
ERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1119, Ch. B, 1156 (1944); Whiteside, 
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw 
OF PROPERTY, §§25.12, 25.15 (1952). No doubt the same rule would 
apply in Michigan to a power to exchange land for other Michigan 
land. 
187 Part Two, note 52, Part Three, note 8 supra. 
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be suspended was immaterial, so long as they did not 
consist of land.188 
Thatcher v. Wardens and Vestrymen of St. Andrew's 
Church of Ann Arbor 189 has sometimes been assumed to 
stand for the proposition that a trustee's discretionary 
power of sale for reinvestment prevented a trust of land 
from suspending the absolute power of alienation.190 By 
deed of June 20, 1862, Minerva Mundy conveyed land 
to trustees, "to have, hold, use and enjoy the same, and 
lease, or dispose of the same, or cause the same to be 
used, and to receive the rents, profits and income thereof, 
and to use or dispose of the same on trust," first, for the 
use of the grantrix during her life; second, to pay the 
grantrix's debts and funeral expenses; and third, to sup-
port the grantrix's husband for life and pay the expenses 
of his last illness and funeral, whereupon the trust should 
cease. The next paragraph of the deed conveyed the 
legal remainder in the land to the Wardens and Vestry-
men of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor. Minerva 
Mundy died in 1871 and her heirs employed Erastus 
Thatcher, a lawyer, to conduct a suit to quiet title on 
their behalf. In 1873 the heirs conveyed to Fanny 
Thatcher, wife of Erastus, and in 1875 they quit claimed 
to the Wardens and Vestrymen, who brought an action 
1SSAs the statutes making the interest of the trustee and cestui que 
trust inalienable apply in Michigan only to trusts of land (Part One, 
notes 638, 640, supra), a trust of personalty would not suspend the 
absolute power of alienation, even if such suspension were prohibited, 
unless it was a spendthrift trust. 
189 37 Mich. 264 (1877). The facts are not fully stated in the report, 
which accounts for the fact that the decision has been misunderstood. 
They are to be found in Records & Briefs, June Term, 1877, No. 36. 
It is not clear, however, when the grantrix's husband died. 
t9o Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); PROPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1!56, note 222 (1944); Whiteside, "Statu-
tory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF 
PROPERTY, §25.41, note 5 (1952). See: Methodist Episcopal Church of 
Newark v. Clark, 41 Mich. 730 at 740, 3 N.W. 207 (1879). 
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of ejectment against Erastus and Fanny Thatcher. The 
Circuit Court entered judgment for the plaintiffs on the 
ground the deed to Fanny Thatcher was void as cham-
pertous. The defendants appealed, contending, inter 
alia, that the trust deed of June 20, 1862, was void be-
cause the provisions for payment of expenses of last ill-
ness and funeral caused a suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation for longer than two lives. The Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Justice Marston, in which 
Chief Justice Cooley and Justices Campbell and Graves 
concurred, affirmed the judgment for the plaintiffs on 
the ground the trust deed of June 20, 1862 was valid, 
saymg, 
"We think it is a self-evident proposition that the 
'absolute power of alienation' is not suspended, where 
the instrument gives the trustees power to dispose of 
the property at their option. Where power is given to 
convey the trust estate, the absolute power of alienation 
can in no possible way be said to be suspended. If such 
a power is exercised as it may at any time, the trust is 
at once and forever, upon the execution and delivery of 
the conveyance, at an end, and cannot be revived, and 
that such a power is good when contained in an instru-
ment which without it would be invalid, there can be 
no doubt. A conveyance under such a power would be 
good and would pass a good title to the grantee. In 
order to render the instrument invalid under our statutes 
the power of alienation must be suspended, and the time 
it is so suspended must be for over two lives in being at 
the creation of the estate, or at least so that it may be 
so suspended, - - - but there is no absolute suspension 
whatever where the trustees have power to sell. It is 
true they may not dispose of the estate, but it is not a 
question of what they may or may not in fact do, but 
one of power. Have they power to sell, or is the power 
of sale suspended absolutely for the prohibited period? 
If the former, the instrument is valid; if the latter, in-
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valid. Belmont v. O'Brien, 12 N.Y. 394; Mason v. 
Mason, 2 Sand£. Ch., 432; Hawley v. ]ames, 16 Wend., 
153, per Bronson, J.; Hunter v. Hunter, 17 Barb., 90; 
Nelson v. Callow, 15 Sim. Ch., 353; Cresson et al v. 
Ferree, 70 Pa. St., 446. The power being one which may 
be exercised at any time before the determination of the 
limitations which precede the ultimate one, renders the 
trust valid. Beyond this we do not express any opinion 
as to the correctness of the rule laid down in New York 
as to the proper construction of the statute." 191 
For several reasons, the Thatcher case is not authority 
for the proposition that a trustee's discretionary power 
of sale for reinvestment prevented a trust for receipt of 
the rents and profits of land from suspending the abso-
lute power of alienation. First, the Court treated the 
power not as one of sale for reinvestment but as one of 
sale and termination of the trust. Second, even if the 
power did not extend to termination of the trust, the 
trust was not to continue beyond the lives of Minerva 
Mundy and her husband except as a trust "to sell lands 
for the benefit of creditors." 192 As will be made clear 
in the next section, such a trust does not suspend the 
absolute power of alienation because the interests of the 
cestuis que trustent are alienable. The provision for pay-
ment of expenses of last illness and funeral, therefore, 
could suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond 
the lives of Mrs. Mundy and her husband only if it be 
assumed that it constituted a limitation of an indestruct-
ible future interest to creditors who might not be ascer-
tainable or members of an ascertainable group for sev-
eral days after the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Mundy.193 
Third, even if the provision for payment of expenses of 
191 37 Mich. 264 at 270·271. 
192 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §11 (1), Part One, notes 583, 586, supra. 
193 Chapter 20, Sec. A, Subsec. B. (2), supra. 
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last illness and funeral did suspend the absolute power 
of alienation because it was a limitation of a future inter-
est to persons who might not be ascertainable within 
two lives, the validity of that interest was not involved 
in the litigation before the Court. All that was involved 
was the validity of the legal remainder limited by the 
deed of June 20, 1862, to the Wardens and Vestrymen. 
This was vested in a corporation in being, subject only 
to partial divestment by exercise of the power in favor 
of the creditors. If the interest of the creditors was void, 
the remainder would be valid and indefeasible.194 
The proposition that a trustee's discretionary power 
of sale for reinvestment prevents a trust from suspending 
the absolute power of alienation was questioned in Palms 
v. Palms 195 and definitely rejected in Niles v. Mason. 196 
This rejection is probably justifiable on the ground that 
a trustee's discretionary power of sale for reinvestment is 
never really absolute and unconditional; under the law 
of trusts the trustee would be guilty of a breach of trust 
if he exercised it before such time as the proposed change 
of investments would be of benefit to the cestuis que 
trustent. Such a power is, therefore, really subject to a 
condition precedent. This is not true of an imperative 
power of sale for reinvestment which the trustee is bound 
194 Part Two, notes 543, 548, supra; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, 
§25.10 (1952). 
195 68 Mich. 355 at 386, 36 N.W. 419 (1888) (Concurring opinion 
of Champlin and Sherwood, JJ). 
m 126 Mich. 482, 86 N.W. llOO (1901). Accord: Grand Rapids 
Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Gardner 
v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); 
In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938); PROPERTY 
REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1!56 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY, 
§25.41 (1952). See: Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467 at 471, 194 N.W. 
131 (1923). Cf. Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905); 
Moore v. O'Leary, 180 Mich. 261, 146 N.W. 661 (1914). 
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to exercise, regardless of the resulting advantage or dis-
advantage to the cestuis que trustent. Consequently, the 
Michigan Supreme Court repeatedly and consistently 
held that an imperative power of sale for reinvestment in 
property other than Michigan land worked an equitable 
conversion, so that the trust was to be considered a trust 
of chattels personal, not subject to the suspension sta-
tutes, from the time when the trustee had an uncondi-
tional duty to sell.197 It has been rather liberal in con-
struing powers to be unconditional and imperative for 
this purpose. Thus in Floyd v. Smith/98 land was de-
197 Penny v. Croul, 76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649, 5 L.R.A. 858 (1889) 
(devise of legal life estate, remainder to trustee with direction to 
convert at once into personalty and hold the latter on perpetual 
charitable trust); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 44 N.W. 1057 (1890) 
(mandatory direction in will to convert Michigan land into Missouri 
land on death of testator and to hold the Missouri land in trust for 
more than two lives); Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 
196 N.W. 976 (1924) (devise of legal life estate, remainder to trustee 
to sell, convert into money, and hold the latter on trust for more than 
two lives); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 
N.W. 703 (1930) (devise to trustee with mandatory direction to sell 
at once and hold proceeds on trust for more than two lives); In re 
De Bancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937) (devise to 
trustee to pay income to testator's heirs for fifteen years, to convert 
into money at or before the expiration of fifteen years, and to divide 
the proceeds among the heirs at the end of fifteen years, determined 
according to the statute then in force); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 
626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939) (devise to trustee upon trust for three lives 
with mandatory direction to sell land at the end of a named life); 
Floyd v. Smith, 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942), Part Three, 
note 198 infra. See: Joseph v. Shaw, 48 Mich. 355, 12 N.W. 486 
(1882) (direction to administrator to convert land into money before 
distribution to life tenant); Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., 300 Mich. 
575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942) (devise to trustees with mandatory direc-
tion to form a corporation, convey the land to it in exchange for 
its stock, and hold the stock in trust). PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. B, 1!51 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.37 (1952). Although 
an imperative power to convert to personalty prevented a trust from 
suspending the absolute power of alienation, contingent limitations of 
interests under or following the trust might violate the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities. Michigan Trust Co. v. Baker, Gettins v. 
Grand Rapids Trust Co., supra. 
198 303 Mich. 137, 5 N.W. (2d) 695 (1942). See also Penny v. Croul, 
76 Mich. 471, 43 N.W. 649 (1889). 
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vised to trustees upon a trust which was to last for four 
lives. The following language of the will was treated as 
creating an imperative power which prevented suspen-
sion of the absolute power of alienation: 
"Any real estate constituting a part of my estate at 
the time of my death shall be sold and converted into 
personalty at the earliest time practicable after my death 
without undue sacrifice of the true value thereof, to the 
end that the trust by this will created shall be solely a 
trust of personalty and subject to the rules applicable 
thereto only." 
Although a trustee's power to sell for reinvestment has 
never been sufficient to make the trust destructible in 
New York 199 and was not sufficient in Michigan unless 
imperative, a power in the trustee to terminate the trust 
by distributing the corpus, or by selling the corpus and 
distributing the proceeds, has always been sufficient in 
both states to prevent the trust from suspending the abso-
lute power of alienation, whether the power is impera-
tive or discretionary.200 It should be borne in mind, 
199 Part Three, note 186 supra. 
200 Part Three, note 185 supra,· Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 
N.W. 715 (1910) (inter vivos trust to last for three lives or twenty 
years, whichever was shorter, with power in the trustee to distribute the 
corpus whenever he deemed it advisable); Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 
467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923) (devise to trustee with discretionary power 
of sale and direction to distribute the corpus within five years after 
testator's death); Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Nichols, 311 Mich. 
107, 18 N.W. (2d) 383 (1945) (trust mortgage with imperative power 
in the trustee, in the event of foreclosure, to sell the land and dis· 
tribute the proceeds to holders of participation certificates). PROPERTY 
RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~20 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: 
Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW oF PROPERTY, 
§25.42 (1952). See Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901); 
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 
(1922); In re Richard's Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938), 
where it was held that a discretionary power of sale for reinvestment 
was not sufficient to make the trust destructible but suggested that a 
discretionary power to terminate the trust would be sufficient. See 
also Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910). 
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however, that while a power of termination in the trustee 
prevents the trust, as such, from suspending the absolute 
power of alienation, the provisions for distribution of 
the corpus or its proceeds may constitute limitations of 
future interests in land or personalty which raise inde-
pendent problems of validity. In New York, these would 
always be governed by the suspension statutes. In Michi-
gan it would seem that, if the distribution was to be of 
land, the suspension statutes governed, but if chattels or 
money were to be distributed, the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities applied.201 
C. INDESTRUCTIBLE TRUSTS 
Chapter 63 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 provides: 
"Sec. 11. Express trusts may be created for any or 
either of the following purposes: 
1. To sell lands for the benefit of creditors: 
2. To sell, mortgage or lease lands, for the benefit 
of legatees, or for the purpose of satisfying any charge 
thereon: 
3. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and 
apply them to the use of any person, during the life of 
such person, or for any shorter term, subject to the rules 
prescribed in the last preceding chapter: 
4. To receive the rents and profits of lands, and to 
accumulate the same for the benefit of any married 
woman, or for either of the purposes and within the 
limits prescribed in the preceding chapter: 
5. For the beneficial interest of any person or per-
sons, when such trust is fully expressed and clearly de-
fined upon the face of the instrument creating it, subject 
to the limitations as to time prescribed in this title. 
201 Cf. note 197 supra. 
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"Sec. 19. No person beneficially interested in a trust 
for the receipt of the rents and profits of land, can assign 
or in any manner dispose of such interest; but the rights 
and interest of every person for whose benefit a trust for 
the payment of a sum in gross is created, are assignable. 
"Sec. 21. When the trust shall be expressed in the 
instrument creating the estate, every sale, conveyance, or 
other act of the trustees, in contravention of the trust, 
shall be absolutely void." 20·2 
This legislation was adopted from the New York Re-
vised Statutes of 1829/03 but Subsection 5 of Section 11 
and the provision as to married women in Subsection 4 
are peculiar to Michigan.204 
( 1) Trusts for Receipt of the Rents and Profits of Land 
The New York courts gave an extensive effect to the 
first clause of the New York equivalent of Section 19, 
holding not only that a cestui que trust of a trust for 
receipt of the rents and profits of land could not alienate 
his interest, 205 but that, even though all the cestuis were 
202 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §§11, 19, 21; Comp. Laws (1857) §§2641, 
2649, 2651; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4124, 4132, 4134; Comp. Laws (1897) 
§§8839, 8847, 8849; How. Stat. §§5573, 5581, 5583; Comp. Laws (1915) 
§§11575, 11583, 11585; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12977, 12985, 12987; 
Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.61, 26.69, 26.71; Comp. Laws (1948) §§555.11, 
555.19, 555.21. For the background of this legislation, see Part One at 
notes 575-587, supra. 
203 Part II, c. 1, tit. II, art. second, §§55, 63, 65, Part One, notes 
580, 581, supra. See: Part Three, note 234 infra. 
2o4 Rev. Stat. 1846, p. V. 
205 Douglas v. Cruger, 80 N.Y. 15 (1880). An express provision of 
the trust instrument, authorizing alienation by the cestui, has been 
deemed inoperative because of the statute. Crooke v. County of 
Kings, 97 N.Y. 421 (1884); Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, 192 
N.Y. 266 at 280, 85 N.E. 59 (1908); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PowER 
OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §254 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. A, 1!17 (1944); 3 Walsh, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §344 (1947); 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.11 (1952). 
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in being and ascertained, they could not compel the 
termination of the trust 206 or cooperate with the trustee 
to terminate it.207 Moreover, they held that the statutory 
inalienability of the cestuis' interests applied to trusts 
to receive and pay over the rents and profits as well as 
to trusts to receive and apply them.208 This being so, 
the existence of such a trust meant that there were no 
persons in being by whom an "absolute fee in posses-
sion" 209 could be conveyed. In consequence, unless such 
a trust was destructible under the rules discussed in the 
preceding subsection, it suspended the absolute power 
of alienation even though all interests in the land were 
indefeasibly vested in ascertained persons in being. 210 
Although the language of Subsection 5 of Section 11 
indicates that, when the Michigan Legislature adopted 
the New York statutes governing trusts and suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation, it was aware of and 
intended to adopt the New York judicial interpretation 
of them, it has been seen that the Michigan Supreme 
Court appears to have held in Bennett v. Chapin 211 that, 
200 Cuthbert v. Chauvet, 136 N.Y. 326, 32 N.E. 1088 (1893); Part 
One, note 614 supra; Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and 
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.11 (1952). 
201 Dale v. Guaranty Trust Co., 168 App. Div. 601, 153 N.Y. Supp. 
1041 (1915); Part Three, note 206 supra. 
2os Leggett v. Perkins, 2 N.Y. 297 (1849); Cochrane v. Schell, 140 
N.Y. 516 (1894); Part One, note 597 supra; PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. A, 1[18 (1944). 
209 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, note I supra. 
210 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835); Hawley v. James, 16 
Wend. 61 (1836); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 
3rd ed., §§252, 255 (1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1[17 
(1944); 3 Walsh, LAW OF REAL PROPERTY, §§344, 350 (1947); White-
side, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.12 (1952). 
211 77 Mich. 526, 43 N.W. 893 (1889), Part One, note 611, Part 
Two, note 466 supra. But see Blossom v. Anketell, (D.C. Mich. 1921) 
275 F. 947. In Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900), 
land was conveyed to a trustee to apply the rents and profits to the 
552 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
if the cestuis que trustent of a trust for receipt of the 
rents and profits of land were all in being and ascer-
tained, they could compel termination of the trust and 
convey an absolute fee in possession. If so, it would 
seem to follow logically that, in Michigan, such a trust 
was destructible under the rules discussed in the pre-
ceding subsection 212 and so did not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation. Nevertheless, the Michigan Court 
held repeatedly that a trust for receipt of the rents and 
profits of land did suspend the absolute power of alien-
ation even if all interests in the land were owned by 
ascertained living persons who, were it not for the sta-
tutory inalienability of the interests of trustee and ces-
tuis que trustent, could join to convey an absolute fee 
in possession. In Casgrain v. Hammond,218 land was con-
veyed to a trustee (I) to pay the income to the settlor 
for life; (2) if the settlor died within fourteen years, to 
pay the income to five children of the settlor or the sur-
vivors of them until the expiration of that period; (3) 
use of William Fitzhugh during his life and after his death to apply 
them to the use of his wife and children during the life of the wife, 
remainder at her death to the children. After the death of William 
his widow released her interest to the other beneficiaries. They sued 
to compel termination of the trust and distribution of the corpus to 
them and were granted the relief sought. This decision is, of course, 
in flat conflict with Section 19 insofar as it holds that the interest 
of a beneficiary of a trust for receipt and application of the rents and 
profits of land is alienable. 
212 Part Three, notes 181, 185, supra. 
21s 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903). Accord: Scheibner v. Scheib-
ner, 199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917) (devise to trustees to pay 
income to widow for life, then to pay $75 a month to each of two sons 
until twenty years after testator's death, then to convert into cash 
and divide between the sons); Loomis v. Laramie, 286 Mich. 707, 282 
N.W. 876 (1938) (devise to trustees to accumulate for twenty years 
and then distribute to six named persons, their heirs or assigns); 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.41 (1952). In James E. Scripps 
Corporation v. Parkinson, 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915) it was 
held that a trust suspended the absolute power of alienation although 
the sole trustee was also the sole income beneficiary. 
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after the death of the settlor and the expiration of four-
teen years from the date of the trust instrument, to con-
vey the principal to the five children or the survivors of 
them. Although the entire fee was owned by the settlor, 
the trustee, who was one of the five children, and the 
other four children, all of whom were ascertained living 
persons, it was held that the trust was wholly void be-
cause it might suspend the absolute power of alienation 
for a period not measured by two lives in being. 
Most trusts for receipt of the rents and profits of land 
involve suspension of the absolute power of alienation 
caused not only by the statutory inalienability of the 
interests of the trustees and cestuis que trustent) but by 
the fact that unborn or unascertained persons are en-
titled to the rents and profits 214 or to shares in the prin-
cipal 215 at some future time. In such cases, the interests 
of the unborn or unascertained persons are, of course, 
future interests which, if indestructible, would suspend 
the absolute power of alienation under the rules dis-
cussed in Section A of this chapter even if there were no 
trust. z16 The opinions commonly fail to make a clear 
214 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. 
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 
44 N.W. 1057 (1890); Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 
(1894); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906); Otis v. 
Arntz, 198 Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917); Grand Rapids Trust Co. 
v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Allen v. Merrill, 
223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 
258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank 
& Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); In re Richards' 
Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 N.W. 657 (1938); Dodge v. Detroit Trust 
Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). 
215 Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891); Niles v. 
Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901); Foster v. Stevens, 146 
Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); James E. Scripps Corporation v. 
Parkinson, 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 
291 Mich. 626, 289 N.W. 275 (1939); Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich. 
426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940); Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. 
(2d) 834 (1950); cases cited in preceding note. 
21e Part Three, notes 77-80, supra. 
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distinction between the two types of suspension, by 
trusts themselves and by future interests under or fol-
lowing trusts, but it is important to make that distinction 
because the possible duration of suspension of the one 
type may not, in a given case, be the same as the possible 
duration of suspension of the other type. If Andrew 
Baker devises land to James Thorpe for the life of John 
Stiles upon trust to apply the rents and profits to the use 
of John, legal remainder to the children of John who 
reach thirty, the remainder is a future interest which may 
suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond the 
permissible period, but suspension caused by the trust 
itself cannot last longer than a single life in being, that 
of John. 
A future interest which violates the common-law Rule 
Against Perpetuities is wholly void, not merely void as 
to those parts which may suspend vesting for too long.m 
Section 14 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 
applied the same rule to future interests which violate 
the suspension statutes by providing that "Every future 
estate shall be void in its creation, which shall suspend 
the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than 
is prescribed in this chapter." 218 The invalidity of pres-
ent trusts which suspend the absolute power of alienation 
rested, however, on Section 15, which provided merely 
that "The absolute power of alienation shall not be sus-
pended by any limitation or condition whatever, for a 
longer period than during the continuance of two lives 
in being ... " 219 It would, therefore, have been possible 
211 Thus a class gift is wholly void under the common-law Rule 
if the interest of any member of the class may vest too remotely, even 
though the interests of some members are presently vested. Part Two, 
note 280 supra. 
21s Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §14, Part Three, notes I, 76, supra. 
219 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §15, Part Three, note 1 supra. 
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to !10ld that a trust set up to last for too long was void 
only as to the excess; for example, that a trust to last for 
three lives was valid for the first two lives named. 220 The 
New York courts held, however, that a trust which, 
under its terms, might last longer than the statutory 
period was wholly void, not merely invalid as to the 
excess,221 and Michigan followed this view.222 
(2) Trusts for Payment of a Sum in Gross; Annuities 
As the statutory inalienability created by Section 19 
of Chapter 63 affects only the interests of beneficiaries 
under trusts, it is clear that a provision for payments to 
an ascertained living person which does not create a trust 
does not suspend the absolute power of alienation. Thus 
a provision for payment of a legacy, whether in a lump 
sum or in instalmentS,223 or a provision for payments 
which imposes a mere equitable charge or lien on land, 224 
22o Cf. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, Part Three, notes 1, 53, supra, 
which provided, "when a remainder shall be limited on more than two 
successive estates for life, all the life estates subsequent to those of 
the two persons first entitled thereto, shall be void, . . ." Under this 
section, if more than two successive legal life estates were limited, the 
first two were valid. Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §38, Part Two, note 482 
supra, provided, similarly, that a provision for an accumulation for 
longer than the permitted period was void only as to the excess. 
221 Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (N.Y. 1835); Whiteside, 
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw 
OF PROPERTY, §25.12 (1952). However, if trust provisions could be 
construed to be separable, that is, to call for several separate trusts, 
some might be valid although some were void. PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. A, 1!1!33, 47-52 (1944). The problem of separability will be 
discussed in Chapter 21, infra. 
222 Part Three, notes 213-215, Part Two, note 541 supra. 
22a See: Radley v. Kuhn, 97 N.Y. 26 (1884). 
224 Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); Mcinerny 
v. Haase, 163 Mich. 364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Peoples' Trust Co. v. 
Flynn, 188 N.Y. 385, 80 N.E. 1098 (1907); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. A, 1!53 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and 
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). When 
the amount payable to the beneficiary is fixed as to total or as to 
periodical payment and thus does not depend upon the amount of 
rents and profits actually earned, the provision is a charge. 
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does not effect suspension. If a provision does create a 
trust, it becomes necessary to determine whether it is for 
"the receipt of the rents and profits" or the "payment of 
a sum in gross." If Andrew Baker devises land to James 
Thorpe on trust to receive the rents and profits and 
apply them to the use of John Stiles, his wife, and chil-
dren, during their lives, it is clear that Section 19 makes 
the interests of the beneficiaries inalienable. If Andrew 
Baker devises land to James Thorpe on trust to sell, 
mortgage, or lease in order to raise the sum of $10,000, 
to pay this sum to John Stiles, and then to transfer the 
balance of the proceeds of sale or the land subject to 
the mortgage or lease to Lucy Baker, it is equally dear 
that the interests of the beneficiaries are alienable. 225 
The provisions which have caused difficulty are those 
which call for periodic payments in fixed amounts, 
usually referred to as "annuities." If such a provision 
creates only an equitable charge, with priority over the 
zzs In Fredericks v. Near, 260 Mich. 627, 245 N.W. 537 (1932), a 
husband and wife conveyed land to a trustee to sell it and pay a debt 
of the husband to a corporation. Being unable to make a sale, the 
trustee, with the consent of the corporation, reconveyed to the settlors. 
Because this was a trust "to sell lands for the benefit of creditors" 
created under Subsection I of Sec. 11 (Part Three, note 202 supra), 
not a trust "for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands," and 
because it was "for the payment of a sum in gross," the interest of 
the beneficiary was alienable under §19. Hence it was correctly held 
that the reconveyance effectively terminated the trust. In re De 
Rancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937), involved a 
devise to a trustee to pay $10,000 to the Salvation Army in Jackson 
upon the performance of a condition precedent. Because this was a 
trust "to sell . . . lands, for the benefit of legatees" created under 
Subsection 2 of Sec. 11 (Part Three, note 202 supra), not a trust 
"for the receipt of the rents and profits of lands," and because it was 
"for the payment of a sum in gross," the interest of the beneficiary 
was alienable under §19. In Fox v. Greene, 289 Mich. 179; 286 N.W. 
203 (1939), land was conveyed to trustees to subdivide, sell, and dis-
tribute the proceeds to the settlors. Because this was a trust to sell 
and distribute the proceeds, not one to hold and receive the rents 
and profits, the interests of the beneficiaries were properly treated 
as alienable. 
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trust, the New York decisions are to the effect that it 
does not suspend the absolute power of alienation. 22~ If, 
on the other hand, a trust is created and the payments 
are to be made exclusively from the rents and profits, 
such an annuity does suspend the absolute power of 
alienation. 221 If the provisions in question create a trust 
and make an annuity payable from principal or from 
both principal and income, it is held in New York that 
the annuity does not effect suspension and does not pro-
long the duration of the trust. 228 After the trust termi-
nates, such an annuity becomes a mere equitable 
charge.229 If Andrew Baker devises land to James Thorpe 
upon trust to pay $5000 per year to Lucy Baker for life, 
using either income or principal therefor, and, subject 
thereto, to pay the net income to John Stiles for life, 
then to William Stiles for life, residue to the heirs of 
the testator, the trust is treated as terminating with the 
deaths of John and William. If Lucy Baker is alive at 
that time, her annuity continues only as an equitable 
22s Part Three, note 224 supra. 
221 Cochrane v. Schell, 140 N.Y. 516, 35 N.E. 871 (1894); Chaplin, 
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §250 (1928). 
228 Clark v. Clark, 147 N.Y. 639, 42 N.E. 275 (1895); Chaplin, id., 
§249; Whiteside, id., §25.15. Subsection 2 of Section 55 of the New 
York statute (Part One, note 580, Part Three, note 203, supra) was 
amended by Laws 1909, ch. 52, to read, "To sell, mortgage or lease 
real property for the benefit of annuitants or other legatees, or for 
the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon." Section 63 was amended 
to read, "The right of a beneficiary of an express trust to receive 
rents and profits of real property and apply them to the use of any 
person, can not be transferred by assignment or otherwise, but the 
right and interest of the beneficiary of any other trust in real prop-
erty, ... may be transferred." Real Property, Law, §§96, 103. These 
amendments served to confirm the existing judicial construction of the 
original sections. 
229 Buchanan v. Little, 154 N.Y. 147, 47 N.E. 970 (1897}; Powell and 
Whiteside, THE STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NEw YoRK CoNCERNING 
PERPETUITIES AND RELATED MATTERS, 102 [N.Y. Legislative Document 
(1936) No. 65 (H).] Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., Part Three, note 
247 infra, where it was suggested that an express provision to this 
effect would be valid. 
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charge, which does not suspend the absolute power of 
alienation. The Michigan decisions involving these 
problems are neither clear nor harmonious and so re-
quire detailed discussion. 
In Toms v. Williams/80 the testatrix owned land sub-
ject to a forty-year lease which provided that the lessor 
would pay for the lessee's improvements at the expiration 
of the term or renew the lease for an additional forty 
years. At the time of the testatrix's death, the original 
term had eighteen years to run. She devised this and 
other property to trustees (1) to set aside $5,000 per 
annum to form a sinking fund to pay for the lessee's im-
provements; (2) to accumulate the balance of the in-
come and pay it over to two nephews and a niece when 
the youngest attained majority; (3) to transfer the prin-
cipal to the nephews and niece as soon as the lessee's 
improvements were paid for. It was held that this was 
a trust to "lease lands, for the benefit of legatees, or for 
the purpose of satisfying any charge thereon" within the 
meaning of Subsection 2 of Section 11 and that it was 
not subject to the suspension statutes. The opinion sug-
gests that trusts falling under Subsection 1, to sell lands 
for the benefit of creditors, were also exempt from the 
suspension statutes. 
Russell v. Musson· 231 involved a devise to a son and 
his wife for their lives, remainder to the children of the 
son who survived him but, if there were no such chil-
dren, remainder to Josiah and Hannah Musson, charged 
with the support of their mother, and if either die with-
2ao 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879). The lessee's interest under 
the trust was alienable. The provision for accumulation of the balance 
of the income was held not to exceed the permissible duration. Part 
Two, notes 485-487, supra. See Part Three, note 225 supra. 
2s1 240 Mich. 631, 216 N.W. 428 (1927). Accord: Matter of Blood-
good, 184 App. Div. 798, 172 N.Y.S. 509 (1918). 
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out issue, to the survivor; if both die without issue, to 
their mother. Under this devise, after the death of the 
son, all interests in the land would necessarily be held 
by ascertained living persons, the son's wife, Josiah, Han-
nah, and their mother. Hence the entire fee would be 
freely alienable after a single life in being unless the pro-
vision for support of the mother made her the bene-
ficiary of a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of 
lands so that her interest thereunder was inalienable. It 
was held that her interest was alienable and that the dis· 
position could not suspend the absolute power of alien-
ation beyond the son's life. This decision was sound 
because the provision for support created an equitable 
charge, not a trust.232 The interest of the beneficiary of 
an equitable charge is not made inalienable by statute; 
hence such a charge in favor of an ascertained living per-
son does not suspend the absolute power of alienation. 
In Wilson v. Odell,233 a testator devised his entire 
estate to trustees with power to sell land, "except as 
otherwise provided, at such times and in such parcels 
as they shall deem advisable, and out of said property 
pay" (1) funeral expenses and the cost of a monument; 
(2) an annuity of $1500 to his widow; (3) annuities to 
each of his three children of $600 while under fourteen 
and $1000 beyond that age; (4) two pecuniary legacies. 
Subsequent clauses directed retention of certain parcels 
of land for the purpose of aiding in carrying out the 
third purpose, devised the residue to his grandchildren 
after the death of all his children and on the majority 
232 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT, §10 (1935). An equitable charge differs 
from a trust in that it is a mere lien on land, the legal owner of which 
holds for his own benefit without fiduciary duties to the beneficiary 
of the charge, whereas a trustee holds for the benefit of the cestuis que 
trustent and owes fiduciary duties to them. The holder of an equitable 
charge is, in effect, a mortgagee. 
23a 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885). 
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of the youngest grandchild, and directed that the an-
nuity of any deceased child be continued to its children 
until the division. It was held that these dispositions 
were valid as to the land subject to the trustees' power 
of sale.234 Insofar as they related to land not subject to 
sale, it was held that the implied direction to accumulate 
surplus rents and profits was valid only during the minor-
ity of the children,235 that the limitations to the grandchil-
dren were void, and that the trust would terminate when 
the children came of age, at which time the land would 
pass to the heirs, subject to the children's annuities. The 
opinion does not discuss the problem of whether the an-
nuities of the children suspended the absolute power of 
alienation, but the fact that they were treated as valid 
indicates that the Court thought they did not. 
Dean v. Mumford 236 involved a will which devised 
the use of testator's homestead to his widow for life, di-
rected the executors to pay the taxes and repairs thereon 
from the estate, bequeathed a life annuity of $1500 to 
the widow, and devised the residue to his five children. 
The will provided that the executors should hold the 
shares of three sons on trust for these sons, their wives 
and children, during the lives of the sons and their wives, 
remainder to their children. It was held that the latter 
provision was for three separate trusts, each for the life 
of a son and his wife, but that the provisions for payment 
of taxes and repairs and the annuity to the widow 
created a trust which suspended the absolute power of 
alienation for her life. As to each of the three shares, 
therefore, the absolute power of alienation was sus-
234 Part Three, note 190 supra. 
2as Part Two, note 489 supra. 
2as 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). The widow elected to take 
against the will, so the validity of the provisions for her was not in 
question. 
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pended for three lives, those of the widow, a son, and his 
wife. The trusts for the sons, their wives and children, 
and the remainders thereafter to the sons' children were 
held void. 237 
In Niles v. Mason/38 an estate was devised to a trustee 
(1) to pay debts, funeral expenses, and a small legacy; 
(2) to pay $12.50 per month to sister Sarah for life, but, 
"upon the event of her marriage the said legacy to cease, 
and to become part of the income hereinafter provided 
for;" (3) subject to the foregoing, to pay half the in-
come to son Charles for life and half to daughter Lottie 
for life; if either die without issue, the whole income to 
the survivor for life, remainder to the issue of Charles 
and Lottie or, if there should be none, to a brother. It 
was held that the provision for an annuity to the sister 
suspended the absolute power of alienation during her 
life and that the other provisions suspended it during the 
lives of Charles and Lottie, making three lives; that the 
trust for Charles and Lottie and the remainders were 
void, but that the annuity, being separable, was valid. 
Before the case was decided the trustee had executed 
a mortgage to the sister to secure payment of the an-
nuity, and the Court approved his act in doing so, thus 
indicating that it considered the annuity a charge on 
principal, not merely on the rents and profits. As has 
been seen, such an annuity does not suspend the abso-
lute power of alienation under the New York decisions.239 
Van Driele v. Kotvis 240 involved a will which pro-
237 Part Two, note 562 supra. 
2s8 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 1100 (1901). 
239 Part Three, note 228 supra. 
240 135 Mith. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903). Contra: Otis v. Arntz, 198 
Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (bequest to church of $25 a year for 
ten years, "the said sum to be taken from the income of my estate.") 
But the will in this case became effective in 1916, after the enactment 
of Act 122 of 1907, Part Two, note 421 supra. 
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vided, "I - - - bequeath to the Fourth Dutch Reformed 
Church - - - the sum of five hundred dollars, to be paid 
by my executor out of the rents, issues, and profits of my 
estate in the manner following, to wit: Twenty-five dol-
lars per year, for a period of twenty years." The pro-
vision was held invalid on the ground that it suspended 
the absolute power of alienation for twenty years. 
In Skinner v. Taft/41 a testator devised his estate to 
trustees to pay "out of the interest, income and profits" 
$5,000 per year to his widow and $1,666.66 to each of 
his three children. The will provided, "the trust herein 
and hereby created ... shall terminate five years from 
the date of the probating of my will," at which time 
the trustees were directed to distribute the principal to 
the wife and children in equal shares. The income was 
insufficient to pay the annuities, and the widow sought 
a decision that they were a charge on principal. It was 
held that they were not in an opinion which assumed 
that, as so construed, the trust was valid. If, as appears 
to have been the case, the estate included land, the im-
plied holding that the trust did not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation seems irreconcilable with the prev-
ious Michigan decisions discussed above. 
Cole v. Lee 242 involved a will which directed the ex-
ecutors (1) to pay Phebe Simons $200 a year for life; 
(2) to provide Carrie Humphrey with a home costing 
not more than $2,000, pay her $50 a month for life, and 
"to make such further expenditures as may be necessary 
to secure her maintenance in ease and comfort;" (3) to 
pay the living expenses of Frank Cole, his wife and chil-
dren, during the lives of Frank and wife. Subject to 
these provisions and some outright legacies, the residue 
2n 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905). 
242 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906). 
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was devised to the children of Frank, whenever born. 
It was held that the will created a valid trust for the lives 
of Frank and his wife. The opinion does not mention 
the Simons annuity but states, "The charge of an annuity 
in favor of Mrs. Humphrey does not prevent the vesting 
of the estate, as the amount is fixed." 
The will involved in Hull v. Osborn 243 directed the 
"executors and trustees" to pay (I) testator's widow $250 
per month during her lifetime, an additional $150 per 
month on demand, and a sum sufficient to pay taxes, in-
surance, and repairs on her home; (2) Fred Rowley $150 
per year during the life of Carrie Rowley for the use of 
Carrie. The residue was devised to Blanche and Frances 
Hull in equal shares, each to be paid $10,000 at 21, 
$10,000 at 25, $10,000 at 30, $10,000 at 35, $10,000 at 
40, and the balance of her half at 45. The will further 
provided that, if Blanche or Frances died under 45, 
without issue, payments due her should be made to the 
survivor at the same times, and that if both died without 
issue, the payments due them should be made to anum-
ber of relatives to be ascertained at that time. The ex-
ecutors and trustees were directed to keep the assets 
safely invested until distribution. When both were 
under 30, Blanche and Frances sued to compel termi-
nation of the trust and distribution of the entire princi-
pal to them. An order sustaining a demurrer to the bill 
was affirmed in an opinion which states that the pro-
visions for Blanche and Francis did not create a trust 
and, because their interests were vested, did not violate 
the suspension statutes, and that the provision for dis-
tribution of the residue in the event both Blanche and 
Frances died without issue did not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation beyond two lives. Although the 
24s 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908). 
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opinion does not mention the annuities to the widow 
and Fred Rowley, the decision necessarily assumes that 
they did not suspend the absolute power of alienation. 
This assumption also seems inconsistent with earlier de-
cisions. 
In Scheibner v. Scheibner/44 the residue of an estate 
was devised to trustees (1) to pay the income to the 
testator's widow for life; (2) to pay to the testator's two 
sons $75 "a month each, from and after the death of my 
said wife, until the expiration of a period of twenty years 
from the date of my death, during which time I direct 
that none of my property shall be sold or mortgaged;" 
(3) to convert the estate into cash at the end of the 
twenty years and pay it to the sons. It was held that a 
bill of complaint praying that this trust be declared 
void as suspending the absolute power of alienation be-
yond two lives stated a cause of action. 
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst 245 involved a will 
which (1) directed payment of $75 per month each to 
two nephews and a niece during their lives; (2) directed 
division of the remainder of the net income among a 
son, a brother, and two sisters in equal shares; (3) de-
vised to the son, when and if he reached 25, half the 
estate outright and the other half charged with payment 
of the $7 5 a month to each nephew and niece and the 
remainder of the net income therefrom to the brother 
and sisters and the survivor of them during life; (4) if 
the son died under 25 leaving issue, devised half the 
estate to trustees to apply principal and income to the 
support of the issue until 21 or earlier death; principal 
to the issue at 21; (5) if the son died under 25 without 
issue or with issue which failed to reach 21, devised the 
244199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917). 
245 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922). 
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entire estate to four named charitable institutions, sub-
ject to the payments specified in (3). It was held that all 
of these provisions were void, the opinion saying, 
"Counsel for sustaining the will contended no trust 
is created by the will except for the unborn issue of tes-
tator's son, and designating as 'annuities' the monthly 
payments provided for the nephews and niece in para-
graphs 3-5, urge that they are thereby made outright be-
quests of definite sums of money to be paid the bene-
ficiaries by the executors. But the next paragraph (6) 
directs 'the remainder of the net income,' not the income 
of the remainder, to 'be equally divided between' tes-
tator's son, brother and two sisters, and although by 
paragraph 7 an ownership accrues to the son if he lives 
until 25 years old which relieves one-half of the estate 
of the monthly payments to nephews and niece, the 
brothers and sisters yet receive 'the balance of the net 
income' of the remaining half after payment of the $7 5 
per month each provided for the nephews and niece, 
thus plainly providing that their monthly payments are 
to be taken from net income and are not annuities. An 
annuity is 'A yearly payment of a certain sum of money, 
granted to another in fee, for life or years, charging the 
person of the grantor only' (Burrill's Law Diet.), dis-
tinguished from an 'income' by the latter being interest 
or profits to be earned. - - -. 
~·---the life beneficiaries being interested in the rents 
and profits of the real estate to which it relates, we are 
unable to see how against the prohibition of this statute246 
those beneficiaries can relieve it of that burden by dis-
posing of their interests. The interests of the life bene-
ficiaries are not sums in gross but portions of an income, 
or rents and profits of ultimate indeterminate amount, 
even as to those given a stated monthly stipend owing 
to uncertainty of their respective lives." 247 
246 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 63, §19, Part Three, note 202 supra. 
m 220 Mich. 321 at 327-329. 
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In Burke v. Central Trust Co./48 a testatrix devised 
her estate to a trustee (1) to pay Mary Burke $300 per 
month for life out of income or, if necessary, out of 
principal; (2) to pay stipulated monthly sums out of 
income to each of five named persons for life; (3) when 
the youngest child of grandnephew Frank Burke, when-
ever born, reached 25, to transfer the principal and any 
accumulated income to the children of Frank then living, 
subject to a lien to ensure payment of the monthly pay-
ments specified in (1) and (2). A codicil provided for 
payment of $300 per month to the guardian of Frank's 
children from the death of their parents until the termi-
nation of the trust. It was held that the entire trust was 
void but suggested that, if the will had provided that the 
trust should terminate when the youngest child of Frank 
then in being reached 25, the provisions would have 
been valid. This, in effect, is dictum that, after the 
termination of the trust, the annuities would be mere 
equitable charges which would not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation. 
In• re Wagar's Estate 249 involved a will which devised 
the estate to a trustee (1) to pay the entire income to 
the widow for life; (2) after the death of the widow, to 
pay stipulated monthly sums from the "rents and earn-
ings" to each of three named children and three named 
grandchildren until the death of the survivor of the 
children, the heirs of any of the six persons who died 
before the termination of the trust to receive the 
amounts otherwise payable to the person so dying. The 
only question raised in the litigation was whether the 
248 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932). 
249 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940). Cf. Dodge v. Detroit Trust 
Co., 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942), where a number of 
annuities under a trust were involved but their validity was not 
determined. 
POWER OF ALIENATION 567 
widow of one of the children was an "heir" for this 
purpose. In an opinion which does not discuss the 
validity of the trust it was held that she was. 
It would seem from the cases just reviewed that, in 
Michigan as in New York, a provision for an annuity 
which created a mere equitable charge and not a trust 
did not suspend the absolute power of alienation. 250 
Several of the decisions, however, found that a trust was 
created in situations where an equitable charge con-
struction would have been possible.251 When the lan-
guage used was construed to create a trust, the Michigan 
decisions are not consistent. It will be recalled that, 
under the New York decisions, an annuity payable 
under a trust suspends the absolute power of alienation 
if it is to be paid exclusively from the rents and profits 25'2 
but does not if it is to be paid from principal or from 
both principal and income.2"3 Three of the Michigan 
cases involving an annuity payable under a trust exclu-
sively from rents and profits held that it did effect sus-
pension/54 and two appear to have held that it did 
not.255 Two Michigan decisions held that an annuity pay-
2so Russell v. Musson, Part Three, note 231 supra. Wilson v. Odell, 
Part Three, note 233 supra, Cole v. Lee, Part Three, note 242 supra, 
and Hull v. Osborn, Part Three, note 243 supra, are probably decisions 
to this effect. The dictum in Burke v. Central Trust Co., Part Three, 
note 248 supra, also appears to support this proposition. 
2s1 Dean v. Mumford, Part Three, note 236 supra; Van Driele v. 
Kotvis, Part Three, note 240 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 
Part Three, note 245 supra. 
252 Part Three, note 227 supra. 
21>a Part Three, note 228 supra. 254 Van Driele v. Kotvis, Part Three, note 240 supra; Scheibner v. 
Scheibner, Part Three, note 244 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. 
Herbst, Part Three, note 245 supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., 
Part Three, note 248 supra. 
255 Skinner v. Taft, Part Three, note 241 supra; In re Wagar's 
Estate, Part Three, note 249 supra. The Wagar decision may have 
assumed or held that the provisions were valid either because the 
probate order of distribution to the trustee was res judicata on this 
point [Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950)] or 
568 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
able under a trust from both principal and income sus-
pended the absolute power of alienation, 25tl and two 
others which involved this problem did not clearly de-
cide it.257 In this state of the authorities, it would be 
hazardous to venture an opinion as to when an annuity 
under a trust suspended the absolute power of alienation 
in Michigan. As Section 19 of Chapter 63 of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1846 258 has not been repealed, the prob-
lem of the alienability of such annuities may still arise, 
even though the instrument creating them became effec-
tive after the repeal of the suspension statutes. 
If the settlor of an inter vivos trust is also a bene-
ficiary, it is held in New York that his beneficial interest 
is alienable and so does not suspend the absolute power 
of alienation.259 Hence a trust to last for the lives of 
the settlor and two other persons is valid. The plaintiff 
in Bateson v. Bateson 260 conveyed land to a trustee (1) 
to pay the entire income to the settlor during his life-
time; (2) after the settlor's death to hold 2/10 of the 
because the suspension effected could not extend beyond the permis-
sible statutory period. In Sprague v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 
712 (1902), a mother conveyed land to a daughter on trust to use the 
income to support the settlor and pay not to exceed $1000 per year 
to each of the settlor's seven children and one grandchild, these eight 
to receive the principal on the death of the settlor. The opinion 
appears to treat the interests of the children and grandchild as to 
income as alienable. If so, they did not suspend the absolute power 
of alienation. 
256 Dean v. Mumford, Part Three, note 236 supra; Niles v. Mason, 
Part Three, note 238 supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., Part 
Three, note 248 supra. 
257 Wilson v. Odell, Part Three, note 233 supra; Burke v. Central 
Trust Co., Part Three, note 248 supra. 
258 Part Three, note 202 supra. 
259 Schenck v. Barnes, 156 N.Y. 316, 50 N.E. 967 (1898); Whiteside, 
"Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw 
OF PROPERTY, §25.15 (1952). 
26o 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940). Cf. Lewis v. Nelson, 4 Mich. 
630 (1857); Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 
(1903), Part Three, note 213 supra. See Part One, supra, at notes 
626-632. 
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corpus in trust and pay the income therefrom to James 
for 15 years; (3) at the expiration of the 15 years to 
convey this 2/10 of the corpus to James in fee; (4) if 
James should die within the 15 years, to convey the fee 
to his wife and children; but if there were none, to con-
vey l/10 to George and hold the other l/10 on trust and 
pay the income therefrom to Samuel for life and, on 
his death, to convey the corpus to Samuel's wife and 
children. The Court disagreed as to the validity of 
the provision relative to George, but all the justices 
agreed that the provisions as to the l/10 to be held in 
trust for the lives of the settlor, James, and Samuel sus-
pended the absolute power of alienation for three lives 
and so were void. This decision is, therefore, contrary 
to the New York view. 
The application of the suspension statutes to charit-
able and honorary trusts has been discussed in Chapter 
16.261 The situations in which a trust does not suspend 
the absolute power of alienation because it is destructible 
by the exercise of a power have been discussed in the 
preceding section of this chapter. 
261 Part Two, supra, at notes 406-428, 432, 437-447. 
CHAPTER 21 
The Statutory Period 
CHAPTER 62 of the Revised Statutes of 1846 pro-vided: 
"Sec. 15. The absolute power of alienation 
shall not be suspended by any limitation or condition 
whatever, for a longer period than during the continu-
ance of two lives in being at the creation of the estate, 
except in the single case mentioned in the next section. 
"Sec. 16. A contingent remainder in fee may be 
created on a prior remainder in fee, to take effect in 
the event that the persons to whom the first remainder 
is limited shall die under the age of twenty-one years, 
or upon any contingency by which the estate of such 
persons may be determined before they attain their full 
age. 
"Sec. 30. When a future estate shall be limited to 
heirs, or issue, or children, posthumous children shall 
be entitled to take, in the same manner as if born before 
the death of the parents. 
"Sec. 31. A future estate depending on the contin-
gency of the death of any person without heirs or issue, 
or children, shall be defeated by the birth of a post-
humous child of such person, capable of taking by de-
scent. 
"Sec. 41. The delivery of the grant, where an ex-
pectant estate is created by grant; and where it is created 
by devise, the death of the testator, shall be deemed the 
time of the creation of the estate." 262 
262 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 16, 30, 31, 41; Comp. Laws (1857) 
§§2599, 2600, 2614, 2615, 2625; Comp. Laws (1871) §§4082, 4083, 
4097, 4098, 4108; Comp. Laws (1897) §§8797, 8798, 8812, 8813, 
8823; How. Stat., §§5531, 5532, 5546, 5547, 5557; Comp. Laws (1915) 
§§11533, 11534, 11548, 11549, 11559; Comp. Laws (1929) §§12935, 
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The period of permissible suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation under Sections 15 and 16 differs 
from the period of permissible suspension of vesting 
under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities in 
three respects: (1) Whereas under the common-law Rule 
there may be suspension for any number of lives in 
being,268 under the statutes the number of lives in being 
is limited to two. (2) Whereas under the common-law 
Rule suspension is always permissible during the mi-
nority of a person who is not in being at the commence-
ment of the period but will certainly come into being, 
if at all, within lives in being, 264 suspension is permis-
sible under the statutes during such a minority only if 
the minor is certain to come into being, if at all, within 
two lives and only when the minor is entitled to a fee 
defeasible by a condition occurring during minority. 
(3) Whereas under the common-law Rule suspension 
is permissible during a gross period of twenty-one years 
or less, unconnected with an actual minority, whether or 
not such period follows lives in being, 265 the statutes do 
not permit suspension for any period in gross whatever. 
A. COMMENCEMENT OF THE PERIOD 
Under both the common-law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties and the statutes, the period is computed, as to an 
interest which is indestructible from its creation, from 
the time when the instrument creating the interest be-
comes effective. In the case of a deed, this is the time of 
12936, 12950, 12951, 12961; Mich. Stat. Ann., §§26.15, 26.16, 26.30, 
26.31, 26.41; Comp. Laws (1948) §§554.15, 554.16, 554.30, 554.31, 
554.41. Sections 15 and 16 were repealed by Act 38, P.A. 1949, Mich. 
Stat. Ann., §26.49 (2); Comp. Laws (1948) §554.52. As to the 
limited effect of this repeal see Part Three at note 3 supra. 
263 Part Two, note 95 supra. 
2&4 Part Two, notes 31, 101, supra. 
265 Part Two, notes 35, 112-115, supra. 
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delivery; in the case of a will, the death of the testator.266 
Under both the common-law Rule and the statutes, an 
interest created by the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment is normally deemed, for this purpose, to be created 
by the instrument creating the power rather than by 
the instrument exercising it. 267 However, under the 
common-law Rule, an interest created by the exercise of 
a power of appointment which is unlimited as to objects, 
and exercisable by deed, is deemed to be created by the 
instrument exercising the power/68 and this is true 
under the statutes as to an interest created by exercise 
of an absolute power of disposition of the entire fee.ll69 
Under both the common-law Rule and the statutes, the 
commencement of the period may be postponed by the 
existence of destructibility. What constitutes destruct-
ibility, however, is not the same under the statutes as 
at common law.270 
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY 
Under both the common-law Rule Against Perpetui-
ties and the statutes, an interest which is indestructible 
from its creation and not created by exercise of a power 
is invalid unless, at the time when the creating instru-
ment becomes effective, it is absolutely certain that the 
interest will not effect suspension for longer than the 
permissible period; a high degree of probability is not 
enough. If, viewed from that time, any combination of 
future events which would extend suspension beyond 
266 Part Two, note 63 supra; Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 41, Part 
Three, note 262 supra; Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENA· 
TION, 3rd ed., §88 (1928). 
267 Part Two, notes 318, 322, Part Three, note 145, supra. 
268 Part Two, note 301 supra. 
269 Part Two, note 305, Part Three, note 148, supra. 
210 Part Two, notes 70-81, Chapter 20, Section B (3), supra. 
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the permissible period is possible, the interest is void, 
although the actual occurrence of that combination of 
events is highly unlikely and even though, by the time 
the validity of the interest is litigated, it has become 
manifest that they did not or cannot occur. 211 In de-
termining this certainty it is always deemed possible, 
under the statutes as at common law, that a living person 
may marry a person as yet unborn, 272 that a living per-
son, regardless of age or physical condition, is capable of 
having children,278 and that such administrative steps as 
211 Part Two, note 130, supra; Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 
N.W. 506 (1885); State v. Holmes, ll5 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898); 
Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901); Casgrain v. 
Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903); Scheibner v. Scheibner, 
199 Mich. 630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 
186 N.W. 489 (1922); Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 
321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 
242 N.W. 760 (1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 
267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934); Bateson v. Bateson, 294 Mich. 
426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940); Chaplin, SusPENSION oF THE PowER oF 
ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §92 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. 
A, 1"[1"[31, 32 (1944); See: Foster v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 
265 (1906); Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 
N.W. 703 (1930); Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 
834 (1950). 
212 Part Two, note 131 supra; Schettler v. Smith, 41 N.Y. 328 (1869); 
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §ll5 
(1928); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1"[32 (1944). That is to 
say, if a limitation is construed to be to, or measured by the life of, 
anyone whom a named person may marry in the future, it is possible 
that the spouse may be a person as yet unborn. But in Dean v. 
Mumford, 102 Mich. 510 at 515, 61 N.W. 7 (1894), where a will, as 
construed by the court, created a trust to last for the lives of the 
testator's widow, his unmarried son, and the son's wife, it was said, 
"But it is suggested that, in this view, as Herbert L. was unmarried 
at the time the will took effect, the will should be construed to 
relate to any wife whom he might in the future marry, and, so con-
strued, the estate would not vest in the children or heirs until after 
the expiration of two lives in being. We think the will not open to 
this construction, but that it was intended to mean any wife of Herbert 
L. living at the time of the decease of the testator." A limitation in 
favor of the wife of a married person is normally construed to refer 
to his existing wife. Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 
(1900); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 855 (1906). 
21s Part Two, notes 138-141, supra; Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 
186 N.W. 489 (1922); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1"[31, Ch. B, 
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probating a will may not be taken within a predictable 
time.274 If the time when the absolute certainty must 
exist is the effective date of the instrument creating the 
interest, it follows that events which occur before that 
time may be considered in determining certainty but 
events which occur thereafter may not. As a will be-
comes effective upon the death of the testator, events 
which occur after the execution of the will and before 
such death may be considered; 275 events which occur 
after the testator's death may not.27~ 
1f56 (1944). See: Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642 at 647, 134 
N.W. 1018 (1912) (woman aged 68; suggestion that it would make 
no difference if she were 100). Accord under the common-law Rule: 
Gettins v. Grand Rapids Trust Co., 249 Mich. 238, 228 N.W. 703 
(1930), Part Two, note 145 supra. 
274 Part Two, note 134 supra. Thus in Battelle v. Parks, 2 Mich. 
531 (1853), it was suggested that a devise of a beneficial power to the 
testator's administrator would be void because of the possible delay 
in appointing an administrator, and in Thatcher v. Wardens & 
Vestrymen of St. Andrew's Church of Ann Arbor, 37 Mich. 264 (1877), 
Part Three, note 189 supra, it was assumed that a direction to a 
trustee to pay the expenses of last illness and funeral of a cestui que 
trust could suspend the absolute power of alienation for a period not 
limited by two lives. In both New York and Michigan there is a 
strong tendency to construe provisions postponing distribution until 
the completion of some administrative step as not suspending the 
absolute power of alienation in the meantime. PROPERTY REsTATE-
MENT, App., Ch. A, 1)66 (1944); Fitzgerald v. City of Big Rapids, 123 
Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900) (discretionary power in executor to 
withhold distribution of residue until payment of debts and other 
legacies; Court remarked that such delay would be necessary in the 
absence of the provision); Moss v. Axford, 246 Mich. 288, 224 N.W. 
425 (1929) (devise to person to be selected by executor valid; sugges-
tion that the ordinary delays in the settlement of an estate are not 
within the reason of the statute); McGraw v. McGraw, 176 Fed. 312 
(6th Cir. 1910) (devise to trustee to convey to named persons after 
two lives and payment of testator's debts). Cf. De Buck v. Bousson, 
295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940). 
2 75 Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138 (1896) (will 
suspended the absolute power of alienation for lives of testator's wife 
and two children; death of wife before testator prevented invalidity); 
PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1)29, Ch. B, 1)56 (1944). Accord, 
under the common-law Rule: Part Two, note 125 supra. 
276 Dean v. Mumford, 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894) (will sus-
pended the absolute power of alienation for lives of testator's wife, 
son, and the son's wife; widow's election to take against the will did 
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Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, 
there are two situations in which the absolute certainty 
that an interest will not suspend vesting for longer than 
the permissible period need not exist at the time when 
the creating instrument becomes effective. When an 
interest will be destructible for a time and then in-
destructible for a time, it is sufficient if the certainty 
that it will vest in due time exists when the indestruct-
ibility commences; that is, events which occur between 
the effective date of the creating instrument and the 
end of the period of destructibility may be considered in 
determining certainty.277 When the interest is created 
by exercise of a power of appointment, it is sufficient if 
certainty exists when the power is exercised, even though 
the period of the Rule is computed from the effective 
date of the instrument creating the power; that is, 
events which occur between the creation of the power 
and its exercise may be considered in determining cer-
tainty.278 Under the statutes, however, it may be that, in 
all cases, it must be absolutely certain at the time when 
the creating instrument becomes effective that any sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation effected 
thereby will terminate within the statutory period; that 
is, events which occur after the effective date of the creat-
ing instrument can never be considered in determining 
certainty.279 It may be that this is so even though, because 
not prevent invalidity); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1f30, 
Ch. B, 1f56 (1944). Cf. Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 
131 (1923). Accord, under the common-law Rule: Part Two, notes 
127, 128, supra. 
277 Part Two, notes 70, 125, supra; PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, §373, 
Comment C. (1944). 
21s Part Two, note 324 supra. 
279 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§§63, 89, 95, 360-362 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities 
and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.13 (1952). 
On this theory, where a power is involved, the instrument exercising 
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the interest in question will be destructible for a time, 
the commencement of the period of suspension is post-
poned to the end of the period of destructibility. If John 
Stiles conveyed land to James Thorpe upon trust to apply 
the rents and profits to the use of John for life, then to 
the use of John's wife for life, then to the use of John's 
daughters Mary and Lucy for their lives and, on the 
death of the survivor, to convey to the descendants of 
John then in being, reserving to the grantor an absolute 
power of revocation, the trust would be destructible until 
the death of John and so could not suspend the absolute 
power of alienation until then.280 Nevertheless, it may 
be that the fact that John's wife predeceased him could 
not be considered in determining the validity of the 
trust. At the time when the deed was delivered it was 
possible that the trust would suspend the absolute power 
of alienation for three lives, those of John's wife and his 
two daughters. 
C. TWO LIVES IN BEING 
(I) What is a Life in Being? 
The statutes did not invalidate an interest which sus-
pended the absolute power of alienation if it was certain 
when the instrument creating the interest took effect 
that the suspension could not last longer than the lives 
of two persons who were in being at that time and desig-
nated by or ascertainable from the instrument as the 
measuring lives. 281 On the other hand, except in the nar-
the power is read as if it were a part of the instrument creating the 
power. Contra: PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~~14, Ill. 8; 
20; 30 (1944). 
28o Part Three, notes 155, 200, supra. 
2s1 Paton v. Langley, 50 Mich. 428, 15 N.W. 537 (1883); Palms v. 
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Defreese v. Lake, 109 Mich. 
415, 67 N.W. 505 (1896); Mullreed v. Clark, llO Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 
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row situation to which the restricted minority provision 
of Section 16 282 applied, the statutes did not permit 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation for any 
part of a life which was not certainly in being when the 
instrument creating the interest took effect.283 
In Palms v. Palms) 284 land was devised to trustees to 
pay half the income to the testator's son for life and half 
to the testator's daughter for life. On the death of either, 
half the principal was to be paid to the children of the 
deceased child. A subsequent clause directed that the 
share of any grandchild who was a minor at its parent's 
death should be held in trust for it during minority. It 
was suggested that the latter provision was invalid as to 
138 (1896); Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); 
Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Sprague v. 
Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Van Driele v. Kotvis, 135 
Mich. 181, 97 N.W. 700 (1903); Cole v. Lee, 143 Mich. 267, 106 N.W. 
855 (1906); Foster v. Stevens, 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); 
Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908); Taylor v. Richards, 
153 Mich. 667, 117 N.W. 208 (1908); Mcinerny v. Haase, 163 Mich. 
364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 
761 (1910); Van Gallow v. Brandt, 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 
(1912); Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918); Cary 
v. Toles, 210 Mich. 30, 177 N.W. 279 (1920); Young v. Young, 255 
Mich. 173, 237 N.W. 535 (1931); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 626, 
289 N.W. 275 (1939); In re Dingler's Estate, 319 Mich. 189, 29 N.W. 
(2d) 108 (1947); Miller v. Curtiss, 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 834 
(1950). However, such an interest might be invalid because of some 
other rule of law. Thus a direct restraint on alienation of an estate 
in fee simple is void under the common law even though limited in 
duration to two lives. Part Three, notes 25-31, supra. And although 
a trust of land did not suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond 
two lives when there was a mandatory direction to convert to per-
sonalty at or before the expiration of two lives, interests under or 
following such a trust might violate the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities. Part Three, note 197 supra. 
282 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §16, Part Three, note 262 supra. 
283 Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 N.W. 506 (1885); Palms v. 
Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888); Ford v. Ford, 80 Mich. 42, 
44 N.W. 1057 (1890); Rozell v. Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 
(1922); Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 
(1932); Gardner v. City National Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 
255 N.W. 587 (1934). 
284 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888). 
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any grandchild who was not in being at the death of the 
testator. In Burke v. Central Trust Co./85 land was de-
vised to a trustee to pay the rents and profits to various 
persons. The will provided that the trust should ter-
minate when the youngest of Frank's three living chil-
dren "or of any child or children hereafter born to my 
said grandnephew Frank . . . shall attain the full age of 
twenty-five years," and devised the remainder to the then 
living children of Frank. As the youngest child of Frank 
might be a person not in being at the death of the testa-
trix, its life was not a proper measuring life and hence 
these provisions were void. In Gardner v. City National 
Bank & Trust Co./86 land was devised to trustees (1) to 
pay the income to testator's daughter Alene for life; (2) 
to pay the income to Alene's named children and any 
further born children until each child reach twenty-five; 
(3) to transfer half of its share in the principal to each 
child of Alene on reaching twenty-five; (4) to pay the 
income from the remaining half to each such child until 
it reached thirty and then to transfer the principal to it; 
(5) if any child of Alene should die before receiving its 
full share of the principal, to pay the income from its 
share to its issue during minority, then to transfer such 
share in the principal to the issue; (6) if any child of 
Alene should die without issue before receiving its full 
share of the principal, to add that share to those of the 
other children; (7) if Alene and all her issue should die 
prior to the termination of these trusts, to add the prin-
cipal to that of a like trust set up for testatrix's daughter 
Natalie and her children. As these provisions might sus-
pend the absolute power of alienation for periods meas-
ured by parts of the lives of unborn children of the 
285 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 760 (1932). 
286 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934). 
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daughters and the minority of unborn grandchildren, 
they were held void. 
It would seem that the two measuring lives must be 
those of human beings; that the lives of corporations, 
animals, or plants would not serve.287 Although the Mich-
igan statutes were not explicit on the point, 288 it appears 
that a child en ventre sa mere at the time the instrument 
creating an interest became effective was a life in being 
which could serve as one of the two measuring lives. 289 
Part of a life in being could be used as a measuring life,29o' 
but, when so used, it was treated as a whole life in com-
puting the number of lives during which suspension 
might last. Thus a suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation for three minorities was invalid, although the 
minors were aged 18, 19 and 20 when the creating instru-
ment took effect.291 Although the New York revisers 
2a7 See: Matter of Howells, 145 Misc. 557, 260 N.Y. Supp. 598 
(1932). Accord, under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities: 
Part Two, notes 92, 93, supra. 
2 88 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§30, 31, Part Three, note 262 supra. 
The New York statutes were amended in 1929 to make it clear that 
a child en ventre is a life in being. REAL PROPERTY LAW, §42; White-
side, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). 
289 Chambers v. Shaw, 52 Mich. 18, 17 N.W. 223 (1883); Rozell v. 
Rozell, 217 Mich. 324, 186 N.W. 489 (1922); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. A, ~37, Ch. B, ~56 (1944). 
290 Paton v. Langley, 50 Mich. 428, 15 N.W. 537 (1883) (widow-
hood); Hull v. Osborn, 151 Mich. 8, 113 N.W. 784 (1908) (until 45); 
Taylor v. Richards, 153 Mich. 667, 117 N.W. 208 (1908) (until 25 
and worthy); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd 
ed., §§106, 107 (1928); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and 
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). Meas-
urement by part of a life in being must be distinguished from 
measurement by part of a life not in being (Part Three, notes 283-
286, supra) and from measurement by a period not certain to termi-
nate at or before the expiration of two lives. Thus a period defined 
as "until my son John reaches 21 or would have reached that age if 
alive" is a period in gross, not a measurement by part of a life. 
291 Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 (1836); Benedict v. Webb, 98 
N.Y. 460 (1885); Matter of Butterfield, 133 N.Y. 473, sub nom. 
In re Christie, 31 N.E. 515 (1892), Part Three, note 137 supra; Chaplin, 
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criticized the use, under the common-law Rule Against 
Perpetuities, of the lives of persons who take no interest 
under the conveyance as measuring lives, 292 the statutes 
did not prohibit doing this. Accordingly, it is not essen-
tial that the two measuring lives in being be those of per-
sons who take an interest under the instrument in ques-
tion.293 The suspension statutes did not limit the num-
ber of interests which could be created by an instru-
ment.294 Hence a trust for receipt of the rents and profits 
of land could have any number of beneficiaries so long 
as it was certain to terminate at or before the expiration 
of two lives in being.295 Similarly, a future interest could 
be limited to any number of persons and could be pre-
ceded by any number of interests in any number of per-
sons, so long as it was certain not to suspend the absolute 
power of alienation for more than two lives in being.296 
SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §107 (1928); White-
side, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN 
LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). In Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 
85 N.W. llOO (1901), "until her death or marriage" was treated as a 
full life in counting the permissible two. Other Michigan cases on 
this point will be discussed below in connection with the problem of 
measurement by the life of the survivor of a group. 
292 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y. Rev. 
Stat. (2d ed.) 571 (1836), quoted in the text at Part Three, note 6 
supra. 
293 Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N.Y. 421 (1884); Chaplin, Sus-
PENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §105 (1928). 
294 But see Chapter 19, supra, as to the statutory restrictions on 
successive legal life estates. 
295 Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900); Sprague 
v. Moore, 130 Mich. 92, 89 N.W. 712 (1902); Foster v. Stevens, 146 
Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906); Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 
N.W. 761 (1910); Van Tyne v. Pratt, 291 Mich. 626, 289 N.W. 275 
(1939); Re Wagar's Estate, 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940); 
McGraw v. McGraw, 176 Fed. 312 (6th Cir. 1910); Chaplin, SusPENSION 
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §105 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATE-
MENT, App., Ch. A, ~59, Ch. B, ~56 (1944). A properly measured trust 
might have unborn beneficiaries. Gilman v. Reddington, 24 N.Y. 9 
(1861 ). 
296 Torpy v. Betts, 123 Mich. 239, 81 N.W. 1094 (1900); Mcinerny 
v. Haase, 163 Mich. 364, 128 N.W. 215 (1910); Kemp v. Sutton, 233 
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(2) As,certainment of the Measuring Lives 
Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, the 
measuring lives must be ascertainable from the instru-
ment creating the interest or, in the case of an interest 
created by the exercise of a power, from the instruments 
creating and exercising the power. 297 That is to say, 
under the common-law Rule, it must be possible, from 
the creating instrument and the extrinsic facts which may 
be considered in determining certainty, 298 to ascertain at 
the time certainty is required 299 the identity of the per-
sons whose lives are the measuring lives in being. This 
is an aspect of the requirement of certainty 300 with which 
the New York revisers must have been familiar and which 
they probably intended to adopt. Nevertheless, both the 
New York and Michigan courts relaxed this aspect of the 
requirement of certainty to some extent. Although it 
was necessary that the creating instrument or instruments 
provide some mode of ascertaining the two measuring 
lives in being which would ensure their identification at 
or before their own expiration, 301 it was not essential that 
the identity of the two persons whose lives were to meas-
ure be determinable at the time the creating instrument 
became effective. It was sufficient if one life was im-
mediately identifiable and the other certainly would be 
at the expiration of the first. 302 Thus the duration of a 
Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925). But some of the preceding interests 
might be invalid under the statutes restricting the creation of life 
estates discussed in Chapter 19, supra. 
297 Part Two, notes 89·91, supra. 
29s Part Two, notes 125, 127, 128, Part Three, notes 275, 276, supra. 
299 Part Two, notes 70, 125, 130, 324, Part Three, notes 271, 277, 
278, supra. 
3oo Chapter 11, Section A, and Chapter 21, Section B, supra. 
301 Everitt v. Everitt, 29 N.Y. 39 at 72 (1864); Chaplin, SusPENSION 
OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§95, 97-99 (1928). 
302 Conover v. Hewitt, 125 Mich. 34, 83 N.W. 1009 (1900) (lives 
of named person and any wife who survived him); Van Cott v. Pren-
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testamentary trust could be measured by the life of the 
testator's widow and that of his youngest child living at 
the widow's death. Moreover, it was sufficient if each 
measuring life was certain to be identifiable at or before 
its own expiration. Thus the duration of a testamentary 
trust could be measured by the lives of those two of the 
testator's six children who first died.303 
(3) Life of the Survivor of a Group 
If it be accepted that it is sufficient if a measuring life 
is certain to be identifiable at or before its own expira-
tion, it would seem to follow logically that a suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation could properly be 
measured by the life of the survivor of a group of three 
or more living persons. This would be a single life, cer-
tain to be identifiable before its own expiration. Re-
laxation of the requirement of ascertainability to this ex-
tent would, however, make the restriction to two lives 
virtually inoperative by equating it to the "any number 
of lives in being" of the common-law Rule. It would 
make possible the measurement of suspension by the life 
of the survivor of a group of twenty-eight persons, as was 
done in an English case 304 which had been severely criti-
tice, 104 N.Y. 45, 10 N.E. 257 (1887) (life of settlor and minority of 
that one of three named persons as should, at the death of the 
settlor, be the youngest of them living); Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE 
POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§100, 102 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATE· 
MENT, App., Ch. A, 1[58 (1944). See: Dean v .. Mumford, 102 Mich. 
510 at 515, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). 
aoa Ward v. Ward, 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910) (trust to 
last for twelve years after the death of the testator "or until the death 
after my decease and prior to the expiration of said period of twelve 
years, of two of my children who shall survive me."); Meldon v. 
Devlin, 31 App. Div. 146, 53 N.Y. Supp. 172 (1898), affd., 167 N.Y. 573, 
60 N.E. 1116 (1901); Chaplin, SuSPENSION OF THE PowER OF ALIENA· 
TION, 3rd ed., §108 (1928). 
&04 Bengough v. Edridge, 1 Sim. 173, 57 Eng. Rep. 544 (1827), aff'd., 
sub nom. Cadell v. Palmer, 1 Cl. & F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833). 
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cized by the New York revisers. 305 Hence, illogically but 
understandably, the New York courts refused to take this 
step. They have held consistently that measurement by 
the life of the survivor of a group of more than two per-
sons is not permissible; that it suspends the absolute 
power of alienation by as many lives as there are persons 
in the group. 3011 The Michigan Supreme Court experi-
enced so much difficulty with this problem that a detailed 
review of the cases involving it is necessary to an under-
standing of the situation here.807 
Toms v. Williams 308 involved a devise of land to trus-
tees to accumulate part of the rents and profits for the 
benefit of three named children of the testatrix's deceased 
brother. When the testatrix died these were aged, re-
spectively, 15, 19, and 21. The will provided, 
"I direct my - - - trustees - --, at the expiration of the 
minority of the youngest of the said children of my de-
ceased brother, - - - to pay over to said children or the 
ao5 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y. 
Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 571 (1836), quoted in the text at Part Three, note 
6 supra. The ideas of the revisers are criticized in 3 Walsh, LAw oF 
REAL PROPERTY, §347 (1947), where it is pointed out that the lives 
of two healthy children are likely to last longer than any number of 
lives of mature persons, and that the life expectancy of two persons is 
little different from that of ten or more of the same age. 
aos Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. 265 (1835) (survivor of twelve 
persons); Hawley v. James, 16 Wend. 61 (1836) (until youngest of 
thirteen minors to reach 21 did so); Benedict v. Levi, 177 App. Div. 
385, 163 N.Y. Supp. 846 (1917), aff'd., 223 N.Y. 707, 120 N.E. 858 
(1918) (survivor of eight persons); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. A, 1!39 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Ac-
cumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw oF PROPERTY, §25.16 (1952). The 
application of this rule is sometimes prevented by the tendency to 
construe "surviving" as meaning "surviving the testator." Part Two, 
notes 251, 253-258, supra. 
307 PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, ff54 (1944); 3 Walsh, LAW 
oF REAL PROPERTY, §358 (1947); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Per-
petuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§25.16, 
25.43 (1952). Professor Whiteside discusses the Michigan cases in some 
detail. He and the Restatement suggest that there is grave doubt 
as to their effect. 
3os 41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), Part Two, notes 485, 487, supra. 
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survivors of them, share and share alike, all the net ac-
cumulations of my estate, - - - ." 
A statute then in force provided that an accumulation of 
rents and profits of real estate "must be made for the 
benefit of one or more minors then in being, and ter-
minate at the expiration of their minority." 309 As only 
two of the children were minors when the testatrix died, 
the quoted provision could not, on any possible construc-
tion of the statutes, have suspended the absolute power 
of alienation for longer than two lives in being, so th~ 
only question presented was the effect of the accumula-
tion statutes. The trial court held that the accumulation 
for each child should terminate when it reached 21 and, 
as this ruling was not appealed, it was not disturbed, but 
the Supreme Court, after holding that "survivors" meant 
those who survived the testatrix, said, 
"But we do not feel at all satisfied that the statute re-
quires such a construction. Its language certainly is quite 
consistent with an accumulation for any number of in-
fants until all come of age, and such an accumulation is 
really no more than for the minority of a single life in 
being." 310 
This passage related only to the accumulation statute and 
had nothing to do with the two lives provisions of the 
suspension statutes, but the last clause reflects a mode of 
thought which is out of harmony with the New York de-
cisions under the suspension statutes. . 
Dean v. Mumford 311 involved a will which gave the 
testator's widow the life use of his homestead and directed 
his executors to pay taxes and repairs and to pay her a 
309 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §37, Part Two, note 482 supra. 
31° 41 Mich. 552 at 569. Per Campbell, C.J. Accord, as to the mean-
ing of the accumulation statute, Wilson v. Odell, 58 Mich. 533, 25 
N.W. 506 (1885). 
311 102 Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894). 
THE STATUTORY PERIOD 585 
life annuity. A succeeding clause directed division of the 
residue among five children. A later clause directed that 
the shares of three sons be held in trust for the sons, their 
wives and children, "during the lives of my said sons, 
and their wives, and upon the decease of said sons and 
their wives, the portion so held in trust by my said execu-
tors shall become the property of and go to the child or 
children of said sons, severally." It was held that the first 
provision created a trust for the life of the widow which 
suspended the absolute power of alienation during her 
life, and that the last clause mentioned created three 
separate trusts, each of which was to be judged, as to 
validity, separately, and each of which suspended the 
absolute power of alienation for the lives of a son and his 
wife. The court held the three trusts void because, in 
combination with the trust for the widow, each sus-
pended the absolute power of alienation for three lives, 
those of the widow, a son and his wife. This decision ap-
pears to accept the New York interpretation of the sus-
pension statutes on the point under consideration. 
In Trufant v. Nunneley/12 a testator devised the use 
of two described farms to his son John for life, the use 
of two smaller farms to his daughter Julia for life, and 
the use of farms of equal value to those of Julia to his 
daughter Alice for life. Subject to these life estates, all 
of the farms were devised "to the body heirs of my said 
son and daughters, share and share alike." The will 
further provided that if any child should die without is-
sue before testator's widow, the land devised to that child 
for life should pass to the widow for life, with remainder 
to the body heirs of the children, if any, otherwise to the 
heirs of the wife. A decree holding these dispositions 
valid was reversed with an opinion which stated, 
a12 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895). 
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"In any view of the case, we are satisfied that the will 
cannot be sustained as to these three parcels of land. The 
conditions of this will are such that there is no one who 
can convey so as to cut off future rights of as yet unascer-
tained persons; for, until the death of testator's three 
children, it cannot be ascertained who are the body heirs 
of these three persons. Complainant's body heirs cannot 
be ascertained until his death, and so with the body heirs 
of the ,daughters. So the estate in these lands is tied up 
during the life of the son and two daughters, making 
three lives, and then the remainder over is to the body 
heirs of all the children of the testator. Until all these 
contingencies happen, there is no person or persons in 
whom the estate can vest in fee simple absolute, and 
hence no person in being who could convey. Chapl. Sus-
pen. §127; Kilpatrick v. Barron~ 54 Hun, 322; Graham 
v. Fountain, 2 N.Y. Supp. 598. It follows that the will 
must be held void as affecting the pieces of land de-
scribed, and, as to the remainder in them, they must be 
distributed under the statute." 313 
In Niles v. Mason, 314 a testator devised his entire estate 
to trustees (1) to pay Sarah Niles $12.50 a month until 
her death or marriage; (2) subject thereto, to pay half 
the income to Charles Niles for life and the other half 
to Lottie Niles for life; (3) upon the death of Charles or 
Lottie to pay half the principal to the children of the de-
ceased; (4) if Charles or Lottie die without surviving is-
sue, to pay the entire income to the other for life and the 
313 106 Mich. 554 at 560-561. Kilpatrick v. Barron, 54 Hun. 322 
(1889), affd., 125 N.Y. 751, 26 N.E. 925 (1891) .and Graham v. Foun-
tain, 2 N.Y. Supp. 598 (1888), cited by the Court, did not involve sus-
pension of the absolute power of alienation beyond two lives. These 
cases held merely that a future interest limited to a class which might 
include unborn persons could not be cut off by persons in being. 
314 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. llOO (1901). As pointed out above (Part 
Three, note 228 supra), this will would have been fully valid in New 
York because the annuity of Sarah was a charge on principal, alien· 
able, and did not suspend the absolute power of alienation for her 
life. Hence, under the New York analysis, there was suspension only 
for the lives of Charles and Lottie. 
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entire principal to his children at death; (5) if both 
Charles and Lottie die without surviving issue, remaind-
er to Charles Niles in fee. It was held that these disposi-
tions suspended the absolute power of alienation for 
three lives, those of Sarah, Charles, and Lottie, and that, 
except as to the annuity of Sarah, they were void. 
In Foster v. Stevens,315 land was devised to trustees to 
pay the rents, profits and income to the testator's widow 
and two sons "during their natural lives and the natural 
life of either of them." A later clause directed that, upon 
the death of the sons, the land should descend to their 
heirs. The Court assumed that, if the trust was to last 
for the life of the survivor of the widow and sons, it 
would suspend the absolute power of alienation for three 
lives but construed the will as providing that the trust 
should cease upon the death of the survivor of the sons, 
even if the widow was still alive. As so construed the 
trust was, of course, valid. 
In Root v. Snyder, 316 Root conveyed land to Frantz as 
trustee to convey to Root, Susan Snyder, Jared Snyder, 
and Flora Snyder, "as joint tenants and to their heirs and 
assigns, and to the survivors or survivor of them, and the 
heirs and assigns of the survivors or survivor of them," 
which Frantz did by a deed which contained the same 
language in the granting clause but the habendum of 
which was, "to them as joint tenants and not as tenants 
in common, and to their heirs and assigns forever." Sub-
315 146 Mich. 131, 109 N.W. 265 (1906). The Court cited People's 
Trust Co. v. Flynn, 106 App. Div. 78, 94 N.Y. Supp. 436 (1905), which 
reached a contrary result on the construction problem, but sought to 
distinguish it on the ground that the Foster will made other provision 
for the widow. Mrs. Foster died before the litigation was commenced 
by one of the sons against the other and the trustee. 
316 161 Mich. 200, 126 N.W. 206 (1910). Compare Trufant v. 
Nunneley, 106 Mich. 554, 64 N.W. 469 (1895), Part Three, note 
312 supra. 
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sequently Root sued to set aside these deeds on the 
ground, inter alia, that they limited interests to the heirs 
of the survivor of four persons and so suspended the ab-
solute power of alienation for four lives. The Court re-
jected this contention, holding that the deeds created an 
ordinary joint tenancy in fee; that the heirs of the sur-
vivor took by descent and not by purchase. This being 
so, the entire title was held by four living persons and 
there was no suspension of the absolute power of alien-
ation.317 
Truitt v. City of Battle Creek 318 involved a series of 
conveyances of land. On April 13, 1903, Robertson, who 
owned in fee, executed a life lease to Beauregard and 
wife. On the same day Robertson conveyed the fee, sub-
ject to the Beauregard lease, to Melbourne Truitt, and 
Truitt and the Beauregards joined in a mortgage of the 
fee to Welch. On July 24, 1903, Melbourne Truitt con-
veyed the fee, subject to the Beauregard lease, to Louise 
Truitt. On the following day Louise Truitt conveyed to 
Melbourne Truitt for life, remainder to his heirs. The 
Welch mortgage was foreclosed and the land purchased 
at foreclosure sale by Onen, who conveyed the fee to 
Melbourne Truitt in 1910. Louise Truitt then quit-
s11 After this decision, Susan and Jared Snyder died, Root conveyed 
an undivided half of the land to Jones, Root died, and Jones sued 
Flora Snyder for partition. The Court then held that the deeds 
created a joint tenancy for life, with a contingent remainder to the 
survivor in fee which could not be cut off by Root's conveyance. 
Hence Flora Snyder acquired the entire fee on the death of Root. 
Jones v. Snyder, 218 Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922). Although this 
construction was inconsistent with that made in Root v. Snyder, it 
did not involve suspension of the absolute power of alienation be-
cause, under it, the entire fee was held by four living persons who 
could, acting together, convey an absolute fee in possession. On the 
construction problem see Part One, note 167 supra, and Danahey, 
"The Confusing Right of Survivorship," 32 MICH. ST. BAR JL. 14-17 
(Feb. 1953). 
31.8 205 Mich. 180, 171 N.W. 338 (1919), overruled on rehearing, 
208 Mich. 618, 175 N.W. 578 (1920), Part Three, note 60 supra. 
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claimed in fee to Melbourne Truitt, and Melbourne 
brought a suit to quiet title against his own unknown 
heirs. The plaintiff conceding that, if he was a life tenant 
before the mortgage foreclosure, his purchase of the title 
acquired by the foreclosure would not cut off the re-
maindermen, contended that the deed of July 25, 1903, 
was void because it violated the suspension statutes and 
the statute prohibiting more than two successive life 
estates.319 On the original hearing the Supreme Court 
reversed a decree for the plaintiff, saying, 
"The crucial question therefore in the instant case 
is, Did the life lease to Oliver Beauregard and Thersil, 
his wife, create an estate for two lives in being, two life 
estates, or but one? Was its duration measured by two 
lives or by only one, that of the survivor? That the estate 
created was an estate by entirety has been frequently held 
by this court - - -. Each is a tenant by the entirety, and 
the survivor takes the whole estate. The duration of the 
estate is measured by the life of the survivor. It is neither 
shortened nor lengthened by the death of one of the 
parties. It is terminated only by the death of the survi-
vor. Obviously, therefore, the estate created is an estate 
for one life, viz., that of the survivor. See Woolfit v. Pres-
ton} 203 Mich. 502." 32{) 
On rehearing, the original decision was vacated and 
the decree of the trial court quieting title in the plaintiff 
3~9 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §17, Part Three, notes I, 53, supra. 
s2o 205 Mich. 180 at 183-184. In Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 
169 N.W. 838 (1918), Part Three, note 57 supra, land was devised to 
Claudia for life, remainder to Martha and Florence for life, re-
mainder to Helen and Ruth in fee. It was held that this was a valid 
disposition of an undivided half to Claudia for life, remainder to 
Martha for life, remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee, and of the other 
undivided half to Claudia for life, remainder to Florence for life, 
remainder to Helen and Ruth in fee; that is, that the life estates of 
Martha and Florence were in separate shares. The Court was careful 
to hold explicitly that the survivor of Martha and Florence would 
take no interest in the share of the other. 
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in fee affirmed on the ground that the deed of July 25, 
1903, had never been accepted, the court saying, 
"The conclusion we have reached makes it unnecessary 
to determine the effect of the life estate given to Oliver 
Beauregard and wife Thersil. The determination of that 
question being unnecessary, what was said in the orig-
inal opinion on that subject may be considered with-
drawn, and the case will be disposed of on another 
theory." 821 
Despite the express withdrawal of the quoted language 
of the original opinion, its presence in the Reports in-
troduces disturbing elements of confusion into the law. 
As the Court evidently failed to see, the interests in-
volved could not possibly have suspended the absolute 
power of alienation for longer than the life of Melbourne 
Truitt. As none of them was subject to a trust, at Mel-
bourne's death his heirs would certainly be ascertainable 
and able to combine with the Beauregards and the mort-
gagee to convey an absolute fee in possession. Hence the 
only problem presented was whether a conveyance to two 
persons for the life of the survivor creates a single life 
estate or two successive life estates within the meaning of 
the statute prohibiting more than two. It was already 
settled in Michigan that such a conveyance creates a 
single life estate. 822 The statement that such an estate 
is one for a single life has nothing to do with the question 
whether there was a single estate or two and so was wholly 
unnecesary to the decision, even on the theory of the 
original opinion. Even more disturbing than this confu-
sion of two separate questions is the suggestion implicit 
in the original opinion that when the absolute power of 
s21208 Mich. 618 at 619. Both opinions were by Fellows, J. 
a22 Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889), Part Three, 
note 59 supra. 
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alienation of a tract of land is suspended by each of sev-
eral distinct and separate conveyances, the periods of 
suspension effected by each are to be added together and 
invalidity found if the aggregate of these periods exceeds 
the permissible statutory period. The New York deci-
sions clearly negative this suggestion. They hold that the 
statutory period limits only suspension created by a single 
transaction. For example, if an owner in fee creates a 
trust which suspends the absolute power of alienation for 
two lives, retaining the reversion, he may at a later time, 
as a separate transaction, create another trust of the re-
version for two other lives then in being.323 
Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst 324 involved a will 
which (1) directed payment of $75 a month each to two 
nephews and a niece during their lives; (2) directed di-
vision of the remainder of the net income among a son, 
a brother, and two sisters in equal shares; (3) devised to 
the son, when and if he reached 25, half the estate out-
right and the other half charged with payment of the $75 
a month to each nephew and niece and the remainder of 
the net income therefrom to the brothers and sisters and 
the survivor of them during life; (4) if the son died 
under 25 leaving issue, devised half the estate to trustees 
to apply principal and income to the support of the issue 
until 21 or earlier death; principal to the issue at 21; (5) 
if the son died under 25 without issue or with issue which 
a2a New York Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Cary, 191 N.Y. 33, 
83 N.E. 598 (1908); Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 
3rd ed., §139 (1928). Of course, the exercise of a power of appoint-
ment created by the original transaction is not a separate transaction. 
Genet v. Hunt, 113 N.Y. 158, 21 N.E. 91 (1889). 
324 220 Mich. 321, 190 N.W. 250 (1922), Part Three, note 245 
supra. Cf. Burke v. Central Trust Co., 258 Mich. 588, 242 N.W. 
760 (1932), Part Three, notes 248, 285, supra; Gardner v. City National 
Bank & Trust Co., 267 Mich. 270, 255 N.W. 587 (1934), Part Three, 
note 286 supra, in both of which the facts were similar and the result 
the same. 
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failed to reach 21, devised the entire estate to four named 
charitable institutions, subject to the payments specified 
in (3). Provision ( 4) was probably invalid, insofar as it 
purported to create a trust for receipt of the rents and 
profits of lands to last during the minority of unborn 
persons.825 It had, however, been held in Palms v. 
Palms 826 that the invalidity of such a provision did not 
invalidate other dispositions made by the same will. The 
Court decided that provisions (1), (2), and (3) created 
a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of lands to last 
until the death of the survivor of the son, brother, sisters, 
nephews, and niece, and held that such a trust was void 
because it was to last for seven lives. Although this case 
was complicated by the interests of the unborn issue of 
the son, the decision, like those in Dean v. Mumford,321 
Trufant v. Nunneley/ 28 Niles v. Mason/~9 Foster v. Ste-
vens,S80 and Root v. Snyder,331 appears to be based on the 
New York theory that a suspension of the absolute power 
of alienation for the life of the survivor of a group of 
persons is a suspension for as many lives as there are per-
sons in the group.332 
In Allen v. Merrill/ 33 a testator devised the residue of 
his estate to trustees (1) to pay out of income $1,000 per 
year to his wife for life and the balance to his wife and 
five children in equal shares; (2) if any child die, his 
children to receive the income otherwise payable to him, 
325 Part Three, note 283 supra . . But see Part Three, notes 369, 370, 
infra. 
a2s 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), Part Two, note 561 supra. 
327 Part Three, note 311 supra. 
328 Part Three, note 312 supra. 
329 Part Three, note 314 supra. 
330 Part Three, note 315 supra. 
381 Part Three, note 316 supra. 
332 Part Three, note 306 supra. 
333 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923). 
THE STATUTORY PERIOD 593 
or, if none, the other children of the testator; (3) on the 
death of the wife, principal to be distributed to the five 
children, share of any child pre-deceasing the wife to go 
to its issue, if any, otherwise to the surviving children of 
the testator; (4) if the wife predecease the testator or 
elect to take against the will, trustees to distribute within 
five years after the testator's death as provided in (3). 
The wife elected to take against the will. Ten years after 
the testator's death, a creditor of one of his children at-
tached the trust land, and the trustees sued to remove 
the attachment as a cloud on title. A decree for the plain-
tiffs was affirmed in an opinion which rejected the con-
tention of the creditor that the trust was void because it 
suspended the absolute power of alienation beyond two 
lives in being. In this connection the Court said, 
"Under the will the trustees hold the legal estate, for 
they have power to convey and thereby cut off the equit-
able estates or interests of the designated beneficiaries. 
Such holding by the trustees, coupled with the duty, in 
case of sale, to bring the avails to the administration of 
the trust, suspends in law the power of alienation. And 
this brings us to the pivotal question of whether this sus-
pension goes beyond two lives in being. 
"If the widow elected to take under the statute, then 
the will directed the estate to be settled in five years after 
testator's death, by distribution, first, to his children then 
living (one life in being); second, in case of death of any 
of his children, with issue, then to such issue by right of 
representation (two lives in being), and if no issue, then 
to his surviving children. The distributees, so desig-
nated, were all in being at the death of testator. The 
trust was a valid one." 334 
The meaning of this passage is obscure. As the trustee 
was empowered to terminate the trust by distribution at 
334 223 Mich. 467 at 471-472. Per Wiest, C.J. 
594 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
any time after the death of the widow or her earlier elec-
tion to take against the will, neither the trust nor inter-
ests under it could suspend the absolute power of aliena-
tion for longer than the life of the widow .335 If this were 
not so, the trust would be void because it might last for 
a gross term of five years, unconnected with measuring 
lives, and the class of distributees might include persons 
who came into being at any time within five years after 
the death of the testator. 33;; The quoted passage has some-
times been thought to state that suspension of the ab-
solute power of alienation may be measured by the life 
of the survivor of a group of more than two persons on 
the theory that that would be one life.337 If this be its 
meaning, the language is not pertinent to the facts, be-
cause the trust involved in the case was not measured by 
lives at all but by a term in gross. 
Kemp v. Sutton 338 involved a devise of land to the 
testator's widow and three sons and the survivors and sur-
vivor of them, remainder on the death of the survivor to 
the City of Sault Ste. Marie. The Court correctly held 
that the will created no trust and that, because all m-
335 Part Three, notes 185, 200, supra. 
336 The quoted passage appears to construe "surviving" as meaning 
"surviving the testator." See Part Two, notes 251, 253-258, supra. 
Actually, it probably meant "surviving to a time when the trustees 
are authorized to distribute," which would be (1) the death of the 
testator if his wife predeceased him, (2) the death of his widow, or (3) 
the widow's election to take against the will. On either of these con-
structions, the distributees of both income and principal would all 
be in being and ascertained within a life in being at the testator's 
death. If, however, "surviving" ineant "surviving until actual distribu-
tion," the class of distributees might include persons who came into 
being at any time within five years after the testator died. A limitation 
to such a class would, in the absence of destructibility, be void even 
if the trust itself did not suspend the absolute power of alienation 
beyond the widow's life. Part Three, note 78 supra. 
337 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. B, 1154, note 216 (1944), 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.43, note 7 (1952). 
ass 233 Mich. 249, 206 N.W. 366 (1925), Part Three, note 61 supra. 
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terests in the land were limited to ascertained persons in 
being, there was no suspension of the absolute power of 
alienation whatever. The only problem involved was 
whether there was a violation of the statute prohibiting 
more than two successive legal life estates.889 Consistently 
with previous decisions, 840 the Court held that a joint 
estate for the life of the survivor of several persons is a 
single estate, not several successive life estates. In reach-
ing this conclusion, however, the Court used language 
which has sometimes been misunderstood to state that 
the life of the survivor of a group of persons is a single 
life for purposes of the suspension statutes. It said, 
"The life tenants are joint holders. They count as a 
class and in the eye of the law as one life in being. - - -
As was said in Smith's Appeal) 88 Pa. St. 492: 
'It matters not how many lives there may be so that 
the candles are all burning at the same time, for the 
life of the longest liver is but a single life.' 
"See 2 Alexander on Wills, §1158. Such rule was an-
nounced upward of two and a half centuries ago. See 
1 Siderfin, 451.'' 841 
In Felt v. Methodist Educational Advance/42 a testa-
tor devised a farm to his widow for life, remainder to his 
three children, 
s89 Rev. State. 1846, c. 62, §17, Part Three, notes 1, 53, supra. This 
was true also in Truitt v. City of Battle Creek, Part Three, note 318 
supra. 
840 Case v. Green, 78 Mich. 540, 44 N.W. 578 (1889); Part Three, 
note 59 supra; Truitt v. City of Battle Creek, 205 Mich. 180, 171 
N.W. 338 (1919), reversed on other grounds, 208 Mich. 618, 175 N.W. 
578 (1920), Part Three, notes 60, 318, supra; Jones v. Snyder, 218 
Mich. 446, 188 N.W. 505 (1922), Part Three, notes 61, 317, supra. 
841 233 Mich. 249 at 257, 260. Per Wiest, J. As the question at issue 
was not whether there were one or more lives but whether there were 
successive life estates, it is unfortunate that the court chose to discuss 
the problem of whether a period measured by the life of the survivor 
of a group is one or several lives and to cite authorities relating to the 
permissible period of suspension of vesting under the common-law 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
u2 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929), Part Three, note 62 supra. 
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"to have and to hold the same to the said Joseph El-
well, George W. Elwell and Rhody Conant for and dur-
ing the term of their natural lives, - - - the same to be 
equally divided among them if requested by all or either 
of them; and from and immediately after the decease of 
the said Joseph Elwell, George W. Elwell and Rhody 
Conant, or either of them, the share set off to such de-
ceased heir, I give, devise and bequeath to the heirs of 
said deceased heir, for him, her or them and their heirs 
and assigns forever." 
The ultimate remainders were held valid in an opin-
ion stating, "Our later cases hold that the devise of a life 
estate to a class collectively creates an estate for one life 
only, that of the 'longest liver' of the class, and is to be 
so taken in determining the period of suspension of pow-
er of alienation." 343 Although the decision was perfectly 
sound, this statement was inaccurate and unnecessary. 
There were two questions presented, (1) whether the de-
vise created more than two successive legal life estates, 
and (2) whether the remainder interests of the heirs of 
the life tenants suspended the absolute power of aliena-
tion for more than two lives. There was no "devise of a 
life estate to a class collectively;" what was involved was 
a devise of separate life estates in distinct shares, without 
cross-remainders. As to each third of the farm, there was 
a life estate in the widow, a second successive life estate 
in a child, and a remainder in fee tO. the heirs of that 
child. Thus as to any share there were only two succes-
sive life estates and suspension of the absolute power of 
343 247 Mich. 168 at 171, citing Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 
169 N.W. 838 (1918), Part Three, notes 57, 320, supra, Truitt v. City 
of Battle Creek, 205 Mich. 180, 171 N.W. 338 (1919), Part Three, 
notes 60, 318, supra, and Kemp v. Sutton, Part Three, note 338 supra. 
Woolfitt v. Preston disposed of virtually the same problem on the 
theory suggested in the text as correct. 
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alienation for one life, that of the child who was life 
tenant in remainder. 
Bateson v. Bateson 344 was a suit by the settlor to set 
aside a deed on the ground that the trust created thereby 
suspended the absolute power of alienation for more than 
two lives. The deed conveyed land to a trustee (1) to 
pay the net income to the settlor for life; (2) on the 
death of the settlor to transfer an undivided 4jl0 of 
the principal to the settlor's son George or, if George was 
then dead, to George's wife Jennie and son George, Jr. 
or the survivor of them; (3) after the death of the grantor 
to hold an undivided 4jl0 of the principal in trust, pay 
the net income therefrom to the settlor's son Samuel for 
life and, on the death of Samuel, to transfer this 4jl0 of 
the principal to Samuel's wife Hattie and daughters Har-
riet and Dorothy, or the survivors or survivor of them; 
( 4) after the death of the settlor to hold an undivided 
2/10 of the principal in trust, pay the net income to the 
settlor's grandson James for fifteen years, computed from 
the death of the settlor, and, at the expiration of that 
period, to transfer this 2jl0 of the principal to James, 
but if James should die within the fifteen years, to trans-
fer this 2jl 0 of the principal to the wife and children of 
James or the survivors of them. The deed provided that 
if James should die within the fifteen years without sur-
viving wife or children, the trustees should transfer half 
of this 2jl 0 of the principal to George and retain the 
other half in the trust for Samuel. The majority opinion, 
written by Mr. Justice Wiest, the author of the opinions 
in Allen v. Merrill 345 and Kemp v. Sutton/46 stated, 
"The trust deed grant of the 2jl0 interest suspended 
&44 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940), Part Three, note 260 supra. 
845 Part Three, notes 333, 334, supra. 
s46 Part Three, notes 338, 341, supra. 
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the power of alienation during the lifetime of the grantor 
and for 15 years thereafter. The grantor is still living. 
Upon execution of the deed there were no persons in 
being by whom an absolute fee in possession could be 
conveyed. Contingent, subsequent vesting of the title 
upon expiration of the stated period of suspension, de-
pendent upon future and unpredictable events, leaves 
the title beyond disposition by persons in being by whom 
an absolute fee in possession could be conveyed and ren-
ders the grant of the 2/10 interest void under the sta-
tute. 3 Comp. Laws 1929, §§12934, 12935 (Stat. Ann. 
§§26.14, 26.15).-- -. 
"This brings to consideration the question of whether 
the void grant invalidates all the grants. Courts in con-
struing trust deed grants make no fine distinction be-
tween such and testamentary trust devises for the ulti-
mate determinative factors in either instance run along 
like lines and are accorded like consideration. 
"To carry out the directions of the grantor the attor-
ney who prepared the deed of trust had to treat each 
grant separately for they were unlike in purpose and 
scope. Each was separate and consequently severable and 
the valid grants are in no way dependent upon operation 
of the one found invalid. The intention of the grantor 
at the time of the execution of the deed of trust governs, 
and it is clear that he then considered each grant by 
itself and imposed conditions relative to contingent 
devolution not to a class but to persons specifically desig-
nated. True, the three grants were in one instrument, 
but that is of no particular importance upon the ques-
tion of severability. Under the evidence bearing upon 
the grantor's intention at the time of the execution of 
the deed and expressed in the terms of that instrument 
we must hold the grants separate and independent and 
the void one falls alone. 
"The general principle is stated in Chaplin on Sus-
pension of the Power of Alienation (3rd ed.), §528, as 
follows: 
"'Where an instrument contains dispositions some of 
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which are void for undue suspension, or postponement 
of vesting, it does not necessarily follow that all parts of 
the scheme are thereby destroyed. For a distinction is to 
be observed between schemes which were obviously in-
tended to constitute a single entity and must stand or fall 
on their merits as one whole, and those which may be 
separated into wholly independent dispositions. If a 
provision of the former character involves an unlawful 
suspension or postponement, the whole scheme falls to 
the ground, while if the taint of illegality attaches only 
to a wholly independent part of an entire scheme, this 
illegal part may be cut off, and the rest allowed to 
stand.' " 
"And also sections 529 and 530 reading: 
" 'The fact that valid and void limitations are both 
embraced within the terms of a single trust, does not 
constitute any insuperable obstacle in the way of sus-
taining the former while cutting off the latter. 
"'And where an estate is vested in a trustee upon 
several independent and separable trusts, some of which 
are legal, while others are in contravention of the sta-
tute concerning suspension, the estate of the trustee may, 
in accordance with the principles above stated, be up-
held to the extent necessary to enable him to execute 
the valid trusts.' " 
"We hold the trust deed valid, except as to the 2/10 
interest mentioned. The devise of the mentioned 2/10 
interest was 'void in its creation' and title thereto re-
mained vested in plaintiff.'' 347 
Three justices dissented in part in an opinion stating, 
"First, it should be noted that the mere inclusion of 
the 15-year limitation incident to this trust provision 
does not render it invalid, because wholly independent 
of that limitation the period of suspension is measured 
by two lives in being-i.e., the life of plaintiff and that 
of his grandson. - - -
347 294 Mich. 426 at 431, 432-433. These parts of the opinion, other 
than the first paragraph quoted, are set out here because they are a 
sound and valuable discussion of the problem of separability. 
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"Nor am I in accord with that portion of my Brother's 
opinion wherein he holds that 2/lOths interest in the 
corpus of the trust provision for the grandson is void 
in toto. Instead, the provision as to the one-half of this 
2/lOths which upon the death of the grandson will 
forthwith vest in fee in defendant George Bateson (or 
in the surviving wife and children, if any, of the grand-
son), is valid because it does not suspend the power of 
alienation beyond two lives in being." 348 
The minority was correct in stating that the trust for 
the grandson James did not suspend the absolute power 
of alienation for fifteen years in gross. It was bound to 
terminate at or before the death of James. But the mi-
nority view that the limitation of the 1/10 which might, 
on the death of James, be continued in trust for the life 
of Samuel, was void follows the New York theory that 
a trust to last for the life of the survivor of three persons 
suspends the absolute power of alienation for three lives 
and so is void. 
In re Wagar's Estate 349 involved a will which devised 
land to a trustee to pay the income to the testator's widow 
for life and after her death to pay fixed annuities from 
the rents and earnings to three named children and four 
named grandchildren, or the heirs of any who died, until 
the death of the survivor of the three children. The 
only question raised in the litigation was whether the 
widow of one of the children was an heir for this pur-
pose. The parties did not attack the validity of the pro-
vision, and the Court decided the question presented in 
favor of the widow without considering the validity of 
the trust. It is possible that this is, in effect, a decision 
a48 294 Mich. 426 at 433-435. A justice having died, the Court had 
only seven members. 
S49 295 Mich. 463, 295 N.W. 227 (1940), Part Three, notes 249, 255, 
supra. 
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that the duration of a trust for receipt of the rents and 
profits of land may be measured by the life of the sur-
vivor of a group of four persons. It may, however, con-
stitute a ruling that the annuities involved were alien-
able and so did not suspend the absolute power of alien-
ation.350 What is more likely than either of these 
hypotheses is that the validity of the trust was already 
res judicata because of failure to appeaJ from the origi-
nal probate order of distribution. 351 If this is the case, 
the decision has no value whatever as a precedent on the 
question under consideration. 
In Dodge v. Detroit Trust Compan'Y/52 the residue of 
an estate was devised to trustees to form a corporation, 
transfer the property to it in exchange for its stock, and 
hold the stock in trust until the death of the survivor of 
four named persons. The interested parties entered into 
a settlement agreement under a statute authorizing such 
settlements. Later one of them sued to set aside this 
agreement. Counsel for the defendants argued that, 
under the language in Kemp v~ Sutton 353 and Felt v. 
Methodist Educational Advance/54 the life of the sur-
vivor of four persons is one life which might be used to 
measure the duration of a trust under the suspension 
statutes. The Court found it unnecessary to pass upon 
this contention, suggesting that the validity of the trust 
was sufficiently doubtful to warrant a settlement agree-
ment. 
It thus appears that, although there are dicta in five 
opinions which seem to suggest that measurement of 
3so Part Three, note 255 supra. 
351 Snyder v. Potter, 328 Mich. 236, 43 N.W. (2d) 922 (1950). 
352 300 Mich. 575, 2 N.W. (2d) 509 (1942). For the statute authoriz-
ing such settlement agreements, see Part One, note 648 supra. 
353 Part Three, notes 338, 341, supra. 
354 Part Three, notes 342, 343, supra. 
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suspension of the absolute power of alienation by the 
life of the survivor of a group of persons is measurement 
by one life, none of the cases in which these opinions 
were rendered actually involved the problem. 855 In 
every case where the problem was really involved the 
Michigan Supreme Court acted on the theory of the New 
York courts that suspension for the life of the survivor 
of a group of persons is for as many lives as there are 
persons in the group. 8 5!6 What the Court will do in cases 
which arise in the future remains to be seen, but it would 
be hazardous to rely on its departing from the New 
York theory in cases involving the suspension statutes, 
as distinguished from the statutes restricting accumula-
tions and successive life estates. 
(4) Separability 
As was seen in Chapter 17, under both the common-
law Rule Against Perpetuities and the statutes restricting 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation, when one 
interest created by an instrument is void because it may 
effect a suspension for too long a period, other interests 
created by the same instrument may be valid if they are 
separable from the void provision.857 Where, as in New 
355 Toms v. Williams, Part Three, note 308 supra; Truitt v. City 
of Battle Creek, Part Three, note 318 supra; Allen v. Merrill, Part 
Three, note 333 supra; Kemp v. Sutton, Part Three, note 338 supra; 
Felt v. Methodist Educational Advance, Part Three, note 342 supra. 
Cf. Dodge v. Detroit Trust Co., Part Three, note 352, supra. 
356 Dean v. Mumford, Part Three, note 3ll supra; Trufant v. Nun-
ne1ey, Part Three, note 312 supra; Niles v. Mason, Part Three, note 
314 supra; Foster v. Stevens, Part Three, note 315 supra; Root v. 
Snyder, Part Three, note 316 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. 
Herbst, Part Three, note 324 supra; Bateson v. Bateson, Part Three, 
note 344 supra. Cf. In re Wagar's Estate, Part Three, note 349 supra. 
357 Part Two at notes 529-572, supra, and see the discussion of this 
point in the opinion in Bateson v. Bateson, Part Three, note 344 
supra, quoted in the text at Part Three, note 347 supra. 
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York, the period of suspension is restricted to two lives 
in being and suspension for the life of the survivor of 
a group of more than two persons is not permitted, 358 
the doctrine of separability attains a new importance 
because in some situations, although all the interests 
violate the statutes if they are not separable, all may 
be valid if they are. If John Stiles devises land to a 
trustee to apply the rents and profits to the use of John's 
widow for life and then to the use of his five children 
for the life of the survivor, the trust suspends the abso-
lute power of alienation for six lives and is wholly void 
under the New York and, at least the earlier, Michigan 
decisions. If, however, John Stiles devises land to a 
trustee to apply the rents and profits to the use of his 
widow for life and on her death to divide the principal 
into five shares and hold each on trust for the life of one 
of John's children, the trusts for the children are separ-
able and all are valid.359 As to each share, the absolute 
power of alienation is suspended for only two lives, those 
of the widow and one child. The New York courts have 
developed the doctrine of separability elaborately and, 
by means of it, have saved many dispositions which other-
wise would have failed. 360 Although there are fewer cases 
here, Michigan recognizes the doctrine.361 If, as sug-
358 Part Three, note 306 supra. 
359 Wells v. Wells, 88 N.Y. 323 (1882); Vanderpoel v. Loew, 112 
N.Y. 167, 19 N.E. 481 (1889); Oliver v. Wells, 254 N.Y. 451, 173 N.E. 
676 (1930); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~43 (1944). 
300 Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., 
§§140-151 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, ~~33, 39-52 
(1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§25.24-25.27 (1952). 
s61 Dean v. Mumford, 102. Mich. 510, 61 N.W. 7 (1894), Part Three, 
note 311 supra; Mullreed v. Clark, 110 Mich. 229, 68 N.W. 138 
(1896) (devise to wife for life, remainder to James in fee but if James 
die without issue, to Mary and Jane in fee and if either Mary or 
Jane die without heirs, her share to Elizabeth in fee. The wife pre-
deceased the testator, and the shares of Mary and Jane were treated as 
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gested in the preceding paragraph, Michigan still follows 
the New York rule that the absolute power of alienation 
may not be suspended for the life of the survivor of a 
group of more than two persons, the doctrine of separ-
ability may yet be used here to validate all of the pro-
visions of an instrument which would, in its absence, be 
wholly void. 
D. THE RESTRICTED MINORITY PROVISION 
Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, 
vesting may be suspended during the minority of a per-
son who is not in being at the commencement of the 
period but is certain to come into being, if ever, within 
designated lives in being.362 The suspension statutes 
permitted suspension of the absolute power of alienation 
beyond two designated lives in being at the time the 
creating instrument took effect in only one narrow situa-
tion. Section 16 of Chapter 62 of the Revised Statutes 
of 1846 provided, 
"A contingent remainder in fee may be created on a 
prior remainder in fee, to take effect in the event that 
the persons to whom the first remainder is limited shall 
die under the age of twenty-one years, or upon any con-
tingency by which the estate of such persons may be de-
termined before they attain their full age." 363 
separable.); Woolfitt v. Preston, 203 Mich. 502, 169 N.W. 838 (1918), 
Part Three, note 320 supra. See: Blossom v. Anketell, 275 Fed. 947 
(D.C.E.D. Mich. 1921). Cf. Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 N.W. 
llOO (1901), Part Three, note 314 supra; Felt v. Methodist Educational 
Advance, 247 Mich. 168, 225 N.W. 545 (1929), Part Three, note 342 
supra, where the doctrine should have been applied but the limita· 
tions were held valid on another theory; Michigan Trust Co. v. 
Baker, 226 Mich. 72, 196 N.W. 976 (1924), Part Two, note 547 supra. 
See: Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.44 (1952). 
a62 Part Two, notes 31, 101, llO, supra. 
363 Part Three, note 262 supra. The comments of the New York 
revisers on this section are set out in the text at Part Three, note 6 
supra. 
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The extended suspension permitted by this section 
appears to be that effected by the second remainder in 
fee and to be permitted only when the person whose 
minority is to serve as its measure is himself certain to 
come into being within the statutory period and when 
a fee in remainder is first limited to him.364 It should 
be noted that the provision is not limited to situations 
where the person whose minority is to measure the ex-
tended term is not in being when the creating instru-
ment takes effect. That is, it permits suspension for two 
and a fraction lives in being or for two lives in being plus 
the minority of a person not in being. 865 
In Van Gallow v. Brandt,S66 land was devised to the 
testator's sister Mary in fee. The will provided, 
"In case my said sister - - - should die before her hus-
band, I hereby give, bequeath and devise forever the 
premises described in this paragraph five to the chil-
dren of my said sister - - - in equal shares, share and 
share alike, intending thereby that my brother in law 
- - -, husband of my said sister - - -, shall not in any man-
ner whatever participate in my estate; neither as heir of 
his wife or any of his children, and to that end I do 
hereby ordain, and it is my will and intent, that in case 
any one or more of the children of my sister die under 
age and without issue, that his or her surviving brothers 
and sisters shall inherit such respective share of any de-
ceased child to the absolute and complete exclusion of 
its or their father - - -." 
As no trust was created, the only possible suspension 
of the absolute power of alienation was by the limitation 
of future interests to persons not in being. Although at 
the death of the testator Mary was 68 and had eight 
364 Eldred v. Shaw, 112 Mich. 237, 70 N.W. 545 (1897); Chaplin, 
SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§119, 120 (1928). 
365Jd., §121. 
366 168 Mich. 642, 134 N.W. 1018 (1912). 
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children, all of whom were of age, it was possible, in the 
eye of the law, that she might have further children who 
might die under age and without issue after her death. 
The Court held that "in that remote event the limita-
tion would not violate the statute." This decision was 
sound because the ultimate limitation fell squarely into 
the provision of Section 16. All of the children of Mary 
were certain to come into being within a single life in 
being, that of their mother, each took a "prior re-
mainder in fee," and each ultimate remainder in fee was 
limited on a contingency by which the estate of the prior 
remainderman in fee would be determined before he 
attained his full age. 
The language of Section 16 appears to relate only to 
suspension of the absolute power of alienation by future 
interests. Whether Section 16 permits the duration of 
a trust for receipt of the rents and profits of land to be 
prolonged beyond two designated lives in being is a 
much more difficult problem. In Manice v. Manice,S67 
land was devised to trustees (1) to apply the rents and 
profits to the use of the testator's widow for life; (2) at 
her death to divide into shares and apply the rents and 
profits of one share to the use of testator's daughter Mary 
for life; (3) on the death of Mary, to divide her share 
into as many shares as she had children and hold each 
on trust to accumulate the rents and profits during the 
minority of the child and transfer the principal and 
accumulated rents and profits to it at 21; (4) if any child 
of Mary die during minority, to transfer its share to its 
issue, if any, otherwise to the other children of Mary. 
367 43 N.Y. 303 at 374-382 (1871). Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE 
POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§122-124 (1928); PROPERTY RESTATE· 
MENT, App., Ch. A, ~61 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpe-
tuities and Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.17 
(1952). 
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The trusts for accumulation could extend beyond two 
lives in being and during the minority of children of 
Mary who were not in being at the death of the testator. 
Both the trusts and the ultimate limitations were held 
valid. The Court held that Section 37 368 expressly per-
mits trusts for accumulation during the minority of un-
born persons and that the interest of such a person is a 
"prior remainder in fee" within the meaning of Section 
16. This is· not a decision that any other type of trust 
may be measured by the minority of an unborn person. 
In Matter of Trevor,S69 part of the residue of an estate 
was devised to trustees (1) to apply the rents and profits 
to the use of testator's widow for life; (2) on the death of 
the widow to divide the principal into three shares and 
hold each on trust to apply the rents and profits to the 
use of a designated child until it reached a stipulated 
age; (3) if any child died before reaching the stipulated 
age, to divide its share into as many sub-shares as it had 
issue, which sub-shares should then vest indefeasibly in 
such issue; (4) to hold the sub-share of any such issue 
in trust during minority and apply the rents and profits 
to its use. All persons taking interests under these dis-
positions would necessarily be in being and ascertained 
within two designated lives in being, but provision (4) 
contemplated trusts for receipt of the rents and profits 
of land which were not for accumulation and which 
might suspend the absolute power of alienation beyond 
ss8 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §37, Part Two, note 482 supra. 
a69 239 N.Y. 6, 145 N.E. 66 (1924). PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., 
Ch. A, ~62 (1944); Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and 
Accumulations," 6 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §25.17 (1952). Pro-
fessor Whiteside explains this decision on the ground that the 
"trusts" for the issue of the children were not true trusts but mere 
provisions for custody similar to guardianship. Sed quaere. Cf. 
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE PoWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §§125, 
295-303 (1928). 
608 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
two lives in being. Moreover, the "prior remainder in 
fee" of each of the issue was not defeasible. Nevertheless, 
they were held valid. The language of Section 16 does 
not extend to this situation and it is doubtful that the 
Michigan courts would follow the decision.mt 
E. PERIODS IN GROSS 
Under the common-law Rule Against Perpetuities, 
vesting may be suspended during a period in gross of 
twenty-one years or less, either following lives in being 
or unrelated to lives. 311 Of the suspension statutes the 
New York revisers said, "the period of twenty-one years, 
after a life or lives in being, is no longer allowed as an 
absolute term," 372 and Section 15 and 16 373 certainly 
did not permit measurement of a period of suspension of 
the absolute power of alienation by anything except two 
37o Palms v. Palms, 68 Mich. 355, 36 N.W. 419 (1888), Part Three, 
note 284 supra; Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. Herbst, 220 Mich. 321, 
190 N.W. 250 (1922), Part Three, note 324 supra. Cf. Blossom v. 
Anketell, 275 Fed. 947 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1921); PRoPERTY REsTATEMENT, 
App., Ch. B, 1!57 (1944). The statement in this paragraph of the 
Restatement to the effect that, in Niles v. Mason, 126 Mich. 482, 85 
N.W. 1100 (1901), a provision that the share of any grandchild "be 
under the care of the trustee as agent of the grandchild" during 
minority was "sustained" is inaccurate. In that case the provisions 
for the grandchildren were held void. Part Three, notes 238, 314, 
supra. Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 
6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §25.43 (1952). Professor Whiteside 
repeats the statement. 
m Cadell v. Palmer, 1 CI. &: F. 372, 6 Eng. Rep. 956 (1833), Part 
Two, note 35 supra, cited with approval in St. Amour v. Rivard, 2 
Mich. 294 at 297 (1852), Part Two, note 39 supra,· Toms v. Williams, 
41 Mich. 552, 2 N.W. 814 (1879), Part Two, note·ll2 supra; Markham 
v. Hufford, 123 Mich. 505, 82 N.W. 222, 48 L.R.A. 580 (1900), Part 
Two, note 114 supra; In re De Bancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 
N.W. 891, llO A.L.R. 1346 (1937), Part Two, note 115 supra. 
s1.2 Extracts from the Original Reports of the Revisers, 3 N.Y. 
Rev. Stat. (2d ed.) 571-573 (1836), Part Three, note 6 supra. 
373 Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §§15, 16, Part Three, note 262 supra; 
Chaplin, SUSPENSION OF THE POWER OF ALIENATION, 3rd ed., §271 
(1928); PROPERTY RESTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1{64, Ch. B, 1{56 (1944); 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, §§25.18, 25.43 (1952). 
THE STATUTORY PERIOD 609 
lives in being and an actual minority. Hence a future 
estate could not be limited to a class which might in-
crease to include members not theretofore in being dur-
ing a fixed term of years,374 and a trust for receipt of the 
rents and profits of land could not be created to last for 
a term of years,375 or even for a single year.376 
When, under the terms of the instrument creating an 
interest, suspension was to last for the longer of two 
alternative periods, one measured by one or two lives 
in being and the other by a gross term of years, the in-
terest was void. Thus a trust for receipt of the rents and 
profits of land stipulated to continue until the death of 
a named beneficiary and, if that beneficiary died within 
3 74 Farrand v. Petit, 84 Mich. 671, 48 N.W. 156 (1891) (devise of 
land to trustees to hold for 20 years and then convey a quarter to 
the children of each of testator's four children as each grandchild 
came of age; share of any grandchild who died without issue before 
such conveyance to be conveyed to the others); Otis v. Arntz, 198 
Mich. 196, 164 N.W. 498 (1917) (devise of residue on trust for 25 
years, then to grandchildren and issue of deceased grandchildren to be 
ascertained at that time); In re Richards' Estate, 283 Mich. 485, 278 
N.W. 657 (1938) (devise to trustees for 20 years, then to grandchildren 
and issue of deceased grandchildren to be ascertained at that time). 
See: State v. Holmes, 115 Mich. 456, 73 N.W. 548 (1898), Part Three, 
note 88 supra. Cf. Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 467, 194 N.W. 131 
(1923), Part Three, notes 200, 333, supra; In re De Rancourt's Estate, 
279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937), Part Three, note 182 supra. Cf. 
the complementary provision of Rev. Stat. 1846, c. 62, §20, Part 
Three, note 1 supra. 
375 Farrand v. Petit, Part Three, note 374 supra; James E. Scripps 
Corporation v. Parkinson, 186 Mich. 663, 153 N.W. 29 (1915) (devise 
to wife upon trust to apply the rents and profits to her own use until 
October 17, 1864; testator died August 14, 1851, so the period was 
slightly over 13 years); Otis v. Arntz, Part Three, note 374 supra; 
In re Richards' Estate, Part Three, note 374 supra; Loomis v. Laramie, 
286 Mich. 707, 282 N.W. 876 (1938) (20 years). Cf. Fitzgerald v. 
City of Big Rapids, 123 Mich. 281, 82 N.W. 56 (1900), Part Three, 
note 182 supra; Skinner v. Taft, 140 Mich. 282, 103 N.W. 702 (1905), 
Part Three, note 241 supra; Gilkey v. Gilkey, 162 Mich. 664, 127 N.W. 
715 (1910), Part Three, note 200 supra; Allen v. Merrill, 223 Mich. 
467, 194 N.W. 131 (1923), Part Three, notes 200, 333, supra,· In re 
De Rancourt's Estate, 279 Mich. 518, 272 N.W. 891 (1937), Part Three, 
note 182 supra. 
376 De Buck v. Bousson, 295 Mich. 164, 294 N.W. 135 (1940). 
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fourteen years from the date of the creating instrument, 
until the expiration of such fourteen years, was invalid. 377 
On the other hand, when, under the terms of the creat-
ing instrument, suspension could not last beyond the 
shorter of two alternative periods, one measured by 
one or two lives in being and the other by a gross term 
of years, the interest thereby created did not offend the 
suspension statutes.378 In Ward v. Ward/79 a devise to 
trustees to receive the rents and profits for twelve years 
"or until the death after my decease and prior to the 
expiration of said period of 12 years, of two of my chil-
dren who shall survive me" was treated as valid. In 
Young v. Y oung/80 a devise to a trustee to receive the 
rents and profits and pay them over to the testator's two 
children for ten years if they should so long live was 
treated as valid. In Miller v. Curtiss~881 the residue of 
an estate was devised to a trustee to pay the income and 
five per cent of the principal annually to Phyllis Jane 
Russell, and, if she should die before distribution of the 
principal was completed, the remainder was devised to 
her children or, if there were none, to seven named per-
sons. The Court rejected a contention that this trust 
' 
377 Casgrain v. Hammond, 134 Mich. 419, 96 N.W. 510 (1903), Part 
Three, note 213 supra. Accord: Schneiber v. Schneiber, 199 Mich. 
630, 165 N.W. 660 (1917), Part Three, note 213 supra (life of widow 
or 20 years, whichever was longer). 
378 Chaplin, SusPENSION OF THE PowER oF ALIEN·ATION, 3rd ed., §134 
(1928); PROPERTY REsTATEMENT, App., Ch. A, 1!67, Ch. B, 1!56 (1944); 
Whiteside, "Statutory Rules: Perpetuities and Accumulations," 6 
AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, §§25.18, 25.43 (1952). 
379 163 Mich. 570, 128 N.W. 761 (1910), Part Three, note 303 supra. 
Six children survived the testator. 
3so 255 Mich. 173, ~37 N.W. 535, 77 A.L.R. 963 (1931). 
381 328 Mich. 239, 43 N.W. (2d) 834 (1950). Accord: Blossom v. 
Anketell, 275 Fed. 947 (D.C.E.D. Mich. 1921) (until death of Julia 
or expiration of two years, whichever shall soonest occur). 
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suspended the absolute power of alienation for twenty 
years in gross, saying, 
"In any event, the trust cannot continue beyond the 
lifetime of Phyllis Jane Russell. The suspension of the 
power of alienation is not for a period beyond the life-
time of Phyllis Jane Russell; it will be shorter than her 
lifetime if she lives more than 20 years after the death of 
the testator. 
"The trust period is not in gross, but is for the lifetime 
or less than the lifetime of one person, the first and 
direct beneficiary. It is not necessary to examine into 
plaintiff's theories as to the class or classes of remainder-
men. It is of no moment to consider how many of the 
contingent remaindermen may die before the death of 
Phyllis Jane Russell." 382 .. 
It will be recalled that, in Bateson v. Bateson,S83 a 
trust to receive the rents and profits of land and pay 
them to the testator's grandson James for fifteen years 
or until his earlier death was treated by the majority 
of the Court as suspending the absolute power of aliena-
tion for a gross period of fifteen years and so void. This 
view was, of course, unsound and contrary to the pre-
ceding three cases mentioned. A trust which cannot last 
longer than one life in being does not suspend the abso-
lute power of alienation for a term in gross merely be-
cause it may terminate before the expiration of that life. 
Three of the seven justices sitting in Bateson v. Bateson 
dissented on this point. 384 The decision in the later case 
of Miller v. Curtiss was unanimous.385 Insofar as Bateson 
v. Bateson held, contrary to the New York and all other 
Michigan decisions, that the absolute power of alienation 
as2 328 Mich. 239 at 242-243. Per Reid, J. The decision was 
unanimous. 
383 294 Mich. 426, 293 N.W. 705 (1940), Part Three, note 344 supra. 
384 Part Three, note 348 supra. 
385 Part Three, note 381 supra. 
612 PERPETUITIES AND OTHER RESTRAINTS 
could not be suspended for the shorter of two alternative 
periods, one measured by one or two lives and the other 
by a gross term of years, it must be deemed to have been 
overruled sub silentio. 
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416-420 
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Michigan law summarized, 
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ation. 
restraints on termination, 
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trusts for, 414-415 
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62, 195-196 
rule against perpetuities, 
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Easements in, 182 
Equitable Restrictions on, 
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trust, 160 
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History of Law of, 155-162 
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164 
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applicability of Michigan 
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years, applicability of 
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Resale Price Maintenance 
Contracts, 180-194 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
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Reversions, 164 
Right of Entry, 155, 164, 182 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
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Spendthrift Trusts, 208-210, 
229-239, 428, 430 
Statute of Uses, 202 
S u s p e n s i o n of Absolute 
Ownership 
New York statutes, 483 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Transfer by Will, 6, 159 
Trusts. See also: Trusts. 
applicability of Michigan 
statutes, 230-231, 327 
Unique Chattels, 157 
Vesting, 319, 326-327 
applicability of Michigan 
statutes, 327 
Chattels Real. See: Estates for 
Years. 
Child En Ventre Sa Mere, 266, 
297-298, 301, 569, 579 
Children. See also: Class Gifts, 
Vesting. 
Adopted, 310 
Construction of Instruments, 
310 
Claflin v. Claflin, Rule In. See: 
Trusts (Termination). 
Class Gifts, 358-369 
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All or Nothing Rule, 363-
369, 461, 554 
exceptions, 364-365 
relation to rule of conven-
ience, 365-369 
Closing of Class, 361-363 
effect of statutory restric-
tions on estates for life, 
495 
Defined, 358-361 
Effect of Statutory Restric-
tions on Estates for Life, 
495 
Gift to Group Is, 358-359 
Gift to Named Persons Is 
Not, 358 
Opening of Class, 361-362 
Requirement of Survival, 
350-357, 360-361 
Right of Survivorship, 361 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
363-369, 461, 491, 554 
Rule of Convenience, 361-
369 
contrary manifestation of 
intention, 361 
effect of statutory restric-
tions on estates for life, 
495 
exceptions, 362-363 
relation to all or nothing 
rule, 365-369 
Survivorship, 350-357, 360-
361 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation 
class as donee of power, 
520-521 
class as object of power, 
521-522 
class which may include 
members not in being, 
505-506, 554 
class whose members can-
not be ascertained, 506 
rules same as under rule 
against perpetuities, 491 
Unit Rule, 363-369, 461, 554 
exceptions, 364-365 
relation to rule of conven-
ience, 365-369 
Vesting, 362-369, 554 
Commencement of Period. See: 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Commercial Transactions. See: 
Chattels Personal, Restraints 
on Alienation. 
Common Law 
Includes Plantagenet Sta-
tutes, 14-16 
In Force in Michigan, 13-14, 
270 
Common-Law Rule Against Ac-
cumulations. See: Accumu-
lations. 
Common-Law Rule Against 
Perpetuities. See: R u 1 e 
Against Perpetuities. 
Common Recovery. See: Estates 
Tail, Estates for Years. 
Competition, 174, 178, 179, 174-
195 
Computation of Period. See: 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Concurrent Limitations. See: 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Conditional Sale Contract, 170-
171 
Condition 
Nominal, 52-53, llO, 323 
Survival, 350-357 
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Condition Precedent 
Effect of Illegality, 152-153, 
448-449 
Prevents Vesting, 312-313, 
333, 344 
Condition Subsequent. See 
also: Restraints on Aliena-
tion, Right of Entry, Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation, Vesting. 
Enures Only to Benefit of 
Grantor, 142, 262 
Conditional Limitation. See: 
Executory Interests, Expec-
tant Interests. 
Consequences of Invalidity. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Consequences of Violation. 
See: Accumulations, Estates 
for Life (Statutory Restric-
tions on), Rule Against Per-
petuities, Suspension of the 
Absolute Power of Aliena-
tion. 
Construction of Instruments 
Adopted Children, 310 
Death Without Issue, 322, 
326 
Effect of Statutory Restric-
tions on Estates for Life, 
495 
Influence of Rule Against 
Perpetuities, 356-357 
Meaning of "Children," 310 
Meaning of "Heirs," 336-337 
Meaning of "Wife," 573 
Meaning of "Surviving," 351-
353, 583, 594 
Options in Leases, 405-406 
Preference for Early Vesting, 
339, 345, 348, 354 
Restraints on Alienation, 48, 
148 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
356-357 
administrative delays, 307-
308 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation 
administrative delays, 574 
Vesting. See: Vesting. 
Words Which Create Estate 
Tail, 20-21, 30-33 
Contingent Remainder. See: 
Remainder, Vesting. 
Contracts. See also: Land Con-
tract. 
Restraints on Alienation, 
180-195 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
397-398 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 515 
Convenience. See: Rule of Con-
venience. 
Coots Case. See: Rule in In Re 
Coots' Estate. 
Corporate Stock 
Restraints on Alienation, 62, 
195-196 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
408 
Co-Tenancy. See also: Joint 
Tenancy, Tenancy in Com-
mon. 
Restraints on Alienation, 8 
Covenants. See also: Restraints 
on Alienat_ion. 
Chattels Personal, 182-183, 
189 
Creditors 
Access to Equity of Redemp-
tion, 245 
Access to Estates for Life, 112 
Access to Estates for Years, 
ll2, 132, 133 
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Access to Estates in Fee 
Simple, 7, 112 
Access to Estates Tail, 23 
Access to Legal Interests, 7 
Access to Spendthrift Trusts, 
208-209, 230-239, 428, 430-
431 
Access to Trusts, 207, 228-
229, 237 
Bankruptcy, 23, 140, 237 
Estates for Years 
conditions against access, 
131-132 
Michigan statute, 132 
policy considerations, 135-
137 
Power of Appointment, 378-
379 
Uses Designed to Defraud, 
200 
Cy Pres Doctrine 
Charitable Trusts, 449 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
449 
Death Benefit Plan. See: 
Trusts. 
Debentures, 195-196 
Default of Appointment. See: 
Powers. 
Defeasibility 
Restraints on Alienation, 8 
Vesting. See: Vesting. 
Descent. See also: Estates Tail, 
Expectant Interests, Re-
straints on Alienation. 
Michigan Statutes, 66 
Destructibility 
Contingent Remainder, 59, 
101, 262-266, 272, 328-329, 
409 
Estate for Life, 263, 93 
Estate for Years, 112, 113 
Estate Tail. See also: Estates 
Tail. 
interest expectant upon, 
22, 25-26, 36, 280-283 
Executory Interests, 23, 25-
26, 36, 69, 268, 281-282 
Expectant Interests in Chat-
tels, 268 
Expectant Interests Under 
Trusts, 268, 409 
Reversions, 10 I, 281 
Right of Entry, 24 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Spendthrift Trust, 427-431 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Trusts, 268, 409, 426-431, 533-
549, 572, 576. See also: 
Trusts (Restraints on Ter-
mination; Termination). 
Determinable Estate, 139. See 
also: Possibility of Reverter. 
Direction to Accumulate. See: 
Accumulations. 
Direct Restraint on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Disability Plan. See: Trusts. 
Disabling Restraints. See: Re-
straints on Alienation. 
Discretionary Trust, 238 
Dividends. See: Accumulations. 
Division, Restraints On, 81-83 
Doctrine of Worthier Title, 19 
Donative Transactions. See: 
Chattels Personal, Restraints 
on Alienation. 
Donee. See: Chattels Personal, 
Estates Tail, Powers. 
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Donor (of Power), 370 
D o u b I e Possibilities, Rule 
Against. See: Rule in Whitby 
v. Mitchell 
Dower 
Alienability, 140-141, 146-147 
Barrability, 14 7 
Power of Appointment, 379 
Trust Property, 204 
Duration. See: Accumulations, 
Estates for Years, Trusts,· 
Easements 
Chattels Personal, 182 
Do Not Prevent Vesting, 394 
Restraints on Alienation, 8 
Right to Exclusive Posses-
sion, 394-395 
Ecclesiastical Corporations. 
See: Charities, Mortmain. 
Effect of Invalidity. See: Re-
straints on Alienation. 
Effect of Violation. See: Ac-
cumulations, Estates for Life 
(Statutory Restrictions on), 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Election to Take Against Will, 
306 
Employees' Trusts. See: Trusts. 
English Law. See also headings 
for specific legal problems 
and Table of Statutory and 
Constitutional Citations. 
Reception in Michigan, 9-16, 
141, 270 
Engrossing, 17 5-178 
Entails. See: Estates Tail. 
Entirety. See: Estates by the 
Entirety. 
En Ventre Sa Mere. See: Child 
En Ventre Sa Mere. 
Equitable Charge 
Distinguished from Trust, 
559 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 555-
556, 559-560, 566, 567 
Equitable Conversion. See: Sus-
pension of the A b s o 1 u t e 
Power of Alienation. 
Equitable Interests. See also: 
Trusts. 
Contingent Remainders 
destructibility, 142, 267-
268, 409 
rule against perpetuities, 
271 
Equitable Charge 
distinguished from trust, 
559 
suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation, 555-
556, 559-560, 566, 567 
Equity of Redemption 
access by creditors, 245 
alienability, 242, 245-246 
devisability, 245 
estate tail in, 245 
restraints on alienation, 
245-247 
rule against perpetuities, 
407 
suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation, 515 
Estates for Life, 219, 493 
Estates for Years 
restraints- on alienation, 
208-209 
Estates in Fee Simple, 216, 
218, 219 
Estates Tail, 23, 245, 267 
Expectant Interests 
destructibility, 142, 267-
268, 409 
INDEX 691 
rule against perpetuities, 
271, 387 
upon estate tail, 267, 268 
Land Contract Vendee's, 247-
258 
alienability, 248-249 
devisability, 248-249 
heritability, 248 
restraints on alienation, 
59-61, 251-258 
rule against perpetuities, 
407-408 
suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation, 515 
Old Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, 264 
Options, 
restraints on alienation, 
87-90, 153, 167 
rule against perpetuities, 
88-90, 167, 398-407 
suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation, 89, 
401, 513-514 
Origin and History, 198-205, 
240-249 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 
264 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Abso-
lute Power of Alienation. 
Trusts. See: Trusts. 
Equitable Restrictions, 8 
Chattels Personal, 182-183, 
189 
Do Not Prevent Vesting, 394 
Land, 182-183 
Equity of Redemption 
Access by Creditors, 245 
Alienability, 242, 245 
Devisability, 245 
Estate Tail in, 245 
Nature of Interest, 244-246 
Restraints on Alienation, 
245-247 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
407 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 515 
Escheat, 262 
Escrow, 280 
Estates by the Entirety, 8, 65 
Estates for Life 
Access by Creditors, JI2 
Alienability, 6, 91-92 
Changed to Fee, 72, 378-379 
Chattels Personal, 321 
Michigan statutory restric-
tions, 327, 483-484, 494 
·Devisability, 92 
Endless Series of, 99-100, 260, 
264, 272-273 
Entailment, 92 
Equitable, 219, 493 
Forfeiture, 92, 101, 263 
Heritability, 92 
Incidents Fixed, 37-39 
In Estate for Years 
remainder on, Michigan 
statutory restrictions, 
478, 494 
In remainder 
may be vested, 314 
In Uses, 201 
Life Tenant's Power to 
Lease, 516, 527 
Michigan Statutes, 46, 97-98, 
108. 477-478 
Motives for Creating, xi 
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Perpetual Freehold, 99-100, 
260, 264, 272-273 
Pur Autre Vie 
definition, 91 
devisability, 92 
measuring lives, Michigan 
statu tory restrictions, 
478 
remainder expectant upon, 
Michigan statutory re-
strictions, 478, 494, 500-
502 
special occupant, 92 
Remainder Expectant Upon, 
94, 138, 314, 318 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Reversion Expectant Upon, 
94, 138 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
301-302 
Sale of Fee on Petition of 
Life Tenant, llO, 286-287 
Special Limitation, 314, 318 
Special Occupant, 92 
Statutory Restrictions on, 
477-484, 493-503 
applicability to chattels 
personal, 327, 483-484, 
494 
applicability to trusts, 493-
494, 497, 501-502 
beneficial life interest, 
493, 497 
trustee's estate, 493-494, 
501-502 
consequences of violation, 
502-503, 555 
effect on class gift rules, 
495 
enactment, 477-478, 493 
estates pur autre vie 
measuring lives, 4 78 
remainder on, 4 78, 494, 
500-502 
partial repeal, 479, 494, 
503 
purpose, 480-483 
remainder expectant upon 
estate for years, 4 78, 494, 
503 
chattels personal, 327, 
494 
statute still in force, 479, 
494, 503 
repeal, 479 
scope and arrangement of 
discussion of, 490-492 
successive estates for life, 
103, 108-109, 456, 477-
478 
concurrent estates for 
life, 498-501 
more than two, 456, 477-
4 78, 496-500 
persons not in being, 
456, 494-495 
Subject to Estate for Years, 
312 
Tenant's Power to Lease, 
516, 527 
Types of, 91 
Unaffected by Quia Emp-
tores Terrarum, 94 
Unlimited Power to Dispose 
of Fee, 71, 284-285, 372-
373, 378, 529-530 
Estate for Years. See also: In-
teressia Termini. 
Access by Creditors, ll2, 132 
Accumulations 
direction to replace lease, 
432 
royalties under mineral 
lease, 439 
INDEX 
Alienability, 6, 111-112, 117, chattels personal 
693 
118, 132 
Analogies to Bailments, 169 
As Substitute for Mortgage, 
241 
Commencing on Uncertain 
Future Event, 312 
Destructibility, 112, 113, 118, 
125 
Devisability, 6, 112 
Duration 
constitutional limit, 115-
116, 137, 474 
mediaeval situation, 113 
Estate for Life in 
remainder on, Michigan 
s t at u tory restrictions, 
478 
Estates Tail in, 26, 267, 281, 
465 
Executory Interest Cutting 
Off or Following, 312-313 
Expectant Interest Cutting 
Off or Following 312-313 
Expectant Interests in, 116-
117, 267-268, 317, 318-319, 
324-325 
Forfeiture, 112, 118, 125 
Freehold Estate Subject to, 
312-313 
History, 111, 169-170 
Incidents Fixed, 37-38 
In Uses, 201 
Land Contract Vendee's In-
terest, 249, 257 
Life Tenant's Power to 
Create, 516, 527 
Michigan Statutes, 46, 116, 
478 
On Special Limitation, 312-
313 
Remainder Expectant Upon, 
116-117, 138, 312-313, 317 
Michigan statutory re-
strictions, 327, 494 
contingent, 262-263 
Michigan statutory re-
strictions, 474, 478, 
494 
vested, 263, 312-313 
Remainder in, 116, 138-141, 
317 
expectant upon estate pur 
autre vie, Michigan sta-
tutory restrictions, 478 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Reversion Expectant Upon, 
116, 138, 388, 391 
Right of Entry, 391 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See also: Rule Against Per-
petuities. 
endless series of five-year 
terms, 287 
options in leases, 399-406 
Shifting Interest in, 114 
Statute of Uses, 202 
Statutory Restrictions on 
suspension of a b s o 1 u t e 
ownership, 4 78, 508 
Suspension of A b s o I u t e 
Ownership, 478, 508 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 276, 
484 
Trusts. See also: Trusts. 
applicability of Michigan 
statutes, 231 
passive, 216 
Estates in Expectancy. See: Ex· 
pectant Interests. 
Estates in Fee Simple 
Access by Creditors, 7, 112 
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Alienability, 3, 39, 42, 43, 94 
Devisability, 4, 5, 67-68, 143, 
200, 201, 221 
Equitable Estates in, 216, 
218-219 
Estate for Life Changed to, 
72, 378-379, 529-530 
Estates Tail Converted into, 
36, 325 
Expectant Interest Cutting 
Off or Following, 318-319 
Heritability, 66 
Incidents Fixed, 37-39, 44, 
47, 94 
In Uses, 201 
Michigan Statute Recogniz-
ing, 46 
Mortgagor's Interest, 246, 
251 
Remainder Expectant Upon, 
39, 261, 318-319, 324 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Reversion Expectant Upon, 
39, 43, 261, 388 
Sale on Petition of Life Ten-
ant, llO, 286-287 
Subject to Estate for Years, 
312-313 
Estates in Fee Simple Condi-
tional. See: Estates Tail. 
Estates in Joint Tenancy. See: 
Joint Tenancy. 
Estates in Land (Types of), 38, 
46, 273, 323-325 
Estates Pur Autre Vie. See: 
Estates for Life. 
Estates Tail 
Abolished in Michigan, 28-
29, 36, 325, 450 
Access by Creditors, 23 
Alienability, 21-26 
Barrability 
common recovery, 22, 25-
26, 220, 260, 266-267 
fine, 22, 267 
perpetuity, 260 
restraints on, 25, 26, 83 
1331-1472, 21-22, 220 
warranty, 23 
Chattels Personal, 27, 281, 
465 
Converted into Fee Simple, 
28, 36, 325 
Created by De Donis Condi-
tionalibus, 20 
Cy Pres Doctrine, 449 
Descent, 66 
Devisability, 24 
Discontinuance, 24, 83, 139 
Equitable Interests, 23, 245, 
267 
Estate for Life, 93 
Estates for Years, 26, 267, 
281, 465 
Expectant Interest Cutting 
Off or Following, 22-23, 26, 
36, 268, 281-283 
Fee Simple Conditional, 18, 
33, 38 
Forfeiture, 22, 23-24, 200 
How Created, 20-21, 31-33 
Incidents Fixed, 37-39 
In Equity of Redemption, 
245 
Interests Expectant Upon 
destructibility, 22-23, 25-
26, 36, 281-282 
equitable, 268 
rule against perpetuities, 
281-282 
In Uses, 201 . 
Maritagium, 17, 18, 21, 38 
INDEX 695 
Meaning Before De Donis 
Conditionalibus, 28 
Michigan Statutes, 27-30, 325 
New York Statutes, 29 
Not Affected by Quia Emp-
tores Terrarum, 20 
Remainder Expectant Upon, 
20, 22, 25-26, 33-36, 138, 
281-282, 312-315, 318, 325, 
465 
barrability, 22, 25-26, 36, 
281-282 
Restraints on Alienation, 21-
22, 24, 25-26, 83 
Reversion Expectant Upon, 
20, 22-23, 138 
abolished in Michigan, 388 
barrability, 22-23, 25-26 
Roman Law, 21 
Taltarum's Case, 22 
Evidences of Debt (Restraints 
on Alienation), 195-196 
Execution. See: Creditors. 
Executory Devise. See: Execu-
tory Interests. 
Executory Interests 
Alienability, 140-141, 143-
144, 485, 507 
Chattels Personal, 163-164, 
319 
Cutting Off Estate in Fee 
Simple, 318 
Cutting Off or Following 
Estate for Years, 312-313 
Cutting Off or Following 
Estate Tail 
destructibility, 22-23, 25-
26, 36, 281-282 
equitable, 267, 268 
rule against perpetuities, 
281-282 
Defined, 317-319 
Destructibility, 22-23, 25-26, 
36, 69, 268, 281-282 
cutting off or following 
estate tail, 281-282 
Devisability, 141, 143 
Differences Between Remain-
ders and 
abolished in Michigan, 324 
Estate for Years to Com-
mence on Uncertain Fu-
ture Event, 312-313 
Expectant Upon Estate in 
Fee Simple, 318-319 
Future Estates in Michigan, 
323, 325 
Heritability, 141, 143 
Interesse Termini, 317 
Interest Subject to May be 
Vested, 316-317, 343 
Interest Subsequent to, 315, 
317, 320 
In Uses, 201 
May Become Remainder, 
320 
Michigan and New York Sta-
tutes, 69 
Michigan Statutes Convert to 
Remainder, 324-325 
On Failure to Alienate, 69 
Permitted by English Law, 
312 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
317-322, 387 
cutting off or following 
estate tail, 281-282 
generally subject to, 387 
some are exempt from, 
320-321, 330-332 
Shifting, 317-318 
Springing, 317-318 
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Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 504-
516 
Types of, 139, 158, 317-319 
Vesting, 317-332 
certain to become posses-
sory, 320-321, 330-332 
cutting off or following 
estate for years, 312-313 
deferred possession, 319-
323, 330-332, 343 
English law, 319-323 
Michigan law, 326-332 
non-possessory interest, 320 
not contingent, 319-320 
Executory Land Contract. See: 
Land Contract. 
Expectant Interests. See also: 
Executory interests, Interes-
sia Termini, Possibility of 
Reverter, Remainders, Re-
versions, Rights of Entry, 
Trusts. 
Alienability, 8, 140-141, 143, 
275, 393, 485, 507 
Chattels Personal, 155-160, 
163-164, 267-268, 317, 319 
Course of Descent, 141 
Cutting Off Estate in Fee 
Simple, 318-319 
Cutting Off or Following 
Estate for Years, 312-313 
Cutting Off or Following 
Estate Tail, 22-23, 25-26, 
36, 268, 281-282 
Destructibility 
chattels personal, 267-268 
contingent remainders, 59, 
101, 262-266, 272, 273, 
328, 409 
executory interests, 22-23, 
25-26, 36, 69, 268, 281-
282 
expectant upon estate tail, 
22-23, 25-26, 36, 281-282 
interests under trusts, 268, 
409 
Devisability, 141, 143 
Estates for Years, 116-117, 
267-268, 312, 317, 319, 324-
325 
Executory Interest. See: Ex-
ecutory Interests. 
Expectant Upon Estate in 
Fee Simple, 318-319 
Expectant Upon Estate Tail 
destructibility, 22-23, 25-
26, 36, 281-282 
equitable, 267, 268 
rule against perpetuities, 
281-282 
Future Interest (Definition), 
311 
Heritability, 141-143 
Interesse Termini. See: Inter-
essia Termini. 
In Uses, 201 
Michigan Statutory Classifi-
cation, 69, 143, 323-325 
Motives for Creating, xi 
Option, 398 
Perpetuity, 261 
Possibility of Reverter. See: 
Possibility of Reverter. 
Remainder. See: Remainders. 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Reversion. See: Reversions. 
Right of Entry. See: Rights 
of Entry. 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
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Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Trusts. See: Trusts. 
Types of, 69, 138-140, 143, 
157-158, 311-312, 317-319, 
323-325 
Fair Trade Laws, 185-187, 193-
194 
Michigan Statute, 193-194 
Non-Signer Provisions, 185-
187, 193-194 
Family Endowments. See: Per-
petuity. 
Fee Simple. See: Estates in Fee 
Simple. 
Fee Simple Conditional. See: 
Estates Tail. 
Fee Tail. See: Estates Tail. 
Feoffee to Uses. See: Uses. 
Fine. See: Estates Tail. 
Fine for Alienation, 3, 135-136 
Forcible Entry and Detainer, 
133 
Foreclosure, 244 
Forestalling, 174-178 
Forfeiture. See also: Estates for 
Life, Estates for Years, Pos-
sibility of Reverter, Re-
straints on Alienation, Right 
of Entry. 
Attainder of Treason, 200 
Bailee's Interest, 171-172 
Estates for Life, 93, 101, 263 
Estates for Years, 112, 118, 
125 
Estates Tail, 22, 23-24, 200 
Land Contracts, 251-258 
Michigan Statutes, 93 
Part of Estate, 25 
Right of Entry, 140-141, 145 
Future Estates. See: Expectant 
Interests, Executory Interests, 
Interessia Termini, Remain-
ders, Reversions, Trusts. 
Future Interests. See: Expec-
tant Interests, Executory In-
terests, Interessia Termini, 
P o s s i b i l i t y of Reverter, 
Powers, Remainders, Rever-
sions, Rig h t s of E n t r y, 
Trusts. 
Gap in Seisin, 262, 263 
Gavelkind, 66 
General Power. See: Powers. 
Gift. See: Chattels Personal, 
Class Gifts, Powers. 
Gift in Default of Appoint-
ment. See: Powers. 
Graves 
Trust for Care of, 418-419, 
423-425, 447 
Gross Period. See: Accumula-
tions, Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, Suspension of the Abso-
lute Power of Alienation. 
Heirs 
Meaning of Term, 336-337 
Remainder to, 19, 30-31, 43, 
44, 334-338 
Honorary Trusts, 423-425 
Illegal Conditions and Limita-
tions, 152-153, 448-449 
I n c i d en t s of Estates. See: 
Estates for Life, Estates for 
Years, Estates in Fee Simple, 
Estates Tail, Interessia Ter-
mini. 
Incorporeal Interests. See: 
Easements, Profits a Prendre. 
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Indestructible Future Interests. 
See: Destructibility, Rule 
Against Perpetuities, Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation. 
Indestructible T r u s t s. See: 
Trusts. 
Indirect Restraint on Aliena-
tion. See: Restraints on Alie-
nation. 
Ingrossing, 17 5-178 
Injunction. See: Restraints on 
Alienation. 
Insurance. See: Accumulations, 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Insurance Policies 
Issue, Possibility of. See: Pos-
sibility of Issue. 
Joint-Stock Companies. See: 
Corporate Stock. 
Joint Tenancy 
Michigan Statutes, 63, 76, 
323 
Restraints on Partition, 63-
65, 75-80 
Right of Survivorship, 63, 
361, 588 
Right to Partition, 75, 76 
Just Price, 172-174 
Just Wage, 172 
Restraints on Alienation, Knight Service, 5 
195-196 
Interessia Termini 
Alienability, 140, 143 
Defined, 138, 312 
Devisability, 141, 143 
Executory Interest, 317 
Future Estate in Michigan, 
323-325 
Heritability, 141, 143 
Not Strictly on Estate, 138 
Permitted by English Law, 
311-312 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
312, 317-319 
Interest (on Debts), 240-243 
Invalidity, Effect of. See: Ac-
cumulations, Estates for Life 
(Statutory Restrictions on), 
Illegal Conditions and Limi-
tations, Restraints on Aliena-
tion, Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, Suspension of the Abso-
lute Power of Alienation. 
Laissez Faire, 177-180 
Land Contracts 
Contract to Make Will, 74-75 
Dower Barred by Joinder in, 
147 
Forfeiture, 251-258 
Restraints on Alienation, 59-
61, 251-258 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
407-408 
Specific Performance, 247 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 515 
Vendee's Interest, 247-258 
alienability, 248, 252 
devisability, 248 
equitable estate, 251 
estate for years, 249, 257 
heritability, 248 
restraints on alienation, 
59-61, 251-258 
Vendor's Interest 
alienability, 248 
Landlord and Tenant. See: 
Estates for Years. 
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Leases. See: Estates for Years. 
Legacy 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 555 
Lien 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 555-
556 
Life Estate. See: Estates for 
Life. 
Life Insurance. See: Accumu-
lations, Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Livery of Seisin, 247 
Lives. See: Estates for Life, 
H o n o r a r y Trusts, Rule 
Against Perpetuities, Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation. 
Lives in Being. See: R u 1 e 
Against Perpetuities, Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation. 
Married Women 
Accumulations, 215, 437, 549 
Married Women's Act, 57 
Restraints on Alienation, 
206, 426-427 
Maritagium. See: Estates Tail. 
Measuring Lives. See: Estates 
for Life, Honorary Trusts, 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Mercantile System, 175 
Michigan Law. See also head-
ings for specific legal prob-
lems and Table of Statutory 
and Constitutional Citations. 
Statutes 
interpretation, weight of 
New York decisions, 484-
485 
partial adoption of New 
York, xiii 
revision of 1846, ix., 213-
214 
gradual piecemeal re-
peal, xiii 
single act, 493 
Unique, xiii 
Miller - Tydings Amendment. 
See: Restraint of Trade. 
Minority. See: Accumulations, 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Monastic Corporations. See: 
Charities, Mortmain. 
Monopolies, 178, 184 
Moore v. Littel. See: Rule in 
Moore v. Littel. 
Mortgages 
Chattel Mortgages 
assignment by mortgagor, 
170-171 
Dower Barred by Joinder in, 
147 
Equity of Redemption, 244-
247 
access by creditors, 245 
alienability, 242, 245-246 
devisability, 245 
estate tail in, 245 
nature of interest, 245-246 
restraints on alienation, 
245-247 
rule against perpetuities, 
407 
suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation, 515 
Estate for Years as Substitute, 
241 
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Foreclosure, 244 
History of, 240-245 
Michigan Law, 250-251 
Mortgagee's Interest 
alienability, 246 
Mortgagor's Interest. See 
also: Equity of Redemp-
tion. 
alienability, 242, 245-246 
legal under lien theory, 
248, 251 
restraints on alienation, 
245-247 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
407-408 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 515 
Trust Mortgages, 251 
Mortmain (Conveyances in), 
198-199, 410 
Necessaries (Claims for), 209 
Negotiable Instruments 
Restraints on Alienation, 196 
New York Decisions 
Weight in Michigan, 484-485 
New York Statutes. See also 
headings for specific legal 
problems and Table of Statu-
tory and Constitutional Cita-
tions. 
History of 1829 Revised Sta-
tutes, 210 
Partial Adoption in Michi-
gan, xiii 
Remoteness of Vesting, 275, 
276, 480-483, 506-508, 519 
Revisers of, 21 0 
Revision of 1829 
revisers' notes, 480-483 
Notes. See: Promissory Notes. 
Object (Power of Appoint-
ment), 370 
Occupancy, Restrictions on, 61 
Old Rule Against Perpetuities, 
99-100, 264, 272-273 
Options 
Construction, 404-406 
Indirect Restraints on Alien-
ation, 399 
Mortgagee, 246 
Restraints on Alienation, 87-
90, 153, 167 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Se~:. Rule Against Perpe-
tmttes. 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 89, 
401, 513-514 
Partition 
Michigan Statutes, 76, 79 
Restraints on, 63-65, 75-80, 
147-148 
Partnership (Renewal Lease), 
126 
Partnership Shares 
Restraints on Alienation, 
195-196 
Patents, 184 
Payment of Sum in Gross. See: 
Trusts. 
Penalty Restraints. See: Re-
straints on Alienation. 
Pension Plan. See: Trusts. 
Period. See: Accumulations 
Estates ·for Years, Rul~ 
Against Perpetuities, Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation, Trusts. 
Perpetual Freehold, 99-100, 
260, 264, 272-273 
Perpetual Trusts. See: Trusts 
(Duration). 
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Perpetuity. See also: Rule 
Against Perpetuities. 
Charitable Corporation, 260, 
409-410 
Evils of, 259-260 
Indirect Restraint on Aliena-
tion, 259 
Meaning of Term 
estate of ecclesiastical cor-
poration, 260 
indestructible trust, 260 
perpetual freehold, 260 
remote future interest, 260 
unbarrable entail, 260 
Motives for Creating, xii, 
259 
Perpetual Freehold, 99-100, 
260, 264, 272,273 
Purposes of, xii, 259 
Strict Settlement, 19, 265-267 
Types of, xi, 260 
future interests, 260 
restraint on alienation, 260 
unbarrable entail, 260 
Personal Property. See: Chat-
tels Personal, Estates for 
Years. 
Philosophic Realism, xii 
Plats (Michigan Statute), 81 
Political Party (Trust for), 423 
Possession 
Class Gifts 
rule of convenience, 361-
363 
Not Necessary for Vesting of 
Remainder, 313-314, 330 
Right to, as easement, 394-
395 
Whether Required for Vest-
ing of Executory Interest, 
319-320, 330-332, 343 
Possibility of Issue, 309-311, 
491, 573 
Possibility of Reverter 
Alienability, 140-141, 145-
146, 393 
Chattels Personal, 155, 164 
Defined, 139, 146 
Devisability, 141 
Heritability, 141 
Indirect Restraint on Aliena-
tion, 392-393 
Interest Subject to May be 
Vested, 316, 332, 343 
Prevents Development of 
Land,393 
Recognized in Michigan, 146 
Reversion Expectant Upon 
Estate in Fee Simple, 39, 
43, 261, 388 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
389-390 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 514-
515 
Vesting, 317, 332-333, 343, 
388-390 
Posthumous Child 
Michigan Statutes, 297, 570 
Remainder to, 262 
Postponement of Enjoyment. 
See: Trusts. 
Power of Alienation. See: Sus-
pension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Power of Termination. See: 
Right of Entry. 
Powers 
Absolute Power, 378-379, 
491, 530-531 
Definitions, 370, 516-519 
Donee 
defined, 370, 518 
need have no other inter-
est, 375 
Donor defined, 370 
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Dower, 379 
Effect of Non-Exercise, 453 
General and Special Powers 
statutory changes in defi-
nitions, 377-383, 517 
General Powers, 372-377 
definition, 283, 517 
peculiar Michigan defini-
tion, 283, 517 
Interest Subject to May be 
Vested, 316-317, 343, 370 
Life Tenant's Power to Ap-
point Fee, 70-72, 284, 372-
373, 377, 529-530 
Life Tenant's Power to 
Lease, 517, 527 
Michigan Statutes, 377-379, 
516-519, 526-530 
applicability to chattels 
personal, 379, 383 
effect of repeal of suspen-
sion statutes, 386 
Mortgagee's Interest as, 407 
New York Statutes, 378-379, 
518 
Not Interest in Property, 373 
Object Defined, 370 
Overriding, 520-522, 524-526 
Powers Appendant, 379 
Power in Trust, 517, 518 
Release, 517, 520-522, 524-
528 
Revocation, 520-522, 524-525 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Special Powers, 370-372, 374-
375, 385-386, 517, 518 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Testamentary Powers, 370-
372, 374-375, 383-385 
To Appoint Use by Will, 200 
To Change Beneficiary. See: 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Pre-Emptive Provisions. See: 
Restraints on Alienation. 
Presumption of Possibility of 
Issue, 309-311, 491, 573 
Price Fixing, 173-178, 180-194 
Principal and Income. See: Ac-
cumulations, Trusts. 
Prior Limitations. See: Rule 
Against Perpetuities, Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation. 
Privity of Estate, 123 
Probate Order (Res Judicata), 
567, 601 
Profits, Unearned, 172-175 
Profit-Sharing P 1 a n. S e e : 
Trusts. 
Profits a Prendre 
Accumulations 
royalties under mineral 
lease, 439 
Appurtenant, 125 
Divisibility, 118, 149 
Do Not Prevent Vesting, 394 
Indirect Restraints on Alien-
ation, 8 
Prohibited Estates for Life. 
See: Estates for Life. 
Prohibitory Restraints. See: 
Restraints on Alienation. 
Promissory Notes 
Restraints on Alienation, 
195-196 
Public Welfare Trusts, 419 
Pur Autre Vie. See: Estates for 
Life. 
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Quia Emptores Terrarum 
Alienation of Part, 81 
Applicable to Remainder Ex-
pectant Upon Estate Tail, 
20 
Enactment, 3 
Fixed Incidents of Fee 
Simple, 47 
Inapplicable to Estates for 
Life, 94 
Inapplicable to Estates Tail, 
20 
Made Estates in Fee Simple 
Alienable, 3, 6-7, 39, 94 
Principles Basic in Michigan 
Law, 16 
Prohibited Fines for Aliena-
tion, 136 
Prohibited Remainder on 
Fee Simple, 39, 94 
Prohibited Reversion on Fee 
Simple, 39, 44, 261 
Qui Tam Actions, 177 
Racial Restrictions, 61 
Realism, xii 
Reception. See: English Law, 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
Regrating, 175-178 
Release of Power. See: Powers. 
Remainders 
Chattels Personal, 163-164, 
267-268, ·317, 319, 326-327 
expectant upon estate for 
years, Michigan statu-
tory restrictions, 327, 
494 
Contingent. See also: Vest-
ing. 
alienability, 140, 143, 275, 
485, 507 
definition, 262, 312-313, 
326, 343 
destructibility, 59, 101, 
262-266, 272, 273, 328-
329, 409 
equitable, 267, 271, 409 
expectant upon estate for 
years, 262 
statutory restrictions, 
474, 478, 494 
expectant upon freehold 
estate, 262 
implied condition of sur-
vival, 144-145, 351-361 
invalid in thirteenth cen-
tury, 19 
may not suspend absolute 
power of alienation, 506-
513 
person not ascertainable, 
315, 333 
rule in In re Coots' Estate, 
354-356 
trust to preserve, 19, 265-
266 
unborn person, 315 
validity, 19, 138, 262 
Creation of, 261-262, 3ll 
Cutting Off Prior Estate, 261-
262, 324 
Defined, 312, 324-325 
Devisability, 141, 143 
Differences Between Execu-
tory Interests and 
abolished in Michigan, 324 
Equitable 
expectant upon estate tail, 
267, 268 
old rule against perpetui-
ties, 264 
rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 
264 
Estate for Life in, May be 
Vested, 313-314 
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Executed Use, 267 
Executory Interest May Be-
come, 320 
Existed in Thirteenth Cen-
tury, 19, 157 
Expectant Upon Contingent 
Prior Estate, May Be 
Vested, 315 
Expectant Upon Estates for 
Life, 94, 138 
on special limitation, 314, 
318 
pur autre vie 
statutory restrictions, 
4 78, 494, 500-502 
Expectant Upon Estates for 
Years, 116, 138, 312-313, 
317 
chattels personal, statutory 
restrictions, 327, 494 
Michigan statutory restric-
tions, 327, 474, 478, 494, 
503 
present estate, 312-313 
remainder for life, statu-
tory restrictions, 478 
vested, 263, 312-313 
Expectant Upon Estate in 
Fee Simple, 39, 261, 318, 
324 
Expectant Upon Estate in 
Fee Simple Conditional, 
33 
Expectant Upon Estate on 
Special Limitation, 262, 
314, 318, 332-333 
Expectant Upon Estate Pur 
Autre Vie, 
statutory restrictions, 4 78, 
494, 500-502 
Expectant Upon Estate Tail, 
20, 33-36, 138, 325, 465 
destructibility, 22, 25-26, 
36, 281-282 
equitable, 267, 268 
may be vested, 314 
Michigan law, 33-36, 325 
on special limitation, 315, 
318 
rule against perpetuities, 
281-282 
Expectant Upon Executory 
Interest, 315, 317, 320 
Following Gap in Seisin, 262 
Heritability, 141, 143 
In Estates for Years, 116, 138, 
140, 317 
expectant upon estate pur 
autre vie, statutory re-
strictions, 4 78 
In Uses, 201 
Michigan Statutory Defini-
tion, 325 
Permitted by English Law, 
311 
Posthumous Child, 262, 297, 
570 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Subject to Condition Prece-
dent, Not Vested, 313 
Subsequent to Executory In-
terest, ·315, 317, 320 
To Heirs, 19, 30, 43, 44, 325, 
333-338 
Types Permitted, 138, 261-
263 
Unborn Child of Unborn 
Child, 264, 272-273 
Vested 
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alienability, 140, 143 
definition, 326 
destructibility, 101 
estate for life, 314 
expectant upon estate for 
years, 262, 312-313 
subject to charge, 345 
what is, in Michigan, 343 
Vesting, 311-317, 326-356. 
See also: Vesting. 
Rent. See: Accumulations. 
Rents and Profits. See: Trusts. 
Repair Costs. See: Accumula-
tions. 
Resale Price Maintenance. See: 
Restraints on Alienation. 
Res Judicata (Probate Or-
der), 567 
Restraint of Trade, 178-179, 
183-195 
Restraints on Alienation 
Charities, 85-87 
Chattels Personal, 155-197 
bailment, 169-172 
commercial transactions, 
169-197 
Michigan law summar-
ized, 194-195 
resale price maintenance 
contracts, 138-150 
scope of treatment, 195-
197 
corporate stock, 62, 195-
196 
difference between dona-
tive and commercial 
transactions, 161 
donative and testamentary 
transactions, 155, 163-
169 
Michigan law summar-
ized, 168-169 
penalty restraints, 155, 
163-169 
prohibitory restraints, 
165-168 
English law, 155-163, 170-
172, 181-183 
equitable interests, 206-
207. See also: Trusts. 
intangibles, 195-196 
resale price maintenance 
contracts, 180-194 
restraints on intestate suc-
cession, 166 
restraints on testation, 166 
rules apply to, xii 
shares in business enter-
prises, 62, 195-196 
spendthrift trusts, 208-209, 
229-239, 428, 430-431 
Conditions Precedent 
effect of invalid, 152-153, 
448 
Consequences of Invalidity, 
448-449 
Contingent Remainders 
Michigan law summarized, 
153-54 
penalty restraints, 141-143, 
149, 151-153 
prohibitory restraints, 143, 
149, 151-153 
Corporate Stock, 62, 195-196 
Covenant Against Aliena-
tion, 53-54, 55, 62, 65, 107, 
ll7-ll8, ll9, 123-124, 129-
135 
specific enforcement, 112, 
ll3, 120-122, 134-135 
Direct and Indirect Distin-
guished, 7-8 
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Disabling Restraints. See: 
Prohibitory Restraints, 
Distinction Between Prohibi-
tory and P e n a 1 t y Re-
straints, 7-8, 24 
Effect of Invalidity, 448 
Equitable Interests, 94, 198-
258 
cestui que trust's interest, 
97, 205-209, 229-239, 428, 
430-431 
English law, 203-207, 245-
246, 249 
equity of redemption, 245-
247 
estates for years, 208-209 
land contract vendee's in-
terest, 59-61, 252-258 
options, 87-90, 153, 167 
policy considerations, 96-
97 
Equity of Redemption, 245-
247 
Estates for Life, 91-110 
covenant against aliena-
tion, 107 
English law, 93-96 
equitable interests, 206-209 
expectant estates, 150, 154 
Michigan law summarized, 
109-110 
penalty restraints, 94-107 
prohibitory restraints, 93-
94, 99-106, 109-110 
tortious alienation, 94, 104 
Estates for Years, 111-13 7 
covenant against aliena-
tion, 117-118, 119, 123-
124, 129-134 
enforcement by injunc-
tion, 120-122, 135 
English law, 112-115 
equitable interests, 206-209 
expectant estates, 153-154 
Michigan law summarized, 
134-135 
penalty restraints, 42, 113-
137 
policy considerations, 134-
137 
prohibitory restraints, 112-
113, 120-123, 125, 134-
135 
Estates in Fee Simple, 37-90, 
488 
contract to make will, 73-
75 
covenant against aliena-
tion, 53-55, 62, 65 
English law, 37-46, 65-69, 
75, 81, 83-85, 87-88 
equitable estates, 206-207, 
208 
expectant estates, 148-154 
in conveyance to charity, 
84-87, 239-240 
Michigan law summarized, 
65 
penalty restraints 
against all alienation, 
40-41, 48-49, 53-54, 62, 
65 
limited as to alienees, 
41-42, 45-46, 59-61, 65 
limited in duration, 45, 
46,.48, 50-51, 55-57, 65, 
488 
pre-emptive options, 87-90, 
153, 167, 399 
prohibitory restraints, 39-
40, 49-52, 58-59, 65, 260, 
488 
restraints on division, 81-
83 
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restraints on inheritance, 
65-69, 166 
restraints on partition, 63-
65, 75-80, 147-148 
restraints on testation, 67-
75, 166 
tortious alienation, 83 
Estates Tail, 25-26, 83 
Executory Interests 
Michigan law summarized, 
154 
penalty restraints, 141-143, 
149, 151-154 
prohibitory restraints, 141-
143, 149, 151-154 
Expectant Interests, 138-154 
English law, 141-142 
equitable, 209 
Michigan law summarized, 
153-154 
penalty restraints, 143, 148-
154 
prohibitory restraints, 143, 
148-154 
Gifts to Charity, 84-87, 239-
240 
Illegal is Void, 448 
Indirect Restraints 
contingent future interests, 
8 
co-tenancy, 8 
defeasibility, 8 
easements, 8 
equitable use restrictions, 
8 
future interests, 8 
interests in unborn per-
sons, 8 
option, 399 
perpetuity, 259 
possibility of reverter, 392-
393 
profits a prendre, 8 
Insurance Policies, 195-196 
lnteressia Termini, 142-143, 
153-154 
Land Contracts, 59-61, 251-
258 
Legal Theory, 41-45, 51-52, 
96-97 
Married Women, 206, 426-
427 
Mortgagor's Interest, 245-247 
Negotiable Instruments, 195-
196 
Not Favored in Michigan, 
48, 148 
Options, 87-90, 153, 167, 399 
Penalty Restraints. See also: 
Estates in Fee Simple, 
Estates for Life, etc. 
defined, 7, 24 
do not suspend the abso-
lute power of alienation, 
489 
Perpetuity, 260 
Pre-Emptive Options, 87-90, 
153, 167, 399 
Prohibitory Restraints. See 
also: Estates in Fee Simple, 
. Estates for Life, etc. 
defined, 7, 24 
suspend the a b s o I u t e 
power of alienation, 488 
void at common law, 485, 
488 
Purpose of Rules Against, 
xii, xiii, 96-97 
Relation of Rules Against to 
Rule Against Accumula-
tions, xi 
Relation of Rules Against to 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
xi, 489 
Relation of Rules Against to 
Statutes Restricting Sus-
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pension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, xi-
xii, 489-490 
Remainders 
contingent 
Michigan law summar-
ized, 154 
penalty restraints, 142-
142-143, 148-149, 150 
prohibitory restraints, 
142-143, 149, 151-153 
vested 
Michigan law summar-
ized, 154 
penalty restraints, 51, 
142-153, 148-149, 150 
prohibitory restraints, 
51, 143, 148-154 
Resale P r i c e Maintenance 
Contracts, 180-194 
Restraints on Division, 81-83 
Restraints on Inheritance 
and Intestate Succession, 
65-69, 166 
Restraints on Partition, 63-
65, 75-80, 148 
Restraints on Testation, 67-
75, 166 
Restrictions on Occupancy, 
61 
Reversions 
Michigan law summarized, 
154 
penalty restraints, 142-143, 
149-151 
prohibitory restraints, 142-
143, 149-151 
Rules Against Not Super-
seded or Modified by Sta-
tutes Restricting Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation, 488-490 
Scope of Rules Against, xii, 
xiii 
Spendthrift Trusts, 97, 208-
209, 229-240, 428, 430-431, 
488 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation Dis-
tinguished, 9, 488-490 
Suspension Statutes do not 
Validate, 488-490 
Trusts 
by trustee, 203-204, 207-
208, 213, 216-217 
cestuis' interest, 97, 205-
209, 229-240, 428, 430-
431, 488 
penalty restraints, 205-
208,239 
prohibitory restraints, 
97, 205-209, 229-239, 
428, 430-431, 488 
charitable, 84-87 
married women, 206, 426-
427 
spendthrift trusts, 97, 208-
209, 229-240, 428, 430-
431, 488 
Vendee's Interest Under 
Land Contract, 59-61, 251-
258 
Vested Remainders 
Michigan law summarized, 
154 
penalty restraints, 142-143, 
148-153 
prohibitory restraints, 142-
143, 148-153 
Restraint on Division, 81-83 
Restraint on Enjoyment. See: 
Trusts. 
Restraint on Inheritance, 65 
69, 166 
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Restraint on Intestate Succes-
sion, 65-69, 166 
Restraint on Partition, 63-65, 
75-80 
Restraint on Testation, 67-75, 
166 
Restraint on Termination. See: 
Trusts. 
Restricted Minority Provision. 
See: Suspension of the Abso-
lute Power of Alienation. 
Restrictions 
Equitable, 8 
. chattels personal, 182-183, 
189 
does not prevent vesting, 
394 
land, 182, 183 
Estates for Life. See: Estates 
for Life. 
Occupancy, 61 
Resubdivision. See: Restraint 
on Division. 
Retailer, 173, 175-176 
Reversions 
Alienability, 140, 143 
Chattels Personal, 164 
Definition, 388 
Destructibility, 101 
Devisability, 141, 143 
Expectant Upon Estates for 
Life, 94, 138 
Expectant Upon Estates for 
Years, ll4-115, 116, 138, 
141, 146, 388, 389, 390 
Expectant Upon Estates in 
Fee Simple, 39, 43, 94, 261, 
388 
Expectant Upon Estates 
Tail, 20-23, 25-26, 138, 388 
Heritability, 141, 143 
Incidents of, 138, 143 
In Estates for Years, 138, 140, 
143, 146 
In Uses, 201 
Michigan Statutory Defini-
tion, 388 
Possibility of Reverter, 139. 
See also: Possibility of Re-
verter. 
Present Estate, 261 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
388-389 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 514-
515 
Tortious Conveyance by Life 
Tenant, 101 
Types of, 138 
Vesting, 261, 388-389 
Waste, 200 
Rights of Action 
Alienability, 140-141, 145-146 
Devisability, 141 
Discontinued Estate, 139 
Heritability, 141 
Rights of Entry 
Alienability, 140-141, 145-146 
Chattels Personal, 155, 164, 
182 
Destructibility by Discontin-
uance, 24 
Devisability, 141 
Estates for Years, 391 
Forfeiture for Alienation, 
140, 145 
Heritability, 141 
Interest Subject to May be 
Vested, 316-317, 343 
Invalidity, Effect of, 448-449 
Of Disseisee, 139, 144-145 
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On Breach of Condition, 
139-141 
Prevent Development of 
Land, 393 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
390-393, 407 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation, 514-
515 
Vesting, 391 
Right of Survivorship. See: 
Class Gifts, Joint Tenancy. 
Royalties, 439 
Rule Against Accumulations. 
See: Accumulations. 
Rule Against Double Possibili-
ties, 99-100, 264, 272-273 
Rule Against Perpetuities 
Accumulations. See also: Ac-
cumulations. 
condition precedent to 
vesting, 433 
Administrative Delays, 307-
309, 346 
All or Nothing Rule, 363-
369, 461 
Applicable to M i c h i g a n 
Land Since 1949, 279 
Applicability to Mixed Dis-
positions of Land and 
Chattels, 276-277 
Certainty of Vesting Re-
quired, 280, 304-357, 572-
573 
absolute c e r t a i n t y re-
quired, 306-311, 572-573 
accumulations, 433 
administrative delays, 307-
309, 346 
analogy to suspension sta-
tutes, 491, 532, 572-573 
appointed interests, 376-
386, 532, 575 
ascertainment of measur-
ing lives, 290-293, 581 
class gifts, 358-369 
effect of destructibility, 575 
English law, 304-310 
facts considered in deter-
mmmg, 304-306, 370-
372, 385, 386, 491, 532, 
575 
gift in default of appoint-
ment, 370-372 
power of appointment, 
372-376 
presumption of possibility 
of issue, 491, 309-311, 
573 
unborn widow, 306-307, 
357, 573 
vesting. See also: Vesting. 
accumulations, 433 
when certainty must exist, 
304-306, 575 
Certainty that Power Cannot 
be Exercised so as to Vio-
late, 376 
Certainty that Power Will be 
Exercisable within the Pe-
riod, 372-373 
Certainty that Power will not 
be Exercisable Beyond the 
Period, 374-376 
Charitable Trusts, 218, 409-
423, 447 
Charities 
accumulations, 435, 447 
duration, 422-423 
remoteness of vesting, 409-
412, 418-421 
Class Gifts, 358-369, 461, 554 
all or nothing rule, 363-
369, 461, 554 
rule of convenience, 361-
363 
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rules same under suspen-
sion statutes, 491 
unit rule, 363-369, 461, 554 
vesting, 360-369, 461, 554 
Common-Law Rule Against 
Accumulations. See: Ac-
cumulations. 
Consequences of Violation, 
448-476 
effect on alternative and 
concurrent limitations, 
461-468 
verbally separate contin-
gencies, 462-465 
effect on prior limitations, 
454-460 
may become indefeas-
ible, 452 
not enlarged, 452 
effect on subsequent limi-
tations, 468-476 
excision of violating inter-
est, 280, 448-454 
disposition of property 
involved, 450-451 
prior interest may be-
come indefeasible, 452 
prior interests not en-
larged, 452 
other interests normally 
valid, 450, 453 
separability, 450, 454-476 
alternative and concur-
rent interests, 461-468 
mixed dispositions of 
land and chattels, 276-
277, 465-467 
prior interests, 454-460 
single clause exercising 
power and disposing 
of owned property, 
467 
splitting single contin-
gency, 463 
subsequent interests, 
468-476 
verbally separate contin-
gencies, 462-463 
substantially the same as 
consequences of violat-
ing statutes restricting 
suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation, 
453-454, 516 
violating interest void, 449 
disposition of property 
involved, 450-451 
Cy Pres Doctrine, 449-450 
Destructibility, 280-287, 371, 
372, 379, 531-538, 572, 575 
contrasted with suspension 
statutes, 531-538, 572 
gifts in default of appoint-
ment, 371 
power of revocation, 379 
power to change benefi-
ciary, 283 
Does Not Prohibit Remote-
ness of Possession, 314-315 
Endless Series of Five-Year 
Terms, 287 
English Background, 259-270 
Exceptions 
administrative powers, 387 
charitable limitations, 409-
421 
charitable trusts, 411-421, 
447 
corporate stock, 408 
destructible interests, 282-
287, 371, 372, 379, 532-
538 
devises and bequests to 
municipal corporations, 
413 
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equity of redemption, 407 
executory interests, 320-
321, 330-332 
executory land contracts, 
407-408 
gifts to charitable corpora-
tions, 409-411 
interessia termini, 312, 319 
interests expectant upon 
estates tail, 281-284 
mortgages, 407, 408 
options in leases, 399-407 
possibility of reverter, 389-
390 
public welfare trusts, 419 
remainder expectant upon 
estate for years, 312-313 
right of entry, 390-394, 407 
trusts for care of graves, 
418-419, 424-425 
trusts for employees, 409, 
419 
Executory Interests, 317-323 
Honorary Trusts, 423-425 
Inapplicable to Michigan 
Land, 1847-1949, 89, 275-
276, 327 
Influence on Construction of 
Instruments, 345, 356-357 
In Force in Michigan Before 
1847, 99-100, 270-273 
Interests to Which it Ap-
plies, 387-408 
appointed interests, 387 
beneficial interest under 
private trust, 409 
charitable trusts, 411-421 
contingent remainders, 
272-273, 311-317, 387, 
393 
contracts, 397-398 
corporate stock, 408 
destructible interests, 282-
287, 371, 372, 379, 532-
538 
dispositive powers, 387 
equitable contingent re-
mainders, 271 
equitable future interests, 
271, 387 
equity of redemption, 407 
estates for the life of a liv-
ing person, 301-302 
executory interests, 317-
323, 330-332, 387 
executory land contracts, 
407-408 
expectant interest under 
trust, 271, 279, 387 
expectant upon estate tail, 
280-282 
future interests only, 453-
454, 460, 539 
gift to charitable corpora-
tion, 409-411 
interessia termini, 312, 
317-319 
interests expectant upon 
estates tail, 280-282 
interests in chattels per-
sonal, 276, 387 
interests of a transferor, 
388-396 
mixed dispositions of land 
and chattels, 276-277, 
465-467, 484 
mortgages, 407-408 
options, 88-90, 167, 397-407 
for perpetual renewal of 
lease, 400, 405-407 
in leases, 399-400, 403-
407 
to repurchase, 396 
present interests, 453-454, 
539 
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possibility of reverter, 389-
390 
powers of appointment, 
370, 372-373, 387, 396 
power of revocation, 396 
private interest following 
trust, 409 
public welfare trusts, 419 
remainders, 271-273, 311-
317, 387, 393 
expectant upon estate 
for years, 312-313 
reserved option to repur-
chase, 396 
reserved power of appoint-
ment, 396 
reversions, 261, 388-389 
right of entry, 390-394, 407 
summarized, 387 
trust of land 
direction to convert, 
547, 577 
power of sale, 278 
power of termination, 
548-549 
unissued corporate stock, 
408 
vested interests, 274, 539 
Michigan Statute Restoring, 
279 
Mixed Dispositions of Land 
and Chattels, 276-277, 465-
467, 484 
Old Rule Against Perpetui-
ties, 99-100, 264, 272-273 
Options, 88-90, 167, 397-407 
Period 
commencement, 280-287 
appointed interests, 287, 
376-386, 571-572 
effect of destructibility, 
281-287, 371, 372, 379, 
532-538, 572, 575 
escrow, 280 
general rule, 280-281 
gifts in default of ap-
pointment, 370-372 
life insurance policy, 283 
computation, 287-303 
alternative m e as u r e s, 
302-303 
animal lives, 291, 424 
ascertainment of measur-
ing lives, 290-293 
general, 287-291, 301 
gifts in default of ap-
pointment, 371 
life of child en ventre sa 
mere, 266, 296-298, 
301 
lives in being, 290-395 
lives of descendants of 
Queen Victoria, 292 
minority of unborn per-
son, 298-299 
parts of lives, 294-296 
period of gross, 298-301 
periods of gestation, 266, 
296-298, 301 
permissible number of 
lives, 292-293 
when there are no meas-
uring lives, 298-299 
development, 270-271 
differences from suspen-
sion statutes, 571-572 
extinction of issue, 465 
general, 269-270 
strict settlement, 265-267 
Perpetual Freehold, 99-100, 
264, 272-273 
Postponement of Enjoyment. 
See also: Trusts. 
accumulations, 433-435, 
440-441 
Powers, Administrative, 387 
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Powers of Appointment, 370-
386 
absolute power of disposi-
tion, 491 
appointed interests, 287, 
376-387, 572, 575 
certainty that power can-
not be exercised so as to 
violate, 376 
certainty that power will 
be exercisable within pe-
riod, 372-373 
certainty that power will 
not be exercisable be-
yond period, 374-376 
gifts in default of exercise, 
370-372 
powers themselves, 287, 
372-376, 387 
powers which prevent vio-
lation, 283-287, 370-372, 
376-383 
Power of Revocation, 396 
Presumption of Possibility of 
Issue, 309-311 
Prohibits Remoteness of 
Vesting, 311-315 
Purpose, 269-272, 409 
Reception in Michigan, 270-
279 
Relation to Rule Against Ac-
cumulations, xi, 434 
Relation to Rules Against 
Restraints on Alienation, 
xi, 488-490 
Relation to Statutes Restrict-
ing Suspension of the Ab-
solute Power of Aliena-
tion, xi-xii, 273-278, 453-
454, 485-492 
Remainder, 271-273, 3ll-317, 
387, 393 
Remoteness of Possession 
Not Prohibited, 313-314 
Remoteness of Vesting Pro-
hibited, 314 
Restraints on Enjoyment. 
See also: Trusts. 
accumulations, 433-435, 
440-441 
Rule Against Double Possi-
bilities, 99-100, 264, 272-
273 
Rule in Whitby v. Mi,tchell, 
99-100, 264, 272-273 
Separability. See: Conse-
quences of Violation. 
Shifting Interest in Estate for 
Years, ll4 
Stated, 269, 280 
Statutes Restricting Suspen-
sion of the Absolute Power 
of Alienation Were Substi-
tute for, 453, 490-491 
Strict Settlement, 265-267 
Theory and Operation Dif-
fers from Statutes Restrict-
ing Suspension of the Ab-
solute Power of Aliena-
tion, 453-454, 487-489 
Trusts 
accumulations. See: Ac-
cumulations. 
charitable, 218, 409-423, 
447 
duration. See also: Trusts, 
218, 220-221, 418-419, 
421-431, 454 
accumulations. See: Ac-
cumulations. 
charitable trusts, 418-
419, 422-423 
honorary trusts, 423-425 
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private trusts, 220-221, 
426-431, 454 
public welfare trusts, 
419 
trusts for unincorpo-
rated societies, 425-426 
for care of animals, 423-
425 
for care of graves, 418-419, 
423-425 
for employees, 409, 419 
for political parties, 423-
425 
for promotion of sports, 
423-425 
honorary, 423-425 
of land, 278 
public welfare, 419 
remoteness of vesting, 409-
412, 417-421 
restraints on termination, 
421-431. See also: Trusts, 
honorary trusts, 423-425 
private trusts, 224-226, 
426-431, 434-435, 551-
552. 
trusts for unincorpo-
rated societies, 425-426 
Unborn Widow, 306-307 
Unit Rule, 363-369, 461 
Vesting. See also: Certainty 
of Vesting Required, Vest-
ing. 
Michigan decisions, 1847-
1949, applicable, 327 
Rule in Claflin v. Claflin, 224-
226, 421-431, 434 
Rule in In Re Coots' Estate) 
354, 356 
Rule in Moore v. LiUel, 333-
343 
Rule in Shelley's Case) 19, 
30-31, 43, 44, 325, 333-338 
Rule in Whitby v. Mitchell, 99-
100, 264, 272-273 
Rule of Convenience, 361-363, 
365-369, 494-495 
Sales. See: Chattels Personal. 
Security Transactions. See: 
Land Contracts, Mortgages. 
Seisin. See: Gap in Seisin, 
Right of Entry. 
Separability. See: Rule Against 
Perpetuities, Suspension of 
the Absolute Power of Alie-
nation. 
Servitudes. S e e: Easements, 
E q u i t a b 1 e Restrictions, 
Profits a Prendre. 
Settlement. See: Strict Settle-
ment, Trusts. 
Settlor. See: Trusts. 
Severability. See: Separability. 
Shares of Stock: See: Corporate 
Stock. 
Shelley's Case. See: Rule in 
Shelley's Case. 
Shifting Executory Devise. See: 
Executory Interests. 
Shifting Use. See: Executory 
Interests. 
Sinking Fund. See: Accumula-
tions. 
Societies (Unincorporated) 
Capacity to Hold Legal 
Title, 413 
Trusts for, 413, 425-426 
duration, 425-426 
restraints on termination, 
425-426 
validity, 425-426 
Special Limitation, 139. See 
also: Possibility of Reverter, 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Vesting. 
Estate for Life, 314, 318 
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Estate for Years, 312-313 
Interest Following May be 
Vested, 332-333 
Interest Subject to May be 
Vested, 316-317, 332-333, 
343-344 
Special Occupant, 92 
Special Power. See: Powers. 
Spendthrift Trusts. See: Trusts. 
Sports (Trust for Promotion 
of), 423-424 
Springing Executory Devise. 
See: Executory Interests. 
Springing Use. See: Executory 
Interests. 
Stock. See: Corporate Stock. 
Stock Bonus Plan. See: Trusts. 
Stock Dividends. See: Accumu-
lations. 
Strict Settlement, 19, 265-267 
Subdivision. See: Plats, Re-
straints on Alienation (Re-
straints on Division). 
Subinfeudation, 1-3 
Subsequent Limitations. See: 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Substitution, 1 
Successive Estates for Life. See: 
Estates for Life. 
Summary Proceeding for Pos-
session, 126 
Support, Trusts for, 208-209 
Surviving. See: Construction of 
Instruments. 
Survivor. See: Estates for Life 
(Statutory Restrictions on), 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation (Per-
iod). 
Survivorship 
Class Gifts, 360-361 
When Required, 144-145, 
350-361 
Suspension of Absolute Owner-
ship, 4 78, 483, 508 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation 
Administrative Delays, 573-
574 
Certainty, 572-576 
absolute certainty re-
quired, 572-574 
administrative delays, 573-
574 
analogy to rule against 
perpetuities, 491, 532, 
572-575 
ascertainment of measur-
ing lives, 581-582 
effect of destructibility, 
575-576 
facts considered in deter-
mining, 491, 532, 571-
576 
presumption of possibility 
of issue, 311, 491, 573 
unborn widow, 573 
when certainty must exist, 
575-576 
Charitaole Corporation, 509, 
515-516 
Charitable Trusts, 414-423, 
509, 515-516 
Chattels Personal, 276-277 
Michigan statutes inap-
plicable~ 483-484 
mixed dispositions of land 
and chattels, 276-277, 
465-467, 484 
Class Gifts 
class as donee of power, 
520-521 
class as objects of power, 
521-522 
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charities, 418-419, 515-516, 
569 
class which may include 
members not in being, 
505-506 
class whose members can-
not be ascertained, 505-
506 
rules same as under rule 
against perpetuities, 491 
Consequences of Violating 
Statutes, 448-476, 516 
effect on alternative and 
concurrent limitations, 
461-468, 516 
effect on prior limitations, 
454-460, 516 
effect on subsequent limi-
tations, 468-476, 516 
excision of violating inter-
est, 448-454, 516 
power which violates, 520 
separability. See: Separa-
bility. 
substantially the same as 
consequences of violat-
ing rule against perpe-
tuities, 453-454, 516 
trusts, 554-555 
Destructibility. See: What 
Prevents Suspension. 
Differences between New 
York and Michigan Sta-
tutes, 483-484 
Equitable Conversion, 277-
278, 484, 523-538, 546-548 
Estate for Life of Survivor 
of Four Persons, 107-108, 
594-595 
Estates for Years, 276, 484 
Exceptions to Statutory Re-
strictions on 
alienable contingent fu-
ture interest, 506-513 
devises and bequests to 
municipal corporations, 
413 
infant unable to alienate, 
515 
insane person unable to 
alienate, 515 
land contract, 515 
mortgage, 515 
options, 88-89, 400-407, 
513-514 
personal incapacity to alie-
nate, 515 
possibility of reverter, 514-
515 
reversions, 514-515 
rights of entry, 514-515 
trusts for employees, 409, 
419 
trusts for care of graves, 
418-419, 424-425, 569 
trusts for public welfare 
purposes, 419, 569 
vested legal future inter-
est, 504-506 
Future Interests. See also: 
What Suspends. 
number of prior interests 
not limited, 580 
number of takers not lim-
ited, 580 
number of takers of prior 
interests not limited, 580 
Infant Unable to Alienate, 
515 
Insane Person Unable to 
Alienate, 515 
Interest Which Does Not 
Suspend May be Void as 
Restraint on Alienation, 
577 
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Interest Which Does Not 
Suspend May be Void 
under Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, 577 
Land Contract, 515 
Meaning of the Phrase, 485-
490 
Mixed Property, 276-277, 
465-467, 484 
Mortgage, 515 
Options, 88-89, 400-407, 513-
514 
Period of Permissible Sus-
pension, 570-612 
administrative delays, 573-
574 
alternative measures, 609-
612 
commencement, 571-572 
effect of destructibility, 
532-549, 572-576 
interests created by ex-
ercise of power, 528-
532, 572-576 
settlor also beneficiary 
of trust, 568-569 
d i ££ e r e n c e s from rule 
against perpetuities, 571 
effect of destructibility, 
532-549, 572-576 
interests created by exer-
cise of power, 528-532, 
572-576 
minority of unborn per-
son, 571, 604-608 
periods in gross, 571, 608-
612 
alternative measures, 
609-612 
part of life distin-
guished, 579 
restricted minority pro-
vision, 571, 604-608 
separability, 450, 454-476, 
602-604 
separate conveyances, 590-
.591 
two lives in being, 576-604 
ascertainment of meas-
uring lives, 581-582 
child end ventre sa 
mere, 579 
life of survivor of group, 
I 07-108, 582-602 
lives of animals, 579 
lives of corporations, 579 
lives of persons who take 
no interest, . 579-580 
lives of plants, 579 
parts of lives, 579 
separability, 602-604 
what is a life in being, 
576-580 
Personal Incapacity to Alien-
ate, 515 
Possibility of Reverter, 514-
515 
Powers 
absolute power, 378-380, 
491, 524, 529-531 
interests created by execu-
tion of, 528-532, 571-576 
powers which cause sus-
pension, 516-528 
powers which prevent sus-
pension, 277-278, 504, 
524-528, 532-549 
Present Interest in Trust, 
277, 539 
Public Welfare Trusts, 419 
Purpose of Statutes Restrict-
ing, 4 79-483 
Relation of Statutes Restrict-
ing to Rule Against Perpe-
tuities, xi, xii, 273-278, 
453-454, 485-490 
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Requirement of Certainty. 
See: Certainty. 
Restraints on Alienation Dis-
tinguished, vii, 9, 109, 488-
490 
Reversion, 514-515 
Right of Entry, 514-515 
Scope and Arrangement of 
Discussion of, 490-492 
Separability, 450, 454-476, 
602-604 
alternative and concurrent 
interests, 461-468 
concurrent trusts, 461-462, 
602-604 
may validate all interests, 
602-604 
may validate separable in-
terests, 450, 453-4 76, 602-
604 
mixed disposition of land 
and chattels, 276-277, 
465-467, 484 
parts of single trust, 460 
prior interests, 454-460 
single clause exercising 
power of disposing of 
owned property, 467 
subsequent interests, 468-
476 
Separate Conveyances, 590-
591 
Statutes Restricting, xi, xii, 
89, 108-109, 217, 273-278, 
380, 414, 429, 477-484, 504 
adopted in thirteen states, 
480 
enactment, 4 77 
repeal, 218, 279, 380, 429, 
479 
revisers' notes, 480-483 
Suspension of Vesting Dis-
tinguished, 485-488, 506-
513, 520 
Trusts. See also: What sus-
pends. 
charitable, 414-421, 509, 
515-516, 569 
for care of graves, 418-419, 
424-425, 569 
number of beneficiaries 
not limited, 497, 580 
public welfare trusts, 419, 
569 
Vesting. See also: Vesting. 
rules same as under rule 
against perpetuities, 491 
unvested future interest 
may not suspend, 506-
513 
vested legal interest does 
not suspend, 504-506 
What Prevents Suspension 
destructibility, 532-549, 
572-576 
differences from rule 
against perpetuities, 
532-538 
future interests, 533-538 
trusts, 539-549 
direction to convert, 277-
278, 484, 523, 538, 546-
548 
persons in existence who 
can convey a fee, 506-
507' 510-513 
power of court to order 
sale of fee, 504 
power of sale, 231, 277-278, 
542-546 
power to convert, 542-549 
power to override power, 
520, 522, 524-526 
power to release power, 
520, 522, 524-528 
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power to revoke power, 
520, 522, 524-525 
power to terminate trust, 
548-549 
powers which prevent, 277-
278, 520-528, 530-549 
settlor also beneficiary of 
trust, 568-569 
What Suspends 
administrative delays, 574 
annuities, 555-569 
Michigan law summar-
ized, 567-568 
charities, 414-419, 509, 515-
516 
class gifts, 491, 505, 506, 
554 
conditions precedent, 506-
513 
contingent remainder, 504. 
516 
destructible trusts, 539-549 
equitable charge, 555-556, 
558,560, 566-567 
equity of redemption, 515 
estate for years, 276, 484 
executory interest, 504-516 
indestructible future inter-
ests, 275 454, 504-516 
class which may include 
members not in being, 
505 
corporation not in be-
ing, 504 
contingent interest may 
not, 506-513 
person not in being, 504-
505, 553 
person not presently as-
certainable, 505-506, 
553 
under trusts, 553 
unvested interest may 
not, 506-513 
vested legal interest does 
not, 504-506 
indestructible trusts, 217-
218, 274-275, 277, 429, 
454, 460, 486-487, 549-
569 
annuities, 555-569 
care of graves, 419, 423-
425 
charitable, 414-421, 509, 
515-516 
for payment of a sum in 
gross, 555-569 
for receipt of the rents 
and profits of land, 
277, 539, 550-555 
future interests under, 
506-516, 553 
not anticipated by re-
visers, 486 
present interests under, 
277, 539 
public welfare trusts, 
419 
settlor as beneficiary, 
568-569 
to pay annunities, 555-
569 
to satisfy a charge, 555-
558 
to sell lands for the 
benefit of creditors, 
556, 558 
to sell, mortgage or lease 
for the benefit of lega-
tees, 555-558 
infant's interest does not, 
515 
interests created by exer-
cise of powers, 528-532 
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land contract, 515 
legacy, 555-556 
lien, 555-556 
lunatic's interest, 515 
mortgage, 515 
mixed dispositions of land 
and chattels, 276-277, 
465-467, 484 
options, 88-89, 400-407, 
513-514 
penalty restraints on alien-
ation, 489 
personal incapacity to alie-
nate, 515 
possibility of reverter, 514-
515 
powers which cause sus-
pension, 516-528 
administrative powers, 
522-523 
beneficiaries not in be-
ing or not ascertain-
able, 521-523 
donee not in being or 
not ascertainable, 520-
521 
power to convert, 523 
power to create a trust, 
524-526 
power to sell, lease, 
charge or encumber, 
522-523 
powers which violate 
rule against perpetui-
ties, 519-520 
present interest under 
trust, 277, 454, 539 
prohibitory restraint on 
alienation, 488-489 
reversions, 514-515 
right of entry, 514-515 
unvested future interests, 
275, 506-513 
vested interests, 274-275, 
504-506 
Taltarum's Case. See: Estates 
Tail. 
Taxes. See: Accumulations. 
Tenancy by the Entireties. See: 
Estates by the Entirety. 
Tenancy in Common 
Restraints on Partition, 75-
80 
Right to Partition, 75-76 
Tenant for Years. See: Estates 
for Years. 
Tenants in Chief, 3 
T e r m. See: Accumulations, 
Estates for Years, Trusts, Sus-
pension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Termination. See: Trusts. 
Testamentary Power. See: 
Powers. 
Testation. See: Restraints on 
Alienation, Wills. 
Tortious Conveyances, 26, 83-
84, 94, 101, 104 
Trade. See: Restraint of Trade. 
Trade Associations, 181 
Treason (Effect of Attainder), 
3, 22, 23-24, 200 
Trustee. See: Trusts. 
Trusts 
Access by Creditors, 206-209, 
228-238, 428, 430-431 
Accumulations. See: Accum-
ulations. 
Alienability 
by trustee, 203-204, 207-
208, 213, 216-217, 221-227, 
231-232, 277, 428, 539 
common-law rules, 203-
204, 207-208, 216-217, 
231-232 
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Michigan statutes, 213-
216-217, 221-227, 277, 
428, 539, 550-551 
New York statutes, 213, 
221-222, 428-429, 550-
551 
trusts of chattels per-
sonal, 231-232, 327 
trusts of land, 230-231, 
327 
will, 221 
cestui's interest, 5-6, 205, 
208-209, 212, 216-217, 
220, 227, 230-232, 277, 
380, 428, 485-486, 539, 
543, 550-552, 568 
common-law rules, 5-6, 
205, 208-209, 216, 232 
Michigan statutes, 212, 
220, 227, 230-232, 277, 
380, 429, 485-486, 539, 
543, 550, 568 
New York statutes, 212, 
230, 428, 539, 550 
settlor also beneficiary, 
568-569 
spendthrift trust, 208-
209, 229-240, 428, 430-
431 
trust for support, 208-
209 
trust of chattels per-
sonal, 230-232, 327 
trusts of land, 230-232 
Applicability of Statutory 
Restrictions on Estates for 
Life, 493-494, 497, 501-502 
Beneficiary. See: Cestui que 
Trust. 
Bona Fide Purchaser, 204, 
207-208, 221 
Cestui in Possession, 216 
Cestui Que Trust 
alienability of interest. 
See: Alienability. 
animal, 423 
ascertainability, 409-412, 
417-421 
charitable trust, 412, 
417-421 
definiteness, 417-421 
definition, 203 . 
interest of life beneficiary 
not life e,state, 493-494, 
497 
no limit on number of, 497 
restraints on alienation. 
See: Restraints on Alien-
ation. 
unincorporated . societies, 
425-426 
Charitable. See: Charities. 
Chattels Personal 
applicability of Michigan 
statutes, 230-232, 327 
Definiteness of Beneficiaries, 
417-421 
charitable trusts, 417-421 
public welfare trusts, 419 
trusts for care of graves, 
418-419, 447 
trusts for employees, 409, 
419, 447 
Definiteness of Purpose, 414-
421 .. 
charitable trusts, 414-421 
public welfare trusts, 419 
trusts for care of graves, 
418-419, 447 
Destructibility, 268, 409 426-
431, 532-549, 572, 575-576. 
See also: Termination. 
Device for Creating Expec-
tant Interests in Chattels, 
160 
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Disability and Death Benefit 
Plans, 409, 419, 447 
Discretionary Trust, 238 
Dower, 204 
Duration, 216-221, 421-431, 
434-435, 551-555, 570-612 
accumulations. See: Ac-
cumulations. 
charitable trusts, 218, 422-
423 
honorary trusts, 423-425 
married women, 426-427 
Michigan law summarized, 
428-431 
private trusts, 224-227, 426-
431, 434-435, 551-555, 
570-612 
public welfare trusts, 419 
rule against perpetuities, 
218, 418-419, 421-431, 
454 
suspension of the absolute 
power of alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Abso-
lute Power of Aliena-
tion. 
trusts for care of graves, 
418-419, 423-425 
trusts for employees, 409, 
419 
trusts for unincorporated 
societies, 415, 425-426 
Equitable Charge Distin-
tinguished, 559 
Estates for Life 
applicability of statutory 
restrictions, 493-494, 496, 
501-502 
Estates for Years (passive), 
216 
Estates in, 203 
Estates Tail, 267 
Exceptions to Statute of 
Uses, 5, 202 
Expectant Interests (destruc-
tibility), 268, 409 
For Care of Animals, 423-425 
For Care of Graves, 418-419, 
423-425, 447 
For Employees, 409, 418-419, 
447 
For Religious Societies, 415 
For Support, 208-209 
For Unincorporated So-
cieties, 415, 425-426 
History of, 202-205 
Honorary Trust, 423-425 
Interest of Life Beneficiary 
Not Estate for Life, 493, 
497 
Interest of Trustee May be 
Estate for Life, 493-494, 
501-502 
Michigan Statutes, 210-216, 
228-231, 277, 414, 493-494 
applicability to trusts of 
chattels personal, 230-
231, 327 
New York Statutes, 210-213, 
229-230, 428-429, 551, 557 
Pension Plan, 409, 419, 447 
Perpetuity (indestructible 
trust), 260 
Postponement of Enjoyment, 
216, 224-227, 232-233, 347, 
427-431, 440-441, 443, 551-
552, 563 
Principal and Income. See: 
Accumulations. 
Profit-Sharing Plan, 409, 419, 
447 
Public Welfare Trusts, 419 
Purposes for Which Per-
mitted, 212-215, 218-221, 
414, 549 
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accumulations, 435-437 
charity, 414-421 
definiteness, 416-421 
Michigan statutes, 214-215, 
418-419, 549 
Restraints on Alienation. 
See: Restraints on Aliena-
tion. 
Restraints on Enjoyment. 
See: Postponement of En-
joyment. 
Restraints on Termination, 
224-227, 421-431, 434-435, 
550-552, 563 
accumulations. See: Ac-
cumulations. 
charitable trusts, 218, 
422-423 
honorary trusts, 423-425 
married women, 426-427 
private trusts, 224-227, 426-
431, 434-435, 551-552 
rule against perpetuities, 
218, 418-419, 421-422, 
453-454 
rule in Claflin v. Claflin, 
224-227, 421-431, 434 
spendthrift trusts, 232-235, 
428, 430-431 
trusts for care of graves, 
418-419, 423-425 
trusts for employees, 409, 
419 
trusts for unincorporated 
societies, 415, 425-426 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Rule in Claflin v. Claflin, 
224-227, 421-431, 434 
Separability. See : R u I e 
Against Perpetuities (Con-
sequences of Violation), 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Settlor (also beneficiary), 
568-569 
Spendthrift Trusts, 96-97, 
208-209, 229-239, 428, 429-
431, 488-489 
Michigan law, 229-239, 
429-431 
policy considerations, 238-
239 
termination, 429-431 
Statute of Charitable Uses, 
12 
Statute of Uses, 5, 12, 139, 
201,202 
Stock Bonus Plan, 409, 419, 
447 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Termination, 216, 224-227, 
232-236, 426-431, 434, 550-
552, 563 
accumulations, 434-435, 
443 
English law, 426, 433 
presumption of possibility 
of issue, 309-310 
restraints on. See: Re-
straints on Termination. 
rule in Claflin v. Claflin, 
224-227,421-431,434 
spendthrift trusts, 427-428, 
430-431 
To Preserve Contingent Re-
mainders, 19, 265-266 
Trustee 
alienation by. See: Alien-
ability. 
definition, 203 
devisability of interest, 221 
INDEX 725 
dower in interest, 204 
heritability of interest, 221 
interest may be estate for 
life, 493-494, 501-502 
Trust Mortgages, 251 
Trust Mortgages, 251 
Two Lives in Being. See: Sus-
pension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Two Lives Statutes. See: Estates 
for Life (Statutory Restric-
tions on) , Suspension of the 
Absolute Power of Aliena-
tion, Remainders. 
Unborn Persons. See also: 
Estates for Life, Expectant 
Interests, Rule Against Per-
petuities, Suspension of the 
Absolute Power of Aliena-
tion, Vesting. 
Alienability of Interests, 7 
Unborn Widow, 306-307, 573 
Unique Chattels. See: Chattels 
Personal. 
Unit Rule. See: Class Gifts. 
Use and Occupation. See: Chat-
tels Personal (History of 
Law of). 
Use Restrictions. See: Equit-
able Restrictions. 
Uses 
Alienability, 4, 201 
Alienation by Feoffee to, 200-
201, 203 
Devisability, 201 
Enforcement in Equity, 200-
201 
Estates in, 201, 268 
Expectant Interests in, 201, 
268 
History of, 198-202 
Raised by Bargain and Sale, 
247 
Remaniders in, 267 
Usury. See: Interest. 
Vesting, 311-357 
Accumulation Condition 
Precedent to, 433 
Administrative Delays, 307-
309, 346 
Bearing on Restraints on 
Alienation, 142-143, 149, 
153-154 
Certainty of Enjoyment not 
Necessary to, 314, 343-344 
Certainty of Possession not 
Necessary to, 314, 343-344 
Certainty of Required by 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Charitable Corporations, 
409-411 
Charitable Trusts, 411-421 
Chattels Personal, 319-320, 
326-327 
Class Gifts, 358-369, 554 
Condition Precedent Pre-
vents, 312-313, 333, 344 
Construction of Instruments, 
339, 343-357 
Constructional Preference 
for Early, 339, 345, 348, 
354 
Contingency as to Person or 
Event, 333-343 
Defeasibility Does Not Pre-
vent, 316-317, 343, 344-345, 
349, 363-369 
Easement Does Not Prevent, 
394 
English Law, 311-323 
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executory interests, 317-
323 
remainders, 311-317 
Equitable Restriction Does 
Not Prevent, 394 
Estates for Life, 313-314 
Estates for Years 
suspension of absolute 
ownership, 478, 508 
Executory Interests, 317-332, 
343 
certain to become posses-
sory, 319-321, 330-332 
cutting off or following 
estate for years, 312-313 
deferred possession, 317-
323, 330-332, 343 
English law, 317-323 
Michigan law, 326-332 
non-possessory 
320 
interests, 
not contingent, 319-320 
Gift in Default of Appoint-
ment, 370-372 
Implied Condition of Sur-
vivorship, 144-145, 354-356 
Interest Subsequent to Ex-
ecutory Interest, 315, 317, 
320 
Michigan Law, 323-357 
Michigan Rules Differ from 
Common Law, 154 
Michigan Statutes, 326 
punctuation, 336 
Options, 398 
Possession Not Required for 
Remainder, 313-315, 330 
Possession Required for Ex-
ecutory Interest, 317-323, 
330-333, 343 
Possibility of Reverter, 316-
317, 332-333, 343-344, 389-
390 
Power of Appointment Does 
Not Prevent, 316-317, 343-
344, 370 
Presumption of Possibility of 
Issue, 309-311 
Profit a Prendre Does Not 
Prevent, 394 
Remainder, 311-317, 326-357 
condition precedent pre-
vents, 312-313, 333, 334 
certain to occur, 313 
condition subsequent does 
not prevent, 316-317, 
344-345 
conditional on preceding 
estate terminating in a 
particular manner, 313-
314 
defeasibility does not pre-
vent, 316-317, 343-345 
class gift exception, 363-
365 
deferred possession does 
not prevent, 313-317, 
330, 343 
English law, 311-317 
estate for life, 314 
executory limitation does 
not prevent, 316-317, 
343-344 
expectant upon estate for 
life on special limita-
tion, 314 
expectant upon estate for 
years, 262-263, 312-313 
Michigan statutory re-
quirement, 474, 478 
expectant upon estate tail 
on special limitation, 
315 
heirs of living person, 316, 
333-338 
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Michigan law, 326-357 
summarized, 343 
peculiar class gift rule, 
363-365 
power of appointment 
does not prevent, 316-
317, 343-344, 370 
remainderman not in be-
ing or not ascertainable, 
315-416, 333 
rule in In re Coots' Estate, 
354-356 
rule in Moore v. Littel, 
333-343 
special limitation does not 
prevent, 316-317, 332-
333, 343-344 
subject to charge, 345 
subsequent to executory 
interest, 320 
Remoteness of 
New York statutes, 275-
276, 484 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Reversion, 261, 388-389 
Right of Entry, 316-317, 332-
333, 343-344, 390-391 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See also: Rule Against Per-
petuities. 
Michigan decisions, 1847-
1949, applicable, 327 
rules same under suspen-
sion statutes, 491 
Rule in In re Coots' Estate, 
354-356 
Rule in Moore v. Littel, 333-
343 
Strict Settlement, 265-266 
Subject to Executory Inter-
est, 316-317, 343-344 
S u r v i v o r s h i p (when re-
quired), 350-361 
S u s p e n s i o n of Absolute 
Ownership, 478, 508 
Suspension of Not Suspen-
sion of lh e Absolute Power 
of Alienation, 506-513, 
519-520 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See 
also: Suspension of the Ab-
solute Power of Aliena-
tion. 
rules same as under rule 
against perpetuities, 491 
suspension of vesting not 
suspension of the abso-
lute power of alienation, 
506-513, 519-520 
T r u s t s. S e e a I s o : Rule 
Against Perpetuities. 
cestui's interest 
charitable trust, 411-412 
trustee's estate 
charitable trust, 411-412 
Unborn Widow, 306-307, 573 
Violation, Effect of. See: Ac-
cumulations, Estates for Life 
(Statutory Restrictions on), 
Rule Against Perpetuities, 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. 
Warranty (Barring Entail), 23 
Waste, 93 12 
Wasting Assets. See: Accumula-
tions. 
Whitby v. Mitchell. See: Rule 
in Whitby v. Mitchell 
Wholesaler, 173 
Will Contest (Compromise), 
234 
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Wills 
INDEX 
Accumulations. See: Accum-
ulations. 
Chattels Personal, 6, 159 
Class gifts. See: Class Gifts. 
Construction. '6~e: Construc-
tion of Instfuments. 
Contract to Make, 73-76 
Effective Date, 280, 571-572 
Equity of Redemption, 245 
Estates for Life, 92 
Estates for Years, 6, 111-112 
Estates in Fee Simple, 3-5, 
67 
Estates Tail, 23-24, 67 
Executory Interests, 141, 143 
Expectant Interests, 141, 143 
Interessia Termini, 141, 143 
Land, 3-5, 23-24, 67, 111-112, 
141, 143, 201, 221 
cestui que use, 200, 201 
Michigan statutes, 67, 143 
trustee, 221 
Land Contracts, 248 
Mortgages, 245 
Possibility of Reverter, 141 
Powers. See: Powers. 
Remainders, 141, 143 
Restraints on Testation, 67-
75, 166 
Reversions, 141, 143 
Right of Action, 141 
Rights of Entry, 141 
Rule Against Perpetuities. 
See: Rule Against Perpe-
tuities. 
Statutes, 67, 143 
Suspension of the Absolute 
Power of Alienation. See: 
Suspension of the Abso-
lute Power of Alienation. 
Testamentary Powers, 370-
372, 374-375, 383-386, 530-
531 
Trustee, 221 
Trusts. See: Trusts. 
Uses, 200, 201 
Worthier Title, Doctrine of, 19 
